Part 6 (1/2)

The example of the loaned bus also serves against another principle sometimes put forth: that enjoyment and use and occupancy of something over a period of time gives one a t.i.tle or right over it. Some such principle presumably underlies rent-control laws, which give someone living in an apartment a right to live in it at (close to) a particular rent, even though the market price of the apartment has increased greatly. In a spirit of amity, I might point out to supporters of rent-control laws an even more efficient alternative, utilizing market mechanisms. A defect of rent-control laws is that they are inefficient; in particular they misallocate apartments. Suppose I am living in an apartment for some period of time at a rent of $100 per month, and the market price goes up to $200. Under the rent-control law, I will sit tight in the apartment at $100 per month. But it might be that you are willing to pay $200 per month for the apartment; furthermore, it might well be that I would prefer giving up the apartment if I could receive $200 a month for it. I would prefer to sublet the apartment to you, paying $1,200 rent to the owner and receiving $2,400 in rent from you for the apartment per year, and I would take some other apartment available on the market, renting at say $150 per month. This would give me $50 extra per month to spend on other things. Living in the apartment (paying $100 per month for it) isn't worth to me to me the cash difference between its market value and its controlled rent. If I could get this difference, I would be willing to give up the apartment. the cash difference between its market value and its controlled rent. If I could get this difference, I would be willing to give up the apartment.

This is very easily arranged, if I am allowed freely to sublet the apartment at the market rate, for as long as I wish. I am better off under such an arrangement than under the rent-control laws without the subletting provision. It gives me an extra option, though it doesn't force me to use it. You are better off, since you get the apartment for $200, which you're willing to pay, whereas you wouldn't get it under the rent-control law with no subletting provision. (Perhaps, during the period of your lease, you may sublet it to yet another person.) The owner of the building is not not worse off, since he receives $1,200 per year for the apartment in either case. Rent-control laws with subletting provisions allow people to improve their position via voluntary exchange; they are superior to rent-control laws without such provisions, and if the latter is better than no rent control at all, then worse off, since he receives $1,200 per year for the apartment in either case. Rent-control laws with subletting provisions allow people to improve their position via voluntary exchange; they are superior to rent-control laws without such provisions, and if the latter is better than no rent control at all, then a fortiori a fortiori so is rent control with subletting allowed. So why do people find the subletting-allowed system unacceptable? so is rent control with subletting allowed. So why do people find the subletting-allowed system unacceptable?bz Its defect is that it makes explicit the partial expropriation of the owner. Why should the renter of the apartment get the extra money upon the apartment's being sublet, rather than the owner of the building? It is easier to ignore the question of why he should get the subsidy given him by the rent-control law, rather than this value's going to the owner of the building. Its defect is that it makes explicit the partial expropriation of the owner. Why should the renter of the apartment get the extra money upon the apartment's being sublet, rather than the owner of the building? It is easier to ignore the question of why he should get the subsidy given him by the rent-control law, rather than this value's going to the owner of the building.

THE NONNEUTRAL STATE.

Since inequalities in economic position often have led to inequalities in political power, may not greater economic equality (and a more extensive state as a means of achieving it) be needed and justified in order to avoid the political inequalities with which economic inequalities are often correlated? Economically well-off persons desire greater political power, in a nonminimal state, because they can use this power to give themselves differential economic benefits. Where a locus of such power exists, it is not surprising that people attempt to use it for their own ends. The illegitimate use of a state by economic interests for their own ends is based upon a preexisting illegitimate power of the state to enrich some persons at the expense of others. Eliminate that that illegitimate power of giving differential economic benefits and you eliminate or drastically restrict the motive for wanting political influence. True, some persons still will thirst for political power, finding intrinsic satisfaction in dominating others. The minimal state best reduces the chances of such takeover or manipulation of the state by persons desiring power or economic benefits, especially if combined with a reasonably alert citizenry, since it is the minimally desirable target for such takeover or manipulation. Nothing much is to be gained by doing so; and the cost to the citizens if it occurs is minimized. To strengthen the state and extend the range of its functions as a way of preventing it from being used by some portion of the populace makes it a more valuable prize and a more alluring illegitimate power of giving differential economic benefits and you eliminate or drastically restrict the motive for wanting political influence. True, some persons still will thirst for political power, finding intrinsic satisfaction in dominating others. The minimal state best reduces the chances of such takeover or manipulation of the state by persons desiring power or economic benefits, especially if combined with a reasonably alert citizenry, since it is the minimally desirable target for such takeover or manipulation. Nothing much is to be gained by doing so; and the cost to the citizens if it occurs is minimized. To strengthen the state and extend the range of its functions as a way of preventing it from being used by some portion of the populace makes it a more valuable prize and a more alluring target target for corrupting by anyone able to offer an officeholder something desirable ; it is, to put it gently, a poor strategy. for corrupting by anyone able to offer an officeholder something desirable ; it is, to put it gently, a poor strategy.

