Part 9 (2/2)
[3] Following the Greek of Bekker.
s.e.xtus' references to Aenesidemus in connection with Herac.l.i.tus are very numerous, and it is absurd to suppose that he would have trusted entirely to some one who reported him for authority on such a subject. Even were it possible that s.e.xtus did not refer directly to the works of Aenesidemus, which we do not admit, even then, there had been many writers in the Sceptical School since the time of Aenesidemus, and they certainly could not all have misrepresented him. We must remember that s.e.xtus was at the head of the School, and had access to all of its literature. His honor would not allow of such a mistake, and if he had indeed made it, his contemporaries must surely have discovered it before Diogenes characterised his books as [Greek: kallista]. Whatever may be said against the accuracy of s.e.xtus as a general historian of philosophy, especially in regard to the older schools, he cannot certainly be accused of ignorance respecting the school of which he was at that time the head.
The opinion of Ritter on this subject is that Aenesidemus must have been a Dogmatic.[1] Saisset contends[2] that Aenesidemus really pa.s.sed from the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus to that of Pyrrho, and made the statement that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus to defend his change of view, although in his case the change had been just the opposite to the one he defends. Saisset propounds as a law in the history of philosophy a fact which he claims to be true, that Scepticism always follows sensationalism, for which he gives two examples, Pyrrho, who was first a disciple of Democritus, and Hume, who was a disciple of Locke It is not necessary to discuss the absurdity of such a law, which someone has well remarked would involve an _a priori_ construction of history. There is no apparent reason for Saisset's conjecture in regard to Aenesidemus, for it is exactly the opposite of what s.e.xtus has reported. Strange to say, Saisset himself remarks in another place that we owe religious respect to any text, and that it should be the first law of criticism to render this.[3] Such respect to the text of s.e.xtus, as he himself advocates, puts Saisset's explanation of the subject under discussion out of the question.
[1] Ritter, _Op. cit._ p. 280. Book IV.
[2] Saisset, _Op. cit._ p. 206.
[3] Saisset _Op. cit._ p. 206.
Hirzel and Natorp do not find such a marked contradiction in the two views presented of the theories of Aenesidemus, nor do they think that s.e.xtus has misrepresented them. They rather maintain, that in declaring the coexistence of contradictory predicates regarding the same object, Aenesidemus does not cease to be a Sceptic, for he did not believe that the predicates are applicable in a dogmatic sense of the word, but are only applicable in appearance, that is, applicable to phenomena. The Herac.l.i.tism of Aenesidemus would be then only in appearance, as he understood the statement, that ”Contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing,” only in the phenomenal sense.[1] Hirzel says in addition, that contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to those phenomena which are the same for all, and consequently true, for Aenesidemus considered those phenomena true that are the same for all.[2] As Protagoras, the disciple of Herac.l.i.tus, declared the relative character of sensations, that things exist only for us, and that their nature depends on our perception of them; so, in the phenomenal sense, Aenesidemus accepts the apparent fact that contradictory predicates in reality apply to the same thing.
[1] Natorp _Op. cit._ 115, 122.
[2] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 8; Hirzel _Op. cit._ p. 95.
This explanation entirely overlooks the fact that we have to do with the word [Greek: huparchein], in the statement that contradictory predicates in reality apply to the same thing; while in the pa.s.sage quoted where Aenesidemus declares common phenomena to be true ones, we have the word [Greek: alethe], so that this explanation of the difficulty would advocate a very strange use of the word [Greek: huparchein].
All of these different views of the possible solution of this perplexing problem are worthy of respect, as the opinion of men who have given much thought to this and other closely Belated subjects. While we may not altogether agree with any one of them, they nevertheless furnish many suggestions, which are very valuable in helping to construct a theory on the subject that shall satisfactorily explain the difficulties, and present a consistent view of the att.i.tude of Aenesidemus.
