Part 7 (1/2)

These were known as Peninsulars or Spanish immigrants. They were the official cla.s.s, the wealthy planters and slave-owners and the real rulers of Cuba. On the other hand there was a party composed of Creoles, or native Cubans, whose cry was ”Cuba for the Cubans!” and who hoped to effect the complete separation of the island from Spain, either through their own efforts or through the a.s.sistance of the United States. Not infrequently in the same family, the father, born and brought up in the Peninsula, was an ardent loyalist, while the son, born in Cuba, was an insurgent at heart, if not actually enlisted in the ranks.

The Spanish revolution of September, 1868, was the signal for an uprising of the native or Creole party in the eastern part of the island. This movement was not at first ostensibly for independence, but for the revolution in Spain, the cries being ”Hurrah for Prim!” ”Hurrah for the Revolution!” Its real character was, however, apparent from the first and its supporters continued for a period of ten years, without regard to the numerous vicissitudes through which the Spanish government pa.s.sed--the provisional government, the regency, the elective monarchy, the republic, and the restored Bourbon dynasty--to wage a dogged, though desultory warfare against the const.i.tuted authorities of the island.

This struggle was almost coterminous with President Grant's administration of eight years.

At an early stage of the contest the Spanish authorities conceived it to be necessary to issue certain decrees which were contrary to public law and, in so far as they affected citizens of the United States, in violation of treaty obligations. On March 24, 1869, the captain-general issued a decree authorizing the capture on the high seas of vessels carrying men, arms, munitions, or effects in aid of the insurgents, and declaring that ”all persons captured in such vessels without regard to their number will be immediately executed.”[109] By another decree the estates of American citizens suspected of sympathy with the insurgents were confiscated.[110] Secretary Hamilton Fish protested against these decrees so far as they affected citizens of the United States, as they were in violation of the provisions of the treaty of 1795.

On July 7, 1869, the captain-general issued another decree closing certain ports, declaring voyages with arms, ammunition, or crew for the insurgents illegal, and directing cruisers on the high seas to bring into port all vessels found to be enemies. On July 16 Mr. Fish called the attention of the Spanish minister to this decree, saying that it a.s.sumed powers over the commerce of the United States that could be permitted only in time of war; that the United States would not yield the right to carry contraband of war in time of peace, and would not permit their vessels to be interfered with on the high seas except in time of war; that if Spain was at war she should give notice to the United States to that effect, and that a continuance of the decree or any attempt to enforce it would be regarded as a recognition by Spain of a state of war in Cuba. This declaration produced a prompt modification of the decree so far as it concerned the search of vessels on the high seas.

As our commercial interests at large, as well as the interests of individual citizens, were deeply affected by the condition of the island, President Grant determined at the beginning of his administration to offer to mediate between Spain and the insurgents.

General Daniel E. Sickles was appointed minister to Spain and his instructions, under date of June 29, 1869, directed him to offer to the cabinet at Madrid the good offices of the United States for the purpose of bringing to a close the civil war then ravaging the island and establis.h.i.+ng the independence of Cuba. Mr. Fish instructed General Sickles to explain to the Spanish government that he used the term civil war advisedly, not as implying any public recognition of belligerent rights, but a condition of affairs that might not justify withholding much longer those rights from the insurgents.[111] In reply Spain agreed to accept the good offices of the United States, but on conditions that were impracticable and unsatisfactory. At the same time the Spanish government allowed the purport of General Sickles's note tendering the good offices of the United States to get out, and it was accepted by the press as indicating the purpose of the United States to recognize the Cubans as belligerents if its offer of mediation were refused. No Spanish cabinet could possibly endure the odium of having made a concession to the Cubans under a threat from an outside power.

The Spanish government therefore requested the withdrawal of the American note.

After the rejection of the offer of mediation President Grant decided to recognize the Cuban insurgents and in August, 1869, while on his way from New York to New England on the Fall River boat he signed a proclamation of Cuban belligerency which he forwarded to Was.h.i.+ngton with a note to Secretary Fish, requesting him to sign, seal, and issue it.

Mr. Fish disapproved of this step, and while he affixed the seal and signed the doc.u.ment, he did not issue it, but kept it in a safe place to await further developments. Grant's attention was diverted by Wall Street speculations in gold and the crisis that followed on ”Black Friday.” He failed to notice at the time that the secretary of state did not carry out his instructions, and later he thanked Mr. Fish for having saved him from a serious mistake.[112]

For some time the United States had been urging upon Spain the importance of abolis.h.i.+ng slavery in Cuba as a necessary condition to the complete pacification of the island. During the fall of 1869 Spain gave repeated a.s.surances to the United States of her readiness to effect emanc.i.p.ation in Cuba as soon as hostilities should cease, but the Spanish government could never be brought to enter into any definite engagement on the subject. In fact as regarded the slavery question the cabinet of Madrid found itself unable to choose between the horns of the dilemma. The United States and Great Britain were urging the immediate abolition of slavery, while the most influential upholders of Spanish rule in Porto Rico as well as in Cuba were the slaveholders themselves.

