Part 18 (2/2)
_March 28, 1831._
_The Unreformed House a complete Legislative Body._
As to the present House of Commons, I maintain that it is as complete a legislative body as can be required; and that the House of Commons, since the peace particularly, has shown itself to be the most efficient legislative body that ever existed in any country in the world, not excepting this. I say, that it has rendered more services than any Legislature ever did in the same period--I say, it has continued those great services up to the present moment, and that those services have only been interrupted by the introduction of this discussion upon the Reform Bill.
_March 28, 1831._
_Reasons why the Duke resigned Office in November, 1830._
It is quite true, that when the late Government brought forward the Catholic question, they were supported by many n.o.ble Lords who were usually opposed to the Government; but it is not correct that the disfranchis.e.m.e.nt of the forty-s.h.i.+lling freeholders was made a _sine qua non_ to ensure the support of the n.o.ble Lords to the Relief Bill. I certainly had the misfortune, on that occasion, to lose the support and regard of a great number of friends, both here and in the other House of Parliament--a misfortune I have never ceased to lament; yet I have the consolation of knowing, that in what I then did, I did no more than what my duty required of me; and I was not justified in relinquis.h.i.+ng that measure by any intimidation, or by any imaginary circ.u.mstance of danger--which I had no right to apprehend. But I own that things were going on in Ireland which induced me to think they might lead to a civil war, in the event of our continuing to refuse the settlement of the question; and I am satisfied that I should have been wanting in duty, both as a man and a Minister, if I had hesitated to give up those opinions which I had previously entertained with regard to that measure.
I afterwards had some difference with a n.o.ble Earl opposite (Earl Grey), but notwithstanding I felt called upon to retain the position I held in the Government as long as I enjoyed the approbation of my Sovereign, and the confidence of the Legislature.
Then came the Revolution in France, followed by that of Belgium; and like the former revolutions of Naples and of Spain, they naturally excited a strong sensation here; that excitement, increased by speeches made in various parts of the country, created a strong desire for Parliamentary Reform. But I did not think then, any more than I think now, that that desire was irresistible. If Parliament should see reason to decide that the proposed alteration in the Const.i.tution is not necessary, and ought not to be made, I am confident the country will acquiesce in that decision. I believe that the wish for reform is strong and growing; but if the people see that the subject is fairly discussed, and honestly determined here, I am sure they will submit without a murmur. Already the sensation produced by the French and Belgian Revolutions has subsided; the natives of the country have seen the deplorable results by which those commotions have been followed, and are wisely warned by the sufferings of their neighbours.
Upon the defeat on the Civil List, finding I had the misfortune no longer to enjoy the confidence of the House of Commons, I thought proper to resign the situation which I held in his Majesty's service. Upon that occasion, the question of Parliamentary Reform had no more to do, as far as I was concerned, with the resignation which I tendered to his Majesty on the day following the defeat on the Civil List, than anything else in the world. I admit I resigned next morning, because I did not wish to expose his Majesty and the country to the consequences that might result from the Government going out on the success of the question of Parliamentary Reform. This is the truth; but, to say I resigned on account of Parliamentary Reform, is wrong; I resigned upon the ground before stated; and I resigned at that particular moment on the Tuesday, because I did not choose to expose his Majesty and the country to the consequences that might ensue from the occurrence of the case just mentioned. This is the real fact of the story. But the n.o.ble and learned Lord has said, that the late Ministry gave up the principle of Parliamentary Reform by their resignation; no such thing--we resigned because we did not possess the confidence of the House of Commons, and we thought that the same majority which defeated us on Monday on the Civil List, might defeat us Tuesday on Reform; and then we should have sacrificed (as the n.o.ble Lord says), the principle of Parliamentary Reform in the Commons. We did not think it worth while to make any farther struggle in order to retain office a day or two longer.
