Part 6 (2/2)
He reminded them, furthermore, that ”the policy of the United States has uniformly been to avoid, as far as possible, alliances or agreements with other states, and to keep itself free from national obligations, except such as affect directly the interests of the United States themselves.”[104]
The matter was again urged upon the United States by the British and French governments in notes to Mr. Webster, dated July 9, 1852, in which the indefensibility of the Spanish t.i.tle to the island and its bearings upon the neutrality of the proposed Central American ca.n.a.ls were dwelt upon. The death of Mr. Webster postponed for some time the answer of the United States, but the proposal was finally rejected in a notable dispatch prepared by Webster's successor, Edward Everett.
With the growth of the slavery conflict, which had now become paramount to all other questions, the annexation of Cuba had become a party issue, and the return of the Democratic party to power, in 1853, was hailed by the southern extremists as a signal for the acquisition of the long coveted prize. This expectation was further heightened by the declaration of President Pierce, in his inaugural address, that the policy of his administration would ”not be controlled by any timid forebodings of evil from expansion,” and that the acquisition of certain possessions not within our jurisdiction was ”eminently important for our protection, if not in the future essential for the preservation of the rights of commerce and the peace of the world.”
William L. Marcy, of New York, was appointed secretary of state and for the mission to Spain the President selected Pierre Soule of Louisiana, a Frenchman by birth and education, who had been exiled for political reasons. His appointment under the circ.u.mstances created unfavorable comment both in this country and in Europe, and his sojourn of several days at Paris on the way to his post at Madrid caused the French government some annoyance. Louis Napoleon advised the court of Madrid not to receive him, as his views on the Cuban question were well known to be of a radical character.
In his instructions to Mr. Soule, July 23, 1853, Mr. Marcy emphasized the importance of our relations with Spain in view of the rumors of contemplated changes in the internal affairs of Cuba and of the recent interposition of England and France. He directed him to try to negotiate a commercial treaty with Spain favorable to our trade with Cuba, and pointed out the urgent necessity of allowing a ”qualified diplomatic intercourse between the captain-general of that island and our consul at Havana, in order to prevent difficulties and preserve a good understanding between the two countries.”[105] The difficulty of settling disputes arising in Cuba had been the subject of frequent remonstrances on the part of the United States. The captain-general was clothed with almost ”unlimited powers for aggression, but with none for reparation.” He exercised no diplomatic functions and was in no way subject to the authority of the Spanish minister at Was.h.i.+ngton.
Upon the arrival of Mr. Soule in Spain, he found that Mr. Calderon, the head of the cabinet, was strongly opposed to any commercial treaty or agreement which would promote intercourse between the United States and the dependencies of Spain, and equally averse to allowing the captain-general any diplomatic powers.[106] Mr. Soule was by nature hot-headed and impetuous and could suffer anything sooner than enforced inactivity. Whatever may have been the intentions of the executive in sending him, he had come to Madrid for the purpose of consummating the long cherished scheme of acquiring Cuba. Accordingly, on February 23, 1854, he wrote to Mr. Marcy that the affairs of the Spanish government were about to reach a crisis, that a change of ministry was imminent, and that contingencies involving the fate of Cuba were likely to arise which might be of great interest to the United States. He, therefore, asked for definite instructions. Relying upon these representations and upon Mr. Soule's judgment, Mr. Marcy transmitted in due time the necessary powers, authorizing him to negotiate with Spain for the purchase of Cuba, or for its independence, if such an arrangement would be more agreeable to Spanish pride, in which event the United States would be willing to contribute substantial aid to the result.
In the meantime, however, the _Black Warrior_ affair had strained the relations of the two countries almost to the point of rupture. This case, involving the seizure of an American steamer by Spanish officials at Havana for an unintentional violation or neglect of custom-house regulations, was of an unusually exasperating character.
As soon as the department at Was.h.i.+ngton was fully informed of this outrage, Mr. Marcy forwarded all the doc.u.ments in the case to Mr. Soule and directed him to demand of the Spanish government a prompt disavowal of the act and the payment of an indemnity to the owners of the vessel and of the cargo, the extent of the injury being estimated at $300,000.
On April 8 Mr. Soule presented a formal demand on the part of his government. No answer to this note having been received, on the 11th he repeated his demands much more emphatically, calling for an indemnity of $300,000, insisting that all persons, whatever their rank or importance, who were concerned in the perpetration of the wrong, be dismissed from her majesty's service, and finally declaring that non-compliance with these demands within forty-eight hours would be considered by the government of the United States as equivalent to a declaration that her majesty's government was determined to uphold the conduct of its officers.
Mr. Calderon replied, on the 12th, that whenever her majesty's government should have before it the authentic and complete data, which it then lacked, a reply would be given to the demand of the United States conformable to justice and right; that the peremptory tone of Mr.
Soule's note suggested to the government of her majesty ”a suspicion that it was not so much the manifestation of a lively interest in the defense of pretended injuries, as an incomprehensible pretext for exciting estrangement, if not a quarrel between two friendly powers.” To this note Mr. Soule replied that the suggestion made as to the motives of the United States in seeking redress was ”but little creditable to the candor of her Catholic majesty's government, and comes in very bad grace from one who, like your excellency, cannot but be aware that the records of this legation, as well as those of her Catholic majesty's department of state, are loaded with reclamations bearing on grievances most flagrant, which have never been earnestly attended to and were met at their inception with precisely the same dilatory excuses through which the present one is sought to be evaded.”
