Part 9 (1/2)
Finally, the logical truth which has its seat in created intelligences is _mutable_: it may be increased or diminished, acquired or lost.
42. ONTOLOGICAL TRUTH A TRANSCENDENTAL ATTRIBUTE OF REALITY.-From what has been said it will be apparent that ontological truth is a transcendental attribute of reality. That is to say, whatever is real, whether actual or possible, is ontologically true; or, in scholastic terminology, ”_Omne ens est verum; Ens et verum convertuntur_: All being is true; The real and the true are convertible terms”. For in the first place there is no mode or category of real being, of which the human mind actually thinks, to which it does not attribute ontological truth in the sense of conformity with the right human conception of it. Moreover, the proper object of the human intellect is reality; all true knowledge is knowledge of reality. Reality of itself is manifestly knowable, intelligible, and thus potentially or fundamentally true; and, on the other hand, intellect is, according to the measure of its capacity, a faculty of insight into all reality, into whatever is real: _intellectus potens fieri omnia; anima ... quodammodo fit omnia_.(171) Deny either of these postulates regarding the terms of the ontological relation, reality and mind, and all rational thought is instantly paralysed. Hence, in so far as a reality becomes an actual object of human knowledge it has formal ontological truth in relation both to the human mind and to the Divine Mind; while antecedently to human thought it is fundamentally true, or intelligible, to the human mind, and of course formally true in relation to the Divine Mind.
Thus we see that whatever is real is ontologically true; that ontological truth is really identical with real being; that, applied to the latter, it is not a mere extrinsic denomination, but signifies an intrinsic, positive aspect of reality, _viz._ the real, essential, or transcendental relation of all real being to Mind or Intellect: a relation which is logically or conceptually distinct from the notion of reality considered in itself.
43. ATTRIBUTION OF FALSITY TO REAL BEING.-If ontological truth is really identical with real being, if it is an essential aspect of the latter, a transcendental relation of reality to mind, it follows immediately that there can be no such thing as transcendental falsity: if whatever is real is ontologically true, then the ontologically false must be the unreal, must be nothingness. And this is really so: ontologically falsity _is_ nothingness. We have, therefore, to discover the real meaning of attributing falsity to things, as when we speak of a false friend, false gold, false teeth, a false musical note, a false measure in poetry, etc.
First of all, then, it will be noted that each such object has its own real nature and character, its proper mental correlate, and, therefore, its ontological truth. The false friend is a true or real deceiver, or traitor, or coward, or whatever his real character may be; the false gold is true or real bronze, or alloy, or whatever it may be in reality; the false teeth are true or real ivory, or whatever substance they are made of; a false musical note is a true or real note but not the proper one in its actual setting; and so of a false measure in poetry. Next, when we thus ascribe falsity to a friend, or gold, or such like, we see that the epithet ”false” is in reality merely transferred from the false judgment which a person is liable to make about the object. We mean that to judge that person a friend, or that substance gold, or those articles real teeth, would be to form a false judgment. We see that it is only in the judgment there can be falsity; but we transfer the epithet to the object because the object is likely to occasion the erroneous judgment in the fallible human mind, by reason of the resemblance of the object to something else which it really is not. We see, therefore, that falsity is not in the objects, but is transferred to them by a purely extrinsic denomination on account of appearances calculated to mislead. We commonly say, in such cases that ”things mislead us,” that ”appearances deceive us”. Things, however, do not deceive or mislead us _necessarily_, but only _accidentally_: they are the _occasions_ of our allowing ourselves to be deceived: the fallibility and limitations of our own minds in interpreting reality are the real cause of our erroneous judgments.(172)
Secondly, there is another improper sense in which we attribute falsity to works of art which fail to realize the artist's ideal. In this sense we speak of a ”false” note in music, a ”false” measure in poetry, a ”false”
tint in painting, a ”false” curve in sculpture or architecture. ”False”
here means defective, bad, wanting in perfection. The object being out of harmony with the ideal or design in the practical intellect of the artist, we describe it as ”false” after the a.n.a.logy of what takes place when we describe as ”false gold” a substance which is out of harmony with the idea of gold in the speculative intellect. It is in relation to the speculative, not the practical, intellect, that things have ontological truth. All created things are, of course, as such, in conformity not only with the Divine Intellect considered as speculative, but also with the Divine Intellect considered as practical. For G.o.d, being omnipotent, does all things according to the designs of His Wisdom. For Him nothing is accidental, nothing happens by chance. But the world He has freely willed to create is not the best possible world. Both in the physical and in the moral order there are things and events which are defective, which fall short of their natural perfection. This defectiveness, which is properly physical or moral evil, is sometimes described as falsity, lying, vanity, etc., on account of the discrepancy between those things and the ideal of what they should be. But all such defective realities are known to be what they are by the Divine Mind, and may be known as they really are by the human mind. They have, therefore, their ontological truth. The question of their perfection or imperfection gives rise to the consideration of quite a different aspect of reality, namely its _goodness_. This, then, we must deal with in the next place.
CHAPTER VI. REALITY AND THE GOOD.
44. THE GOOD AS ”DESIRABLE” AND AS ”SUITABLE”.-The notion of the _good_ (L. _bonum_; Gr. ??a???) is one of the most familiar of all notions. But like all other transcendental or widely generic concepts, the a.n.a.lysis of it opens up some fundamental questions. The princes of ancient Greek philosophy, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, gave much anxious thought to its elucidation. The tentative gropings of Socrates involved an ambiguity which issued in the conflicting philosophies of Stoicism and Epicureanism.
Nor did Plato succeed in bringing down from the clouds the ”Idea of the Good” which he so devotedly wors.h.i.+pped as the Sun of the Intellectual World. It needed the more sober and searching a.n.a.lysis of the Stagyrite to bring to light the formula so universally accepted in after ages: The Good of beings is that which all desire: _Bonum est quod omnia appetunt_.(173) Let us try to reach the fundamental idea underlying the terms ”good,”
”goodness,” by some simple examples.
The child, deriving sensible pleasure from a sweetmeat, cries out: That is _good_! Whatever gratifies its senses, gives it sensible delight, it _likes_ or _loves_. Such things it _desires_, _seeks_, _yearns for_, in their absence; and in their presence _enjoys_. At this stage the good means simply the _pleasure-giving_. But as reason develops the human being apprehends and describes as good not merely what is pleasure-giving, but whatever satisfies any natural need or craving, whether purely organic, or purely intellectual, or more widely human: food is good because it satisfies a physical, organic craving; knowledge is good because it satisfies a natural intellectual thirst; friends.h.i.+p is good because it satisfies a wider need of the heart. Here we notice a transition from ”agreeable” in the sense of ”pleasure-giving” to ”agreeable” in the more proper sense of ”suitable” or useful. The good is now conceived not in the narrow sense of what yields sensible pleasure but in the wider sense of that which is useful or suitable for the satisfaction of a natural tendency or need, that which is _the object of a natural tendency_.
Next, let us reflect, with Aristotle, that each of the individual persons and things that make up the world of our direct experience has an end towards which it naturally tends. There is a purpose in the existence of each. Each has a nature, _i.e._ an essence which is for it a principle of development, a source of all the functions and activities whereby it continually adapts itself to its environment and thereby continually fulfils the aim of its existence. By its very nature it tends towards its end along the proper line of its development.(174) In the world of conscious beings this natural tendency is properly called appet.i.te: _sense appet.i.te_ of what is apprehended as good by sense cognition, and rational appet.i.te or _will_ in regard to what is apprehended as good by intellect or reason. In the world of unconscious things this natural tendency is a real tendency and is a.n.a.logous to conscious appet.i.te. Hence it is that Aristotle, taking in all grades of real being, describes the good as that which is the object of any natural tendency or ”appet.i.te” whatsoever: the good is the ”_appetibile_” or ”desirable,” that which all things seek: _bonum est quod omnia appetunt_.
