Part 3 (1/2)

Virginia and the Stamp Act, 1764

That Grenville might have hoped that the ”power and sovereignty of Parliament ... would not be disputed” suggests the degree to which he did not comprehend 18th Century colonial const.i.tutional developments.

Virginia reaction was immediate, clear, unequivocal, and ill.u.s.trative of just how deeply ingrained were Virginia's const.i.tutional positions about the limits of parliamentary authority. In 1759 the General a.s.sembly had elected a joint committee to correspond regularly with its London agent and to instruct him on matters of policy and legislation pending in England. This committee was meeting on July 28, 1764, in Williamsburg drafting instructions to agent Edward Montagu on the Sugar Act when word arrived from Montagu about the commons resolution. The Committee of Correspondence's reply was instantaneous:

That no subjects of the King of great Britain can be justly made subservient to Laws without either their personal Consent, or their Consent by their representatives we take to be the most vital Principle of the British Const.i.tution; it cannot be denyed that the Parliament has from Time to Time ... made such Laws as were thought sufficient to restrain such Trade to what was judg'd its proper Channel, neither can it be denied that, the Parliament, out the same Plent.i.tude of its Power, has gone a little Step farther and imposed some Duties upon our Exports....

P.S. Since writing the foregoing Part ... we have received your letter of the parliam'ts Intention to lay an Inland Duty upon us gives us fresh Apprehension of the fatal Consequences that may arise to Posterity from such a precedent.... We conceive that no Man or Body of Men, however invested with power, have a Right to do anything that is contrary to Reason and Justice, or that can tend to the Destruction of the Const.i.tution.[14]

[14] Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, XII, 10, 13.

Comprising the committee were Councilors John Blair, William Nelson, Thomas Nelson, Sr., Robert Carter, and Burgesses Peyton Randolph, George Wyth, Robert Carter Nicholas, and Dudley Digges.

Navigation Acts were acceptable, Stamp Acts were a ”Destruction of the Const.i.tution.”

In May Grenville met with the colonial agents in London and possibly suggested (his intent has been disputed) that a stamp tax might not be imposed if the colonial legislatures came up with alternative taxes. At least Montagu thought this is what Grenville suggested. The Virginia committee even told Montagu in its July letter, ”if a reasonable apportionm't be laid before the Legislature of this Country, their past Compliance with his Majesty's several Requisitions during the late expensive War, leaves no room to doubt that they will do everything that can be reasonably expected of them.” It made no difference, for even before the agents could receive replies from their various colonies, Grenville had fixed upon the stamp act itself. This was probably just as well for the Virginians, once they reflected on the requisition scheme, came to believe that taxes imposed by the General a.s.sembly to offset a threatened tax by parliament were as unpalatable and unconst.i.tutional as a tax pa.s.sed by parliament.

On December 18, 1765, the Virginia General a.s.sembly confirmed the const.i.tutional stance taken by its committee in July. Unanimously the House of Burgesses and the council sent a polite address to the king, an humble memorial to the House of Lords, and a firm remonstrance to the commons. The commons' resolution of March 17 was against ”British Liberty that Laws imposing Taxes on the People ought not be made without the Consent of Representatives chosen by themselves; who at the same time that they are acquainted with the Circ.u.mstances of their Const.i.tuents, sustain a Proportion of the Burthen laid upon them.”[15]

From this position, Virginia never retreated.

[15] William Van Schreeven and Robert Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia: The Road to Independence, Vol. I. A. Doc.u.mentary Record (University Press of Virginia: Charlottesville, 1973), 9-14. This volume contains the main revolutionary statements of the a.s.sembly, conventions, and certain county and quasi-legal local gatherings, 1763-1774.

By the time parliament took up the Stamp Act in February 1765, the die was already cast. Members of parliament were outraged by the presumptuous claims of the colonial a.s.semblies to sovereignty co-equal with itself. Only a few members questioned the wisdom of the act. Issac Barre won fame as a patriot member of parliament for his eloquent defense of the colonies as he called on the Commons to ”remember I this Day told you so, that same Spirit of Freedom which actuated that people at first, will accompany them still.” Yet even Barre would not deny parliament's right to pa.s.s the tax. The House of Commons refused even to receive the pet.i.tions from the colonial legislatures and pa.s.sed the act into law on March 22, 1765.

