Part 9 (1/2)
Pappenheim claims that s.e.xtus was not referring to Aenesidemus himself in these statements which he joins with his name. In the most important of these, the one quoted from the _Hypotyposes_,[3] which represents Aenesidemus as claiming that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus, the expression used is [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon], and in many of the other places where s.e.xtus refers to the dogmatic statements of Aenesidemus, the expression is either [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon], or [Greek: Ainesidemos kath'
Herakleiton], while when s.e.xtus quotes Aenesidemus to sustain Scepticism, he uses his name alone.
[1] Compare Zeller _Op. cit._ III. p. 16.
[2] _Die angebliche Herac.l.i.tismus des Skeptikers Ainesidemos_, Berlin 1889.
[3] _Hyp._ I. 210-212.
Pappenheim thinks that s.e.xtus' conflict was not with the dead Aenesidemus, who had lived two centuries before him, but with his own contemporaries. He also seeks to prove that s.e.xtus could not have gained his knowledge of these sayings of Aenesidemus from any of Aenesidemus' own writings, as neither by the ancients, nor by later writers, was any book spoken of which could well have contained them. Neither Aristocles nor Diogenes mentions any such book.
Pappenheim also makes much of the argument that s.e.xtus in no instance seems conscious of inconsistency on the part of Aenesidemus, even when most earnestly combating his alleged teachings, but in referring to him personally he always speaks of him with great respect.
Pappenheim suggests, accordingly, that the polemic of s.e.xtus was against contemporaries, those who accepted the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus in consequence of, or in some connection with, the teachings of Aenesidemus. He entirely ignores the fact that there is no trace of any such school or sect in history, calling themselves followers of ”Aenesidemus according to Herac.l.i.tus,”
but still thinks it possible that such a movement existed in Alexandria at the time of s.e.xtus, where so many different sects were found. s.e.xtus use Aenesidemus' name in four different ways:--alone, [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon], [Greek: Ainesidemos kath' Herakleiton], and in one instance [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon kath' Herakleiton].[1]
[1] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 8.
Pappenheim advances the theory that some of these contemporaries against whom s.e.xtus directed his arguments had written a book ent.i.tled [Greek: Ainesidemos kath' Herakleiton], to prove the harmony between Aenesidemus and Herac.l.i.tus, and that it was from this book that s.e.xtus quoted the dogmatic statements which he introduced with that formula. He claims, further, that the pa.s.sage quoted from _Hypotyposes I._ even, is directed against contemporaries, who founded their system of proofs of the harmony between Aenesidemus and Herac.l.i.tus on the connection of the celebrated formula which was such a favourite with the Sceptics: ”Contrary predicates appear to apply to the same thing,” with the apparent deduction from this, that ”Contrary predicates in reality apply to the same thing.” s.e.xtus wishes, according to Pappenheim, to prove to these contemporaries that they had misunderstood Aenesidemus, and s.e.xtus does not report Aenesidemus to be a Dogmatic, nor to have taught the doctrines of Herac.l.i.tus; neither has he misunderstood Aenesidemus, nor consequently misrepresented him; but on the contrary, these dogmatic quotations have nothing to do with Aenesidemus, but refer altogether to contemporaries who pretended to be Sceptics while they accepted the teachings of Herac.l.i.tus. s.e.xtus naturally warmly combats this tendency, as he wishes to preserve Pyrrhonism pure.
Brochard advocates a change of opinion on the part of Aenesidemus as an explanation of the difficulty in question.[1]
He starts from the supposition, the reasonableness of which we shall consider later, that Aenesidemus had pa.s.sed through one change of opinion already when he severed his connection with the New Academy; and to the two phases of his life, which such a change has already made us familiar with, he adds a third.
Aenesidemus would not be the first who has accepted different beliefs at different periods of his life, and Brochard claims that such a development in the opinions of Aenesidemus is logical. He does not accuse Aenesidemus of having, as might seem from the perusal of s.e.xtus, suddenly changed his basis, but rather of having gradually come to accept much in the teachings of Herac.l.i.tus. Aenesidemus modifies his Scepticism only to the extent of pretending to know something of absolute reality. The Sceptic says, ”Contradictory predicates are apparently applicable to the same thing,” and Aenesidemus accepts the Herac.l.i.tan result--”Contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing.” From s.e.xtus' report, Aenesidemus would seem to have renounced his position as a Sceptic in saying that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus. He does not, however, renounce Scepticism, but he finds it incomplete. In deliberating concerning the appearance of contradictory predicates in regard to the same object, he would naturally ask, ”Whence come these contradictory appearances?”
After having doubted all things, he wished to know wherefore he doubts. The system of Herac.l.i.tus offers a solution, and he accepts it. Contradictory predicates produce equilibrium in the soul because they are an expression of reality.
[1] Brochard _Op. cit._ 272.
As a Sceptic he claims that knowledge is impossible, and he does not find that the statement of Herac.l.i.tus disproves this, but rather that it supports his theory. He had denied the existence of science. He still does so, but now he knows why he denies it.
Brochard asks why it is any more impossible that Aenesidemus should have been a follower of Herac.l.i.tus than that Protagoras was so, as Protagoras was after all a Sceptic. In conclusion, Brochard claims that the dogmatic theories attributed to Aenesidemus relate to the doctrine of the truth of contradictory predicates, which seemed to him a logical explanation of the foundation theories of Scepticism. It is right to call him a Sceptic, for he was so, and that sincerely; and he deserves his rank as one of the chiefs of the Sceptical School.
Coming now to the opinion of Zeller,[1] we find that he advocates a misconception of Aenesidemus on the part of s.e.xtus.
The whole difficulty is removed, Zeller thinks, by the simple fact that s.e.xtus had not understood Aenesidemus; and as Tertullian and s.e.xtus agree in this misconception of the views of Aenesidemus, they must have been misled by consulting a common author in regard to Aenesidemus, who confused what Aenesidemus said of Herac.l.i.tus with his own opinion. Zeller maintains that the expression so often repeated by s.e.xtus--[Greek: Ainesidemos kath' Herakleiton]--shows that some one of Aenesidemus' books contained a report of Herac.l.i.tus'
doctrines, as Aenesidemus was in the habit of quoting as many authorities as possible to sustain his Scepticism. To justify his quotations from Herac.l.i.tus, he had possibly given a short abstract of Herac.l.i.tus' teachings; and the misconception advocated by Zeller and found both in Tertullian and s.e.xtus, refers rather to the spirit than to the words quoted from Aenesidemus, and is a misconception due to some earlier author, who had given a false impression of the meaning of Aenesidemus in quoting what Aenesidemus wrote about Herac.l.i.tus. That is to say, Herac.l.i.tus was cla.s.sed by Aenesidemus only among those who prepared the way for Scepticism, just as Diogenes[2] mentions many philosophers in that way; and that Sora.n.u.s[3] and s.e.xtus both had the same misunderstanding can only be explained by a mistake on the part of the authority whom they consulted.
[1] Zeller _Op. cit._ III, pp. 31-35; _Grundriss der Geschichte der Griechischen Phil._ p. 263.
[2] Diog. Laert. IX. 11, 71-74.
[3] Tertullian.
This explanation, however, makes s.e.xtus a very stupid man.
Aenesidemus' books were well known, and s.e.xtus would most certainly take the trouble to read them. His reputation as an historian would not sustain such an accusation, as Diogenes calls his books [Greek: ta deka ton skeptikon kai alla kallista].[1] Furthermore, that s.e.xtus used Aenesidemus' own books we know from the direct quotation from them in regard to Plato,[2] which he combines with the ideas of Menodotus[3] and his own.
[1] Diog. IX. 12, 116.
[2] _Hyp._ I. 222.