One might think that the minimal state also is nonneutral with regard to its citizens. After all, it enforces contracts, prohibitions on aggression, on theft, and so on, and the end result of the operation of the process is one in which people's economic situations differ. Whereas without these enforcements (or with some others) the resulting distribution might differ, and some people's relative positions might be reversed. Suppose it were were in some people's interests to take or seize the property of others, or expropriate them. By using or threatening to use force to prevent this, isn't the minimal state in fact rendered nonneutral? in some people's interests to take or seize the property of others, or expropriate them. By using or threatening to use force to prevent this, isn't the minimal state in fact rendered nonneutral?

Not every enforcement of a prohibition which differentially benefits people makes the state nonneutral. Suppose some men are potential rapists of women, while no women are potential rapists of men or of each other. Would a prohibition against rape be nonneutral? It would, by hypothesis, differentially benefit people; but for potential rapists to complain that the prohibition was nonneutral between the s.e.xes, and therefore s.e.xist, would be absurd. There is an independent independent reason for prohibiting rape: (the reason why) people have a right to control their own bodies, to choose their s.e.xual partners, and to be secure against physical force and its threat. That a prohibition thus independently justifiable works out to affect different persons differently is no reason to condemn it as nonneutral, provided it was inst.i.tuted or continues for (something like) the reasons which justify it, and not in order to yield differential benefits. (How should it be viewed if it reason for prohibiting rape: (the reason why) people have a right to control their own bodies, to choose their s.e.xual partners, and to be secure against physical force and its threat. That a prohibition thus independently justifiable works out to affect different persons differently is no reason to condemn it as nonneutral, provided it was inst.i.tuted or continues for (something like) the reasons which justify it, and not in order to yield differential benefits. (How should it be viewed if it is is independently justifiable, but actually is supported and maintained because of its differential benefits?) To claim that a prohibition or rule is nonneutral independently justifiable, but actually is supported and maintained because of its differential benefits?) To claim that a prohibition or rule is nonneutral presupposes presupposes that it is unfair. that it is unfair.

Similarly with the prohibitions and enforcements of the minimal state. That such a state preserves and protects a process that works out with people having different holdings would be sufficient to condemn it as nonneutral only if only if there were no independent justification for the rules and prohibitions it enforces. But there is. Or, at least, the person who claims the minimal state is nonneutral cannot sidestep the issue of whether its structure and the content of its rules is independently justifiable. there were no independent justification for the rules and prohibitions it enforces. But there is. Or, at least, the person who claims the minimal state is nonneutral cannot sidestep the issue of whether its structure and the content of its rules is independently justifiable.ca In this chapter and in the previous one we have canva.s.sed the most important of the considerations that plausibly might be thought to justify a state more extensive than the minimal state. When scrutinized closely, none of these considerations succeeds in doing so (nor does their combination); the minimal state remains as the most extensive state that can be justified.

HOW REDISTRIBUTION OPERATES.

Our normative task in these two chapters is now complete, but perhaps something should be said about the actual operation of redistributive programs. It has often been noticed, both by proponents of laissez-faire capitalism and and by radicals, that the poor in the United States are not net beneficiaries of the total of government programs and interventions in the economy. Much of government regulation of industry was originated and is geared to protect the position of established firms against compet.i.tion, and many programs most greatly benefit the middle cla.s.s. The critics (from the right or the left) of these government programs have offered no explanation, to my knowledge, of by radicals, that the poor in the United States are not net beneficiaries of the total of government programs and interventions in the economy. Much of government regulation of industry was originated and is geared to protect the position of established firms against compet.i.tion, and many programs most greatly benefit the middle cla.s.s. The critics (from the right or the left) of these government programs have offered no explanation, to my knowledge, of why why the middle cla.s.s is the greatest net beneficiary. the middle cla.s.s is the greatest net beneficiary.

