Part 11 (2/2)
Though unfruitful in substantial results, Parker's action merits commemoration; for, after all, even where skill does its utmost, staunchness such as his shows the sound const.i.tution of a military body.
[Footnote 103: Beatson, ”Military and Naval Memoirs,” v. 347.]
[Footnote 104: Sir John Ross, in his ”Life of Saumarez,” who was lieutenant in the flags.h.i.+p, says that the flags.h.i.+p only pa.s.sed ahead of the _Buffalo_, and that the rear s.h.i.+ps closed upon the latter.
The version in the text rests upon the detailed and circ.u.mstantial statements of another lieutenant of the squadron, in Ekins's ”Naval Battles.” As Ekins also was present as a mids.h.i.+pman, this gives, as it were, the confirmation of two witnesses.]
CHAPTER XII
THE FINAL NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST INDIES. HOOD AND DE GRa.s.sE.
RODNEY AND DE GRa.s.sE. THE GREAT BATTLE OF APRIL 12, 1782
The year 1781 closed with an incident more decisive in character than most of the events that occurred in European waters during its course; one also which transfers the interest, by natural transition, again to the West Indies. The French government had felt throughout the summer the necessity of sending de Gra.s.se reinforcements both of s.h.i.+ps and of supplies, but the transports and material of war needed could not be collected before December. As the British probably would attempt to intercept a convoy upon which the next campaign so much depended, Rear-Admiral de Guichen was ordered to accompany it clear of the Bay of Biscay, with twelve s.h.i.+ps of the line, and then to go to Cadiz.
Five s.h.i.+ps of the line destined to de Gra.s.se, and two going to the East Indies, raised to nineteen the total force with which de Guichen left Brest on the 10th of December. On the afternoon of the 12th, the French being then one hundred and fifty miles to the southward and westward of Ushant, with a south-east wind, the weather, which had been thick and squally, suddenly cleared and showed sails to windward.
These were twelve s.h.i.+ps of the line, one 50, and some frigates, under Rear-Admiral Richard Kempenfelt, who had left England on the 2d of the month, to cruise in wait for this expedition. The French numbers were amply sufficient to frustrate any attack, but de Guichen, ordinarily a careful officer, had allowed his s.h.i.+ps of war to be to leeward and ahead of the convoy. The latter scattered in every direction, as the British swooped down upon them, but all could not escape; and the French s.h.i.+ps of war remained helpless spectators, while the victims were hauling down their flags right and left. Night coming on, some prizes could not be secured, but Kempenfelt carried off fifteen, laden with military and naval stores of great money value and greater military importance. A few days later a violent storm dispersed and shattered the remainder of the French body. Two s.h.i.+ps of the line only, the _Triomphant_, 84, and _Brave_, 74, and five transports, could pursue their way to the West Indies. The rest went back to Brest. This event may be considered as opening the naval campaign of 1782 in the West Indies.
Kempenfelt, before returning to England, sent off express to Hood in the West Indies the fires.h.i.+p _Tisiphone_, 8, Commander James Saumarez,[105]--afterwards the distinguished admiral,--with news of the French approach. Saumarez, having been first to Barbados, joined Hood on the 31st of January, 1782, in Ba.s.se Terre Roads, on the lee side of St. Kitts; a position from which Hood had dislodged de Gra.s.se six days before by a brilliant manoeuvre, resembling that which he had contemplated[106] as open to Graves the previous September at Chesapeake Bay for the relief of Cornwallis. The campaign for the year 1782 had opened already with an attack upon St. Kitts by the French army and navy; and the French fleet was even then cruising close at hand to leeward, between St. Kitts and Nevis.
The original intention of de Gra.s.se and de Bouille had been to capture Barbados, the most important of the Eastern Antilles still remaining to the British; but the heavy trade-winds, which in those days made a winter pa.s.sage to windward so long and dreary a beat, twice drove them back to port. ”The whole French fleet,” wrote Hood, ”appeared off Santa Lucia on the 17th of last month, endeavouring to get to windward, and having carried away many topmasts and yards in struggling against very squally weather, returned to Fort Royal Bay on the 23d, and on the 28th came out again with forty transports, manoeuvring as before.” On the 2d of January it disappeared from Santa Lucia, and, after a short stay again at Martinique, proceeded on the 5th to St. Kitts, anchoring in Ba.s.se Terre Roads on the 11th. The British garrison retired to Brimstone Hill, a fortified position at the north-west of the island, while the inhabitants surrendered the government to the French, pledging themselves to neutrality. The adjacent island of Nevis capitulated on the same terms on the 20th.
