Part 9 (2/2)
as _that which is actually lacking in nothing that is due to its nature_.
The perfect is therefore not simply the good, but the complete or finished good; and it is even logically distinct from the latter, inasmuch as the actuality connoted by the former has added to it the relation to appet.i.te connoted by the latter. Similarly ”goodness” is logically distinct from ”perfection” by adding the like relation to the latter. Although a thing has goodness in so far as it has perfection, and _vice versa_, still its perfection is its actuality simply, while its goodness is this actuality considered as the term of its natural appet.i.te or tendency.
47. GRADES OF PERFECTION. REALITY AS STANDARD OF VALUE.-We may distinguish between stages of perfection in the changing reality of the same being, or grades of perfection in comparing with one another different cla.s.ses or orders of being.
In one and the same being we may distinguish between what is called its _first_ or _essential_ perfection, which means its essence or nature considered as capable of realizing its purpose in existence by tending effectively towards its end; what is called its _intermediate_ or _accidental_ perfection, which consists in all the powers, faculties and functions whereby this tendency is gradually actualized; and what is called its _final_ or _integral_ perfection, which consists in its full actualization by complete attainment of its end.
Again, comparing with one another the individual beings that make up our experience, we cla.s.sify them, we arrange them in a hierarchical order of relative ”perfection,” of inferiority or superiority, according to the different grades of reality or perfection which we think we apprehend in them. Thus, we look on living things as a higher, n.o.bler, more perfect order of beings than non-living things, on animal life as a higher form of being than plant life, on intelligence as higher than instinct, on will as superior to sense appet.i.te, on mind or spirit as n.o.bler than matter, and so on. Now all such comparisons involve the apprehension of some standard of value. An estimation of relative values, or relative grades of perfection in things, is unintelligible except in reference to some such standard; it involves of necessity the intuition of such a standard. We feel sure that some at least of our appreciations are unquestionably correct: that man, for instance, is superior to the brute beast, and the latter superior to the plant; that the lowest manifestation of life-in the amba, or whatever monocellular, microscopic germ may be the lowest-is higher on the scale of being than the highest expression of the mechanical, chemical and physical forces of the inorganic universe. And if we ask ourselves what is our standard of comparison, what is our test or measure, and why are we sure of our application of it in such cases, our only answer is that our standard of comparison is reality itself, actual being, perfection; that we rely implicitly on our intuition of such actual reality as manifested to us in varying grades or degrees within our experience; that without claiming to be infallible in our judgments of comparison, in our cla.s.sifications of things, in our appreciations of their relative perfection, we may justly a.s.sume reality itself to be as such intelligible, and the human mind to be capable of obtaining some true and certain insight into the nature of reality.
48. THE GOOD, THE REAL, AND THE ACTUAL.-Having compared ”perfection” with ”goodness” and with ”being,” let us next compare the two latter notions with each other. We shall see presently that every actual being has its ontological goodness, that these are in reality identical. But there is a logical distinction between them. In the first place the term ”being” is applied _par excellence_ to substances rather than to accidents. But we do not commonly speak of an individual substance, a person or thing, as good in reference to essential or substantial perfection.(178) When we describe a man, or a machine, as ”good,” we mean that the man possesses those _accidental_ perfections, those qualities and endowments, which are suitable to his nature as a man; that the machine possesses those properties which adapt it to its end. In the second place the notion of being is absolute; that of the good is relative, for it implies the notion not of reality simply but of reality as desirable, agreeable, suitable, as perfecting the nature of a subject, as being the end, or conducive to the end, towards which this nature tends. And since what thus _perfects_ must be something not potential but actual, it follows that, unlike real truth, real goodness is identical not with potential, but only with actual reality. It is not an attribute of the abstract, possible essence, but only of the concrete, actually existing essence.(179)
From the fact that the notion of the good is relative it follows that the same thing can be simultaneously good and bad in different relations: ”What is one man's meat is another man's poison”.
49. KINDS OF GOODNESS; DIVISIONS OF THE GOOD.-(_a_) The goodness of a being may be considered in relation to this being itself, or to other beings. What is good for a being itself, what makes it intrinsically and formally good, _bonum sibi_, is whatever perfects it, and in the fullest sense the realization of its end. Hence we speak of a virtuous, upright man, whose conduct is in keeping with his nature and conducive to the realization of his end, as a good man. But a being may also be good to others, _bonum alteri_, by an extrinsic, active, effective goodness, inasmuch as by its action it may help other beings in the realization of their ends. In this sense, a beneficent man, who wishes the well-being of his fellow-men and helps them to realize this well-being, is called a good man. This kind of goodness is what is often nowadays styled _philanthropy_; in Christian ethics it is known as _charity_.