There is another puzzle about redistributive programs: why don't the least well-off 51 percent of the voters vote for redistributive policies that would greatly improve their position at the expense of the best-off 49 percent? That this would work against their own long-run interests is true, but this does not ring true as the explanation of their refraining. Nor is an adequate explanation provided by referring to the lack of organization, political savvy, and so forth, in the bottom majority. So why hasn't hasn't such ma.s.sive redistribution been voted? The fact will seem puzzling until one notices that the bottom 51 percent is not the only possible (continuous) voting majority; there is also, for example, the top 51 percent. Which of these two majorities will form depends on how the middle 2 percent votes. It will be in the interests of the top 49 percent to support and devise programs to gain the middle 2 percent as allies. It is cheaper for the top 49 percent to buy the support of the middle 2 percent than to be (partially) expropriated by the bottom 51 percent. The bottom 49 percent cannot offer more than the top 49 percent can to the middle 2 percent in order to gain them as allies. For what the bottom 49 percent offers the middle 2 percent will come (after the policies are inst.i.tuted) from the top 49 percent; and in addition the bottom 49 percent also will take something for themselves from the top 49 percent. The top 49 percent always can save by offering the middle 2 percent slightly more than the bottom group would, for that way they avoid such ma.s.sive redistribution been voted? The fact will seem puzzling until one notices that the bottom 51 percent is not the only possible (continuous) voting majority; there is also, for example, the top 51 percent. Which of these two majorities will form depends on how the middle 2 percent votes. It will be in the interests of the top 49 percent to support and devise programs to gain the middle 2 percent as allies. It is cheaper for the top 49 percent to buy the support of the middle 2 percent than to be (partially) expropriated by the bottom 51 percent. The bottom 49 percent cannot offer more than the top 49 percent can to the middle 2 percent in order to gain them as allies. For what the bottom 49 percent offers the middle 2 percent will come (after the policies are inst.i.tuted) from the top 49 percent; and in addition the bottom 49 percent also will take something for themselves from the top 49 percent. The top 49 percent always can save by offering the middle 2 percent slightly more than the bottom group would, for that way they avoid also also having to pay to the remainder of the possible coalition of the bottom 51 percent, namely the bottom 49 percent. The top group will be able always to buy the support of the swing middle 2 percent to combat measures which would more seriously violate its rights. having to pay to the remainder of the possible coalition of the bottom 51 percent, namely the bottom 49 percent. The top group will be able always to buy the support of the swing middle 2 percent to combat measures which would more seriously violate its rights.

Of course, speaking of the middle 2 percent is much too precise; people do not know precisely in what percentile they fall, and policies are not easily geared to target upon 2 percent somewhere in the middle. One therefore would expect that a middle group considerably considerably larger than 2 percent will be a beneficiary of a voting coalition from the top. larger than 2 percent will be a beneficiary of a voting coalition from the top.cb A voting coalition from the bottom won't form because it will be less expensive to the top group to buy off the swing middle group than to let it form. In answering one puzzle, we find a possible explanation of the other often noticed fact: that redistributive programs mainly benefit the middle cla.s.s. If correct, this explanation implies that a society whose policies result from democratic elections will not find it easy to avoid having its redistributive programs most benefit the middle cla.s.s. A voting coalition from the bottom won't form because it will be less expensive to the top group to buy off the swing middle group than to let it form. In answering one puzzle, we find a possible explanation of the other often noticed fact: that redistributive programs mainly benefit the middle cla.s.s. If correct, this explanation implies that a society whose policies result from democratic elections will not find it easy to avoid having its redistributive programs most benefit the middle cla.s.s.cc

CHAPTER 9.

