Part 12 (2/2)
To this de Gra.s.se added another fault by forming on the port tack, the contrary to that on which the British were, and standing southerly towards Dominica. The effect of this was to bring his s.h.i.+ps into the calms and baffling winds which cling to the sh.o.r.e-line, thus depriving them of their power of manoeuvre. His object probably was to confine the engagement to a mere pa.s.s-by on opposite tacks, by which in all previous instances the French had thwarted the decisive action that Rodney sought. Nevertheless, the blunder was evident at once to French eyes. ”What evil genius has inspired the admiral?” exclaimed du Pavillon, Vaudreuil's flag-captain, who was esteemed one of the best tacticians in France, and who fell in the battle.
[Ill.u.s.tration]
As the two lines drew near to one another, standing, the French south, the British east-north-east, the wind s.h.i.+fted back to the eastward, allowing the French to head higher, to south-south-east, and knocking the British off to north-north-east (Position 4). The head of the French column thus pa.s.sed out of gunshot, across the bows of Rodney's leading vessel, the _Marlborough_, (m), which came within range when abreast the eighth s.h.i.+p. The first shots were fired by the _Brave_, 74, ninth in the French line, at 8 A.M. The British captain then put his helm up and ran slowly along, north-north-west, under the lee of the French, towards their rear. The rest of the British fleet followed in his wake. The battle thus a.s.sumed the form of pa.s.sing in opposite directions on parallel lines; except that the French s.h.i.+ps, as they successively cleared the point where the British column struck their line, would draw out of fire, their course diverging thenceforth from that of the British approach. The effect of this would be that the British rear, when it reached that point, would be fresh, having undergone no fire, and with that advantage would encounter the French rear, which had received already the fire of the British van and centre. To obviate this, by bringing his own van into action, de Gra.s.se signalled the van s.h.i.+ps to lead south-south-west, parallel with the British north-north-east (4, a). The engagement thus became general all along the lines; but it is probable that the French van was never well formed. Its commander, at all events, reached his post later than the commander of the rear did his.[117]
At five minutes past eight, Rodney made a general signal for close action, followed immediately by another for the leading s.h.i.+ps to head one point to starboard--towards the enemy--which indicates that he was not satisfied with the distance first taken by the _Marlborough_.
The _Formidable_, his flags.h.i.+p, eighteenth in the column, began to fire at 8.23;[118] but the _Barfleur_, Hood's flags.h.i.+p, which was thirty-first, not till 9.25. This difference in time is to be accounted for chiefly by the light airs near Dominica, contrasted with the fresh trades in the open channel to the northward, which the leading British vessels felt before their rear. De Gra.s.se now, too late, had realised the disastrous effect which this would have upon his fleet. If he escaped all else, his s.h.i.+ps, baffled by calms and catspaws while the British had a breeze, must lose the weather-gage, and with it the hope of evading pursuit, hitherto his chief preoccupation. Twice he signalled to wear,--first, all together, then in succession,--but, although the signals were seen, they could not be obeyed with the enemy close under the lee. ”The French fleet,”
comments Chevalier justly, ”had freedom of movement no longer. A fleet cannot wear with an enemy's fleet within musket-range to leeward.”
The movement therefore continued as described, the opposing s.h.i.+ps slowly ”sliding by” each other until about 9.15, when the wind suddenly s.h.i.+fted back to south-east again. The necessity of keeping the sails full forced the bows of each French vessel towards the enemy (Position 5), destroying the order in column, and throwing the fleet into _echelon_, or, as the phrase then was, into bow and quarter line.[119] The British, on the contrary, were free either to hold their course or to head towards the enemy. Rodney's flags.h.i.+p (5, a) luffed, and led through the French line just astern of the _Glorieux_, 74, (g), which was the nineteenth in their order. She was followed by five s.h.i.+ps; and her next ahead also, the _Duke_ (d), seeing her chief's movement, imitated it, breaking through the line astern of the twenty-third French. The _Glorieux_, on the starboard hand of Rodney's little column, received its successive broadsides. Her main and mizzen masts went overboard at 9.28, when the _Canada_, third astern of the _Formidable_, had just pa.s.sed her; and a few moments later her foremast and bowsprit fell. At 9.33 the _Canada_ was to windward of the French line. The flags.h.i.+p _Formidable_ was using both broadsides as she broke through the enemy's order. On her port hand, between her and the _Duke_, were four French s.h.i.+ps huddled together (c), one of which had paid off the wrong way; that is, after the s.h.i.+ft of wind took her aback, her sails had filled on the opposite tack from that of the rest of her fleet.[120] These four, receiving the repeated broadsides, at close quarters, of the _Formidable_, _Duke_, and _Namur_, and having undergone besides the fire of the British van, were very severely mauled. While these things were happening, the _Bedford_, the sixth astern of the _Formidable_, perhaps unable to see her next ahead in the smoke, had luffed independently (b), and was followed by the twelve rearmost British s.h.i.+ps, whom she led through the French order astern of the _Cesar_, 74, (k), twelfth from the van.
This s.h.i.+p and her next ahead, the _Hector_, 74, (h), suffered as did the _Glorieux_. The _Barfleur_, which was in the centre of this column of thirteen, opened fire at 9.25. At 10.45 she ”ceased firing, having pa.s.sed the enemy's van s.h.i.+ps;” that is, she was well on the weather side of the French fleet. Some of the rearmost of Hood's division, however, were still engaged at noon; but probably all were then to windward of the enemy.
[Ill.u.s.tration]
The British s.h.i.+ps ahead of the _Duke_, the van and part of the centre, in all sixteen sail, had continued to stand to the northward. At the time Rodney broke the line, several of them must have pa.s.sed beyond the French rear, and out of action. One, the _America_, the twelfth from the van, wore without signals, to pursue the enemy, and her example was followed at once by the s.h.i.+p next ahead, the _Russell_, Captain Saumarez. No signal following, the _America_ again wore and followed her leaders, but the _Russell_ continued as she was, now to windward of the French; by which course she was able to take a conspicuous share in the closing scenes. At 11.33 Rodney signalled the van to tack, but the delay of an hour or more had given the _Russell_ a start over the other s.h.i.+ps of her division ”towards the enemy” which could not be overcome.
The effect of these several occurrences had been to transfer the weather-gage, the position for attack, to the British from the French, and to divide the latter also into three groups, widely separated and disordered (Position 6). In the centre was the flags.h.i.+p _Ville de Paris_ with five s.h.i.+ps (c). To windward of her, and two miles distant, was the van, of some dozen vessels (v). The rear was four miles away to leeward (r). To restore the order, and to connect the fleet again, it was decided to re-form on the leewardmost s.h.i.+ps; and several signals to this effect were made by de Gra.s.se. They received but imperfect execution. The manageable vessels succeeded easily enough in running before the wind to leeward, but, when there, exact.i.tude of position and of movement was unattainable to s.h.i.+ps in various degrees of disability, with light and baffling side airs. The French were never again in order after the wind s.h.i.+fted and the line was broken; but the movement to leeward left the dismasted _Glorieux_, (g), _Hector_, (h), and _Cesar_, (k), motionless between the hostile lines.