45. THE GOOD AS AN ”END,” ”PERFECTING” THE ”NATURE”.-So far, we have a.n.a.lysed the notion of what is ”good” _for some being_; and we have gathered that it implies what _suits_ this being, what contributes to the latter's realization of its end. But we apply the term ”good” to objects, and speak of their goodness, apart from their direct and immediate relation of helpfulness or suitability _for us_. When, for instance, we say of a watch that it is a _good_ one, or of a soldier that he is a _good_ soldier, what precisely do we mean by such attribution of goodness to things or persons? A little reflection will show that it is intelligible _only in reference to an end or purpose_. And we mean by it that the being we describe as good has the powers, qualities, equipments, which _fit it for its end or purpose_. A being is good whose nature is equipped and adapted for the realization of its natural end or purpose.
Thus we see that the notion of goodness is correlative with the notion of an end, towards which, or for which, a being has a natural tendency or desire. Without the concept of a nature as tending to realize an end or purpose, the notion of ”the good” would be inexplicable.(175) And the two formulae, ”The good is that which beings desire, or towards which they naturally tend,” and ”The good is that which is adapted to the ends which beings have in their existence,” really come to the same thing; the former statement resolving itself into the latter as the more fundamental. For the reason why anything is desirable, why it is the object of a natural tendency, is because it is good, and not _vice versa_. The description of the good as that which is desirable, ”_Bonum est id quod est appetibile_,”
is an _a posteriori_ description, a description of cause by reference to effect.(176) A thing is desirable because it is good. Why then is it good, and therefore desirable? Because it _suits_ the natural needs, and _is adapted_ to the nature, of the being that desires it or tends towards it; because it _helps_ this being, _agrees with_ it, by contributing towards the realization of its end: _Bonum est id quod convenit naturae appetentis_: The good is that which suits the nature of the being that desires it. The greatest good for a being is the realization of its end; and the means towards this are also good because they contribute to this realization.
No doubt, in beings endowed with consciousness the gradual realization of this natural tendency, by the normal functioning and development of their activities, is accompanied by pleasurable feeling. The latter is, in fact, not an end of action itself, but rather the natural concomitant, the effect and index, of the healthy and normal activity of the conscious being: _delectatio sequitur operationem debitam_. It is the pleasure felt in tending towards the good that reveals the good to the conscious agent: that is, taking pleasure in its wide sense as the feeling of well-being, of satisfaction with one's whole condition, activities and environment.
Hence it is the antic.i.p.ated pleasure, connected by past a.s.sociation with a certain line of action, that stimulates the conscious being to act in that way again. It is in the first instance because a certain operation or tendency is felt to be _pleasing_ that it is desired, and apprehended as _desirable_. Nor does the brute beast recognize or respond to any stimulus of action other than pleasure. But man-endowed with reason, and reflecting on the relation between his own nature and the activities whereby he duly orients his life in his environment-must see that what is pleasure-giving or ”agreeable” in the ordinary sense of this term is generally so because it is ”agreeable” in the deeper sense of being ”suitable to his nature,”
”adapted to his end,” and therefore ”good”.
The good, then, is whatever suits the nature of a being tending towards its end: _bonum est conveniens naturae appetentis_. In what precisely does this suitability consist? What suits any nature _perfects_ that nature, and suits it precisely in so far as it perfects it. But whatever perfects a nature does so only because and in so far as it is _a realization of the end_ towards which this nature tends. Here we reach a new notion, that of ”perfecting” or ”perfection,” and one which is as essentially connected with the notion of ”end” or ”purpose,” as the concept of the ”good” itself is. Let us compare these notions of ”goodness,” ”end,” and ”perfection”.
We have said that a watch or a soldier are good when they are adapted to their respective ends. But they are so only because the end itself is already good. And we may ask why any such end is itself good and therefore desirable. For example, why is the accurate indication of time good, or the defence of one's country? And obviously in such a series of questions we must come to something which is good and desirable in and for itself, for its own sake and not as leading and helping towards some remoter good.