Meanwhile the aspects of the case were altogether changed by a private agreement between the Havana officials and the owners of the _Black Warrior_, by which the s.h.i.+p and her cargo were released. Mr. Soule continued, however, according to instructions from Was.h.i.+ngton, to demand compensation for the damages sustained by the owners and pa.s.sengers not compensated for by the return of the s.h.i.+p and cargo, and also reparation for the insult to the United States flag. The Spanish government, however, refused to recognize any ground for reparation after the rest.i.tution of the s.h.i.+p and cargo, and persisted in contradicting, without the support of any evidence whatever, the facts as presented by the United States, although they were all certified to in proper legal form.
On June 24 Mr. Marcy wrote that the President was far from satisfied with the manner in which our demands were treated by the Spanish government, but that before resorting to extreme measures he was determined to make a final appeal to Spain for the adjustment of past difficulties and for the guarantee of more friendly relations in the future. Although satisfied with the spirited manner in which Mr. Soule had performed the duties of his mission, the President was considering the expediency of reinforcing the demands of the United States by the appointment of an extraordinary commission of two distinguished citizens to act in conjunction with him. He instructed him, therefore, not to press the affair of the _Black Warrior_, but to wait until the question of the special commission could be laid before Congress.
During the summer there was a change of ministry in the Spanish government, which, as was not infrequently the case, was attended with more or less serious disorders. In August Mr. Marcy wrote that in view of the unsettled condition of affairs in Spain and for other reasons not stated, the purpose of sending a special mission had, for the present at least, been abandoned. Without pressing matters Mr. Soule was, nevertheless, to avail himself of any opportunity which might be presented, of settling the affairs in dispute and of negotiating for the purchase of Cuba.
Under the same date he proposed to Mr. Soule the plan of consulting with Mr. Mason and Mr. Buchanan, our ministers at Paris and London, for the purpose of overcoming any obstacles that England and France might interpose. This suggestion led to the celebrated meeting at Ostend and the so-called manifesto.
In accordance with the instructions of the President, Messrs. Soule, Mason, and Buchanan proceeded to make arrangements for the proposed conference, which was held at Ostend, in Belgium, October 9, 10, 11, 1854. They then adjourned to Aix-la-Chapelle for a week, where the reports of their proceedings were prepared.
The greater part of the report is taken up with an enumeration of the advantages that would accrue to the United States from the acquisition of Cuba, and an elaborate exposition of the ways in which the interests of Spain would be promoted by the sale. The only specific recommendation of the report was that a proposal should be made through the proper diplomatic channel to the Supreme Const.i.tuent Cortes about to a.s.semble, to purchase Cuba from Spain, the maximum price to be $120,000,000. The report then proceeds to discuss the question, what ought to be the course of the American government should Spain refuse to sell Cuba? The ministers declared:
After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba, in the possession of Spain, seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union?
Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power; and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home.
The report also recommended that all proceedings in reference to the negotiations with Spain ”ought to be open, frank, and public.” This recommendation, together with the general character of the report, indicates that its authors were rather bent on making political capital of the affair at home than on seriously furthering negotiations at Madrid. As a matter of fact the Ostend Manifesto made Buchanan an acceptable presidential candidate to the southern wing of the Democratic party and played no small part in securing for him the nomination in 1856.[107]
The objectionable features of the report were politely but firmly repudiated by the administration in Marcy's reply to Soule and Soule promptly resigned his mission. This fact was generally overlooked at the time, while the unfortunate publicity given to the proceedings at Ostend brought endless censure upon President Pierce and Secretary Marcy.
In spite of the ”jingo” policy attributed to the Pierce administration, the complications arising out of the seizure of the _Black Warrior_ were not made a _casus belli_, as might easily have been done. After Mr.
Soule's return to the United States the negotiations were continued by his successor. The conduct of the officials concerned in the seizure was disavowed, and the indemnity claimed by the American citizens concerned was paid. The administration closed on terms of comparative friends.h.i.+p with Spain, although there were numbers of claims still unadjusted. The Cuban question figured conspicuously in the campaign of 1856. The platform of the Democratic party was strongly in favor of acquisition, while the new Republican platform stigmatized the Ostend manifesto as the highwayman's plea.
Until the Buchanan administration all negotiations for the purchase of Cuba had been undertaken on the authority of the executive alone. An effort was now made to get the two houses of Congress to concur in an appropriation for this purpose. It was thought that united action on the part of the legislative and executive branches of the government would produce some impression on Spain. Accordingly, in his second, third and fourth annual messages, President Buchanan brought the matter to the attention of Congress, but his appeal met with little encouragement. In January, 1859, Senator Slidell, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, reported a bill carrying $30,000,000, to be placed at the disposal of the President as a preliminary sum for the purchase of Cuba.[108]
This report created violent opposition, and in February the bill was withdrawn by Mr. Slidell at the urgent request of his friends.
The annexationist and filibustering schemes of the decade immediately preceding the War of Secession were prompted by two motives. The one was the extension of slave territory, or at least the thwarting of the schemes of emanc.i.p.ation for Cuba which Great Britain was urging upon the Spanish government. The other was to secure, by the occupation of this strong strategic position, undisputed control over the proposed interoceanic ca.n.a.l routes of Central America and communication by this means with the new states on the Pacific coast. These motives for annexation were removed, the one by the abolition of slavery in the United States, and the other by the construction of the great transcontinental railroads which established direct overland communication with the Pacific states. During the period following the civil war, therefore, our policy was mainly concerned in urging upon the Spanish government the abolition of slavery in Cuba, the establishment of a more liberal form of government through independence or autonomy, and the promotion of more untrammelled commercial intercourse with the United States.
The abolition of slavery in the southern states left the Spanish Antilles in the enjoyment of a monopoly of slave labor, which in the production of sugar, especially, gave them advantages which overcame all compet.i.tion. This led to the formation of a strong Spanish party, for whom the cause of slavery and that of Spanish dominion were identical.
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