Part 21 (2/2)
That speech I made on Saturday I hope was correctly understood We are fighting, as I understand it, for justice to everybody and are ready to stop just as soon as justice to everybody is everybody's programme
I have the same opinion privately about, I will not say the policy, but the entlemen have who see red all the tiht is that if the Ger shall be settled unjustly, that is to say by force, then of course we accept that and will settle it by force Whenever we see sincere symptoms of their desire to settle it by justice, ill not only accept their suggestions but ill be glad and eager to accept them, as I said in -out language; that is not the language of liberty, that is the language of braggadocio For my part, I have no desire to e us to march triumphantly into Berlin, then ill do it if it takes twenty years But the world will come to its senses some day, no matter how , that we ought when the thing is over to be able to look back upon a course which had no element in it which we need be ashamed of So it is so difficult in any kind of a speech, this kind or any other, to express two things that see in opposite directions that I wasn't sure that I had succeeded in expressing theness to discuss peace whenever the proposals are themselves sincere and yet at the same time the determination never to discuss it until the basis laid down for the discussion is justice By that I et anything out of this war, because we are fighting for peace if we mean e say, for permanent peace No injustice furnishes a basis for per sense of injustice anywhere, it will not only produce a running sore presently which will result in trouble and probably war, but it ought to produce war so healed except by re the injustice Therefore, I for my part wouldn't want to see a peace which was based upon coreat or sly accept
If I were just a sheer Machiavelli and didn't have any heart but had brains, I would say: ”If youfor peret it, whether you like justice or not” It is the only conceivable intellectual basis for it, because this is not like the tiress of Vienna Peoples were then not willing, but so speechless and unorganized and without the overnments could sit on their necks indefinitely They didn't kno to prevent it But they are wide awake now and nobody is going to sit co or little, and the more uncomfortable he is who tries it, the more I am personally pleased So that I a to work out a purely scientific proposition: ”What will stay put?”
A peace is not going to be periven a political unit, every people has the right to deterentlemen, is all I have to say to you, but it is the real inside of n policy of the United States which for the ti I hope it will be useful to you, as it is welco you what I really think and what I understand we are really doing
CHAPTER xxxI
THE PEN IS MIGHTIER THAN THE SWORD
During this tiuard at the Executive offices, never for a moment out of touch with the situation He was the intimate associate of the men ere his co-labourers on the various boards that had been set up to prosecute the work of the war He sees were given to exa dispatches that came from diplomatic and consular representatives of A hireat war
One of thethe ene the Central Powers froned to incite the es between Gere Creel says, ”The projectile force of the President's idealism, its full military value may be measured by the fact that between April 6 and Deceainst Germany, or severed diplomatic relations with her From the very first the Allies accepted the President as their spokesman” It was under the influence of Woodrow Wilson's clear vision and nificance of the war became clear At first it had seeerly published official documents, Red Books, White Books, Yellow Books, and so forth, through all the colours of the spectruan it became after a while quite secondary to the question of the fundaer a national conflict, but a world aged to the death between two irreconcilable views of the relationshi+p of government to individuals, the autocratic view on the one hand, on the other the deht the fundaht A conteical effect of Woodrow Wilson's utterances on all the Allies was due, not to his rhetoric but to his subli a profound truth after which others had been only groping That is the prophet's power, to voice the latent, inarticulate aspirations of the multitude Proof of the value of the President's anda was disclosed in General Ludendorff's and Von Tirpitz's revelations In Ludendorff's opinion, the President's note to Germany had forced the Central Empires to yield to the President Ludendorff says:
In his answer to our second note, Wilson gave us nothing; he did not even tell us whether the Entente took its stand on the Fourteen Points He den, stigmatized our conduct of the war in the west as a violation of international law, and once again sought to meddle with intiain of the answer to one of the Wilson notes, Ludendorff says:
The answer to Wilson was dispatched on the 20th of October The subn was abandoned This concession to Wilson was the deepest blow to the army, and especially to the navy The injury to the morale of the fleet must have been ie
On October 23rd, President Wilson sent the following peree to the Germans:
It is evident that the Ger the acquiescence of the military authorities of the E of Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is still unimpaired If the United States must deal with the military masters and monarchical authorities now, or if it is likely to have to deal with theations of the Gerotiations but surrender Nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid
In discussing this and the other Wilson notes, Ludendorff says that they had dealt a vital blow at the heart of rip they held on the German people This entire situation is best expressed in Ludendorff's oords:
On October 23rd or 24th Wilson's answer arrived It was a strong answer to our cowardly note This time he had made it quite clear that the armistice conditions must be such as to ive the powers allied against her unlimited power to settle themselves the details of the peace accepted by Gerer be doubt in any ht I felt quite confident that the people were still to be won over to this course
On the evening of the 24th, shortly after leaving Spa for Berlin, there was brought to ned by the Field Marshal, which expressed the views prevailing at G H Q on the third Wilson note It appeared essential that G H Q in its dealings with Berlin should take up a definite stand to the note in order to eliram to the Army ran thus:
”For the information of all troops: Wilson says in his answer that he is ready to propose to his allies that they should enter into arotiations; but that the armistice must render Gerain He will only negotiate with Germany for peace if she concedes all the demands of America's associates as to the internal constitutional arrangements of Germany; otherwise, there is no choice but unconditional surrender
”_Wilson's answer is a demand for unconditional surrender_ It is thus unacceptable to us soldiers It proves that our enemies'
desire for our destruction, which let loose the war in 1914, still exists undiminished It proves, further, that our enemies use the phrase 'peace of justice' merely to deceive us and break our resistance Wilson's answer can thus be nothing for us soldiers but a challenge to continue our resistance with all our strength
”When our enemies know that no sacrifices will achieve the rupture of the German front, then they will be ready for a peace which will make the future of our country safe for the broad masses of our people
”At the front, October 24th, 10 PM”
This procla was later signed by Ludendorff It resulted in the Kaiser's immediate orders for a special conference at which both of these officials were dismissed from the Imperial German army
Von Tirpitz in his Memoirs laid stress on the effect of the Wilson submarine notes Ludendorff declares in his book that the ”Wilson propaganda” that found root in Berlin and finally grew there eventually convinced the German people that it was not they themselves, but the Governainst
_This was the seed of dissension that ruined Gerinning of the end came when in answer to the President's_ Sussex _note, ”We showed the world that ere going down before A chapter of either book is that containing Tirpitz's contention that the influence of the Wilson suber and more active alliance with the Allies In this connection Von Tirpitz says: