Part 10 (1/2)

(2) BONUM ALTERI.-Even, however, if it were granted that the actual existence of some beings is not good for _themselves_, might it not nevertheless be good for _other beings_, and in relation to the general scheme of things? Is there not an intelligible sense in which _every_ actual being is _bonum alteri_, good for other things? Here again the same experience of actual reality, which teaches us that each individual being has a nature whereby it tends to its own good as a particular end, also teaches us that in the general scheme of reality things are helpful to one another, nay, are intended by their interaction and co-operation with one another to subserve the wider end which is the good of the whole system of reality. There is little use in puzzling, as people sometimes do, over the _raison d'etre_ of individual things or cla.s.ses of things in human experience, over the good or the evil of the existence of these things, over the question whether or not it would be better that these things should never have existed, until we have consulted not any isolated portion of human experience but _this experience as a whole_. In this we can find sufficient evidence for the prevalence of a beneficent purpose everywhere. Not that we can read this purpose in every detail of reality.

Even when we have convinced ourselves that all creation is the work of a Supreme Being who is Infinite Goodness Itself, we cannot gain that full insight into the secret designs of His Providence, which would be needed in order to ”justify His ways” in all things. But when we have convinced ourselves that the created universe exists because G.o.d wills it, we can understand that every actual reality in it must be ”good,” as being an object or term of the Divine Will. Every created reality is thus _bonum alteri_ inasmuch as it is good for G.o.d, not, of course, in the impossible sense of perfecting Him, but as an imitation and expression of the Goodness of the Divine Nature Itself. The experience which enables us to reach a knowledge of the existence and nature of G.o.d, the Creator, Conserver, and Providence of the actual universe, also teaches us that this universe can have no other ultimate end or good than G.o.d Himself, _i.e._ G.o.d's will to manifest His goodness by the extrinsic glory which consists in the knowledge and love of Him by His rational creatures. The omnipotence of the Creator, His freedom in creating, and our knowledge of the universe He has actually chosen to create from among indefinite possible worlds, all alike convince us that the actual world is neither the best possible nor the worst possible, _absolutely_ speaking. But our knowledge of His wisdom and power also convinces us that for the purpose of manifesting His glory in the measure and degree in which He has actually chosen to manifest it by creating the existing universe, and _relatively_ to the attainment of this specific purpose, the existing universe is the best possible.

51. OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM.-Those few outlines of the philosophy of theism-theses established in Natural Theology-will reveal to us the place of theism in relation to ”optimist” and ”pessimist” systems of philosophy.

Pessimism, as an outcome of philosophical speculation, is the proclamation in some form or other of the conviction that human existence, nay, existence in general, is a failure, an evil. It is the a.n.a.logue, in relation to will, of what scepticism is in relation to intellect; and it is no less self-contradictory than the latter. While the latter points to total paralysis of thought, the former involves a like paralysis of all will, all effort, all purpose in existence-a philosophy of despair, despondency, gloom. Both are equally erroneous, equally indicative of philosophical failure, equally repugnant to the normal, healthy mind.

Optimism on the other hand is expressive of the conviction that good predominates in all existence: _melius est esse quam non esse_; that at the root of all reality there is a beneficent purpose which is ever being realized; that there is in things not merely a truth that can be known but a goodness that can be loved. Existence is not an evil, life is not a failure. This is a philosophy of hope, buoyancy, effort and attainment.

But is it true, or is it an empty illusion? Well, to maintain that the actual universe is the best absolutely, would, of course, be absurd. If Leibniz's ”Principle of Sufficient Reason” obliged him to contend, in face of the painfully palpable facts of physical and moral evil in the universe, that this universe is the best absolutely possible, the best that G.o.d could create, we can only say: so much the worse for his ”Principle”. The true optimism is that of the theist who, admitting the prevalence of evil in the universe, in the sense to be explained presently, at the same time holds that throughout creation the good predominates, that G.o.d's beneficent purpose in regard to individuals does in the main prevail, and that His glory is manifested in giving to rational creatures the perfection and felicity of knowing and loving Himself. For the theist, then, the problem of the existence of evil in the universe a.s.sumes the general form of reconciling the fact of evil in G.o.d's creation with the fact of G.o.d's infinite power and goodness. This is a problem for Natural Theology. Here we have merely to indicate some general principles arising from the consideration of evil as the correlative and ant.i.thesis of goodness.