The insurgents on the other hand had abolished slavery by a decree of the a.s.sembly of February 26, 1869, promising indemnity to the owners in due time and providing for the enrolment of liberated slaves in the army.[113] On January 26, 1870, Mr. Fish wrote to General Sickles:

It becomes more apparent every day that this contest cannot terminate without the abolition of slavery. This government regards the government at Madrid as committed to that result.... You will, therefore, if it shall appear that the insurrection is regarded as suppressed, frankly state that this government, relying upon the a.s.surances so often given, will expect steps to be taken for the emanc.i.p.ation of the slaves in the Spanish colonies.

The British representative at Madrid, Mr. Layard, was instructed to second the suggestions of the United States minister in regard to the abolition of slavery in the Spanish colonies.

From the outbreak of the insurrection the Cuban patriots had the sympathy of the great ma.s.s of the American people, and that of the administration, although the latter was kept within the bounds of public law and treaty obligation, so as to avoid giving offense to Spain. The government did all that treaty obligations demanded of it to prevent the violation of the neutrality laws. Numbers of filibustering expeditions did, however, escape from American ports, and those that were arrested at the instance of the Spanish government through its representatives in this country usually escaped conviction in our courts for want of evidence.

In June, 1870, the question of granting belligerent rights to the Cubans was brought before Congress in the form of a joint resolution introduced into the House. Personally General Grant sympathized with the Cubans and was disposed to grant them the rights of belligerents, but his judgment was again overruled by the counsels of Mr. Fish. On June 13, during the heat of the debate on the question of belligerency, the President sent to Congress a message embodying the views of the executive. At Mr.

Fish's instance the message took the ground that the facts did not justify the recognition of a state of war, although Mr. Fish himself had made use of the term civil war in his instructions to General Sickles.

The Secretary had almost to force the President to sign this message, though General Grant was afterwards satisfied as to the wisdom of the measure.[114] The message said in part:

The question of belligerency is one of fact not to be decided by sympathies with or prejudices against either party. The relations between the parent state and the insurgents must amount, in fact, to war in the sense of international law. Fighting, though fierce and protracted, does not alone const.i.tute war; there must be military forces acting in accordance with the rules and customs of war--flags of truce, cartels, exchange of prisoners, etc.,--and to justify belligerency there must be, above all, a _de facto_ political organization of the insurgents sufficient in character and resources to const.i.tute it, if left to itself, a state among nations capable of discharging the duties of a state, and of meeting the just responsibilities it may incur as such toward other powers in the discharge of its international duties.

This message provoked a long and animated discussion in the House next day and sharp criticism on the part of the Cuban sympathizers of the President's conduct in thus ”intruding himself into the House for the purpose of controlling their deliberations.” The debate continued until June 16, when the resolution pa.s.sed the House by a vote of 80 to 68.[115] It was taken up by the Senate, discussed and amended, but finally lost.

The conclusion of an agreement on February 12, 1871, for the submission to a mixed commission of claims of American citizens arising in Cuba,[116] took away all our pressing grievances against Spain and for more than two years our diplomatic relations were on a comparatively friendly basis. Good feeling between the two countries was further promoted by the proclamation of the Spanish republic in 1873 and by the prompt action of General Sickles in extending to it the recognition of the United States. After striving in vain for more than two years to reconcile and unite the contending factions of Spain, King Amadeus on February 11, 1873, abdicated the royal authority and returned to the nation the powers with which he had been intrusted. The Cortes at once proclaimed a republic. General Sickles had on January 30 telegraphed to Was.h.i.+ngton for instructions in case the republicans should succeed in their efforts. On the day after the abdication, he received directions to recognize the republican government when it was fully established and in possession of the power of the nation. Three days later, in the uniform of a major-general of the United States army he was given an audience by the president of the a.s.sembly and formally recognized the republic.

On March 6, Congress by joint resolution, in behalf of the American people, tendered its congratulations to the people of Spain. It seemed at last as if our relations with Spain were on a good footing. General Sickles urged upon the new republican government the abolition of slavery and the concession of self-government to Cuba.