First, in regard to the Greek expression [Greek: hoi peri] in connection with proper names, upon which Pappenheim bases so much of his argument. All Greek scholars would agree that the expression does not apply usually only to the disciples of any teacher, but [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon], for instance, includes Aenesidemus with his followers, and is literally translated, ”Aenesidemus and his followers.” It is noticeable, however, in the writings of s.e.xtus that he uses the expression [Greek: hoi peri] often for the name of the founder of a school alone, as Pappenheim himself admits.[1] We find examples of this in the mention of Plato and Democritus and Arcesilaus, as [Greek: hoi peri ton Platona kai Demokriton][2] and [Greek: hoi peri ton Arkesilaon],[3] and accordingly we have no right to infer that his use of the name Aenesidemus in this way has an exceptional significance. It may mean Aenesidemus alone, or it may signify Aenesidemus in connection with his followers.
[1] Pappenheim _Op. cit._ p. 21.
[2] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 6.
[3] _Adv. Math._ VII. 150.
In reply to Zeller's position, that s.e.xtus and Tertullian have misunderstood Aenesidemus, and quote from some common author who misrepresents him, we would admit that such a misunderstanding might be possible where s.e.xtus gives long explanations of Herac.l.i.tus' teachings, beginning with quoting Aenesidemus, and continuing in such a way that it is not always possible to distinguish just the part that is attributed to Aenesidemus; but such a misunderstanding certainly cannot be a.s.serted in regard to the direct statement that Aenesidemus regarded Scepticism as the path to the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus, for the reasons previously given. Neither would we agree with Brochard, whose solution of the difficulty is on the whole the most logical, _i.e._, that Aenesidemus had necessarily already pa.s.sed through two phases of philosophical belief. It is possible to admit a gradual evolution of thought in Aenesidemus without supposing in either case a change of basis. His withdrawal from the Academy is an argument against, rather than in favor of a change on his part, and was caused by the well-known change in the att.i.tude of the Academy.
Many of the teachings of the Sceptical School were taken directly from the Academy, belonging to those doctrines advocated in the Academy before the eclectic dogmatic tendency introduced by Antiochus. In fact, s.e.xtus himself claims a close relation between the Middle Academy and Pyrrhonism.[1]
Aenesidemus, although he was a Sceptic, belonged to the Academy, and on leaving it became, as it were, a pioneer in Pyrrhonism, and cannot be judged in the same way as we should judge a Sceptic of s.e.xtus' time.
It seems a self-evident fact that during the two centuries which elapsed between the time of Aenesidemus and s.e.xtus, the standpoint of judgment in the Sceptical School had greatly changed. An example ill.u.s.trating this change we find in a comparison of the presentation of Scepticism by Diogenes with that of s.e.xtus. The author Whom Diogenes follows, probably one of the Sceptical writers, considers Xenophanes, Zeno, and Democritus, Sceptics, and also Plato,[2] while s.e.xtus, in regard to all of these men, opposes the idea that they were Sceptics.[3] Diogenes also calls Herac.l.i.tus a Sceptic, and even Homer,[4] and quotes sceptical sayings from the Seven Wise Men;[5] he includes in the list of Sceptics, Archilochus, Euripides, Empedocles, and Hippocrates,[6] and, furthermore, says that Theodosius, probably one of the younger Sceptics, objected to the name 'Pyrrhonean' on the ground that Pyrrho was not the first Sceptic.[7]
[1] _Hyp._ I. 232.
[2] Diog. IX. 11, 17-72.
[3] _Hyp._ I. 213-214; I. 223-225.
[4] Diog. IX. 11, 71.
[5] Diog. IX. 11, 71.
[6] Diog. IX. 11, 71-73.
[7] Diog. IX. 11. 70.
We have given the testimony from many sources to the effect that before the time of s.e.xtus the Empirical School of Medicine was considered identical with Scepticism, although not so by s.e.xtus himself. From all of these things we may infer a narrowing of the limits of Pyrrhonism in the time of s.e.xtus.
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