On the 14th of January, an express sent by General s.h.i.+rley, governor of St. Kitts, had informed Hood at Barbados that a great fleet approaching had been seen from the heights of Nevis on the 10th. Hood at once put to sea, though short of bread and flour, which could not be had, and with the material of his s.h.i.+ps in wretched condition.
”When the _President_[107] joins,” he wrote the Admiralty, ”I shall be twenty-two strong, with which I beg you will a.s.sure their Lords.h.i.+ps I will seek and give battle to the Count de Gra.s.se, be his numbers as they may.” On the way a s.h.i.+p reached him with word that the French fleet had invested St. Kitts. On the 21st he anch.o.r.ed at Antigua for repairs and supplies, indispensable for keeping the sea in the operations which he contemplated, the duration of which could not be foreseen. About a thousand troops also were embarked, which, with the marines that could be spared from the squadron, would give a landing force of twenty-four hundred men.
St. Kitts being less than fifty miles from Antigua, Hood doubtless now got accurate information of the enemy's dispositions, and could form a definite, well-matured plan. This seems to have been carefully imparted to all his captains, as was the practice of Nelson, who was the pupil of Hood, if of any one. ”At 9.15 A.M. the Admiral made the signal for all flag-officers,” says the log of the _Canada_; ”and at 4 P.M. the Admirals and Commodore made the signals for all captains of their divisions.” At 5 P.M. of the same day, January 23d, the fleet weighed and stood over for Nevis, round the southern point of which Ba.s.se Terre must be approached; for, the channel between Nevis and St.
Kitts being impracticable for s.h.i.+ps of the line, the two islands were virtually one, and, their common axis lying north-west and south-east, the trade-wind is fair only when coming from the south.
Ba.s.se Terre, where de Gra.s.se then was, is about fifteen miles from the south point of Nevis. The roadstead lies east and west, and the French fleet, then twenty-four of the line and two fifties, were anch.o.r.ed without attention to order, three or four deep; the eastern s.h.i.+ps so placed that an enemy coming from the southward could reach them with the prevailing trade-wind, against which the western s.h.i.+ps could not beat up quickly to their support. This being so, we are told that Hood, starting shortly before sunset with a fair, and probably fresh wind, from a point only sixty miles distant, hoped to come upon the French by surprise at early daybreak, to attack the weather s.h.i.+ps, and from them to sail along the hostile order so far as might seem expedient. His column, thus pa.s.sing in its entirety close to a certain exposed fraction of the enemy, the latter would be cut up in detail by the concentration upon it. The British then, wearing to the southward, would haul their wind, tack, and again stand up to the a.s.sault, if the enemy continued to await it.
This reasonable expectation, and skilful conception, was thwarted by a collision, during the night, between a frigate, the _Nymphe_, 36, and the leading s.h.i.+p of the line, the _Alfred_, 74. The repairs to the latter delayed the fleet, the approach of which was discovered by daylight. De Gra.s.se therefore put to sea. He imagined Hood's purpose was to throw succours into Brimstone Hill; and moreover the position of the enemy now was between him and four s.h.i.+ps of the line momentarily expected from Martinique, one of which joined him on the same day. The French were all under way by sunset, standing to the southward under easy sail, towards the British, who had rounded the south point of Nevis at 1 P.M. Towards dark, Hood went about and stood also to the southward, seemingly in retreat.
During the following night the British tacked several times, to keep their position to windward. At daylight of January 25th, the two fleets were to the westward of Nevis; the British near the island, the French abreast, but several miles to leeward. Foiled in his first spring by an unexpected accident, Hood had not relinquished his enterprise, and now proposed to seize the anchorage quitted by the French, so establis.h.i.+ng himself there,--as he had proposed to Graves to do in the Chesapeake,--that he could not be dislodged. For such a defensive position St. Kitts offered special advantages. The anchorage was a narrow ledge, dropping precipitately to very deep water; and it was possible so to place the s.h.i.+ps that the enemy could not easily anchor near them.
At 5.30 A.M. of the 25th Hood made the signal to form line of battle on the starboard tack, at one cable interval.[108] It is mentioned in the log of the _Canada_, 74, Captain Cornwallis, that that s.h.i.+p brought-to in her station, fourth from the rear, at 7 o'clock. By 10 o'clock the line was formed, and the s.h.i.+ps hove-to in it. At 10.45 the signal was made to fill [to go ahead], the van s.h.i.+ps to carry the same sail as the Admiral,--topsails and foresails,--followed, just before noon, by the order to prepare to anchor, with springs on the cables.
