Part 12 (1/2)
[Ill.u.s.tration]
At daylight on the following morning, January 26th, the s.h.i.+ps began changing their places, the French being then seven or eight miles distant in the south-south-east. At 7 A.M. they were seen to be approaching in line of battle, under a press of sail, heading for the British van. The _Canada_, which had begun at 5 A.M. to tackle her 200-odd fathoms of cable, was obliged to cut, whereby ”we lost the small bower anchor and two cables with one 8-inch and one 9-inch hawsers, which were bent for springs.” The s.h.i.+p had to work to windward to close with the fleet, and was therefore ordered by the Rear-Admiral to keep engaging under way, until 10.50, when a message was sent her to anchor in support of the rear. The action began between 8.30 and 9 A.M., the leading French s.h.i.+p heading for the British van, seemingly with the view of pa.s.sing round and inside it.
Against this attempt Hood's precautions probably were sufficient; but as the enemy's vessel approached, the wind headed her, so that she could only fetch the third s.h.i.+p. The latter, with the vessels ahead and astern, sprung their batteries upon her. ”The crash occasioned by their destructive broadsides was so tremendous on board her that whole pieces of plank were seen flying from her off side, ere she could escape the cool concentrated fire of her determined adversaries.”[111]
She put her helm up, and ran along outside the British line, receiving the first fire of each successive s.h.i.+p. Her movement was imitated by her followers, some keeping off sooner, some later; but de Gra.s.se in his flags.h.i.+p not only came close, but pointed his after yards to the wind,[112] to move the slower. As he ported his helm when leaving the _Barfleur_, this brought these sails aback, keeping him a still longer time before the British s.h.i.+ps thrown to the rear. ”In this he was supported by those s.h.i.+ps which were astern, or immediately ahead of him. During this short but tremendous conflict in that part of the field of battle, nothing whatever could be seen of them for upwards of twenty minutes, save de Gra.s.se's white flag at the main-topgallant masthead of the _Ville de Paris_, gracefully floating above the immense volumes of smoke that enveloped them, or the pennants of those s.h.i.+ps which were occasionally perceptible, when an increase of breeze would waft away the smoke.”[113]
[Ill.u.s.tration]
Though most gallantly done, no such routine manoeuvre as this could shake Hood's solidly a.s.sumed position. The attempt was repeated in the afternoon, but more feebly, and upon the centre and rear only. This also was ineffectual; and Hood was left in triumphant possession of the field. The losses in the several affairs of the two days had been: British, 72 killed, 244 wounded; French, 107 killed, 207 wounded.
Thenceforth the French fleet continued cruising to leeward of the island, approaching almost daily, frequently threatening attack, and occasionally exchanging distant shots; but no serious encounter took place. Interest was centred on Brimstone Hill, where alone on the island the British flag still flew. De Gra.s.se awaited its surrender, flattering himself that the British would be forced then to put to sea, and that his fleet, increased by successive arrivals to thirty-two of the line, would then find an opportunity to crush the man who had outwitted and out-manoeuvred him on January 25th and 26th.
In this hope he was deceived by his own inaptness and his adversary's readiness. Hood was unable to succour Brimstone Hill, for want of troops; the French having landed six thousand men, against which the British twenty-four hundred could effect nothing, either alone or in cooperation with the garrison, which was but twelve hundred strong.
The work capitulated on the 13th of February. De Gra.s.se, who had neglected to keep his s.h.i.+ps provisioned, went next day to Nevis and anch.o.r.ed there to empty the stores.h.i.+ps. That evening Hood called his captains on board, explained his intentions, had them set their watches by his, and at 11 P.M. the cables were cut one by one, lights being left on the buoys, and the fleet silently decamped, pa.s.sing round the north end of St. Kitts, and so towards Antigua. When de Gra.s.se opened his eyes next morning, the British were no longer to be seen. ”Nothing could have been more fortunately executed,” wrote Lord Robert Manners, ”as not one accident happened from it. Taking the whole in one light, though not successful in the point we aimed at, nevertheless it was well conducted, and has given the enemy a pretty severe check; and if you give him half the credit the enemy does, Sir Samuel Hood will stand very high in the public estimation.”