And this something which is good in and for itself is a last or ultimate end-an absolute, not a relative, good. There must be such an absolute good, such an ultimate end, if goodness in things is to be made intelligible at all. And it is only in so far as things tend towards this absolute good, and are adapted to it, that they can be termed good. The realization of this tendency of things towards the absolute good, or ultimate end, is what const.i.tutes the goodness of those things, and it does so because it _perfects their natures_.
The end towards which any nature tends is the cause of this tendency, its _final_ cause; and the influence of a final cause consists precisely in its goodness, _i.e._ in its power of actualizing and perfecting a nature. This influence of the good is sometimes described as the ”diffusive” character of goodness: _Bonum est diffusivum sui_: Goodness tends to diffuse or communicate itself, to multiply or reproduce itself. This character, which we may recognize in the goodness of finite, created things, is explained in the philosophy of theism as being derived, with this goodness itself, from the uncreated goodness of G.o.d who is the Ultimate End and Supreme Good of all reality. Every creature has its own proper ultimate end and highest perfection in its being a manifestation, an expression, a shewing forth, of the Divine Goodness. It has its own actuality and goodness, distinct from, but dependent on, the Divine Goodness; but inasmuch as its goodness is an expression or imitation of the Divine Goodness, we may, by an _extrinsic_ denomination, say that the creature is good _by the Divine Goodness_. In a similar way, and without any suspicion of pantheism, we may speak of the goodness of creatures as being a _partic.i.p.ation_ of the Divine Goodness (5).
46. THE PERFECT. a.n.a.lYSIS OF THE NOTION OF PERFECTION.-It is the realization of the end or object or purpose of a nature that perfects the latter, and so far formally const.i.tutes the goodness of this nature. Now the notion of perfection is not exactly the same as the notion of goodness: although what is perfect is always good, what is good is not always perfect. The term ”perfect” comes from the Latin _perficere_, _perfectum_, meaning fully made, thoroughly achieved, completed, finished.
Strictly speaking, it is only finite being, potential being, capable of completion, that can be spoken of as _perfectible_, or, when fully actualized, _perfect_. But by universal usage the term has been extended to the reality of the Infinite Being: we speak of the latter as the Infinitely _Perfect_ Being, not meaning that this Being has been ”perfected,” but that He is the purely Actual and Infinite Reality.
Applied to any finite being, the term ”perfect” means that this being has attained to the full actuality which we regard as its end, as the ideal of its natural capacity and tendency. The finite being is subject to change; it is not actualized all at once, but gradually; by the play of those active and pa.s.sive powers which are rooted in its nature it is gradually actualized, and thus perfected, gaining more and more reality or being by the process. But what directs this process and determines the line of its tendency? The _good_ which is the _end_ of the being, the good towards which the being by its nature tends. This good, which is the term of the being's natural tendency-which is, in other words, its end-is the fundamental principle(177) which perfects the nature of the being, is the source and explanation of the process whereby this nature is perfected: _bonum est perfectivum_: _the good is the perfecting principle of reality_. The end itself is ”the good which perfects,” _bonum quod_; the ”perfecting” itself is the formal cause of the goodness of the being that is perfected, _bonum quo_; the being itself which is perfected, and therefore ameliorated or increased in goodness, is the _bonum cui_. In proportion, therefore, to the degree in which a being actually possesses the perfection due to its nature it is ”good”; in so far as it lacks this perfection, it is wanting in goodness, or is, as we shall see, ontologically ”bad” or ”evil”.
While, then, the notion of the ”good” implies a relation of the appet.i.te or natural tendency of a being towards its end, the notion of ”perfection,” or ”perfecting,” conveys to our minds actual reality simply, or the actualizing of reality. The term ”perfection” is commonly used as synonymous with actual reality. In so far forth as a reality is actual we say it ”has perfection”. But we do not call it ”perfect” _simply_, unless it has all the actuality we conceive to be due to its nature: so long as it lacks any of this it is only perfect _secundum quid_, _i.e._ in proportion to the actuality it does possess. Hence we define ”the perfect”