Part 6 (1/2)
The very situation of Cuba and Porto Rico furnishes the strongest inducement to the United States not to take a place at the contemplated congress, since, by so doing, they must be considered as changing the att.i.tude in which they hitherto have stood as impartial spectators of the pa.s.sing scenes, and identifying themselves with the new republics.[90]
The Southern members were united in their opposition to the Panama mission, and in fact to any closer alliance with the new republics, for the reason that the latter had adopted the principle of emanc.i.p.ation and any further extension of their influence would jeopardize the inst.i.tution of slavery in the United States. For the same reason they were opposed to the transfer of Cuba to any other European power. If a change from its connection with Spain were necessary they favored annexation by the United States, and meantime they were strongly opposed to the government entering into any engagement with foreign powers or in any way committing itself on the Cuban question.[91]
The declaration of Mr. Clay against the interference of England and France in the affairs of Cuba was consistently adhered to under the administrations of Jackson and Van Buren.
In 1838-39, the British government dispatched special commissioners to Cuba and Porto Rico to report on the condition of the slave trade. The presence of these agents in Cuba gave rise to reports that Great Britain contemplated revolutionizing the island, or at least occupying it for the purpose of suppressing the slave trade. The United States gave Spain to understand that we would not consent to British control in whatever way it might be brought about. Mr. Forsyth wrote to Mr. Vail, our representative at Madrid, July 15, 1840:
You are authorized to a.s.sure the Spanish government, that in case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military and naval resources of the United States to aid her in preserving or recovering it.[92]
Again, Mr. Webster in January, 1843, wrote to Mr. Campbell, United States consul at Havana:
The Spanish government has long been in possession of the policy and wishes of this government in regard to Cuba, which have never changed, and has repeatedly been told that the United States never would permit the occupation of that island by British agents or forces upon any pretext whatever; and that in the event of any attempt to wrest it from her, she might securely rely upon the whole naval and military resources of this country to aid her in preserving or recovering it.[93]
A copy of this letter was also sent to Was.h.i.+ngton Irving, our representative at Madrid to make such use of as circ.u.mstances might require.[94]
During the first period of our Cuban diplomacy the efforts of this government were directed toward preventing the acquisition of the island, or the establishment of a protectorate over it, by Great Britain or France. With the Mexican war, however, and the growing conviction of ”manifest destiny,” our foreign policy a.s.sumed a much bolder and more aggressive character, and during the next fifteen years all manner of schemes for the southward extension of our territory were suggested and many of them actually undertaken. Cuba became an object of desire, not only in the eyes of the slave-holding population of the South as an acquisition to slave territory, but of a large part of the nation, because of its strategic importance in relation to the inter-oceanic transit routes of Central America, which seemed the only feasible line of communication with our rapidly developing interests in California.
Consequently various attempts were made to annex the island to the United States, both by purchase from Spain and forcibly by filibustering expeditions.
In June, 1848, under the administration of President Polk, Mr. Buchanan, secretary of state, wrote to our minister at Madrid, directing him to open negotiations with the Spanish government for the purchase of Cuba.
After referring to the dangers of British occupation and to the advantages of annexation, he said: ”Desirable, however, as this island may be to the United States, we would not acquire it except by the free will of Spain. Any acquisition not sanctioned by justice and honor would be too dearly purchased.” He stated that the President would stipulate for the payment of $100,000,000, as a maximum price.[95] This offer was rejected by the Spanish government. The minister of state after several months' delay finally replied ”that it was more than any minister dare to entertain any such proposition; that he believed such to be the feeling of the country, that sooner than see the island transferred to any power, they would prefer seeing it sunk in the ocean.”
Under the Whig administration of Taylor and Fillmore no effort was made for the purchase of Cuba. On August 2, 1849, Mr. Clayton wrote to Mr.
Barringer that the government did not desire to renew the negotiation for the purchase of Cuba made by the late administration, since the proposition had been considered by the Spanish government as a national indignity; that should Spain desire to part with Cuba, the proposal must come from her.
About this time active preparations were going on for the invasion of Cuba by an armed expedition under the Cuban patriot Narciso Lopez. On August 11, 1849, President Taylor issued a proclamation warning all citizens of the United States against taking part in such expedition and saying, ”No such persons must expect the interference of this government in any form on their behalf, no matter to what extremities they may be reduced in consequence of their conduct.”[96] A few days later the entire force of Lopez was arrested by the United States marshal just as it was on the point of leaving New York.
Nothing daunted, Lopez traveled through the southern and southwestern states secretly enlisting men and making arrangements for their transportation to Cuba. Many men of prominence at the South were in open and avowed sympathy with the enterprise. In the spring of 1850, Lopez called upon Gen. John A. Quitman, governor of Mississippi, who had served with great distinction in the Mexican war, and offered him, in the name of his compatriots, the leaders.h.i.+p of the revolution and the supreme command of the army. Quitman's sympathies were thoroughly enlisted in the movement, but he declined the honor on account of the serious aspect of political affairs, particularly what he considered the encroachments of the federal government upon the rights of the states.
