Part 5 (1/2)

At the very least, we can parallel these statements about desert with ones about ent.i.tlements. And if, correctly, we describe people as ent.i.tled to their natural a.s.sets even if it's not the case that they can be said to deserve them, then the argument parallel to E above, with ”are ent.i.tled to” replacing ”deserve” throughout, will go through. This gives us the acceptable argument G: 1. People are ent.i.tled to their natural a.s.sets.2. If people are ent.i.tled to something, they are ent.i.tled to whatever flows from it (via specified types of processes).3. People's holdings flow from their natural a.s.sets.Therefore,4. People are ent.i.tled to their holdings.5. If people are ent.i.tled to something, then they ought to have it (and this overrides any presumption of equality there may be about holdings).

Whether or not people's natural a.s.sets are arbitrary from a moral point of view, they are ent.i.tled to them, and to what flows from them.bj A recognition of people's ent.i.tlements to their natural a.s.sets (the first premiss of argument G) might be necessary to avoid the stringent application of the difference principle which would lead, we already have seen, to even stronger property rights in other persons than redistributive theories usually yield. Rawls feels that he avoids this 42 42 because people in his original position rank the principle of liberty as lexicographically prior to the difference principle, applied not only to economic well-being but to health, length of life, and so on. (However, see note 29 above.) because people in his original position rank the principle of liberty as lexicographically prior to the difference principle, applied not only to economic well-being but to health, length of life, and so on. (However, see note 29 above.) We have found no cogent argument to (help) establish that dif ferences in holding arising from differences in natural a.s.sets should be eliminated or minimized. Can the theme that people's natural a.s.sets are arbitrary from a moral point of view be used differently, for example, to justify a certain shaping shaping of the original position? Clearly if the shaping is designed to nullify differences in holdings due to differences in natural a.s.sets, we need an argument for this goal, and we are back to our unsuccessful quest for the route to the conclusion that such differences in holdings ought to be nullified. Instead, the shaping might take place by excluding the partic.i.p.ants in the original position from knowing of their own natural endowments. In this way the fact that natural endowments are arbitrary from a moral point of view would help to impose and to justify the veil of ignorance. But how does it do this; why should knowledge of natural endowments be excluded from the original position? Presumably the underlying principle would be that if any particular features are arbitrary from a moral point of view, then persons in the original position should not know they possess them. But this would exclude their knowing of the original position? Clearly if the shaping is designed to nullify differences in holdings due to differences in natural a.s.sets, we need an argument for this goal, and we are back to our unsuccessful quest for the route to the conclusion that such differences in holdings ought to be nullified. Instead, the shaping might take place by excluding the partic.i.p.ants in the original position from knowing of their own natural endowments. In this way the fact that natural endowments are arbitrary from a moral point of view would help to impose and to justify the veil of ignorance. But how does it do this; why should knowledge of natural endowments be excluded from the original position? Presumably the underlying principle would be that if any particular features are arbitrary from a moral point of view, then persons in the original position should not know they possess them. But this would exclude their knowing anything anything about themselves, for each of their features (including rationality, the ability to make choices, having a life span of more than three days, having a memory, being able to communicate with other organisms like themselves) will be based upon the fact that the sperm and ovum which produced them contained particular genetic material. The physical fact that those particular gametes contained particular organized chemicals (the genes for people rather than for muskrats or trees) is arbitrary about themselves, for each of their features (including rationality, the ability to make choices, having a life span of more than three days, having a memory, being able to communicate with other organisms like themselves) will be based upon the fact that the sperm and ovum which produced them contained particular genetic material. The physical fact that those particular gametes contained particular organized chemicals (the genes for people rather than for muskrats or trees) is arbitrary from a moral point of view; from a moral point of view; it is, from a moral point of view, an accident. Yet the persons in the original position are to know some of their attributes. it is, from a moral point of view, an accident. Yet the persons in the original position are to know some of their attributes.

