Part 11 (1/2)
[Footnote 100: Hood himself.]
[Footnote 101: Letters of Lord Hood, p. 32. Navy Records Society. My italics. Concerning the crucial fact of the signal for the line of battle being kept flying continuously until 5.30 P.M., upon which there is a direct contradiction between Hood and the log of the _London_, it is necessary to give the statement of Captain Thomas White, who was present in the action in one of the rear s.h.i.+ps. ”If the _London's_ log, or the log of any other individual s.h.i.+p in the fleet, confirm this statement,” (that Hood was dilatory in obeying the order for close action), ”I shall be induced to fancy that what I that day saw and heard was a mere chimera of the brain, and that what I believed to be the signal for the line was not a union jack, but an _ignis fatuus_ conjured up to mock me.” White and Hood also agree that the signal for the line was rehoisted at 6.30. (White: ”Naval Researches,” London, 1830, p. 45.)]
[Footnote 102: ”Letters of Lord Hood.” Navy Records Society, p. 35.]
CHAPTER XI
NAVAL EVENTS OF 1781 IN EUROPE. DARBY'S RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR, AND THE BATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK
In Europe, during the year 1781, the two leading questions which dominated the action of the belligerents were the protection, or destruction, of commerce, and the attack and defence of Gibraltar. The British Channel Fleet was much inferior to the aggregate sea forces of France and Spain in the waters of Europe; and the Dutch navy also was now hostile. The French government represented to its allies that by concentrating their squadrons near the entrance of the Channel they would control the situation in every point of view; but the Spaniards, intent upon Gibraltar, declined to withdraw their fleet from Cadiz until late in the summer, while the French persisted in keeping their own at Brest. The Channel Fleet was decisively superior to the latter, and inferior to the Spaniards in numbers only.
No relief having been given Gibraltar since Rodney had left it in February, 1780, the question of supplying the fortress became pressing. For this purpose, twenty-eight s.h.i.+ps of the line, under Vice-Admiral George Darby, sailed from St. Helen's on the 13th of March, 1781, with a large convoy. Off Cork a number of victuallers joined, and the whole body then proceeded for Gibraltar, accompanied by five s.h.i.+ps of the line which were destined for the East Indies, as well as by the West India and American ”trade.” These several attachments parted from time to time on the way, and on the 11th of April the main expedition sighted Cape Spartel, on the African coast.
No attempt to intercept it was made by the great Spanish fleet in Cadiz; and on the 12th of April, at noon, the convoy anch.o.r.ed in the Bay of Gibraltar. That night thirteen sail of the transports, under charge of two frigates, slipped out and made their way to Minorca, then a British possession. The British s.h.i.+ps of war continued under way, cruising in the Bay and Gut of Gibraltar.
As the convoy entered, the besiegers opened a tremendous cannonade, which was ineffectual, however, to stop the landing of the stores.
More annoyance was caused by a flotilla of gunboats, specially built for this siege, the peculiar fighting power of which lay in one 26-pounder, whose great length gave a range superior to the batteries of s.h.i.+ps of the line. Being moved by oars as well as by sails, these little vessels could choose their distance in light airs and calms, and were used so actively to hara.s.s the transports at anchor that Darby was obliged to cover them with three s.h.i.+ps of the line. These proved powerless effectually to injure the gunboats; but, while the latter caused great annoyance and petty injury, they did not hinder the unlading nor even greatly delay it. The experience ill.u.s.trates again the unlikelihood that great results can be obtained by petty means, or that ma.s.sed force, force concentrated, can be effectually counteracted either by cheap and ingenious expedients, or by the cooperative exertions of many small independent units. ”They were only capable of producing trouble and vexation. So far were they from preventing the succours from being thrown into the garrison, or from burning the convoy, that the only damage of any consequence that they did to the s.h.i.+pping was the wounding of the mizzen-mast of the _Nonsuch_ so much that it required to be s.h.i.+fted.”[103] On the 19th of April--in one week--the revictualling was completed, and the expedition started back for England. The fleet anch.o.r.ed again at Spithead on the 22d of May.
While Darby was returning, La Motte Picquet had gone to sea from Brest with six s.h.i.+ps of the line and some frigates to cruise in the approaches to the Channel. There, on the 2d of May, he fell in with the convoy returning from the West Indies with the spoils of St.
Eustatius. The s.h.i.+ps of war for the most part escaped, but La Motte Picquet carried twenty-two out of thirty merchant s.h.i.+ps into Brest before he could be intercepted, although a detachment of eight sail sent by Darby got close upon his heels.
After a long refit, Darby put to sea again, about the 1st of August, to cover the approach of the large convoys then expected to arrive.