Hood's intention had been to return to Barbados; but on the 25th of February he was joined, to windward of Antigua, by Rodney, who had arrived from England a week earlier, bringing with him twelve s.h.i.+ps of the line. The new Commander-in-Chief endeavoured to cut off de Gra.s.se from Martinique, but the French fleet got in there on the 26th.
Rodney consequently went to Santa Lucia, to refit Hood's s.h.i.+ps, and to prepare for the coming campaign, in which it was understood that the conquest of Jamaica was to be the first object of the allies.
An important condition to their success was the arrival of a great convoy, known to be on its way from Brest to repair the losses which Kempenfelt's raid and subsequent bad weather had inflicted in December. Hood suggested to Rodney to halve the fleet, which then numbered thirty-six of the line, letting one part cruise north of Dominica, between that island and Deseada, while the other guarded the southern approach, between Martinique and Santa Lucia. Rodney, however, was unwilling to do this, and adopted a half-measure,--Hood's division being stationed to windward of the north end of Martinique, reaching only as far north as the lat.i.tude of Dominica, while the center and rear were abreast of the centre and south of Martinique; all in mutual touch by intermediate vessels. It would seem--reading between the lines--that Hood tried to stretch his cruising ground northwards, in pursuance of his own ideas, but Rodney recalled him.
The French convoy consequently pa.s.sed north of Deseada, convoyed by two s.h.i.+ps of the line, and on the 20th of March reached Martinique safely. De Gra.s.se's force was thus raised to thirty-five of the line, including two 50-gun s.h.i.+ps, as against the British thirty-six. At the end of the month Rodney returned to Santa Lucia, and there remained at anchor, vigilantly watching the French fleet in Fort Royal by means of a chain of frigates.
The problem now immediately confronting de Gra.s.se--the first step towards the conquest of Jamaica--was extremely difficult. It was to convoy to Cap Francois the supply vessels essential to his enterprise, besides the merchant fleet bound for France; making in all one hundred and fifty unarmed s.h.i.+ps to be protected by his thirty-five sail of the line, in face of the British thirty-six. The trade-wind being fair, he purposed to skirt the inner northern edge of the Caribbean Sea; by which means he would keep close to a succession of friendly ports, wherein the convoy might find refuge in case of need.
With this plan the French armament put to sea on the 8th of April, 1782. The fact being reported promptly to Rodney, by noon his whole fleet was clear of its anchorage and in pursuit. Then was evident the vital importance of Barrington's conquest of Santa Lucia; for, had the British been at Barbados, the most probable alternative, the French movement not only would have been longer unknown, but pursuit would have started from a hundred miles distant, instead of thirty. If the British had met this disadvantage by cruising before Martinique, they would have encountered the difficulty of keeping their s.h.i.+ps supplied with water and other necessaries, which Santa Lucia afforded. In truth, without in any degree minimizing the faults of the loser, or the merits of the winner, in the exciting week that followed, the opening situation may be said to have represented on either side an acc.u.mulation of neglects or of successes, which at the moment of their occurrence may have seemed individually trivial; a conspicuous warning against the risk incurred by losing single points in the game of war.