Perhaps we are too quick when we suggest excluding knowledge of rationality, and so forth, merely because these features arise from arise from morally arbitrary facts. For these features also have moral significance ; that is, moral facts depend upon or arise from them. Here we see an ambiguity in saying that a fact is arbitrary from a moral point of view. It might mean that there is no moral reason why the fact ought to be that way, or it might mean that the fact's being that way is of no moral significance and has no moral consequences. Rationality, the ability to make choices, and so on, are not morally arbitrary in this second sense. But if they escape exclusion on this ground, now the problem is that the natural a.s.sets, knowledge of which Rawls wishes to exclude from the original position, are not morally arbitrary in this sense either. At any rate, the ent.i.tlement theory's claim that moral ent.i.tlements may arise from or be partially based upon such facts is what is now at issue. Thus, in the absence of an argument to the effect that dif ferences in holdings due to differences in natural a.s.sets ought to be nullified, it is not clear how anything about the original position can be based upon the (ambiguous) claim that differences in natural a.s.sets are arbitrary from a moral point of view. morally arbitrary facts. For these features also have moral significance ; that is, moral facts depend upon or arise from them. Here we see an ambiguity in saying that a fact is arbitrary from a moral point of view. It might mean that there is no moral reason why the fact ought to be that way, or it might mean that the fact's being that way is of no moral significance and has no moral consequences. Rationality, the ability to make choices, and so on, are not morally arbitrary in this second sense. But if they escape exclusion on this ground, now the problem is that the natural a.s.sets, knowledge of which Rawls wishes to exclude from the original position, are not morally arbitrary in this sense either. At any rate, the ent.i.tlement theory's claim that moral ent.i.tlements may arise from or be partially based upon such facts is what is now at issue. Thus, in the absence of an argument to the effect that dif ferences in holdings due to differences in natural a.s.sets ought to be nullified, it is not clear how anything about the original position can be based upon the (ambiguous) claim that differences in natural a.s.sets are arbitrary from a moral point of view.

COLLECTIVE a.s.sETS.

Rawls' view seems to be that everyone has some ent.i.tlement or claim on the totality of natural a.s.sets (viewed as a pool), with no one having differential claims. The distribution of natural abilities is viewed as a ”collective a.s.set.” 43 43

We see then that the difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common a.s.set and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be. Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out.... No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society. But it does not follow that one should eliminate these distinctions. There is another way to deal with them. The basic structure can be arranged so that these contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate.44

People will differ in how they view regarding natural talents as a common a.s.set. Some will complain, echoing Rawls against utilitarianism, 45 45 that this ”does not take seriously the distinction between persons”; and they will wonder whether any reconstruction of Kant that treats people's abilities and talents as resources for others can be adequate. ”The two principles of justice ... rule out even the tendency to regard men as means to one another's welfare.” that this ”does not take seriously the distinction between persons”; and they will wonder whether any reconstruction of Kant that treats people's abilities and talents as resources for others can be adequate. ”The two principles of justice ... rule out even the tendency to regard men as means to one another's welfare.” 46 46 Only if one presses Only if one presses very very hard on the distinction between men and their talents, a.s.sets, abilities, and special traits. Whether any coherent conception of a person remains when the distinction is so pressed is an open question. Why we, thick with particular traits, should be cheered that (only) the thus purified men within us are not regarded as means is also unclear. hard on the distinction between men and their talents, a.s.sets, abilities, and special traits. Whether any coherent conception of a person remains when the distinction is so pressed is an open question. Why we, thick with particular traits, should be cheered that (only) the thus purified men within us are not regarded as means is also unclear.

People's talents and abilities are are an a.s.set to a free community; others in the community benefit from their presence and are better off because they are there rather than elsewhere or nowhere. (Otherwise they wouldn't choose to deal with them.) Life, over time, is not a constant-sum game, wherein if greater ability or effort leads to some getting more, that means that others must lose. In a free society, people's talents do benefit others, and not only themselves. Is it the extraction of even more benefit to others that is supposed to justify treating people's natural a.s.sets as a collective resource? What justifies this extraction? an a.s.set to a free community; others in the community benefit from their presence and are better off because they are there rather than elsewhere or nowhere. (Otherwise they wouldn't choose to deal with them.) Life, over time, is not a constant-sum game, wherein if greater ability or effort leads to some getting more, that means that others must lose. In a free society, people's talents do benefit others, and not only themselves. Is it the extraction of even more benefit to others that is supposed to justify treating people's natural a.s.sets as a collective resource? What justifies this extraction?

No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society. But it does not follow that one should eliminate these distinctions. There is another way to deal with them. The basic structure can be arranged so that these contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate.47