(_b_) We have described the good as the term or object of natural tendency or appet.i.te. In the domain of beings not endowed with the power of conscious apprehension, determinism rules this natural tendency; this latter is always oriented towards the _real_ good: it never acts amiss: it is always directed by the Divine Wisdom which has given to things their natures. But in the domain of conscious living agents this natural tendency is consequent on apprehension: it takes the form of instinctive animal appet.i.te or of rational volition. And since this apprehension of the good may be erroneous, since what is not really good but evil may be apprehended as good, the appet.i.te or will, which follows this apprehension-_nil volitum nisi praecognitum_-may be borne towards evil _sub ratione boni_. Hence the obvious distinction between _real good_ and _apparent good_-_bonum verum_ and _bonum apparens_.
(_c_) In reference to any individual subject-a man, for instance-it is manifest that _other_ beings can be good for him in so far as any of them can be his end or a means to the attainment of his end. They are called in reference to him _objective goods_, and their goodness _objective goodness_. But it is equally clear that they are good for him only because he can perfect his own nature by somehow identifying or uniting himself with them, possessing, using, or enjoying them. This possession of the objective good const.i.tutes what has been already referred to as _formal_ or _subjective goodness_.(180)
(_d_) We have likewise already referred to the fact that in beings endowed with consciousness and appet.i.te proper, whether sentient or rational, the function of possessing or attaining to what is objectively good, to what suits and perfects the nature of the subject, has for its natural concomitant a feeling of pleasure, satisfaction, well-being, delight, enjoyment. And we have observed that this pleasurable feeling may then become a stimulus to fresh desire, may indeed be desired for its own sake.
Now this subjective, pleasure-giving possession of an objective good has been itself called by scholastics _bonum delectabile_-delectable or delight-giving good. The objective good itself considered as an end, and the perfecting of the subject by its attainment, have been called _bonum honestum_-good which is really and _absolutely_ such _in itself_. While if the good in question is really such only when considered as a means to the attainment of an end, of something that is good in itself, the former is called _bonum utile_-useful good.(181)
In this important triple division _bonum honestum_ is used in the wide sense in which it embraces any _real_ good, whether physical or moral. As applied to man it would therefore embrace whatever perfects his physical life as well as whatever perfects his nature considered as a rational, and therefore moral, being. But in common usage it has been restricted to the latter, and is in this sense synonymous with _moral good_, _virtue_.(182)
Furthermore, a good which is an end, and therefore desirable for its own sake, whether it be physical or moral, can be at the same time a means to some higher good and desired for the sake of this latter. Hence St.
Thomas, following Aristotle, reduces all the moral goods which are desirable in themselves to two kinds: that which is desirable only for itself, which is the last end, final felicity; and those which, while good in themselves, are also conducive to the former, and these are the virtues.(183)
When these various kinds of goodness are examined in reference to the nature, conduct and destiny of man, they raise a mult.i.tude of problems which belong properly to Ethics and Natural Theology. The fact that man has a composite nature which is the seat of various and conflicting tendencies, of the flesh and of the spirit; that he perceives in himself a ”double law,” a higher and a lower appet.i.te; that he is subject to error in his apprehension of the good; that he apprehends a distinction between pleasure and duty; that he feels the latter to be the path to ultimate happiness,-all this accentuates the distinction between real and apparent good, between _bonum honestum_, _bonum utile_, and _bonum delectabile_.
The existence of G.o.d is established in Natural Theology; and in Ethics, aided by Psychology, it is proved that no finite good can be the last end of man, that G.o.d, the Supreme, Infinite Good, is his last end, and that only in the possession of G.o.d by knowledge and love can man find his complete and final felicity.
50. GOODNESS A TRANSCENDENTAL ATTRIBUTE OF BEING.-We have shown that there is a logical distinction between the concept of ”goodness” and that of ”being”. We have now to show that the distinction is not real, in other words, that goodness is a transcendental attribute of all actual reality, that all being, in so far forth as it is actual, has goodness-transcendental or ontological goodness in the sense of _appetibility_, _desirability_, _suitability_, as already explained.
When the thesis is formulated in the traditional scholastic statement, ”_Omne ens est bonum_: _All being is good_” it sounds a startling paradox.
Surely it cannot be contended that everything is good? A cancer in the stomach is not good; lies are not good; yet these are actual realities; cancers exist and lies are told; therefore not every reality is good. This is unquestionably true. But it does not contradict the thesis rightly understood. The true meaning of the thesis is, not that every being is good in all respects, or possesses such goodness as would justify us in describing it as ”good” in the ordinary sense, but that every being possesses some goodness: every being in so far as it has actuality has formal, intrinsic goodness, or is, in other words, the term or object of natural tendency or desire. This goodness, which we predicate of any and every actual being, may be (1) the term of the natural tendency or appet.i.te of that being itself, _bonum sibi_, or (2) it may be conceivably the term of the appet.i.te of some other being, _bonum alteri_. Let us see whether it can be shown that every actual being has goodness in one or both of these senses.