52. EVIL: ITS NATURE AND CAUSES. MANICHEISM.-Admitting the existence of evil in the universe, the scholastic apparently withdraws the admission forthwith by denying the reality of evil. The paradox explains itself by comparing the notions of good and evil, and thus trying to arrive at a proper conception of the latter.

If ontological goodness is really identical with actual being, if being is good in so far as it is actual, then it would appear that ontological evil must be identical with non-being, nothingness. And so it is, in the sense that no evil is a positive, actual reality, that all evil is an absence of reality. But just as the good, though really identical with the actual, is nevertheless logically distinct from the latter, so is evil logically distinct from nothingness, or the absence of reality. As we have seen, the good is that which perfects a nature, that which is due to a nature as the realization of the end of the latter. So, too, is evil the _privation_ of any perfection due to a nature, the absence of something positive and something which ought to be present. Evil, therefore, is not a mere negation or absence of being; it is the absence of a good, or in other words the absence of a reality that should be present. All privation is negation, but not _vice versa_; for privation is the negation of something _due_: the absence of virtue is a mere negation in an animal, in man it is a privation. Hence the commonly accepted definition of evil: _Malum est privatio boni debiti_: _Evil is the privation of the goodness due to a thing_.(187) Evil is always, therefore, a defect, a deficiency. The notion of evil is a relative, not an absolute notion. As goodness is the right relation of a nature to its proper end, so is evil a failure, a defect in this relation: _Malum est privatio ordinis ad finem debitum_.(188)

The very finiteness of a finite being is the absence of further reality in this being; but as this further reality is not due to such a being, its absence, which has sometimes been improperly described as ”metaphysical evil,” is not rightly regarded as evil at all: except, indeed, we were to conceive it as happening to the Infinite Being Himself, which would be a contradiction in thought.

Evil, then, in its formal concept is nothing positive; it is essentially negative, or rather privative. For this very reason, when we consider evil in the concrete, _i.e._ as affecting actual things, as occurring in the actual universe-we can scarcely speak of it with propriety as ”existing,”-we see that it essentially involves some positive, real subject which it affects, some nature which, by affecting, it renders so far evil. Cancer in the stomach is a real evil of the stomach, a defect, a deficiency, a failure, in the adaptation of the stomach to its proper end.

It is not itself a positive, absolute, _evil ent.i.ty_. In so far as it is itself a positive, physical reality, a growth of living cells, it has its own nature, its natural tendency, its development towards an end in accordance with biological laws: in all of which it verifies the definition of ontological goodness. But the existence of such a growth in the stomach is pathological, _i.e._ a disease of the stomach, a prevention of the natural, normal function of the stomach, a _failure of the latter's adaptation to its end_, and hence an _evil for the stomach_. Lying, too, is an evil, a moral evil of man as a moral subject. But this does not mean that the whole physical process of thinking, judging, speaking, whereby a man lies, is itself a positive evil ent.i.ty. The thinking is itself good as a physical act. So is the speaking in itself good as a physical act.

Whatever of positive reality there is in the whole process is good, ontologically good. But there is a _want of conformity_ of the language with the thought, entailing a _privation_ or _failure of adaptation_ of the man as a moral subject with his end, with his real good; and in this failure of adaptation, this privation of goodness, lies the moral evil of lying.

Evil, then, has a _material_ or subjective cause, _viz._ some positive, actual reality, which is good in so far forth as it is actual, but which is evil, or wanting in something due to it, in so far as the privation which we have called evil affects it.

But evil has no _formal_ cause: formally it is not a reality but a privation: ”evil has no formal cause, but is rather the privation of a form”.(189)