De Gra.s.se was tremendously handicapped from the outset by the errors of his predecessors and of himself. That the British had Santa Lucia as their outpost was due not only to Barrington's diligence, but also to d'Estaing's slackness and professional timidity; and it may be questioned whether de Gra.s.se himself had shown a proper understanding of strategic conditions, when he neglected that island in favour of Tobago and St. Kitts. Certainly, Hood had feared for it greatly the year before. That the convoy was there to embarra.s.s his movements, may not have been the fault of the French admiral; but it was greatly and entirely his fault that, of the thirty-six s.h.i.+ps pursuing him, twenty-one represented a force that he might have crushed in detail a few weeks before,--not to mention the similar failure of April, 1781.[114]
Large bodies of s.h.i.+ps commonly will move less rapidly than small. By 2.30 P.M. of the day of starting, Rodney's look-outs had sighted the French fleet; and before sundown it could be seen from the mastheads of the main body. At 6 next morning, April 9th, the enemy, both fleet and convoy, was visible from the deck of the _Barfleur_, the flags.h.i.+p of Hood's division, then in the British van. The French bore north-east, distant four to twelve miles, extending from abreast of the centre of Dominica northwards towards Guadeloupe. The British had gained much during the night, and their centre was now off Dominica to leeward of the enemy's rear, which was becalmed under the island. Some fourteen or fifteen of the French van, having opened out the channel between Dominica and Guadeloupe, felt a fresh trade-wind, from east by north, with which they steered north; and their number was gradually increased as individual s.h.i.+ps, utilising the catspaws, stole clear of the high land of Dominica. Hood's division in like manner, first among the British, got the breeze, and, with eight s.h.i.+ps, the commander of the van stood north in order of battle. To the north-west of him were two French vessels, separated from their consorts and threatened to be cut off (i). These stood boldly down and crossed the head of Hood's column; one pa.s.sing so close to the leading s.h.i.+p, the _Alfred_, that the latter had to bear up to let her pa.s.s. Rodney had hoisted a signal to engage at 6.38 A.M., but had hauled it down almost immediately, and Hood would not fire without orders. These s.h.i.+ps therefore rejoined their main body unharmed. At 8.30 the French hoisted their colours, and shortly afterwards the vessels which had cleared Dominica tacked and stood south, opposite to Hood.
De Gra.s.se now had recognised that he could not escape action, if the convoy kept company. He therefore directed the two 50-gun s.h.i.+ps, _Experiment_ and _Sagittaire_, to accompany it into Guadeloupe, where it arrived safely that day (Position 1, dd); and he decided that the fleet should ply to windward through the channel between Dominica and Guadeloupe, nearly midway in which lies a group of small islands called Les Saintes,--a name at times given to the battle of April 12th. By this course he hoped not only to lead the enemy away from the convoy, but also to throw off pursuit through his superior speed, and so to accomplish his mission unharmed. The French s.h.i.+ps, larger, deeper, and with better lines than their opponents, were naturally better sailers, and it may be inferred that even coppering had not entirely overcome this original disadvantage of the British.
At the very moment of beginning his new policy, however, a subtle temptation a.s.sailed de Gra.s.se irresistibly, in the exposed position of Hood's column (h); and he met it, not by a frank and hearty acceptance of a great opportunity, but by a half-measure. Hood thoroughly crushed, the British fleet became hopelessly inferior to the French; Hood damaged, and it became somewhat inferior: possibly it would be deterred from further pursuit. De Gra.s.se decided for this second course, and ordered part of his fleet to attack. This operation was carried out under the orders of the Marquis de Vaudreuil, the second in command. The s.h.i.+ps engaged in it bore down from the windward, attacked Hood's rear s.h.i.+ps, stood along northward (f) on the weather side of his column at long range, and, having pa.s.sed ahead, tacked (t) in succession and formed again in the rear, (f^2) whence they repeated the same manoeuvre (Positions 1 and 2). Thus a procession of fifteen s.h.i.+ps kept pa.s.sing by eight, describing a continuous curve of elliptical form. They were able to do this because Hood was condemned to a low speed, lest he should draw too far away from the British centre (a) and rear (c), still becalmed under Dominica (Position 2).
The French, having choice of distance, kept at long gunshot, because they were deficient in carronades, of which the British had many.