And if there weren't ”another way to deal with them”? Would it then follow that one should eliminate these distinctions? What exactly would be contemplated in the case of natural a.s.sets? If people's a.s.sets and talents couldn't couldn't be harnessed to serve others, would something be done to remove these exceptional a.s.sets and talents, or to forbid them from being exercised for the person's own benefit or that of someone else he chose, even though this limitation wouldn't improve the absolute position of those somehow unable to harness the talents and abilities of others for their own benefit? Is it so implausible to claim that envy underlies this conception of justice, forming part of its root notion? be harnessed to serve others, would something be done to remove these exceptional a.s.sets and talents, or to forbid them from being exercised for the person's own benefit or that of someone else he chose, even though this limitation wouldn't improve the absolute position of those somehow unable to harness the talents and abilities of others for their own benefit? Is it so implausible to claim that envy underlies this conception of justice, forming part of its root notion?bk We have used our ent.i.tlement conception of justice in holdings to probe Rawls' theory, sharpening our understanding of what the ent.i.tlement conception involves by bringing it to bear upon an alternative conception of distributive justice, one that is deep and elegant. Also, I believe, we have probed deep-lying inadequacies in Rawls' theory. I am mindful of Rawls' reiterated point that a theory cannot be evaluated by focusing upon a single feature or part of it; instead the whole theory must be a.s.sessed (the reader will not know how whole a theory can be until he has read all of Rawls' book), and a perfect theory is not to be expected. However we have examined an important part of Rawls' theory, and its crucial underlying a.s.sumptions. I am as well aware as anyone of how sketchy my discussion of the ent.i.tlement conception of justice in holdings has been. But I no more believe we need to have formulated a complete alternative theory in order to reject Rawls' undeniably great advance over utilitarianism, than Rawls needed a complete alternative theory before he could reject utilitarianism. What more does one need or can one have, in order to begin progressing toward a better theory, than a sketch of a plausible alternative view, which from its very different perspective highlights the inadequacies of the best existing well-worked-out theory? Here, as in so many things, we learn from Rawls.

We began this chapter's investigation of distributive justice in order to consider the claim that a state more extensive than the minimal state could be justified on the grounds that it was necessary, or the most appropriate instrument, to achieve distributive justice. According to the ent.i.tlement conception of justice in holdings that we have presented, there is no argument based upon the first two principles of distributive justice, the principles of acquisition and of transfer, for such a more extensive state. If the set of holdings is properly generated, there is no argument for a more extensive state based upon distributive justice.48 (Nor, we have claimed, will the Lockean proviso actually provide occasion for a more extensive state.) If, however, these principles are violated, the principle of rectification comes into play. Perhaps it is best to view some patterned principles of distributive justice as rough rules of thumb meant to approximate the general results of applying the principle of rectification of injustice. For example, lacking much historical information, and a.s.suming (I) that victims of injustice generally do worse than they otherwise would and (2) that those from the least well-off group in the society have the highest probabilities of being the (descendants of) victims of the most serious injustice who are owed compensation by those who benefited from the injustices (a.s.sumed to be those better off, though sometimes the perpetrators will be others in the worst-off group), then a (Nor, we have claimed, will the Lockean proviso actually provide occasion for a more extensive state.) If, however, these principles are violated, the principle of rectification comes into play. Perhaps it is best to view some patterned principles of distributive justice as rough rules of thumb meant to approximate the general results of applying the principle of rectification of injustice. For example, lacking much historical information, and a.s.suming (I) that victims of injustice generally do worse than they otherwise would and (2) that those from the least well-off group in the society have the highest probabilities of being the (descendants of) victims of the most serious injustice who are owed compensation by those who benefited from the injustices (a.s.sumed to be those better off, though sometimes the perpetrators will be others in the worst-off group), then a rough rough rule of thumb for rectifying injustices might seem to be the following: organize society so as to maximize the position of whatever group ends up least well-off in the society. This particular example may well be implausible, but an important question for each society will be the following: given rule of thumb for rectifying injustices might seem to be the following: organize society so as to maximize the position of whatever group ends up least well-off in the society. This particular example may well be implausible, but an important question for each society will be the following: given its its particular history, what operable rule of thumb best approximates the results of a detailed application in that society of the principle of rectification? These issues are very complex and are best left to a full treatment of the principle of rectification. In the absence of such a treatment applied to a particular society, one particular history, what operable rule of thumb best approximates the results of a detailed application in that society of the principle of rectification? These issues are very complex and are best left to a full treatment of the principle of rectification. In the absence of such a treatment applied to a particular society, one cannot cannot use the a.n.a.lysis and theory presented here to condemn any particular scheme of transfer payments, unless it is clear that no considerations of rectification of injustice could apply to justify it. Although to introduce socialism as the punishment for our sins would be to go too far, past injustices might be so great as to make necessary in the short run a more extensive state in order to rectify them. use the a.n.a.lysis and theory presented here to condemn any particular scheme of transfer payments, unless it is clear that no considerations of rectification of injustice could apply to justify it. Although to introduce socialism as the punishment for our sins would be to go too far, past injustices might be so great as to make necessary in the short run a more extensive state in order to rectify them.

CHAPTER 8.

Equality, Envy, Exploitation, Etc.

EQUALITY.