Nor has evil any _final_ cause, for it consists precisely in the failure of a being's natural tendency towards its end, in the want of adaptation of a nature to its end: ”nor has evil a final cause, but is rather the privation of a being's due relation to its natural end”.(190) Evil cannot be the natural result of a being's tendency towards its end, or a means to the attainment of this end. For that which is really an end must be good, and a means derives its goodness from the end to which it is a means. The good, because it is an end, or a means to an end, is desirable; and so, too, might evil be defined _a posteriori_ as that which is the object of no natural tendency or desire, that from which all things are averse: _malum est quod nullum ens appet.i.t, vel a quo omnia aversantur_. Nor can evil be itself an end, or be as such desired or desirable. Real evil is no doubt often sought and desired by conscious beings, sometimes physical evil, sometimes moral evil. But it is always desired and embraced as a good, _sub specie boni_, _i.e._ when apprehended as here and now good in the sense of gratifying, pleasure-giving, _bonum delectabile_. This is possible because _pleasure_, especially organic, sensible pleasure, as distinct from the state of real well-being which characterizes true _happiness_, is not the exclusive concomitant of seeking and possessing a _real_ good: it often accompanies the seeking and possessing of a merely apparent good: and in such cases it is itself a merely apparent good, and in reality evil. The unfortunate man who commits suicide does not embrace evil as such. He wrongly judges death to be good, as being in his view a lesser evil than the miseries of his existence, and under this aspect of goodness he embraces death.

Finally we have to inquire whether evil has an _efficient_ cause. Seeing that it is not merely a logical figment, seeing that it really affects actual things, that it really occurs in the actual universe, it must have a real source among the efficient causes of these actual things that make up the universe. It is undoubtedly due to the action of efficient causes, _i.e._ to the _failure_, the _defective_ action, of efficient causes. But being itself something negative, a privation, it cannot properly be said to have an ”efficient” cause; for the influence of an efficient cause is positive action, which in turn must have for its term something positive, something real, and therefore good. Hence St. Augustine very properly says that evil should be described as having a ”_deficient_” cause rather than an ”efficient” cause.(191) In other words, evil is not the direct, natural or normal result of the activity of efficient causes; for this result is always good. It must therefore be always an indirect, abnormal, accidental consequence of their activity. Let us see how this can be-firstly in regard to physical evil, then in regard to moral evil.

In the action of physical causes we may distinguish between the operative agencies themselves and the subjects in which the effects of these operations are produced. Sometimes the effect is wanting in due perfection, or is in other words imperfect, physically evil, because of some defect in the agencies: the statue may be defective because the sculptor is unskilled, or his instruments bad; offspring may be weak or malformed owing to some congenital or accidental weakness or unfitness in the parents. Sometimes the evil in the effect is traceable not to the agents but to the materials on which they have to work: the sculptor and his instruments may be perfect, but if there be a flaw in the marble the statue will be a failure; the educator may be efficient, but if the pupil be wanting in apt.i.tude or application the results cannot be ”good”.

All this, however, does not carry us very far, for we must still inquire _why_ are the agencies, or the materials, themselves defective. Moreover, physical evil sometimes occurs without any defect either in the agencies or in the materials. The effect produced may be incompatible with some minor perfection already in the subject; it can then be produced only at the sacrifice of this minor perfection: which sacrifice is for the subject _pro tanto_ an evil. It is in the natural order of things that the production of a new ”form” or perfection excludes the actuality of a pre-existing form or perfection. All nature is subject to change, and we have seen that all change is ruled by the law: _Generatio unius est corruptio alterius_. It might perhaps be said that this privation or supplanting of perfections in things by the actualization in these things of incompatible perfections, is inherent in the nature of things and essential to their finiteness-at least, if we regard the things not individually but as parts of a whole, as members of a system, as subserving a general scheme;-and that therefore such privation should not be regarded as physical evil proper, but rather as ”metaphysical” evil, improperly so called. However we regard it, it can have no other first source than the Will of the Creator decreeing the actual order of the existing universe. And the same must be said of the physical evils proper that are incident to the actual order of things. These evils are ”accidental” when considered in relation to the individual natures of the created agencies and materials. They are defects or failures of natural tendencies: were these natural tendencies always realized there would be no such evils. But they are not realized; and their ”failure” or ”evil” is not ”accidental” in regard to G.o.d; for G.o.d has willed and created these agencies with natural tendencies which He has destined to be fulfilled not always and in every detail, but in such measure as will secure the actual order of the universe and show forth His perfections in the finite degree in which He has freely chosen to manifest these perfections. The world He has chosen to create is not the best absolutely possible: there are physical evils in it; but it is the best for the exact purpose for which He created it.

