Part 8 (1/2)

I. Since aetiology in general refers to things that are unseen, it does not give testimony that is incontestable in regard to phenomena. For example, the Pythagoreans explain the distance of the planets by a musical proportion.

II. From many equally plausible reasons which might be given for the same thing, one only is arbitrarily chosen, as some explain the inundation of the Nile by a fall of snow at its source, while there could be other causes, as rain, or wind, or the action of the sun.

III. Things take place in an orderly manner, but the causes presented do not show any order, as for example, the motion of the stars is explained by their mutual pressure, which does not take into account the order that reigns among them.

IV. The unseen things are supposed to take place in the same way as phenomena, as vision is explained in the same way as the appearance of images in a dark room.

V. Most philosophers present theories of aetiology which agree with their own individual hypotheses about the elements, but not with common and accepted ideas, as to explain the world by atoms like Epicurus, by h.o.m.oeomeriae like Anaxagoras, or by matter and form like Aristotle.

VI. Theories are accepted which agree with individual hypotheses, and others equally probable are pa.s.sed by, as Aristotle's explanation of comets, that they are a collection of vapors near the earth, because that coincided with his theory of the universe.

VII. Theories of aetiology are presented which conflict not only with individual hypotheses, but also with phenomena, as to admit like Epicurus an inclination or desire of the soul, which was incompatible with the necessity which he advocated.

VIII. The inscrutable is explained by things equally inscrutable, as the rising of sap in plants is explained by the attraction of a sponge for water, a fact contested by some.[2]

[1] _Hyp._ I. 98.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 180-186; Fabricius, Cap. XVII. 180 z.

Diogenes does not mention these Tropes in this form, but he gives a _resume_ of the general arguments of the Sceptics against aetiology,[1] which has less in common with the eight Tropes of Aenesidemus, than with the presentation of the subject by s.e.xtus later,[2] when he multiplies his proofs exceedingly to show [Greek: meden einai aition]. Although the Tropes of Aenesidemus have a dialectic rather than an objective character, it would not seem that he made the distinction, which is so prominent with s.e.xtus, between the signs [Greek: hypomnestika]

and [Greek: endeiktika],[3] especially as Diogenes sums up his argument on the subject with the general a.s.sertion, [Greek: Semeion ouk einai],[4] and proceeds to introduce the logical consequence of the denial of aetiology. The summing up of the Tropes of Aenesidemus is given as follows, in the _Hypotyposes_, by s.e.xtus:--”A cause in harmony with all the sects of philosophy, and with Scepticism, and with phenomena, is perhaps not possible, for the phenomena and the unknown altogether disagree.”[5]

It is interesting to remark in connection with the seventh of these Tropes, that Aenesidemus a.s.serts that causality has only a subjective value, which from his materialistic standpoint was an argument against its real existence, and the same argument is used by Kant to prove that causality is a necessary condition of thought.[6]

Chaignet characterises the Tropes of Aenesidemus as false and sophistical,[7] but as Maccoll has well said, they are remarkable for their judicious and strong criticism, and are directed against the false method of observing facts through the light of preconceived opinion.[8] They have, however, a stronger critical side than sceptical, and show the positive tendency of the thought of Aenesidemus.

[1] Diog. IX. 11, 96-98.

[2] _Hyp._ III. 24-28.

[3] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 151.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 96.

[5] _Hyp._ I. 185.

[6] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 77.

[7] Chaignet _Op. cit._ 507.

[8] Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 88.

CHAPTER IV.

_Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus._

A paragraph in the First Book of the _Hypotyposes_ which has given rise to much speculation and many different theories, is the comparison which s.e.xtus makes of Scepticism with the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus.[1] In this paragraph the statement is made that Aenesidemus and his followers, [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon], said that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus, because the doctrine that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, leads the way to the one that contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing.[2] [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon elegon hodon einai ten skeptiken agogen epi ten Herakleiteion philosophian, dioti proegeitai tou tanantia peri to auto hyparchein to tanantia peri to auto phainesthai]. As the Sceptics say that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, the Herac.l.i.tans come from this to the more positive doctrine that they are in reality so.[3]