These guns, of short range but large calibre, were thus rendered useless. Could they have come into play, the French rigging and sails would have suffered severely. This first engagement (Position 1) lasted, by Hood's log, from 9.48 to 10.25 A.M. It was resumed in stronger force (Position 2) at 14 minutes past noon, and continued till 1.45 P.M., when firing ceased for that day; Rodney hauling down the signal for battle at 2. Between the two affairs, which were identical in general character, Hood's column was reinforced, and great part of the British centre also got into action with some of the French main body, though at long range only. ”Except the two rear s.h.i.+ps,” wrote Rodney to Hood that night, ”the others fired at such a distance that I returned none.”
[Ill.u.s.tration]
The injuries to the British s.h.i.+ps engaged were not such as to compel them to leave the fleet. The _Royal Oak_ lost her main topmast, and that of the _Warrior_ fell two days later, not improbably from wounds; but in these was nothing that the ready hands of seamen could not repair so as to continue the chase. Rodney, therefore, contented himself with reversing the order of sailing, putting Hood in the rear, whereby he was able to refit, and yet follow fast enough not to be out of supporting distance. This circ.u.mstance caused Hood's division to be in the rear in the battle of the 12th. One of the French s.h.i.+ps, the _Caton_, 64, had been so injured that de Gra.s.se detached her into Guadeloupe. It must be remembered that a crippled s.h.i.+p in a chased fleet not only embarra.s.ses movement, but may compromise the whole body, if the latter delay to protect it; whereas the chaser keeps between his lame birds and the enemy.
During the night of the 9th the British lay-to for repairs. The next morning they resumed the pursuit, turning to windward after the enemy, but upon the whole losing throughout the 10th and the 11th. At daylight of the 10th the French, by the logs of Hood and Cornwallis, were ”from four to five leagues distant,” ”just in sight from the deck.” During that night, however, the _Zele_, 74, had collided with the _Jason_, 64; and the latter was injured so far as to be compelled to follow the _Caton_ into Guadeloupe. At sunset of that day Rodney signalled a general chase to windward, the effect of which was to enable each s.h.i.+p to do her best according to her captain's judgment during the dark hours. Nevertheless, on the morning of the 11th the French seem again to have gained, for Hood, who, it will be remembered, was now in the rear, notes that at 10 A.M. twenty-two French sail (not all the fleet) could be counted _from the masthead_; Cornwallis, further to windward, could count thirty-three. Troude, a French authority, says that at that time nearly all the French had doubled The Saintes, that is, had got to windward of them, and it looked as though de Gra.s.se might succeed in throwing off his pursuer.
Unluckily, two s.h.i.+ps, the _Magnanime_, 74, and the _Zele_, 74, the latter of which had lost her main topmast, were several miles to leeward of the French main body. It was necessary to delay, or to drop those vessels. Again, trivial circ.u.mstances conspired to further a great disaster, and de Gra.s.se bore down to cover the crippled s.h.i.+ps; so losing much of his hard-won ground, and entailing a further misfortune that night. Rodney hung doggedly on, relying on the chapter of accidents, as one who knows that all things come to him who endures. To be sure, there was not much else he could do; yet he deserves credit for unremitting industry and pluck. During the afternoon, the signals noted in the British logs--to call in all cruisers and for the fleet to close--attest mutely the movement of de Gra.s.se in bearing down,--coming nearer.
[Ill.u.s.tration]
During the night, at 2 A.M. of April 12th, the _Zele_ and de Gra.s.se's flags.h.i.+p, the _Ville de Paris_, 110, crossing on opposite tacks, came into collision. The former lost both foremast and bowsprit. It has been stated by John Paul Jones, who by permission of Congress embarked a few months later on board the French fleet as a volunteer, and doubtless thus heard many personal narratives, that this accident was due to the deficiency of watch-officers in the French navy; the deck of the _Zele_ being in charge of a young ensign, instead of an experienced lieutenant. It was necessary to rid the fleet of the _Zele_ at once, or an action could not be avoided; so a frigate was summoned to tow her, and the two were left to make their way to Guadeloupe, while the others resumed the beat to windward. At 5 A.M.