There is also moral evil in the universe. In comparison with moral evil, the physical defects in G.o.d's creation-physical pain and suffering, material privations and hards.h.i.+ps, decay and death of living things-are not properly evils at all. At least they are not evils in the same profound sense as the deliberate turning away of the moral agent from G.o.d, his Last End and Ultimate Good, is an evil. For the physical evils incident to individual beings in the universe can be not only foreseen by G.o.d but accepted and approved, so to speak, by His Will, as subserving the realization of the total physical good which He wills in the universe; and as subordinate to, and instrumental in the realization of, the moral good of mankind: for it is obvious that in the all-wise designs of Providence physical evils such as pain, suffering, poverty, hunger, etc., may be the means of realizing moral goodness. But moral evil, on the contrary, or, in the language of Christian ethics, _Sin_-the conscious and deliberate rejection, by the free agent, of G.o.d who is his true good-though necessarily foreseen by G.o.d in the universe He has actually chosen to create, and therefore necessarily permitted by the Will of G.o.d consequently on this foresight, cannot have been and cannot be intended or approved by Him. Having created man an intelligent and free being, G.o.d could not will or decree the revolt of the latter from Himself. He loves essentially His own Infinite Goodness: were He to identify His Will with that of the sinning creature He would at the same time be turning away from His Goodness: which is a contradiction in terms. G.o.d, therefore, does not will moral evil. Nevertheless He permits it: otherwise it would not occur, for nothing can happen ”against His will”. He has permitted it by freely choosing to create this actual universe of rational and free creatures, foreseeing that they would sin. He could have created instead a universe of such beings, in which there would be no moral evil: for He is omnipotent. Into the secrets of His election it is not given to finite minds to penetrate. Acknowledging His Infinite Power, Wisdom and Goodness, realizing at the same time the finiteness of our faculties, we see how rational it is to bow down our minds with St. Paul and to exclaim in admiration: ”O, the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of G.o.d! How incomprehensible are His judgments, and how unsearchable His ways!”(192)

If it be objected that G.o.d's permission of moral evil in the universe is really the cause of this evil, and makes G.o.d Himself responsible for sin and its consequences, a satisfactory answer is not far to seek. It is absolutely incompatible with G.o.d's Infinite Sanct.i.ty that He be responsible for sin and its consequences. For these the free will of the creature is _alone_ responsible. The creation of intelligent beings, endowed with the power _freely_ to love, honour and serve G.o.d, is the most marvellous of all G.o.d's works. Free will is the n.o.blest endowment of a creature of G.o.d, as it is also the most mysterious. Man, who by his intelligence has the power to know G.o.d as his Supreme Good, has by his will the power _freely_ to tend towards G.o.d and attain to the possession of G.o.d as his Last End. In so far as man sins, _i.e._ knowingly, deliberately, and freely violates the tendency of his nature towards G.o.d by turning away from Him, he and he alone is responsible for the consequences, because he has the power to accomplish what he knows to be G.o.d's design in his regard, and to be his true destiny and path to happiness-_viz._ that he tend towards union with G.o.d and the possession of G.o.d-and he deliberately fails to make use of this power. Such failure and its consequences are, therefore, his own; they leave absolutely untouched and una.s.sailed the Infinite Goodness and Benevolence of G.o.d's eternal design in his regard.

In scholastic form, the objection is proposed and answered in this way: ”The cause of a cause is the cause of the latter's effects; but G.o.d is the cause of man, and sin is the latter's effect; therefore G.o.d is the cause of sin”. ”That the cause of a _non-free_ cause is the cause of the latter's effects, we admit. That the cause of a _free_ cause is the cause of the latter's effects, at least in the sense of permitting, without intending and being thereby responsible for them, we also admit; always in the sense of intending and being responsible for them, we deny. The _positive effects_ of a created free cause, those which the latter by nature is intended to produce, are attributable to the first cause or creator of the free cause, and the first cause is responsible for them.

The _failures_ of the created free cause to produce its natural and intended effects, are not due to the first cause; they are not intended by, nor attributable to, the first cause; nor is the latter responsible for them: they are failures of the free cause, and of him alone; though they are of course foreseen and permitted by the first cause or creator of the latter. The minor premiss of the objection we may admit-noting, however, that sin is not properly called an effect, but rather, like all evil, a _failure_ of some cause to produce its connatural effect: it is a defect, a deficiency, a privation of some effect, of some positive perfection, which the cause ought naturally to have produced. The conclusion of the objection we distinguish, according to our a.n.a.lysis of the major premiss: G.o.d is the cause of sin in the proper sense of intending it, willing it, and producing it positively, and being thereby responsible for it, we deny; G.o.d is the cause of sin in the improper sense of merely foreseeing and permitting it as incidental to the universe He has actually willed and decreed to create, as occurring in this universe by the deliberate failure of free creatures to conform themselves to His primary benevolent intention in their regard, we may grant. And this Divine permission of moral evil cannot be shown to be incompatible with any attribute of the Divinity.”