(1) _Bonum sibi_.-Is there any intelligible sense in which it can be said that the actuality of any and every existing being is _good for that being_-_bonum sibi_? There is. For if we recognize in every such being, as we must, a _nature_, a potentiality of further actualization, a tendency towards a state of fuller actuality which is its _end_; and if, furthermore, we recognize that every such being at any instant not merely _is_ or exists, but is _becoming_ or _changing_, and thereby tending effectively towards its end; we must admit not merely that the full attainment of its end (its integral or final perfection) is ”desired” by, and ”perfects,” and is ”good” for, that being's nature; but also that the partial realization of its end, or, in other words, the actuality it has at any instant in its changing condition of existence (its accidental or intermediate perfection) is similarly ”good” for it; and even that its actual existence as compared with its mere possibility (its first or essential perfection) is ”desirable” and ”good” for its nature. Actually existing beings are intelligible only because they exist for some end or purpose, which, by their very existence, activities, operations, conduct, they tend to realize. If this be admitted we cannot deny that the full attainment of this end or purpose is ”good” for them-suitable, desirable, agreeable, perfecting them. In so far as they fail in this purpose they are wanting in goodness, they are bad, evil. For the realization of their end their natures are endowed with appropriate powers, faculties, forces, by the normal functioning of which they gradually develop and grow in actuality. No real being is by nature inert or aimless; no real being is without its connatural faculties, forces and functions. But the natural result of all operation, of all action and interaction among things, is _actualization_ of the potential, amelioration, development, growth in perfection and goodness by gradual realization of ends. If by accident any of these powers is wanting, or acts amiss by failing to contribute its due perfection to the nature, there is in the being a proportionate want of goodness-it is so far bad, evil. But, even so, the nature of the thing preserves its fundamental orientation towards its end, towards the perfection natural to it, and struggles as it were against the evil-tries to make good the deficiency. A cancer in the stomach is never good _for the stomach_, or _for the living subject_ of which the stomach is an organ. For the living being the cancer is an evil, a _failure_ of one of the organs to discharge its functions normally, _an absence of a good_, _viz._ the healthy functioning of an organ. But the cancerous growth, considered in itself and for itself, biologically and chemically, has its own nature, purpose, tendencies, laws; nor can we deny that its development according to these laws is ”good” for its specific nature,(184) _bonum sibi_.
It may be asked how can the _first_ or _essential_ perfection of an existing substance, which is nothing else than the actual existence of the nature itself, be conceived as ”good” for this nature? It is so inasmuch as the actual existence of the substance is the first stage in the process by which the nature tends towards its end; an existing nature desires and tends towards the conservation of its own being;(185) hence the saying, ”Self-preservation is the first law of nature”; and hence, too, the scholastic aphorism, ”_Melius est esse quam non esse_”.
The argument just outlined tends to show that every nature of which we can have direct experience, or in other words every finite, contingent nature, is _bonum sibi_, formally and intrinsically good for itself.
It is, of course, equally applicable to the Uncreated, Necessary Being Himself. The Infinite Actuality of the Divine Nature is essentially the term and end of the Divine Love. Therefore every actual being has intrinsic, formal goodness, whereby it is _bonum sibi_, _i.e._ its actuality is, in regard to its nature, really an object of tendency, desire, appet.i.te, a something that really suits and perfects this nature.
Thus understood, the thesis formulates no mere tautology. It makes a real a.s.sertion about real being; nor can the truth of this a.s.sertion be proved otherwise than by an argument based, as ours is, on the recognition of purpose, of final causality, of adaptation of means to ends, in the actual universe of our experience.
Notwithstanding all that has been said, it may still be asked why should those individual beings, whose existence we have claimed to be good for them, exist at all. It will be objected that there exist mult.i.tudes of beings whose existence is manifestly _not_ good for them. Take, for instance, the case of the reprobate. If they wish their total annihilation, if they desire the total cessation of their being, rather than an existence of eternal punishment, they undoubtedly wish it _as a good_. Is annihilation or absolute non-existence _really_ a good _for them_? _De facto_ it is _for them_, considered _in their actual condition_ which is _accidental to their nature_. Christ said of the scandal-giver what is surely true of the reprobate: ”It were better for that man had he never been born”. We may admit, therefore, that for the reprobate themselves simple non-existence is more desirable, and better, than their actual concrete state of existence as reprobate: because simple non-existence is for them the simple _negation_ of their reality, whereas the absolute and irreparable loss of their last end, the total frustration of the purpose for which they came into being, is for them the greatest conceivable _privation_. But this condition of the reprobate is accidental to their nature, alien to the purpose of their being, a self-incurred failure, a deliberate thwarting of their natural tendency. It remains true, therefore, that their nature is good though incapable of progress, its purpose is good though frustrated. In so far as they have actual reality they have ”essential” goodness. Their _natures_ still tend towards self-conservation and the realization of their end. They form no _real_ exception to the general truth that ”it is better to be than not to be: _melius est esse quam non esse_”. It is not annihilation as such that is desired by them, but only as a less evil alternative than the eternal privation of their last end.(186) If the evils accidentally and actually attaching to a certain state of existence make the continuance of _this state_ undesirable for a being, it by no means follows that the continuance of this being in existence, simply and in itself, is less desirable than non-existence.
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