Part 6 (2/2)

Here, however, the scheme becomes incoherent if pushed to another level. For you benefit from living in a society where others repay you for the benefits you provide them. Is this this benefit that the presence of others provides you to be internalized as well, so that you pay back fully for that? Do you, for example, pay back your expected payback from others? Clearly this question can be iterated an indefinite number of times, and since receiving payback is a benefit of coexisting with others, there can be no stable result of internalizing benefit that the presence of others provides you to be internalized as well, so that you pay back fully for that? Do you, for example, pay back your expected payback from others? Clearly this question can be iterated an indefinite number of times, and since receiving payback is a benefit of coexisting with others, there can be no stable result of internalizing all all positive externalities. Considerations about drawing forth the activities would lead to a system of person positive externalities. Considerations about drawing forth the activities would lead to a system of person X X's paying back Y Y for ”ordinary” benefits for ”ordinary” benefits Y Y provides, instead of one in which provides, instead of one in which Y Y pays pays X X back for the benefits back for the benefits Y Y receives from receives from X X by by X X's being present and paying Y Y under the ”ordinary” system. For under the latter system the benefits would not get provided initially. Also, since it rides piggyback on the ”ordinary” one, it cannot under the ”ordinary” system. For under the latter system the benefits would not get provided initially. Also, since it rides piggyback on the ”ordinary” one, it cannot replace replace it. In the absence of the ”ordinary” system and it. In the absence of the ”ordinary” system and its its payback benefits, there is nothing for the latter system to operate upon. payback benefits, there is nothing for the latter system to operate upon.

Economists' discussions of internalizing positive externalities do not focus upon the strong strong principle of full payback of benefits. Rather, their concern is that there be more than sufficient payback to cover the costs to the agent of performing the activity with the positive externalities, so that the activity will be called forth. It is this principle of full payback of benefits. Rather, their concern is that there be more than sufficient payback to cover the costs to the agent of performing the activity with the positive externalities, so that the activity will be called forth. It is this weak weak form of payback, which suffices for economic efficiency, that const.i.tutes the subject of the economic literature on internalizing (positive) externalities. form of payback, which suffices for economic efficiency, that const.i.tutes the subject of the economic literature on internalizing (positive) externalities.

Returning to our derivation of a more-than-minimal state: people do not conceive of owners.h.i.+p as having a thing, but as possessing rights (perhaps connected with a thing) which are theoretically separable. Property rights are viewed as rights to determine which of a specified range of admissible options concerning something will be realized. Admissible options are those that do not cross another's moral boundary; to reuse an example, one's property right in a knife does not include the right to replace it between someone else's ribs against their will (unless in justified punishment for a crime, or self-defense, and so on). One person can possess one right about a thing, another person another right about the same thing. Neighbors immediately surrounding a house can buy the right to determine what color its exterior will be, while the person living within has the right to determine what (admissible thing) will happen inside the structure. Furthermore, several people can jointly possess the same right, using some decision procedure to determine how that right would be exercised. As for people's economic situation, the free operation of the market, some people's voluntarily uniting (kibbutzim, and so on), private philanthropy, and so on, greatly reduces private dest.i.tution. But we may suppose it either not wholly eliminated, or alternatively that some people are greatly desirous of even more goods and services. With all this as background, how might a state more extensive than the minimal one arise?

Some of these people desirous of more money hit upon the idea of incorporating themselves, of raising money by selling shares in themselves. They part.i.tion the rights that until that time each person alone possessed over himself into a long list of discrete rights. These include the right to decide which occupation he would have a try at making a living in, the right to determine what type of clothing he would wear, the right to determine whom of those willing to marry him he would marry, the right to determine where he would live, the right to determine whether he would smoke marijuana, the right to decide which books he would read of all those others were willing to write and publish, and so on. Some of this vast array of rights these people continue to hold for themselves, as before. The others they place on the market; they sell separate shares of owners.h.i.+p in these particular rights over themselves.