Demoktesis We have justified the minimal state, overcoming individualist anarchist objections, and have found all of the major moral arguments for a more extensive or powerful state inadequate. Despite this, some readers will continue to find the minimal state frail and insubstantial.1 Robustness, in their view, would consist of some asymmetry in rights between the (individuals jointly composing the) state and an individual who remains in a state of nature with respect to it (and them). Furthermore, a robust state would have more power and a larger legitimate domain of action than defensive functions. There is no legitimate way to arrive at the asymmetry in rights. Is there some way to continue our story of the origin of the (minimal) state from the state of nature to arrive, via only legitimate steps which violate no one's rights, at something more closely resembling a modern state? Robustness, in their view, would consist of some asymmetry in rights between the (individuals jointly composing the) state and an individual who remains in a state of nature with respect to it (and them). Furthermore, a robust state would have more power and a larger legitimate domain of action than defensive functions. There is no legitimate way to arrive at the asymmetry in rights. Is there some way to continue our story of the origin of the (minimal) state from the state of nature to arrive, via only legitimate steps which violate no one's rights, at something more closely resembling a modern state? 2 2 Were such a continuation of the story possible, it would illuminate essential aspects of the more extensive states people everywhere now live under, laying bare their nature. I shall offer a modest effort in that direction. Were such a continuation of the story possible, it would illuminate essential aspects of the more extensive states people everywhere now live under, laying bare their nature. I shall offer a modest effort in that direction.

CONSISTENCY AND PARALLEL EXAMPLES.