The French, who were steering south, on the port tack, while the British were hove-to, went about as soon as the latter filled, and stood towards them in bow and quarter line.[109]
[Ill.u.s.tration]
At noon the British fleet was running along close under the high land of Nevis; so close that the _Solebay_, 28, one of the frigates insh.o.r.e of the line, grounded and was wrecked. No signals were needed, except to correct irregularities in the order, for the captains knew what they were to do. The French were approaching steadily, but inevitably dropping astern with reference to the point of the enemy's line for which they were heading. At 2 P.M. de Gra.s.se's flags.h.i.+p, the _Ville de Paris_, fired several shot at the British rear, which alone she could reach, while his left wing was nearing the _Barfleur_, Hood's flags.h.i.+p, and the vessels astern of her, the centre of the column, which opened their fire at 2.30. Hood, trusting to his captains, disregarded this threat to the rear half of his force. Signals flew for the van to crowd sail and take its anchorage, and at 3.30 P.M. the leading s.h.i.+ps began to anchor in line ahead, (Fig. 1, a), covered as they did so by the broadsides of the rear and the rear centre (b).
Upon the latter the French were now keeping up a smart fire. Between the _Canada_ and her next astern, the _Prudent_, 64,--which was a dull sailer,--there was a considerable interval. Towards it the French admiral pressed, aiming to cut off the three rear vessels; but Cornwallis threw everything aback and closed down upon his consort,--a stirring deed in which he was imitated by the _Resolution_ and _Bedford_, 74's, immediately ahead of him. De Gra.s.se was thus foiled, but so narrowly, that an officer, looking from one of the s.h.i.+ps which had anch.o.r.ed, a.s.serted that for a moment he could perceive the _Ville de Paris's_ jib inside the British line. As the rear of the latter pushed on to its place, it cleared the broadsides of the now anch.o.r.ed van and centre, (Fig. 2, a), and these opened upon the enemy, a great part of whom were strung out behind the British column, without opponents as yet, but hastening up to get their share of the action.
Hood's flags.h.i.+p, (f), which anch.o.r.ed at 4.03, opened fire again at 4.40 P.M. Thus, as the _Canada_ and her few companions, who bore the brunt of the day, were shortening sail and rounding-to, (b), still under a hot cannonade, the batteries of their predecessors were ringing out their welcome, and at the same time covering their movements by giving the enemy much else to think about. The _Canada_, fetching up near the tail of the column and letting go in a hurry, ran out two cables on end, and found upon sounding that she had dropped her anchor in a hundred and fifty fathoms of water. The French column stood on, off soundings, though close to, firing as it pa.s.sed, and then, wearing to the southward in succession, stood out of action on the port tack, (c), its ineffectual broadsides adding to the grandeur and excitement of the scene, and swelling the glory of Hood's successful daring, of which it is difficult to speak too highly. Lord Robert Manners, the captain of the _Resolution_, which was fifth s.h.i.+p from the British rear, writing a week later, pa.s.sed upon this achievement a verdict, which posterity will confirm. ”The taking possession of this road was well judged, well conducted, and well executed, though indeed the French had an opportunity--which they missed--of bringing our rear to a very severe account. The van and centre divisions brought to an anchor under the fire of the rear, which was engaged with the enemy's centre (Fig. 1); and then the centre, being at an anchor and properly placed, covered us while we anch.o.r.ed (Fig. 2), making, I think, the most masterly manoeuvre I ever saw.” Whether regard be had to the thoughtful preparation, the crafty management of the fleet antecedent to the final push, the calculated audacity of the latter, or the firm and sagacious tactical handling from the first moment to the last, Nelson himself never did a more brilliant deed than this of Hood's.[110] All firing ceased at 5.30.
Naturally, an order taken up under such conditions needed some rectifying before further battle. As the proper stationing of the fleet depended in great measure upon the position of the van s.h.i.+p, Hood had put a local pilot on board her; but when the action ceased, he found that she was not as close to the sh.o.r.e as he had intended.
The rear, on the other hand, was naturally in the most disorder, owing to the circ.u.mstances attending its anchorage. Three s.h.i.+ps from the rear were consequently directed to place themselves ahead of the van, closing the interval, while others s.h.i.+fted their berths, according to specific directions. The order as finally a.s.sumed (Fig. 3) was as follows. The van s.h.i.+p was anch.o.r.ed so close to the sh.o.r.e that it was impossible to pa.s.s within her, or, with the prevailing wind, even to reach her, because of a point and shoal just outside, covering her position. From her the line extended in a west-north-west direction to the fifteenth s.h.i.+p,--the _Barfleur_, 98, Hood's flags.h.i.+p,--when it turned to north, the last six s.h.i.+ps being on a north and south line.
These six, with their broadsides turned to the westward, prevented a column pa.s.sing from south to north, the only way one could pa.s.s, from enfilading the main line with impunity. The latter covered with its guns the approach from the south. All the s.h.i.+ps had springs on their cables, enabling them to turn their sides so as to cover a large arc of a circle with their batteries.
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