At first, solely as a joke or a novelty, people pay money to buy partial owners.h.i.+p of such rights. It becomes a fad to give another person gifts of ridiculous stock, either in oneself or in a third person. But even before the fad wears thin, others see more serious possibilities. They propose selling rights in themselves that might be of real use or benefit to others: the right to decide from which persons they could buy certain services (which they call occupational licensure rights); the right to decide what countries they would buy goods from (import-control rights); the right to decide whether or not they would use LSD, or heroin, or tobacco, or calcium cyclamate (drug rights); the right to decide what proportion of their income would go to various purposes independently of whether they approved of these purposes (tax rights); the right to determine their permitted mode and manner of s.e.xual activity (vice rights); the right to decide when and whether they would fight against and kill whom (draft rights); the right to decide the range of prices within which they could make exchanges (wage-price-control rights); the right to decide what grounds were illegitimate in hiring or selling or renting decisions (antidiscrimination rights); the right to force them to partic.i.p.ate in the operation of a judicial system (subpoena rights); the right to requisition bodily parts for transplantation in the more needy (physical equality rights); and so on. and so on. For various reasons of their own, other people want these rights or want to exercise a say in them, and so enormous numbers of shares are bought and sold, sometimes for considerable sums of money. For various reasons of their own, other people want these rights or want to exercise a say in them, and so enormous numbers of shares are bought and sold, sometimes for considerable sums of money.

Perhaps no persons completely sell themselves into slavery, or perhaps the protective a.s.sociations do not enforce such contracts. At any rate, there are at most only a few complete slaves. Almost everyone who sells any such rights sells only enough to bring the total (though very very extensive) up to owners.h.i.+p with some limits on its extent. Since there extensive) up to owners.h.i.+p with some limits on its extent. Since there are are some limits to the rights others hold in them, they are not completely enslaved. But many persons have the separate rights in themselves they put up for sale all bought up by one other individual or a small group. Thus even though there are some limits to the ent.i.tlement of the owner(s), considerable oppression is felt by these narrowly held people, subject to their shareholder's desires. Since this very extensive domination of some persons by others arises by a series of legitimate steps, via volunatry exchanges, from an initial situation that is not unjust, it itself is not unjust. But though not unjust, some find it intolerable. some limits to the rights others hold in them, they are not completely enslaved. But many persons have the separate rights in themselves they put up for sale all bought up by one other individual or a small group. Thus even though there are some limits to the ent.i.tlement of the owner(s), considerable oppression is felt by these narrowly held people, subject to their shareholder's desires. Since this very extensive domination of some persons by others arises by a series of legitimate steps, via volunatry exchanges, from an initial situation that is not unjust, it itself is not unjust. But though not unjust, some find it intolerable.

Persons newly incorporating themselves write into the terms of each stock the provision that it not be sold to anyone already owning more than a certain number of shares of that stock. (Since the more restrictive the conditions, the less valuable the stock, the number set is not very low.) Over time many of the original small holding companies in a person disintegrate, either because the owners sell their shares in scattered fas.h.i.+on when in economic need, or because many persons buy shares in the holding companies so that at the level of ultimate owners.h.i.+p there is enlarged and more widely dispersed shareholding in the person. As time goes on, for one reason or another just about everyone sells off rights in themselves, keeping one share in each right as their own, so they can attend the stockholders' meeting if they wish. (Given the minuscule power of their vote at these meetings, and the inattention with which their occasional speeches are heard, perhaps it is solely for reasons of sentiment that they retain shares in themselves.) The enormous number of shares held and the dispersal in owners.h.i.+p of these shares leads to considerable chaos and inefficiency. Large stockholder meetings are constantly being held to make the varied decisions now subject to external determination: one about a person's hairstyle, another about his lifestyle, another about another's hairstyle, and so on. Some people spend most of their time attending stockholders' meetings or signing proxies over to others. Division of labor creates the special occupation of stockholders' representative, persons who spend all of their time at different meetings. Various reform movements, called ”consolidation movements,” come into being; two sorts are tried widely. There are the individual consolidating stockholders' meetings in which all who own any sort of stock in any right over some particular specified person meet together to vote. They vote one question at a time, with only those eligible on each question voting. (This consolidation increases efficiency because people who own some share in any right in a particular person tend to own shares in other rights in him as well.) Also there are the consolidated shareholders' meetings in which all persons holding shares in a given right in anyone meet together and vote; for example, the drug conventions, with votes taken on each person consecutively. (The increased efficiency here is gotten because people who buy a share of a particular right in one person tend to acquire shares in the same right in other persons.) Still, even with all of these consolidations it is an impossibly complex situation, taking inordinate time. People try to sell off shares, holding onto one of a kind, ”to have some say” as they put it. As people try to sell, the price of each share drops drastically, leading others to buy token shares of rights they don't yet hold. (Such shares are traded like baseball cards, with people trying to ama.s.s complete collections. Children are encouraged to collect as a way of preparing them for their future role of shareholder.) This great dispersal of shares essentially ends the domination of one person by another identifiable person or small group. by another identifiable person or small group. People are no longer under the thumb of People are no longer under the thumb of one one another. Instead almost everybody is deciding about them, and they are deciding about almost everybody. The another. Instead almost everybody is deciding about them, and they are deciding about almost everybody. The extent extent of the powers others hold over an individual is not reduced; the change is in who holds it. of the powers others hold over an individual is not reduced; the change is in who holds it.