But first something must be said about the difficulties in convincing someone to change his evaluation of a case by producing a parallel example. Suppose that you are trying to convince me to change my evaluation of a case in this way. If your parallel example is not close, I can accept your evaluation of it while maintaining my original evaluation of the case in question. The closer the parallel example, the more will I be p.r.o.ne to see it it through the filter of my original evaluation. (”That's not so bad after all, for it's just like....”) There is a similar difficulty with deductive arguments, because a person can reject one of the premisses he previously accepted rather than accept an unwelcome conclusion; but the difficulty often is less pressing. For a long chain of deductive reasoning enables one to start considerably far off, with premisses the person is sure of and won't see through the filter of his rejection of the conclusion. Whereas an example, to be a convincing parallel, must be very close by. (Of course, the longer the chain of reasoning the more p.r.o.ne the person will be to doubt that the conclusion through the filter of my original evaluation. (”That's not so bad after all, for it's just like....”) There is a similar difficulty with deductive arguments, because a person can reject one of the premisses he previously accepted rather than accept an unwelcome conclusion; but the difficulty often is less pressing. For a long chain of deductive reasoning enables one to start considerably far off, with premisses the person is sure of and won't see through the filter of his rejection of the conclusion. Whereas an example, to be a convincing parallel, must be very close by. (Of course, the longer the chain of reasoning the more p.r.o.ne the person will be to doubt that the conclusion does does follow; and a person can reconsider his acceptance of statements after he sees what follows from them.) follow; and a person can reconsider his acceptance of statements after he sees what follows from them.) You might try to isolate my judgment or evaluation about your starting place from my judgment or evaluation of the thing to be affected (thereby achieving the effect of a long chain of reasoning) by presenting a chain chain of examples. You begin with an example far off and step by step arrive at one exactly parallel in structure to the one under dispute. The challenge would be for me, who agrees with you about the far-off initial example (whose distance from the case in question has isolated it from the contamination of being seen through that case's perspective), to explain where and why, in the step-by-step sequence of pairwise similar examples, I change my judgment. But such challenges to draw the line rarely convince anyone. (”It's a problem to draw the line, I admit, but wherever it gets drawn it must be on the other side of my clear judgment about the case in question.”) of examples. You begin with an example far off and step by step arrive at one exactly parallel in structure to the one under dispute. The challenge would be for me, who agrees with you about the far-off initial example (whose distance from the case in question has isolated it from the contamination of being seen through that case's perspective), to explain where and why, in the step-by-step sequence of pairwise similar examples, I change my judgment. But such challenges to draw the line rarely convince anyone. (”It's a problem to draw the line, I admit, but wherever it gets drawn it must be on the other side of my clear judgment about the case in question.”) Your strongest case would be made by an exactly parallel example that was glowingly clear in its own right, so my initial judgment about it wouldn't be shaped or controverted by my judgment about the case under dispute. It is enormously difficult to find such lovely examples. Even with one, you would face the task of explaining wherein it differs from its parallel (under dispute), so that I make one judgment about it and another about the parallel; and and also the task of showing that also the task of showing that this this difference does difference does not not make the cases, for the purposes of the argument, make the cases, for the purposes of the argument, non non parallel. parallel.3 There is a more general puzzle about consistency arguments which lean heavily on the question, ”How do you distinguish this case from that?” Philosophers of science often claim that for any given body of data there are an infinite number of possible explanations ; for the explanatory relation E and any body of data d, d, an infinite number of alternative potential explanations stand in the relation E to an infinite number of alternative potential explanations stand in the relation E to d. d. We shall not linger long over why this is said. (Is it We shall not linger long over why this is said. (Is it really really enough merely to say that through any finite number of points an infinite number of different curves can be drawn?) There has not, to my knowledge, been any argument presented to show that for each body of data there exists at least enough merely to say that through any finite number of points an infinite number of different curves can be drawn?) There has not, to my knowledge, been any argument presented to show that for each body of data there exists at least one one explanation, much less an infinite number! It is difficult to know whether the claim is true (one would like to see it proven as a theorem) in the absence of an adequate account of the relation explanation, much less an infinite number! It is difficult to know whether the claim is true (one would like to see it proven as a theorem) in the absence of an adequate account of the relation E. E. If all we yet possess are necessary conditions for If all we yet possess are necessary conditions for E, E, perhaps the imposition of further conditions to attain sufficiency will so restrict perhaps the imposition of further conditions to attain sufficiency will so restrict E E that there won't be an infinite number of things standing in that there won't be an infinite number of things standing in E E to to d d. (Though perhaps there is a general argument to show how one can always get new things standing in E E to to d, d, out of old ones that so stand, without repet.i.tions, on out of old ones that so stand, without repet.i.tions, on any any plausible construal of plausible construal of E E.) The usual conditions on explanation require that what stands in E E to to d d essentially contain some lawlike or theoretical statement. In the moral case, what correspond to lawlike statements are moral principles. Isn't it equally plausible (or implausible) to suppose that essentially contain some lawlike or theoretical statement. In the moral case, what correspond to lawlike statements are moral principles. Isn't it equally plausible (or implausible) to suppose that any any given set of particular moral judgments can be accounted for by an infinite number of alternative moral principles (not all of them correct)? The usual requirement that moral principles not contain proper names, indexical expressions, and so on, corresponds to the requirement of the philosopher of science that fundamental lawlike statements not contain positional predicates. given set of particular moral judgments can be accounted for by an infinite number of alternative moral principles (not all of them correct)? The usual requirement that moral principles not contain proper names, indexical expressions, and so on, corresponds to the requirement of the philosopher of science that fundamental lawlike statements not contain positional predicates.4 The hope of using generalization conditions to reach the result that only one general moral principle is compatible with a large number of particular moral judgments seems akin to supposing that only one fundamental lawlike statement would account for a given body of data. And, hoping to s.h.i.+ft someone off a particular moral judgment by challenging him to distinguish it from another judgment he refuses to make, that is to reconcile it with the opposite judgment he makes, seems akin to supposing that for some logically consistent body of data there is The hope of using generalization conditions to reach the result that only one general moral principle is compatible with a large number of particular moral judgments seems akin to supposing that only one fundamental lawlike statement would account for a given body of data. And, hoping to s.h.i.+ft someone off a particular moral judgment by challenging him to distinguish it from another judgment he refuses to make, that is to reconcile it with the opposite judgment he makes, seems akin to supposing that for some logically consistent body of data there is no no fundamental lawlike statement or set of fundamental lawlike statements that would account for it. fundamental lawlike statement or set of fundamental lawlike statements that would account for it.

These suppositions are very strong and go far beyond anything anyone has shown. What then can anyone hope to prove by generalization arguments in ethics? More plausible than the belief that no fundamental moral statement at all (satisfying generalization conditions) accounts for both of the judgments a person makes is the belief that no fundamental moral statement does so which uses only concepts available to that that person. And one may think one reasonably can demand, if not that the person person. And one may think one reasonably can demand, if not that the person come up come up with the fundamental moral statement which accounts for his judgments, at least that there with the fundamental moral statement which accounts for his judgments, at least that there be be one in his moral universe; that is, one using only one in his moral universe; that is, one using only his his moral concepts. There is no guarantee that this will be so; and it is plausible to claim that he may not merely reply: ”Well, some moral genius could think up new moral concepts and theoretical terms, as yet undreamt of, and in terms of them account for all of my particular judgments via only fundamental principles.” One would have to explain and explore the reasons why a person cannot just rest content with the belief that some fundamental moral law or laws (using some concepts or other) account for all of his judgments. This would appear to be a manageable task. moral concepts. There is no guarantee that this will be so; and it is plausible to claim that he may not merely reply: ”Well, some moral genius could think up new moral concepts and theoretical terms, as yet undreamt of, and in terms of them account for all of my particular judgments via only fundamental principles.” One would have to explain and explore the reasons why a person cannot just rest content with the belief that some fundamental moral law or laws (using some concepts or other) account for all of his judgments. This would appear to be a manageable task.