It has been remarked, disparagingly, that the British fleet also was divided into three by the manoeuvre of breaking the line. This is true; but the advantage remained with it incontestably, in two respects. By favor of the wind, each of the three groups had been able to maintain its general formation in line or column, instead of being thrown entirely out, as the French were; and pa.s.sing thus in column along the _Glorieux_, _Hector_, and _Cesar_, they wrought upon these three s.h.i.+ps a concentration of injury which had no parallel among the British vessels. The French in fact had lost three s.h.i.+ps, as well as the wind. To these certain disadvantages is probably to be added a demoralisation among the French crews, from the much heavier losses resultant upon the British practice of firing at the hull. An officer present in the action told Sir John Ross[121] afterwards that the French fired very high throughout; and he cited in ill.u.s.tration that the three trucks[122] of the British _Princesa_ were shot away. Sir Gilbert Blane, who, though Physician to the Fleet, obtained permission to be on deck throughout the action, wrote ten days after it, ”I can aver from my own observation that the French fire slackens as we approach, and is totally silent when we are close alongside.” It is needless to say that a marked superiority of fire will silence that of the bravest enemy; and the practice of aiming at the spars and sails, however suited for frustrating an approach, substantially conceded that superiority upon which the issue of decisive battle depends. As ill.u.s.trative of this result, the British loss will be stated here. It was but 243 killed and 816 wounded in a fleet of thirty-six sail. The highest in any one s.h.i.+p was that of the _Duke_, 73 killed and wounded.
No certain account, or even very probable estimate, of the French loss has ever been given. None is cited by French authorities. Sir Gilbert Blane, who was favourably placed for information, reckoned that of the _Ville de Paris_ alone to be 300. There being fifty-four hundred troops distributed among the vessels of the fleet, the casualties would be proportionately more numerous; but, even allowing for this, there can be no doubt that the loss of the French, to use Chevalier's words, ”was certainly much more considerable” than that reported by the British. Six post-captains out of thirty were killed, against two British out of thirty-six.
Rodney did not make adequate use of the great opportunity, which accident rather than design had given him at noon of April 12th. He did allow a certain liberty of manoeuvre, by discontinuing the order for the line of battle; but the signal for close action, hoisted at 1 P.M., was hauled down a half-hour later. Hood, who realised the conditions plainly visible, as well as the reasonable inferences therefrom, wished the order given for a general chase, which would have applied the spur of emulation to every captain present, without surrendering the hold that particular signals afford upon indiscreet movements. He bitterly censured the Admiral's failure to issue this command. Had it been done, he said:--
”I am very confident we should have had twenty sail of the enemy's s.h.i.+ps before dark. Instead of that, he pursued only under his topsails (sometimes his foresail was set and at others his mizzen topsail aback) the greatest part of the afternoon, though the _flying_ enemy had all the sail set their very shattered state would allow.”[123]
To make signal for a general chase was beyond the competence of a junior admiral; but Hood did what he could, by repeated signals to individual s.h.i.+ps of his own division to make more sail, by setting all he could on the _Barfleur_, and by getting out his boats to tow her head round. Sir Gilbert Blane unintentionally gives a similar impression of laxity.
”After cutting the French line, the action during the rest of the day was partial and desultory, the enemy never being able to form, and several of the [our] s.h.i.+ps being obliged to lie by and repair their damages. As the signal for the line was now hauled down, every s.h.i.+p annoyed the enemy as their respective commanders judged best.”[124]
For this indolent abandonment of the captains to their own devices, the correctest remedy was, as Hood indicated, the order for a general chase, supplemented by a watchful supervision, which should check the over-rash and stimulate the over-cautious. If Hood's account of the sail carried by Rodney be correct, the Commander-in-Chief did not even set the best example. In this languid pursuit, the three crippled French s.h.i.+ps were overhauled, and of course had to strike; and a fourth, the _Ardent_, 64, was taken, owing to her indifferent sailing.
Towards sunset the flags.h.i.+p _Ville de Paris_, 110,[125] the finest s.h.i.+p of war afloat, having been valiantly defended against a host of enemies throughout great part of the afternoon, and having expended all her ammunition, hauled down her colours. The two British vessels then immediately engaged with her were the _Russell_ and the _Barfleur_, Hood's flags.h.i.+p, to the latter of which she formally surrendered; the exact moment, noted in Hood's journal, being 6.29 P.M.