He made liberal contributions of money, however, and gave Lopez sound advice about his undertaking, insisting that he must have an advance column of at least 2,000 men to maintain a footing on the island until reinforcements could go to their aid.[97]
Unfortunately for Lopez he did not follow the advice of Quitman. A company of volunteers altogether inadequate for the successful accomplishment of the enterprise was collected at New Orleans. There Lopez chartered a steamer, the _Creole_, and two barks, the _Georgiana_ and the _Susan Loud_. Three-fourths of the volunteers had served in the Mexican war. The first detachment comprising 250 men left New Orleans in the bark _Georgiana_, April 25, 1850, under the command of Col. Theodore O'Hara. They proceeded to the island of Contoy off the coast of Yucatan in the territory of Mexico. There they were joined three weeks later by Lopez and 450 followers in the _Creole_. The entire command, with the exception of the crews of the two barks and a few others to guard the stores, embarked in the _Creole_ and effected a landing at Cardenas, but the natives did not come to the aid of Lopez and after holding the town for twelve hours he reluctantly reembarked and headed for Key West. The _Creole_ was pursued by the _Pizarro_, a Spanish war vessel, which steamed into the harbor just as she cast anchor. For a few moments the Spaniards seemed to be on the point of preparing to open fire on the _Creole_, but when they saw the United States custom-house officers take possession of her they changed their minds and left the harbor.
The two barks, which had been left with a small guard at the island of Contoy, were captured by Spanish wars.h.i.+ps, taken to Havana, condemned as prizes and the men put on trial for partic.i.p.ation in the Lopez expedition. As these men had committed no act of hostility against Spain, and had, moreover, been seized on neutral territory, the United States government at once issued its protest and demanded their release.
The Spanish government replied that these men had been described as pirates by the President of the United States in his proclamation warning citizens against joining the expedition and were, therefore, beyond the pale of the protection of the United States. After heated negotiations which lasted several months and seriously threatened the peace of the two countries, the prisoners were released, but it was declared to be an act of grace on the part of the Queen and not a concession to the demands of the United States.[98]
Lopez was prosecuted by the United States government for violation of the neutrality laws, but escaped conviction and at once set about organizing another expedition. On August 3, 1851, the third and last expedition of Lopez, consisting of over 400 men, left New Orleans. After touching at Key West the steamer proceeded to the coast of Cuba and landed the expedition at Bahia Honda. The main body under Lopez proceeded into the country where they had been led to expect a general uprising of the Cubans. Col. W. S. Crittenden, who had served with bravery in the Mexican war, was left in command of a smaller body to bring up the baggage. This detachment was attacked on the 13th and forced to retreat to the place where they had landed, where about fifty of them obtained boats and tried to escape. They were, however, intercepted off the coast, taken to Havana, sentenced before a military court, and executed on the 16th.
The main body under Lopez was overcome and dispersed by Spanish troops on the 24th. Lopez was taken prisoner, tried, and executed. Many of his followers were killed or died of hunger and fatigue and the rest made prisoners. Upon receipt of this news Commodore Parker was at once ordered to proceed in a frigate to Havana to inquire into the charges against the prisoners executed, and the circ.u.mstances of their capture, trial, and sentence. To these inquiries the captain-general replied that he considered those executed as pirates, that they had been so denounced by the President of the United States in his proclamation, that he was not at liberty to furnish a copy of the court records, but would send them to Madrid and to the Spanish minister at Was.h.i.+ngton.[99]
When the news of the executions at Havana reached New Orleans the excitement was intense. The office of the Spanish consul was broken into, portraits of the Queen and Captain-General of Cuba defaced, the Spanish flag torn in pieces, and the consul burned in effigy in LaFayette Square. The consul had to flee from the city for safety and the property of certain Spaniards residing in New Orleans was destroyed.
A long correspondence ensued between the two governments. The United States agreed to pay an indemnity for injuries to the public property of Spain, but not for the destruction of property belonging to Spanish residents, who were ent.i.tled only to the same protection afforded our own citizens.[100]
A few weeks after the last Lopez expedition the British and French representatives at Was.h.i.+ngton notified our government that orders had been issued to their squadrons in the West Indies to repel by force any attempts at the invasion of Cuba from any quarter. Our government replied that such action on the part of England and France could ”not but be regarded by the United States with grave disapproval, as involving on the part of European sovereigns combined action of protectors.h.i.+p over American waters.”[101]
In order to allay the uneasiness caused by the attempts of filibusters, supposed to be encouraged or at least connived at by the government of the United States, the Spanish government requested Great Britain and France, in January, 1852, to secure the signature by the American government in conjunction with them of an abnegatory declaration with respect to Cuba.[102] Accordingly in April, 1852, the British and French ministers at Was.h.i.+ngton brought the subject to the attention of this government in notes of the same date, suggesting a tripart.i.te convention for the guarantee of Cuba to Spain.[103]
To this proposal Mr. Webster replied in part as follows:
It has been stated and often repeated to the government of Spain by this government, under various administrations, not only that the United States have no design upon Cuba themselves, but that, if Spain should refrain from a voluntary cession of the island to any other European power, she might rely on the countenance and friends.h.i.+p of the United States to a.s.sist her in the defense and preservation of that island. At the same time it has always been declared to Spain that the government of the United States could not be expected to acquiesce in the cession of Cuba to an European power.