she and the frigate were again under way, steering for Guadeloupe, to the north-west, making from five to six miles (Position 3, a); but in the interval they had been nearly motionless, and consequently when day broke at 5.30 they were only two leagues from the _Barfleur_, Hood's flags.h.i.+p, which, still in the British rear, was then standing south on the port tack. The body of the French, (Position 3), was at about the same distance as on the previous evening,--ten to fifteen miles,--but the _Ville de Paris_ (c) not more than eight. Just before 6 A.M. Rodney signalled Hood, who was nearest, to chase the _Zele_; and four of the rearmost s.h.i.+ps of the line were detached for that purpose (b). De Gra.s.se, seeing this, signalled his vessels at 6 A.M.
to close the flags.h.i.+p, making all sail; and he himself bore down to the westward (cc'), on the port tack, but running free, to frighten away Rodney's chasers. The British Admiral kept them out until 7 o'clock, by which time de Gra.s.se was fairly committed to his false step. All cruisers were then called in, and the line was closed to one cable.[115] Within an hour were heard the opening guns of the great battle, since known by the names of the 12th of April, or of The Saintes, and, in the French navy, of Dominica. The successive losses of the _Caton_, _Jason_, and _Zele_, with the previous detachment of the two 50-gun s.h.i.+ps with the convoy, had reduced the French numbers from thirty-five to thirty effective vessels. The thirty-six British remained undiminished.
The British appear to have been standing to the south on the port tack at daylight; but, soon after sending out the chasers, Rodney had ordered the line of bearing (from s.h.i.+p to s.h.i.+p) to be north-north-east to south-south-west, evidently in preparation for a close-hauled line of battle on the starboard tack, heading northerly to an east wind.
Somewhat unusually, the wind that morning held at south-east for some time, enabling the British to lie up as high as east-north-east on the starboard tack (Position 3, d), on which they were when the battle joined; and this circ.u.mstance, being very favourable for gaining to windward,--to the eastward,--doubtless led to the annulling of the signal for the line of bearing, half an hour after it was made, and the subst.i.tution for it of the line of battle ahead at one cable. It is to be inferred that Rodney's first purpose was to tack together, thus restoring Hood to the van, his natural station; but the accident of the wind holding to the southward placed the actual van--regularly the rear--most to windward, and rendered it expedient to tack in succession, instead of all together, preserving to the full the opportunity which chance had extended for reaching the enemy. In the engagement, therefore, Hood commanded in the rear, and Rear-Admiral Drake in the van. The wind with the French seems to have been more to the eastward than with the British,--not an unusual circ.u.mstance in the neighbourhood of land.
As Rodney, notwithstanding his haste, had formed line from time to time during the past three days, his fleet was now in good order, and his signals were chiefly confined to keeping it closed. The French, on the other hand, were greatly scattered when their Commander-in-Chief, in an impulse of hasty, unbalanced judgment, abandoned his previous cautious policy and hurried them into action. Some of them were over ten miles to windward of the flags.h.i.+p. Though they crowded sail to rejoin her, there was not time enough for all to take their stations properly, between daylight and 8 A.M., when the firing began. ”Our line of battle was formed under the fire of musketry,”[116] wrote the Marquis de Vaudreuil, the second in command, who, being in the rear of the fleet on this occasion, and consequently among the last to be engaged, had excellent opportunity for observation. At the beginning it was in de Gra.s.se's power to postpone action, until the order should be formed, by holding his wind under short canvas; while the mere sight of his vessels hurrying down for action would have compelled Rodney to call in the s.h.i.+ps chasing the _Zele_, the rescue of which was the sole motive of the French manoeuvre. Instead of this, the French flags.h.i.+p kept off the wind; which precipitated the collision, while at the same time delaying the preparations needed to sustain it.