In the preceding paragraphs we have barely outlined the principles on which the philosophy of theism meets the problem of evil in the universe.

We have made a.s.sumptions which it is the proper province of Natural Theology to establish, and to that department also we must refer the student for a fuller treatment of the whole problem.

It has been sometimes said that the fact of evil in the universe is one of the greatest difficulties against the philosophy of Theism. If this be taken as an insinuation that the fact of evil can be better explained-or even as well explained-on the a.s.sumptions of Pantheism, Monism, Manicheism, or any other philosophy besides Theism, it is false. If it means simply that in accounting for evil-whether on principles of Theism or of any other philosophy-we are forced to raise some ultimate questions in the face of which we must admit that we have come upon depths of mystery which the plummet of our finite intellects cannot hope to fathom, in this sense indeed the a.s.sertion may be admitted. As we have already hinted, even with the light of the Christian Revelation to aid the natural light of reason, there are questions about the existence and causes of evil which we may indeed ask, but which we cannot adequately answer. And obviously this is no reflection on Theism; while in the latter system we have a more intelligible and more satisfactory a.n.a.lysis of the problem than in any other philosophy.

Among the ancient Greek philosophers we find ”matter” (???) identified with ”vacuum” or ”empty s.p.a.ce” (t? ?e???) and this again with ”nothingness” or non-being (t? ? ??). Now the concept of evil is the concept of something negative-a privation of goodness, of being or reality. Thus the notion of evil came to be a.s.sociated with the notion of matter. But the latter notion is not really negative: it is that of a formless, chaotic, disorderly material. When, therefore, the Manicheans attributed a positive reality to evil-conceiving it as the principle of all disorder, strife, discord-they naturally regarded all matter as the expression of the Evil Principle, in opposition to soul or spirit as the expression of the Good Principle. The Manichean philosophy of Evil, a product of the early Christian centuries, has been perhaps the most notable alternative or rival system encountered by the theistic philosophy of Evil; for, notwithstanding the fantastic character of its conceptions Manicheism has reappeared and rea.s.serted itself repeatedly in after ages, notably in the Middle Ages. Its prevalence has probably been due partly to the concreteness of its conceptions and partly to a certain a.n.a.logy which they bear towards the conception of Satan and the fallen angels in Christian theology. In both cases there is the idea of conflict, strife, active and irreconcilable opposition, between the powers of good and the powers of evil. But there the a.n.a.logy ends. While in Christian theology the powers of evil are presented as essentially subject to the Divine Omnipotence, in Manicheism the _Evil Principle_, the _Summum Malum_, is presented as a supreme, self-existent principle, essentially independent of, as well as antagonistic to, the Divine Being, the _Summum Bonum_.

Since there is evil in the world, and since good cannot be the cause of evil-so the Manicheans argue-there must be an essentially Evil First Principle which is the primary source of all the evil in the universe, just as there is an essentially Good First Principle which is the source of all its good. Everything in the world-and especially man himself, composed of matter and spirit-is the expression and the theatre of the essential conflict which is being ever waged between the Good and the Evil Principle. Everywhere throughout the universe we find this dualism: between spirit and matter, light and darkness, order and disorder, etc.

From all that has been said in the preceding paragraphs regarding the nature and causes of good and evil the errors of the Manichean system will be apparent. Its fundamental error is the conception of evil as a positive ent.i.ty. Evil is not a positive ent.i.ty but a privation. And this being so, its occurrence does not demand a positive efficient cause. It can be explained and accounted for by deficiency or failure in causes that are good in so far forth as they are operative, but which have not all the goodness their nature demands. And we have seen how this failure of created causes is permitted by the First Cause, and is not incompatible with His Infinite Goodness.

Besides, the Manichean conception of an intrinsically evil cause, a cause that could produce only evil, is a contradiction in terms. The operation of an efficient cause must have a positive term: in so far as the term is positive it is good: and therefore its cause cannot have been totally evil, but must have been in some degree good. The crucial point in the whole debate is this, that we cannot conceive evil as a positive ent.i.ty.