But such cordial relations did not long continue. On October 31, 1873, the steamer _Virginius_, sailing under American colors and carrying a United States registry, was captured on the high seas by the _Tornado_, a Spanish war vessel, and on the afternoon of the first of November taken into the port of Santiago de Cuba. The men and supplies she bore were bound for the insurgents, but the capture did not occur in Cuban waters. General Burriel, the commandant of the city, summoned a court-martial, and in spite of the protests of the American consul, condemned to death at the first sitting four of the pa.s.sengers, General W. A. C. Ryan, an Irish patriot and three Cubans. They were shot on the morning of November 4. On the 7th twelve other pa.s.sengers were executed and on the 8th, Captain Fry and his entire crew, numbering thirty-six, making the total number of executions fifty-three. As soon as news of the capture reached Madrid, General Sickles called upon President Castelar and represented to him the difficulties that might arise in case the s.h.i.+p had been taken on the high seas bearing United States colors. Upon General Sickles's suggestion the President of the Spanish republic at once telegraphed to the captain-general to await orders before taking any steps in regard to the captured vessel and crew.

In accordance with instructions from Mr. Fish, General Sickles on November 14 protested by note against the executions as brutal and barbarous and stated that ample reparation would be demanded. The next day he received from the minister of state an ill-tempered reply, rejecting the protest as inadmissible when neither the cabinet at Was.h.i.+ngton nor that of Madrid had sufficient data upon which to ground a complaint. On the day this reply was received General Sickles, following out telegraphic instructions from Was.h.i.+ngton, made a formal demand by note for the restoration of the _Virginius_, the surrender of the survivors, a salute to the United States flag, and the punishment of the guilty officials. In case of a refusal of satisfactory reparation within twelve days, General Sickles was instructed by his government, at the expiration of that period, to close the legation and leave Madrid.

The formal reply to General Sickles's demand for reparation was received November 18. The Spanish government declared that it would make no reparation until satisfied that an offense had been committed against the flag of the United States, and that when so convinced through her own sources of information or by the showing of the United States, due reparation would be made.

The representations made at Was.h.i.+ngton by the Spanish minister were of a much more satisfactory character than those made to General Sickles at Madrid. Mr. Fish, therefore, instructed General Sickles to remain at his post until the 26th, and if no accommodation were reached by that time he could demand his pa.s.sports. By the time this dispatch reached Madrid General Sickles had already asked for his pa.s.sports, but had not received the reply of the Spanish government. On the 26th he received a note from the Spanish minister asking for a postponement to December 25 and promising that if by that time Spain could not show that she had the right on her side--i.e., that the _Virginius_ was not ent.i.tled to sail under the United States flag--she would comply with the demands of the United States. General Sickles replied that he could not accept such a proposal, but that he would inform his government of it and take the responsibility of deferring his departure.

Meanwhile the Spanish minister at Was.h.i.+ngton had proposed arbitration, but Mr. Fish declined to submit to arbitration the question of an indignity to the United States flag. The minister then asked for a delay, but Mr. Fish told him that delay was impossible in view of the approaching meeting of Congress. Unless settled beforehand the question would have to be referred to Congress. This firm stand brought the Spanish minister to time and on November 27 a proposition was submitted and accepted by Mr. Fish, by the terms of which Spain stipulated to restore the vessel forthwith, to surrender the survivors of her pa.s.sengers and crew, and on the 25th of December to salute the flag of the United States. If, however, before that date Spain should prove to the satisfaction of the United States that the _Virginius_ was not ent.i.tled to carry the flag of the United States, the salute should be dispensed with, but in such case the United States would expect a disclaimer of intent of indignity to its flag.

The Spanish envoy submitted to the state department a large number of doc.u.ments and depositions to show that the _Virginius_ had no right to sail under the United States flag. These were referred to the attorney-general, and on December 17 he gave his opinion that the evidence was conclusive that the _Virginius_, although registered in New York on September 26, 1870, in the name of one Patterson, who made oath as required by law that he was the owner, was in fact the property of certain Cubans and was controlled by them. In conclusion the attorney-general said:

Spain, no doubt, has a right to capture a vessel, with an American register, and carrying the American flag, found in her own waters a.s.sisting, or endeavoring to a.s.sist, the insurrection in Cuba, but she has no right to capture such a vessel on the high seas upon an apprehension that, in violation of the neutrality or navigation laws of the United States, she was on her way to a.s.sist said rebellion. Spain may defend her territory and people from the hostile attacks of what is, or appears to be, an American vessel; but she has no jurisdiction whatever over the question as to whether or not such vessel is on the high seas in violation of any law of the United States. Spain cannot rightfully raise that question as to the _Virginius_, but the United States may, and, as I understand the protocol, they have agreed to do it, and, governed by that agreement and without admitting that Spain would otherwise have any interest in the question, I decide that the _Virginius_, at the time of her capture, was without right, and improperly carrying the American flag.[117]