The system at this point is still much too time-consuming and unwieldy. The remedy is a great consolidational convention. Everyone gathers from far and wide, trading and selling shares, and by the end of a hectic three days (lo and behold!) each person owns exactly one share in each right over every other person, including himself. So now there can be just one meeting in which everything is decided for everybody, one meeting in which each person casts one vote, either by himself or by giving his proxy to another. Instead of taking up each person singly, general decisions are made for everyone. At first each person can attend the triannual stockholders' meeting and cast his votes: his own plus any he may have been given in proxy. But the attendance is too great, the discussion too boring and drawn out with everyone wanting to add his words. Eventually it is decided that only those ent.i.tled to cast at least 100,000 votes may attend the grand stockholders' meeting.

A major problem is how the children are to be included. A Great Corporation Share is a valuable and treasured holding, without which one is an isolated nonstockholder, powerless over others. For children to wait until their parents die so they could inherit shares would leave these children shareless for most of their adult lives. And not every family contains exactly two children. Shares cannot just be given given to a youngster. Whose would be given, and would it be fair just to give away Great Corporation Shares when others had bought theirs? So splitting is introduced as a way of allowing young people to enter the guild of stockholders. In the time since each previous triannual stockholders' meeting, to a youngster. Whose would be given, and would it be fair just to give away Great Corporation Shares when others had bought theirs? So splitting is introduced as a way of allowing young people to enter the guild of stockholders. In the time since each previous triannual stockholders' meeting, m m stockholders have died and stockholders have died and n n persons have come of age. The persons have come of age. The m m shares revert to the Board of Directors and are retired, and each of the s remaining shares outstanding splits ( shares revert to the Board of Directors and are retired, and each of the s remaining shares outstanding splits (s + n)/s for one, with the fractions being merged to form for one, with the fractions being merged to form n n new shares that are distributed to the entering youngsters. These are not distributed to them gratis (that would be unfair) but in exchange for their incorporating themselves and signing over all of the stock in themselves to the corporation. In exchange for the stock in themselves, they each receive a Great Corporation Share and become a member of the guild of stockholders, a sharer by right in the joint decisions of the corporation, a part-owner of each other person. Each old stock is in a position to split because the influx of new persons who join the guild means that each stock is a share in more people. So the people joining and the stock splitting justify each other. new shares that are distributed to the entering youngsters. These are not distributed to them gratis (that would be unfair) but in exchange for their incorporating themselves and signing over all of the stock in themselves to the corporation. In exchange for the stock in themselves, they each receive a Great Corporation Share and become a member of the guild of stockholders, a sharer by right in the joint decisions of the corporation, a part-owner of each other person. Each old stock is in a position to split because the influx of new persons who join the guild means that each stock is a share in more people. So the people joining and the stock splitting justify each other.

People view the exchange as an absolutely even trade. Before the exchange a person has one full share in himself, and not even a partial share in any other person. With s s+n- 1 other individuals (to use the same letters as before) in the society, each person incorporates himself into s + n s + n shares, signing over each of these shares to the Board of Directors. In exchange for this he gets a I/ shares, signing over each of these shares to the Board of Directors. In exchange for this he gets a I/s + + n nth share in each of the other s s + + n n-I persons in the society, plus plus the same share in himself. Thus he has the same share in himself. Thus he has s s + + n n shares each representing I/ shares each representing I/s + +nth owners.h.i.+p in each of the s + n n individuals in the society. Multiplying the number of shares he holds by the fraction of owners.h.i.+p in someone that each share represents we get ( individuals in the society. Multiplying the number of shares he holds by the fraction of owners.h.i.+p in someone that each share represents we get (s+n) (I/s+n), which is equal to 1. What he ends up with from the exchange totals to one full owners.h.i.+p, which is exactly what he signs over to the Board of Directors for it. People say, and think, that when everybody owns everybody, n.o.body owns anybody.6 Each person believes that each other person is not a tyrant but rather someone just like himself, in exactly the same position. Since everyone is in the same boat, no one views the situation as one of domination; the large number of pa.s.sengers in that boat make it more tolerable than a one-person rowboat. Since the decisions apply to all equally, one gets (it is said) the rule of impersonal and nonarbitrary regulations rather than the rule of men. Each person is thought to benefit from the efforts of the others to rule wisely over all, and each is an equal in this endeavor, having an equal say with the others. Thus is established the system of one shareholder, one vote. And perhaps fraternal feelings flourish as people realize that they all are inextricably intertwined, each equally shareholder and shareheld, each his brothers' keeper and his brothers' kept. Each person believes that each other person is not a tyrant but rather someone just like himself, in exactly the same position. Since everyone is in the same boat, no one views the situation as one of domination; the large number of pa.s.sengers in that boat make it more tolerable than a one-person rowboat. Since the decisions apply to all equally, one gets (it is said) the rule of impersonal and nonarbitrary regulations rather than the rule of men. Each person is thought to benefit from the efforts of the others to rule wisely over all, and each is an equal in this endeavor, having an equal say with the others. Thus is established the system of one shareholder, one vote. And perhaps fraternal feelings flourish as people realize that they all are inextricably intertwined, each equally shareholder and shareheld, each his brothers' keeper and his brothers' kept.