At 6.45 Rodney made the signal for the fleet to bring-to (form line and stop) on the port tack, and he remained lying-to during the night, while the French continued to retreat under the orders of the Marquis de Vaudreuil, who by de Gra.s.se's capture had become commander-in-chief. For this easy-going deliberation also Hood had strong words of condemnation.
”Why he should bring the fleet to because the _Ville de Paris_ was taken, I cannot reconcile. He did not pursue under easy sail, so as never to have lost sight of the enemy in the night, which would clearly and most undoubtedly have enabled him to have taken almost every s.h.i.+p the next day.... Had I had the honour of commanding his Majesty's n.o.ble fleet on the 12th, I may, without much imputation of vanity, say the flag of England should now have graced the sterns of _upwards_ of twenty sail of the enemy's s.h.i.+ps of the line.”[126]
Such criticisms by those not responsible are to be received generally with caution; but Hood was, in thought and in deed, a man so much above the common that these cannot be dismissed lightly. His opinion is known to have been shared by Sir Charles Douglas, Rodney's Captain of the Fleet;[127] and their conclusion is supported by the inferences to be drawn from Rodney's own a.s.sumptions as to the condition of the French, contrasted with the known facts. The enemy, he wrote, in a.s.signing his reasons for not pursuing, ”went off in a _close connected body_,[128] and might have defeated, by rotation, the s.h.i.+ps that had come up with them.” ”The enemy _who went off in a body of twenty-six s.h.i.+ps of the line_,[128] might, by ordering two or three of their best sailing s.h.i.+ps or frigates to have shown lights at times, and by changing their course, have induced the British fleet to have followed them, while the main of their fleet, by hiding their lights, might have hauled their wind, and have been far to windward by daylight, and intercepted the captured s.h.i.+ps, and the most crippled s.h.i.+ps of the English;” and he adds that the Windward Islands even might have been endangered. That such action was in a remote degree possible to a well-conditioned fleet may be guardedly conceded; but it was wildly improbable to a fleet staggering under such a blow as the day had seen, which had changed its commander just as dark came on, and was widely scattered and disordered up to the moment when signals by flags became invisible.
The facts, however, were utterly at variance with these ingenious suppositions. Instead of being connected, as Rodney represents, de Vaudreuil had with him next morning but ten s.h.i.+ps; and no others during the whole of the 13th. He made sail for Cap Francois, and was joined on the way by five more, so that at no time were there upwards of fifteen[129] French s.h.i.+ps of the line together, prior to his arrival at that port on April 25th. He there found four others of the fleet. The tale of twenty-five survivors, from the thirty engaged on April 12th, was completed by six which had gone to Curacao, and which did not rejoin until May. So much for the close connected body of the French. It is clear, therefore, that Rodney's reasons ill.u.s.trate the frame of mind against which Napoleon used to caution his generals as ”making to themselves a picture” of possibilities; and that his conclusion at best was based upon the ruinous idea, which a vivid imagination or slothful temper is p.r.o.ne to present to itself, that war may be made decisive without running risks. That Jamaica even was saved was not due to this fine, but indecisive battle, but to the hesitation of the allies. When de Vaudreuil reached Cap Francois, he found there the French convoy safely arrived from Guadeloupe, and also a body of fifteen Spanish s.h.i.+ps of the line. The troops available for the descent upon Jamaica were from fifteen to twenty thousand. Well might Hood write: ”Had Sir George Rodney's judgment, after the enemy had been so totally put to flight, borne any proportion to the high courage, zeal and exertion, so very manifestly shown by every captain, _all_ difficulty would now have been at an end. We might have done just as we pleased, instead of being at this hour upon the defensive.”[130]
The allies, however, though superior in numbers, did not venture to a.s.sume the offensive. After the battle, Rodney remained near Guadeloupe until the 17th of April, refitting, and searching the neighbouring islands, in case the French fleet might have entered some one of them. For most of this time the British were becalmed, but Hood remarks that there had been wind enough to get twenty leagues to the westward; and there more wind probably would have been found. On the 17th Hood was detached in pursuit with ten sail of the line; and a day or two later Rodney himself started for Jamaica. Left to his own discretion, Hood pushed for the Mona Pa.s.sage, between Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo, carrying studding-sails below and aloft in his haste.