_March 28, 1831._
_The Civil List principle, on what arranged._
My Lords, the principle on which I and my colleagues drew up the Civil List, was always directed to enable the Sovereign, so far as was practicable, to defray all the expenses necessary to be incurred in supporting the dignity, splendour, and comforts of the Crown, without mixing them up with the other expenses of the Government. For this purpose, it was formerly the practice to grant a considerable sum for those various, but necessary expenses. Certainly, the Crown enjoyed great advantage in supporting its dignity, influence, and efficiency, as long as the system of supporting itself on its hereditary revenues remained in practice. That system, my Lords, was departed from at the commencement of the reign of Geo. III.; and a further departure from it has since taken place, into which I shall, with your Lords.h.i.+ps'
permission, examine presently, and compare that departure with those proposed by the late Government. From the accounts I have seen of the hereditary revenues enjoyed by Geo. II., I have reason to believe that were they now enjoyed by our Sovereign, and employed in defraying the civil expenses of the Government, and sustaining the dignity and splendour of the Crown, they would amount to a sum larger than would be necessary to meet those expenses, notwithstanding the increase which has been made in them by the increased salaries of the judges, the increased number of the public officers, and the vast increase of the royal family of England. I say, my Lords, that these hereditary revenues would be more than adequate to defray all these charges. I believe that these revenues, independent of droits and West Indian duties, amount, at the present moment, to 850,000 l. a-year; and these revenues, my Lords, I consider as much the King's property, as I hold the possessions of your Lords.h.i.+ps to be yours. I make this statement, because it is important that your Lords.h.i.+ps should recollect it, and the public should know that notwithstanding the magnitude of the expenses of the Sovereign, the Sovereign has as much right to the sum which I have mentioned, as any of your Lords.h.i.+ps to your own estates. The system of giving the Sovereign the amount of certain taxes to defray the expenses of the civil government, was first departed from at the commencement of the reign of Geo. III., when a fixed sum was appointed, instead of that mode of payment, for its support. In process of time the expenses of the civil government increased, and the Civil List became a debt. The consequence was, that in the year 1815, an inquiry was inst.i.tuted into the circ.u.mstances which had caused this increase of charges upon the Civil List, up to the period of the Regency. What was the course then adopted by Parliament? Why, it was to bring certain charges--as, for instance, the charges for amba.s.sadors and ministers abroad--under the annual vote of Parliament; and the immediate object was to avoid thereby the fixing of any fresh debt, for which no estimate could be previously made, upon the Civil List. In 1820 it was determined that nothing whatever should be brought before Parliament, in connexion with the Civil List, that was a casual expense, or for which a regular vote could not be submitted.
The original system, I have already stated, had been departed from in the reign of George III., and the late Government in presenting their civil list made a still further departure from it, and upon this principle;--wherever a part of a salary was to be paid out of the civil list, and part out of the consolidated fund, it was resolved to pay all out of the consolidated fund. The course was adopted with regard to the salaries of the Judges, the Lord Chancellor, and the Speaker of the House of Commons, and also of various other offices, some of which have been since abolished. This was thought a less objectionable mode than that of subjecting those salaries to an annual discussion in the Committee of the House of Commons. We wished my Lords to place those salaries upon the consolidated fund, in order to prevent the possibility of the country being left without a proper and efficient administration of public affairs. We did not wish to leave the Government to the chance of being impeded by a small majority, in the House of Commons, which, according to other proposed plans, might diminish the salaries of public officers at pleasure. If my Lord we look to the period of the Revolution we shall find that there were long discussions respecting the right of the crown to its hereditary revenues, which ended in a concession of the principle that these revenues did belong to the crown. At that time n.o.body ever dreamed of separating the expenses of the crown from those of the civil government, and of making a separate provision for the support of the state and dignity of the crown, which should be subject to the controul of parliament. The plan of separation, my Lords, is one of modern invention altogether, and I totally dissent from it. Because, let us look to the situation in which the crown is placed under the operation of such a system, and we must observe that it will place the crown in a situation such as it ought not to be reduced to; namely that it will render it liable to be deprived of the a.s.sistance--say of a public officer, whose salary may be lost by a single vote in a committee of supply.
_April, 19th, 1831._
_The Expenses of Ministers ruinous, unless they have large Private fortunes._
With respect to the reduction in the salaries of the great officers of state, I have only to observe, that even under the existing rate of salaries, unless a First Lord of the Treasury, (and the remark will apply to the other state officers) possesses a large private fortune, he must be ruined in consequence of the heavy expences entailed on him by his situation, and the inadequacy of the sum allowed by the public for the maintenance of those expenses. In proof of this, I may instance the case of three prime ministers--Mr. Pitt, Mr. Percival, and Mr.
Canning,--all of whom were almost ruined by their being in office. I took upon myself to propose a provision for the family of Mr. Canning in consequence.
_April, 19th. 1831._
_The Roman Catholic Relief Bill settled the question of the Repeal of the Union._
It is not my intention at present to enter into the question, as to the expediency of granting the Roman Catholic claims; for I hope that question is for ever set at rest. The former government of this country derived some advantage from the settlement of that question; and I believe that this advantage will at least be admitted to have flowed from it,--that now there is no question either in this or the other House of Parliament, or among the public, respecting the necessity or expediency of repealing the Union. When I introduced the Catholic Relief Bill, I stated that political power already existed in the hands of the Roman Catholics, and that was a statement, generally admitted by n.o.ble Lords on both sides of the House. What the Bill effected was to give the capacity of enjoying political power to the higher cla.s.ses of the Roman Catholics, and to take it out of the hands of those of the lower cla.s.ses who did not exercise it themselves for their own purposes, and according to the suggestion of their own sentiments, but at the dictation of a body among the Catholic people, who, it will be admitted by everybody, ought not to possess any political power whatever,--I mean the Roman Catholic priesthood.
_April, 21st. 1831._
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