The difficulties about parallel examples mentioned above apply to our current procedure. In the probably vain hope that something can be done about the contamination of judgment when one case is seen through a settled view about another, I ask the reader to catch and check himself if he finds himself thinking, ”But that's not so bad, because it's just like....” Now for the derivation of a more extensive state from our minimal one.

THE MORE-THAN-MINIMAL STATE DERIVED.

In the state of nature, property is acquired initially, let us suppose, in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition, and thereafter in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, by exchange of owned property for owned property or for services or commitments, or by means of gifts. Perhaps the precise contour of the bundle of property rights is shaped by considerations about how externalities may be most efficiently internalized (with minimum cost, and so on).5 This notion merits some examination. The property rights of others internalize negative externalities of your activities insofar as you are required to compensate these others for your activities' effects on their property; your property rights internalize positive externalities of your activities insofar as these activities raise the value of things that you can first acquire property rights in. Given boundaries drawn, we can see, roughly and abstractly, what a system that internalized all negative externalities would be like. What, though, would the full internalization of all This notion merits some examination. The property rights of others internalize negative externalities of your activities insofar as you are required to compensate these others for your activities' effects on their property; your property rights internalize positive externalities of your activities insofar as these activities raise the value of things that you can first acquire property rights in. Given boundaries drawn, we can see, roughly and abstractly, what a system that internalized all negative externalities would be like. What, though, would the full internalization of all positive positive externalities involve? In its strong form, it would involve your (each person's) receiving the full benefits of your (his) activities to others. Since benefits are hard to create, let us imagine this involves the transfer of benefits from others to you, returning the others to the same indifference curve they would have occupied if not for your activities. (In the absence of unrestrictedly transferrable utility, there is no guarantee that this internalization will lead to the agent's receiving the same amount of benefit as the recipient would have without this internalization.) At first, it strikes one that such strong internalization would eliminate externalities involve? In its strong form, it would involve your (each person's) receiving the full benefits of your (his) activities to others. Since benefits are hard to create, let us imagine this involves the transfer of benefits from others to you, returning the others to the same indifference curve they would have occupied if not for your activities. (In the absence of unrestrictedly transferrable utility, there is no guarantee that this internalization will lead to the agent's receiving the same amount of benefit as the recipient would have without this internalization.) At first, it strikes one that such strong internalization would eliminate all all benefits of living in society with others; for each benefit you receive from others is removed and transferred (insofar as possible) back to these others. But since people will desire receiving this payback for benefits rendered, in a free society there will be compet.i.tion among people to provide benefits for others. The resulting market price for providing these benefits will be lower than the highest price the recipient would be willing to pay, and this consumers' surplus would be a benefit of living in a society with others. Even if the society were not free and did not allow price compet.i.tion among potential providers of a benefit (but instead used some other selection device to determine who would provide the benefit) there still would be benefit to living in a society with others. In each situation of full payback for benefits received, there also is full receipt for benefits provided to others. So the advantages of living in society under this scheme would not be the benefits others provide you, but rather the payback they give you for the benefits you provide them. benefits of living in society with others; for each benefit you receive from others is removed and transferred (insofar as possible) back to these others. But since people will desire receiving this payback for benefits rendered, in a free society there will be compet.i.tion among people to provide benefits for others. The resulting market price for providing these benefits will be lower than the highest price the recipient would be willing to pay, and this consumers' surplus would be a benefit of living in a society with others. Even if the society were not free and did not allow price compet.i.tion among potential providers of a benefit (but instead used some other selection device to determine who would provide the benefit) there still would be benefit to living in a society with others. In each situation of full payback for benefits received, there also is full receipt for benefits provided to others. So the advantages of living in society under this scheme would not be the benefits others provide you, but rather the payback they give you for the benefits you provide them.