Occasionally some few malcontents refuse to accept their Great Corporation Shares and refuse to sign the stockholders' guild Scroll of Members.h.i.+p. Refusing to put their John Hanc.o.c.ks on the Declaration of Interdependence, they say they want no part of the system and refuse to grant the system any part of them. Several of them go so far as to call for the dismantling of the corporation! Hotheads on the Board of Directors call for their incarceration, but in view of the youngsters' noncooperation it seems that they haven't yet granted the Board the explicit right to do that. Some members of the Board maintain that by accepting the benefits of growing up under the wing of the corporation and by remaining in its area of influence, the youngsters have already tacitly consented to be shareheld, and so no further act from them is needed. But since everyone else realizes that tacit consent isn't worth the paper it's not written on, that claim commands little support. One member of the Board says that, since all children are made by their parents, their parents own them and so the Board's owners.h.i.+p shares in the parents thereby give it owners.h.i.+p shares in the children. The novelty of this line militates against its use at such a delicate moment.

We slow the dramatic pace of our tale in order to consider Locke's views on parental owners.h.i.+p of children.7 Locke must discuss Filmer in detail, not merely to clear the field of some alternative curious view, but to show why that view doesn't follow from elements of his own view, Locke must discuss Filmer in detail, not merely to clear the field of some alternative curious view, but to show why that view doesn't follow from elements of his own view, as one might suppose it did. That is as one might suppose it did. That is why the author of the why the author of the Second Treatise Second Treatise goes goes on on to compose the to compose the First. First.8 Owners.h.i.+p rights in what one has made would seem to follow from Locke's theory of property. Hence Locke would have a real problem if G.o.d who made and owned the world Owners.h.i.+p rights in what one has made would seem to follow from Locke's theory of property. Hence Locke would have a real problem if G.o.d who made and owned the world gave gave Adam sole owners.h.i.+p in it. Even though Locke thought and argued that this hadn't happened (chap. 4), he also must have wondered what the consequences would be if it had happened. He must have wondered if his views would entail that Adam sole owners.h.i.+p in it. Even though Locke thought and argued that this hadn't happened (chap. 4), he also must have wondered what the consequences would be if it had happened. He must have wondered if his views would entail that if it had if it had then others would need Adam's permission to use his property to sustain themselves physically and so would be within his power. (If so and if a gift can be bequeathed then....) Views whose satisfactory result (no domination of some by others) depends upon a contingency which could have been otherwise (no such gift by G.o.d to Adam) should leave someone holding them very uncomfortable. (I ignore here the reply that G.o.d is necessarily good and so his not making such a gift is then others would need Adam's permission to use his property to sustain themselves physically and so would be within his power. (If so and if a gift can be bequeathed then....) Views whose satisfactory result (no domination of some by others) depends upon a contingency which could have been otherwise (no such gift by G.o.d to Adam) should leave someone holding them very uncomfortable. (I ignore here the reply that G.o.d is necessarily good and so his not making such a gift is not not contingent. A moral view which must take contingent. A moral view which must take that that route to avoid being overthrown by facts that look accidental is very shaky indeed.) Thus Locke discussed (I, sects. 41, 42) an essential element of his theory when he speaks of every man's ”t.i.tle to so much out of another's plenty, as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise,” which the other may not withhold. route to avoid being overthrown by facts that look accidental is very shaky indeed.) Thus Locke discussed (I, sects. 41, 42) an essential element of his theory when he speaks of every man's ”t.i.tle to so much out of another's plenty, as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise,” which the other may not withhold.