At daybreak of the 19th he sighted the west end of Puerto Rico; and soon afterwards a small French squadron was seen. A general chase resulted in the capture of the _Jason_ and _Caton_, sixty-fours, which had parted from their fleet before the battle and were on their way to Cap Francois. A frigate, the _Aimable_, 32, and a sloop, the _Ceres_, 18, also were taken. In reporting this affair to Rodney, Hood got a thrust into his superior. ”It is a very mortifying circ.u.mstance to relate to you, Sir, that the French fleet which you put to flight on the 12th went through the Mona Channel on the 18th, only the day before I was in it.”[131] A further proof of the utility of pursuit, here hinted at, is to be found in the fact that Rodney, starting six days later than de Vaudreuil, reached Jamaica, April 28th, only three days after the French got into Cap Francois. He had therefore gained three days in a fortnight's run. What might not have been done by an untiring chase! But a remark recorded by Hood summed up the frame of mind which dominated Rodney: ”I lamented to Sir George on the 13th that the signal for a general chase was not made when that for the line was hauled down and that he did not continue to pursue so as to keep sight of the enemy all night, to which he only answered, 'Come, we have done very handsomely as it is.'”[132]
Rodney stayed at Jamaica until the 10th of July, when Admiral Hugh Pigot arrived from England to supersede him. This change was consequent upon the fall of Lord North's ministry, in March, 1782, and had been decided before the news of the victory could reach England.
Admiral Keppel now became the head of the Admiralty. Rodney sailed for home from Port Royal on the 22d of July; and with his departure the war in the West Indies and North America may be said to have ended.
Pigot started almost immediately for New York, and remained in North American waters until the end of October, when he returned to Barbados, first having detached Hood with thirteen s.h.i.+ps of the line from the main fleet, to cruise off Cap Francois. It is of interest to note that at this time Hood took with him from New York the frigate _Albemarle_, 28, then commanded by Nelson, who had been serving on the North American station. These various movements were dictated by those of the enemy, either actually made or supposed to be in contemplation; for it was an inevitable part of the ill-effects of Rodney's most imperfect success, that the British fleet was thenceforth on the defensive purely, with all the perplexities of him who waits upon the initiative of an opponent. Nothing came of them all, however, for the war now was but lingering in its death stupor. The defeat of de Gra.s.se, partial though it was; the abandonment of the enterprise upon Jamaica; the failure of the attack upon Gibraltar; and the success of Howe in re-victualling that fortress,--these had taken all heart out of the French and Spaniards; while the numerical superiority of the allies, inefficiently though it had been used heretofore, weighed heavily upon the imagination of the British Government, which now had abandoned all hope of subduing its American Colonies. Upon the conclusion of peace, in 1783, Pigot and Hood returned to England, leaving the Leeward Islands' Station under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Hughes, an officer remembered by history only through Nelson's refusing to obey his orders not to enforce the Navigation Acts, in 1785.
[Footnote 105: James Saumarez, Lord de Saumarez, G.C.B. Born, 1757.
Commander, 1781. Captain, 1782. Captain of _Russell_ in Rodney's action, 1782. Knighted for capture of frigate _Reunion_, 1793. Captain of _Orion_ in Bridport's action, at St. Vincent, and at the Nile (when he was second in command). Rear-Admiral and Baronet, 1801. Defeated French and Spaniards off Cadiz, July 12th, 1801. Vice-Admiral, 1805.
Vice-Admiral of England and a peer, 1831. Died, 1836.]
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