Part 21 (1/2)

It is to be reainst the Aircraft Board, the hly ihes

Three assistant Secretaries of War were appointed by Mr Baker--Mr

Benedict Crowell, a Cleveland contractor; Doctor F E Keppel, dean of Columbia University, and Eton's secretary--and all three were Republicans Mr E R Stettinius of the J P Morgan firm and a Republican was made special assistant to the Secretary of War and placed in charge of supplies, a duty that he had been discharging for the Allies Maj Gen George W Goethals, after his unfortunate experience in shi+pbuilding, was given a second chance and put in the War Department as an assistant Chief of staff The Chief of Staff himself, Gen Peyton C March, was a Republican no less definite and regular than General Goethals Mr Samuel McRoberts, president of the National City Bank and one of the pillars of the Republican party, was brought to Washi+ngton as chief of the procureadier-general, Maj Gen E H Croas appointed Provost- Marshal-General, although his Republicanism ell known, and no objection of any kind was made when General Crowder put Charles B

Warren, the Republican National Coe of appeal cases, a position of rare power

The Eency Fleet Corporation was virtually turned over to Republicans under Charles M Schwab and Charles Piez Mr Vance McCormick, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, was htfive were Republicans: Albert Strauss of New York, Alonzo E

Taylor of Pennsylvania, John Beaver White, of New York, Frank C

Munson of New York, and Clarence M Woolley of Chicago

The same conditions obtained in the Red Cross A very eminent Republican, Mr H P Davison, was put in supreme authority, and on the Red Cross War Council were placed ex-President Taft; Mr Charles D Norton, Mr Taft's secretary while President; and Mr Cornelius N

Bliss, former treasurer of the Republican National Committee Not only was Mr Taft thus honoured, but upon the creation of a National War Labour Board the ex-President was made its chairman and virtually empowered to act as the administration's representative in its contact with industry

Mr Frank A Vanderlip, a Republican of iron regularity, was placed in charge of the War Savings Stan, and when Mr McAdoo had occasion to name assistant Secretaries of the Treasury he selected Prof L S Rowe of the University of Pennsylvania and Mr H C

Leffingwell of New York

Harry A Garfield, son of the Republican President, was made Fuel Administrator, and Mr Herbert Hoover, now a candidate for President, on a platform, of unadulterated Republicanism, was nominated as head of the Food Adanization of high importance and one of tremendous influence from a partisan standpoint, yet its executive body was divided as follows: Republicans--Howard E Coffin, Julius Rosenwald, Dr Hollis Godfrey, Dr Franklin Martin, Walter S

Gifford, Director; Democrats--Daniel Willard and Bernard M Baruch; Independent--Saun than the prelian to bear fruit

Within a month from the declaration of war the traditional policy of the nation was reversed, by the enactistration was created that ran without a hitch, and on June 5th istered quickly and efficiently

Thirty-two encampments--virtual cities, since each had to house 40,000of the first nail, complete in every municipal detail, a feat declared i miracle

In June, scarcely two ress, General Pershi+ng and his staff reached France, and on July 3rd the last of four groups of transports landed A men in the home of La Fayette and Rocha-line

Training caraduated 27,341 successful aspirants, ready to assume the tasks of leadershi+p

In a notable speech, confidential in character, the President on the 8th day of April, 1918, addressed the foreign correspondents at the White House concerning ”our resolutions” and ”actions in the war” The speech was as follows:

I alad to have this opportunity to meet you So to say I would prefer that you take it in this way, as for the private information of your minds and not for transmission to anybody, because I just want, if I round for you which may be serviceable to you I speak in confidence

I was rendered a little uneasy by what Mr Lloyd George was quoted as having said the other day that the Areat surprise in store for Germany I don't knohat sense he meant that, but there is no surprise in store I want you to know the sequence of resolves and of actions concerning our part in the war Soo it was proposed to us that we, if I lish ariades--and not wait to train and coordinate the larger units of our arment in the face of that proposition was that the American people would feel a very hting under their own flag and under their own general officers, but at that tio, I instructed General Pershi+ng that he had full authority whenever any exigency thatnecessary should occur to put the men in any units or in any nu What I wanted you to knoas that that was not a new action, that General Pershi+ng was fully instructed about that all along

Then, si to rush troops to Europe Of course, you cannot rush any faster than there isand, what I have said recently is what I have said all along, that we are getting et them ready and as quickly as we can find the shi+ps to transport the Let ramme was to send over ninety thousandover only thirty thousand--one third of the programme

Why? Not because we didn't have the men ready, not even because we didn't have the means of transportation, but because--and there is no criticism of the French Governned to us for landing couldn't take care of the supplies we had to send over We had to send ineers, and workmen, even, over to build the docks and the piers that would be adequate to handle the nuan with the ninety-thousand prograo shi+ps that we needed were lying in those ports for several weeks together without being unloaded, as there was nothem It was bad economy and bad practice fro there during a period when they could have es There is still this difficulty which I a rapidly, that the railroad communication between those ports and the front is inadequate to handle very large bodies ofrecommended that Christmas boxes should not be sent to the men That sounded like a pretty hard piece of advice, but if you could go to those ports and see those Christmas boxes which are still there, you would knohy he didn't want the theifts were piled up there with nothem adequately even

I just wanted to create for you this picture, that the channels have been inevitably choked Noe believe that, inasely reramme and add to it in proportion as the British can spare us the tonnage, and they are going to spare us the tonnage for the purpose And with the extra tonnage which the British are going to spare us ill send our men, not to France but to Great Britain, and froh the channel ports You see thatthem are already established and where they are more abundant than they are at the French ports Noant to say again that none of this involves the least criticism of the French authorities, because I think they have done their very best in every respect, but they couldn't make ports out of hand, they couldn't build new facilities suddenly, and their er proportion than our man power Therefore, it was perfectly proper that we should send men over there and sendthe troops and the cargoes entlemen to realize that there was no wave-likeso far as our purpose and preparation are concerned We have ht have been avoided and ought to have been avoided, and which are being slowly corrected, but apart fro all the time It has been the reater and sora surprises I would like the people to be surprised if we didn't do our duty, but not surprised that we did do it Of course, I don't eour duty, but I don't just kno to interpret his idea of it, because I have said the sa as I infor, that we had been and alould be doing our damnedest, and there could not be a more definite American expression of purpose than that

As to another s to think about and not things to say, if you will be kind enough to take it that way)