Similarly Locke must explain why parents don't own their children. His major argument (I, sects. 52-54) seems to depend upon the view that one owns something one makes only if one controls and understands all parts of the process of making it. By this criterion, people who plant seeds on their land and water them would not own the trees that then grow. Surely most of what most of us do is to intervene in or originate processes whose complete operation we do not understand, yielding a result we could not completely design. (Who knows all all of what physicists say is relevant to materials having the properties they do and to forces working as they do; and who knows what the physicists don't know?) Yet in many such cases, Locke does want to say that we own what we produce. of what physicists say is relevant to materials having the properties they do and to forces working as they do; and who knows what the physicists don't know?) Yet in many such cases, Locke does want to say that we own what we produce.

Locke offers a second argument: ”Even the power which G.o.d himself exerciseth over mankind is by right of fatherhood, yet this fatherhood is such a one as utterly excludes all pretense of t.i.tle in earthly parents; for he is King because he is indeed maker of us all, which no parents can pretend to be of their children” (I, sect. 54). It is difficult to puzzle this out. If the point is that people cannot own their children because they themselves are owned and so incapable of owners.h.i.+p, this would apply to owning everything else they make as well. If the point is that G.o.d, far more than a child's parents, is the maker of a child, this applies to many other things that Locke thinks can be owned (plants, nonhuman animals); and perhaps it applies to everything. (The degree degree to which this holds seems an unsubstantial base upon which to build a theory.) Note that Locke is to which this holds seems an unsubstantial base upon which to build a theory.) Note that Locke is not not claiming that children, because of something about claiming that children, because of something about their their nature, cannot be owned by their parents even if these make them. He does nature, cannot be owned by their parents even if these make them. He does not not claim that something about people (who have not done anything unjust for which their lives are forfeit, sects. 23, 178) bars owners.h.i.+p in them by their maker, for he holds that G.o.d owns man by virtue of making him in all his exalted natural properties (sect. 6). claim that something about people (who have not done anything unjust for which their lives are forfeit, sects. 23, 178) bars owners.h.i.+p in them by their maker, for he holds that G.o.d owns man by virtue of making him in all his exalted natural properties (sect. 6).

Since Locke does not hold that (1) something intrinsic to persons bars those who make them from owning them-to avoid the conclusion that parents own their children, he must argue either that (2) some condition within the theory of how property rights arise in productive processes excludes the process whereby parents make their children as yielding owners.h.i.+p, or (3) something about parents bars them from standing in the, or a particular, owners.h.i.+p relation, or (4) parents do not, really, make their children. We have seen problems with Locke's attempt to work 2, 3, and 4. The latter two being unpromising, someone of Lockean persuasion would have to work out a variant of 1 or 2.

Note that Locke's strong denial that parents make their children, causing these beings, removes one base on which to found the responsibility of parents to care for their children. Thus Locke is reduced to saying that the law of nature requires such parental care (sect. 56), as a brute moral fact, apparently. But this leaves unexplained why it requires the care from the parents, from the parents, and why it isn't another case of someone's receiving ”the benefit of another's pains, which he had no right to” (sect. 34). and why it isn't another case of someone's receiving ”the benefit of another's pains, which he had no right to” (sect. 34).

Our tale now must be brought to a close. About the youngsters, it is decided they do not have to join the stockholders' guild, after all. They can refuse its benefits and leave the corporation area, without any hard feelings. (But since no settlement has survived on Mars for more than six months there are strong reasons for remaining on earth and becoming a stockholder.) Those invited to love it or leave it respond by claiming that since the corporation doesn't own all the land, anybody can buy some land in the corporation area and live as they wish. Though the corporation hadn't actually bought up all the land itself, the original corporation rules, adopted by everyone at the great consolidational convention, are viewed as prohibiting the secession of land from the corporation's control.9 Can the corporation, it is asked, allow another corporation to spring up in its midst? Can it tolerate the dangers of isolated nonstockheld individuals; in a word, ancorpy? Can the corporation, it is asked, allow another corporation to spring up in its midst? Can it tolerate the dangers of isolated nonstockheld individuals; in a word, ancorpy?

Some suggest that the recalcitrant people be allowed to opt out of the corporation yet remain within the territory. Why shouldn't they be allowed to stay in the midst of the corporation, choosing precisely those contacts with the corporation they wish to have, formulating their own personal package of rights and duties (above and beyond nonaggression) vis-a-vis other persons and the corporation, paying for the particular things they receive, living independently? 10 10 But others reply that this would be too chaotic; and that it also might undermine the corporate system. For others (”gullible others,” it is said) also

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