Being greatly delayed by head winds, he had got no further than the Lizard, when news was brought him that the Franco-Spanish grand fleet, of forty-nine s.h.i.+ps of the line, was cruising near the Scilly Isles.
Having himself but thirty of the line, he put into Tor Bay on the 24th of August, and moored his squadron across the entrance to the Bay.
This appearance of the allies was a surprise to the British authorities, who saw thus unexpectedly renewed the invasion of the Channel made in 1779. Spain, mortified justly by her failure even to molest the intrusion of succours into Gibraltar, had thought to retrieve her honour by an attack upon Minorca, for which she asked the cooperation of France. De Guichen was sent in July with nineteen s.h.i.+ps of the line; and the combined fleets, under the chief command of the Spanish admiral, Don Luis de Cordova, convoyed the troops into the Mediterranean beyond the reach of Gibraltar cruisers. Returning thence into the Atlantic, de Cordova directed his course for the Channel, keeping far out to sea to conceal his movements. But though thus successful in reaching his ground unheralded, he made no attempt to profit by the advantage gained. The question of attacking Darby at his anchors was discussed in a council of war, at which de Guichen strongly advocated the measure; but a majority of votes decided that Great Britain would be less hurt by ruining her fleet than by intercepting the expected convoys. Even for the latter purpose, however, de Cordova could not wait. On the 5th of September he informed de Guichen that he was at liberty to return to Brest; and he himself went back to Cadiz with thirty-nine s.h.i.+ps, nine of which were French. ”This cruise of the combined fleet,” says Chevalier, ”diminished the consideration of France and Spain. These two powers had made a great display of force, without producing the slightest result.” It may be mentioned here that Minorca, after a six months'
siege, capitulated in February, 1782.
While Darby was beating down Channel in the early days of August, 1781, Vice-Admiral Hyde Parker, lately Rodney's second in command in the West Indies, was returning to England convoying a large merchant fleet from the Baltic. On the 5th of August, at daylight, a Dutch squadron, also with a convoy, but outward bound, from the Texel to the Baltic, was discovered in the south-west, near the Doggersbank.
Heading as the two enemies then were, their courses must shortly intersect. Parker, therefore, ordered his convoy to steer to the westward for England, while he himself bore down for the enemy. The Dutch Rear-Admiral, Johan Arnold Zoutman, on the contrary, kept the merchant vessels with him, under his lee, but drew out the s.h.i.+ps of war from among them, to form his order on the side towards the enemy.
Each opponent put seven sail into the line. The British vessels, besides being of different rates, were chiefly very old s.h.i.+ps, dragged out from Rotten Row to meet the pressing emergency caused by the greatly superior forces which were in coalition against Great Britain.
Owing to the decayed condition of some of them, their batteries had been lightened, to the detriment of their fighting power. Two of them, however, were good and new seventy-fours. It is probable that the Dutch vessels, after a long peace, were not much better than their antagonists. In fact, each squadron was a scratch lot, in the worst sense of the phrase. The conduct of the affair by the two admirals, even to the very intensity of their pugnaciousness, contributes a tinge of the comic to the history of a desperately fought action. The breeze was fresh at north-east, and the sea smooth. The Dutch, being to leeward, awaited attack, forming line on the port tack, heading south-east by east, a point off the wind, under topsails and foresails, a cable's length apart. There is little room to doubt that an adversary who thus holds his ground means to make a stand-up fight, but Parker, although the sun of a midsummer day had scarcely risen, thought advisable to order a general chase. Of course, no s.h.i.+p spared her canvas to this, while the worse sailers had to set their studdingsails to keep up; and the handling of the sails took the men off from the preparations for battle. Parker, who doubtless was still sore over Rodney's censure of the year before, and who moreover had incurred the Admiralty's rebuke, for apparent hesitation to attack the enemy's islands while temporarily in command in the West Indies, was determined now to show the fight that was in him. ”It is related that, upon being informed of the force of the Dutch squadron in the morning, he replied (pulling up his breeches), 'It matters little what their force is; we must fight them if they are double the number.'” At 6.10 A.M. the signal was made for line abreast, the s.h.i.+ps running down nearly before the wind. This of course introduced more regularity, the leading s.h.i.+ps taking in their lighter sails to permit the others to reach their places; but the pace still was rapid. At 6.45 the order was closed to one cable, and at 7.56 the signal for battle was hoisted. It is said that at that moment the 80-gun s.h.i.+p was still securing a studding-sail-boom, which indicates how closely action trod on the heels of preparation.
The Dutch admiral was as deliberate as Parker was headlong. An English witness writes:--
”They appeared to be in great order; and their hammocks, quarter-cloths, etc., were spread in as nice order as if for show in harbour. Their marines also were well drawn up, and stood with their muskets shouldered, with all the regularity and exactness of a review. Their politeness ought to be remembered by every man in our line; for, as if certain of what happened, we came down almost end-on upon their broadsides; yet did not the Dutch admiral fire a gun, or make the signal to engage, till the red flag was at the _Fort.i.tude's_ masthead, and her shot finding their way into his s.h.i.+p. This was a manoeuvre which Admiral Zutman should not be warmly thanked for by their High Mightinesses; as he had it in his power to have done infinite mischief to our fleet, coming down in that unofficer-like manner. Having suffered Admiral Parker to place himself as he pleased, he calmly waited till the signal was hoisted on board the _Fort.i.tude_, and at the same time we saw the signal going up on board Admiral Zutman's s.h.i.+p.”
The British, thus unmolested, rounded-to just to windward of the enemy. A pilot who was on board their leading s.h.i.+p was for some reason told to a.s.sist in laying her close to her opponent. ”By close,” he asked, ”do you mean about a s.h.i.+p's breadth?” ”Not a gun was fired on either side,” says the official British report, ”until within the distance of half musket-shot.” Parker, whom an on-looker describes as full of life and spirits, here made a mistake, of a routine character, which somewhat dislocated his order. It was a matter of tradition for flags.h.i.+p to seek flags.h.i.+p, just as it was to signal a general chase, and to bear down together, each s.h.i.+p for its opposite, well extended with the enemy. Now Parker, as was usual, was in the centre of his line, the fourth s.h.i.+p; but Zoutman was for some reason in the fifth. Parker therefore placed his fourth by the enemy's fifth. In consequence, the rear British s.h.i.+p overlapped the enemy, and for a time had no opponent; while the second and third found themselves engaged with three of the Dutch. At 8 A.M. the signal for the line was hauled down, and that for close action hoisted,--thus avoiding a mistake often made.
All the vessels were soon satisfactorily and hotly at work, and the action continued with varying phases till 11.35 A.M. The leading two s.h.i.+ps in both orders got well to leeward of the lines, the British two having to tack to regain their places to windward. Towards the middle of the engagement the Dutch convoy bore away, back to the Texel, as the British had steered for England before it began; the difference being that the voyage was abandoned by the Dutch and completed by the British. At eleven o'clock Parker made sail, and pa.s.sed with the flags.h.i.+p between the enemy and the _Buffalo_, his next ahead and third in the British order; the three rear s.h.i.+ps following close in his wake, in obedience to the signal for line ahead, which had been rehoisted at 10.43.[104] A heavy cannonade attended this evolution, the Dutch fighting gloriously to the last. When it was completed, the British fleet wore and the action ceased. ”I made an effort to form the line, in order to renew the action,” wrote Parker in his report, ”but found it impracticable. The enemy appeared to be in as bad a condition. Both squadrons lay-to a considerable time near each other, when the Dutch, with their convoy, bore away for the Texel. We were not in a condition to follow them.”
This was a most satisfactory exhibition of valour, and a most unsatisfactory battle; magnificent, but not war. The completion of their voyage by the British merchant s.h.i.+ps, while the Dutch were obliged to return to the port which they had just left, may be considered to award success, and therefore the essentials of victory, to Parker's fleet. With this exception the _status quo_ remained much as before, although one of the Dutch s.h.i.+ps sank next day; yet the British loss, 104 killed and 339 wounded, was nearly as great as in Keppel's action, where thirty s.h.i.+ps fought on each side, or in Rodney's of April 17th, 1780, where the British had twenty sail; greater than with Graves off the Chesapeake, and, in proportion, fully equal to the sanguinary conflicts between Suffren and Hughes in the East Indies. The Dutch loss is reported as 142 killed, 403 wounded.
Both sides aimed at the hull, as is shown by the injuries; for though much harm was done aloft, few spars were wholly shot away. The _Buffalo_, a small s.h.i.+p, had 39 shot through and through her, and a very great number pierced between wind and water; in the British van s.h.i.+p as many as 14, another proof that the Dutch fired low.
With the rudimentary notions of manoeuvring evinced, it is not surprising that Parker was found an unsatisfactory second by an enlightened tactician like Rodney. The Vice-Admiral, however, laid his unsuccess to the indifferent quality of his s.h.i.+ps. George III visited the squadron after the action, but Parker was not open to compliments.
”I wish your Majesty better s.h.i.+ps and younger officers,” he said. ”For myself, I am now too old for service.” No rewards were given, and it is a.s.serted that Parker made no secret that none would be accepted, if offered, at the hands of the then Admiralty. He voiced the protest of the Navy and of the nation against the mal-administration of the peace days, which had left the country unprepared for war. The gallant veteran was ordered soon afterwards to command in the East Indies. He sailed for his station in the _Cato_, which was never heard of again.