THE legitimacy of altering social inst.i.tutions to achieve greater equality of material condition is, though often a.s.sumed, rarely argued argued for. Writers note that in a given country the wealthiest for. Writers note that in a given country the wealthiest n n percent of the population holds more than that percentage of the wealth, and the poorest percent of the population holds more than that percentage of the wealth, and the poorest n n percent holds less; that to get to the wealth of the top percent holds less; that to get to the wealth of the top n n percent from the poorest, one must look at the bottom percent from the poorest, one must look at the bottom p p percent (where percent (where p p is vastly greater than is vastly greater than n), n), and so forth. They then proceed immediately to discuss how this might be altered. On the ent.i.tlement conception of justice in holdings, one and so forth. They then proceed immediately to discuss how this might be altered. On the ent.i.tlement conception of justice in holdings, one cannot cannot decide whether the state must do something to alter the situation merely by looking at a distributional profile or at facts such as these. It depends upon how the distribution came about. Some processes yielding these results would be legitimate, and the various parties would be ent.i.tled to their respective holdings. If these distributional facts decide whether the state must do something to alter the situation merely by looking at a distributional profile or at facts such as these. It depends upon how the distribution came about. Some processes yielding these results would be legitimate, and the various parties would be ent.i.tled to their respective holdings. If these distributional facts did did arise by a legitimate process, then they themselves are legitimate. This is, of course, arise by a legitimate process, then they themselves are legitimate. This is, of course, not not to say that they may not be changed, provided this can be done without violating people's ent.i.tlements. Any persons who favor a particular end-state pattern may choose to transfer some or all of their own holdings so as (at least temporarily) more nearly to realize their desired pattern. to say that they may not be changed, provided this can be done without violating people's ent.i.tlements. Any persons who favor a particular end-state pattern may choose to transfer some or all of their own holdings so as (at least temporarily) more nearly to realize their desired pattern.

The ent.i.tlement conception of justice in holdings makes no presumption in favor of equality, or any other overall end state or patterning. It cannot merely be a.s.sumed a.s.sumed that equality must be built into any theory of justice. There is a surprising dearth of arguments for equality capable of coming to grips with the considerations that underlie a nonglobal and nonpatterned conception of justice in holdings. that equality must be built into any theory of justice. There is a surprising dearth of arguments for equality capable of coming to grips with the considerations that underlie a nonglobal and nonpatterned conception of justice in holdings.1 (However, there is no lack of unsupported statements of a presumption in favor of equality.) I shall consider the argument which has received the most attention from philosophers in recent years; that offered by Bernard Williams in his influential essay ”The Idea of Equality.” (However, there is no lack of unsupported statements of a presumption in favor of equality.) I shall consider the argument which has received the most attention from philosophers in recent years; that offered by Bernard Williams in his influential essay ”The Idea of Equality.” 2 2 (No doubt many readers will feel that all hangs on some other argument; I would like to see (No doubt many readers will feel that all hangs on some other argument; I would like to see that that argument precisely set out, in detail.) argument precisely set out, in detail.)

Leaving aside preventive medicine, the proper ground of distribution of medical care is ill health: this is a necessary truth. Now in very many societies, while ill health may work as a necessary condition of receiving treatment, it does not work as a sufficient condition, since such treatment costs money, and not all who are ill have the money; hence the possession of sufficient money becomes in fact an additional necessary condition of actually receiving treatment.... When we have the situation in which, for instance, wealth is a further necessary condition of the receipt of medical treatment, we can once more apply the notions of equality and inequality: not now in connection with the inequality between the well and the ill, but in connection with the inequality between the rich ill and the poor ill, since we have straightforwardly the situation of those whose needs are the same not receiving the same treatment, though the needs are the ground of the treatment. This is an irrational state of affairs ... it is a situation in which reasons are insufficiently operative; it is a situation insufficiently controlled by reasons-and hence by reason itself.3

Williams seems to be arguing that if among the different descriptions applying to an activity, there is one that contains an ”internal goal” of the activity, then (it is a necessary truth that) the only proper grounds for the performance of the activity, or its allocation if it is scarce, are connected with the effective achievement of the internal goal. If the activity is done upon others, the only proper criterion for distributing the activity is their need for it, if any. Thus it is that Williams says (it is a necessary truth that) the only proper criterion for the distribution of medical care is medical need. Presumably, then, the only proper criterion for the distribution of barbering services is barbering need. But why must the internal goal of the activity take precedence over, for example, the person's particular purpose in performing the activity? (We ignore the question of whether one activity can fall under two different descriptions involving different internal goals.) If someone becomes a barber because he likes talking to a variety of different people, and so on, is it unjust of him to allocate his services to those he most likes to talk to? Or if he works as a barber in order to earn money to pay tuition at school, may he cut the hair of only those who pay or tip well? Why may not a barber use exactly the same criteria in allocating his services as someone else whose activities have no internal goal involving others? Need a gardener allocate his services to those lawns which need him most?