Covering over 25 pages in the statute book, the Stamp Act imposed a tax on doc.u.ments and paper products ranging from nearly all court doc.u.ments, s.h.i.+pping papers, and mortgages, deeds, and land patents to cards, dice, almanacs, and newspapers, including the advertis.e.m.e.nts in them. Charges ranged from 3d to 10s, with a few as high as 10, all to be paid in specie. Virtually no free man in Virginia was left untouched by the tax. Edmund Pendleton, upon hearing of its pa.s.sage, lamented ”Poor America”.

The law was to become effective on November 1, 1765.

The Stamp Act Resolves, May 1765

That the May 1765 session of the Virginia General a.s.sembly became one of the most famous in the state's history was totally unantic.i.p.ated by all political experts. The only reason Governor Fauquier called the session was to amend the frequently revised tobacco planting and inspection law. The Stamp Act already had been taken care of by the remonstrance in December. A new issue did develop when Governor Fauquier announced that all outstanding Virginia paper currency must be redeemed by March 1st, after which it no longer would be legal tender.

As the money poured into the treasurer's office, it rapidly became apparent what Richard Henry Lee had suspected as early as 1763 and what many debt-ridden Tidewater planter-burgesses personally knew--Robinson was tens of thousands of pounds short in his accounts. The shortage, which turned out to be 106,000, derived from the speaker-treasurer's habit of lending his fellow planters tax funds to pay private debts to British merchants. The speaker, whom Jefferson called ”an excellent man, liberal, friendly, and rich”, had antic.i.p.ated improvement in the economic climate would bring the money in. Meanwhile he could always rely on his own great private fortune. He failed to count on the continued economic depression, the pa.s.sage of the Currency Act, or the living standards of his debtors. Something had to be done and quickly.

While the tobacco revision was working its way through committees, the speaker and his debtor-burgess friends devised a public loan office plan to take up the debts, provide an alternative source for funds, and relieve Robinson of his burden. Such a plan would have raised the ire of Richard Henry Lee, but the burgess from Westmoreland was sitting out this supposedly ”short, uneventful meeting.” He had made a monumental error in political judgment, having applied to the crown to be the Stamp Act agent in Virginia. Robinson knew this and quietly warned Lee that he should stay home. Robinson did not antic.i.p.ate the unlikely duo which would bring down the public loan office. Leading the opposition in the House was Patrick Henry, first-term burgess from Louisa County.

Directing his attack against favoritism and special interest legislation, Henry, who had developed a thriving legal trade representing creditors against debtors, knew whereof he spoke when he exclaimed, ”What, sir, is it proposed then to reclaim the spendthrift from his dissipation and extravagance, by filling his pockets with money?” Robinson had the votes and carried the house, but lost in the council whose members disliked all public finance schemes. Chief opponent was Richard Corbin, wealthy, receiver-general of royal revenues and later Tory. In words nearly identical to Henry's, Corbin noted, ”To Tax People that are not in Debt to lend to those that are is highly unjust, it is in Fact to tax the honest, frugal, industrious Man, in order to encourage the idle, the profligate, the Extravagant, and the Gamester”. Council defeated the loan plan. With the tobacco laws revised and the loan scheme defeated and only routine legislation in committee, most burgesses left town.

Exactly when or why Patrick Henry, George Johnston of Fairfax, and John Fleming of c.u.mberland decided to offer the Stamp Act Resolves is lost in obscurity. Our sources are princ.i.p.ally Thomas Jefferson, then a college student at William and Mary, Paul Carrington, a pro-Henry burgess from Charlotte County, and an unknown French traveler who stood with Jefferson at the house chamber doors. Jefferson and Carrington did not record their thoughts until a half-century later, during which the sequence of events became blurred by time. The Frenchman, who stood with Jefferson at the house chamber doors, missed the subtleties of the language and parliamentary procedure. One thing is clear--men who heard Patrick Henry never forgot the impression he made on them.

Governor Fauquier suggested that many burgesses were not satisfied with the remonstrance against the Stamp Act in December. Although he described the remonstrance as ”very warm and indecent”, he told the Board of Trade the original version was much more inflammatory and its language was ”mollified” so that the a.s.sembly could convey its opposition to the Stamp Tax without giving the ”least offense” to crown and parliament. Fauquier also observed that economic uncertainties had made Virginians ”uneasy, peevish, and ready to murmur at every Occurrence.” Henry suggests that he drew up the Resolves when he found no one else was willing to do so after hearing of the actual pa.s.sage of the Tax Act. Whatever the reason, Henry and his a.s.sociates were ready to abandon the niceties of formal address and const.i.tutional subtleties and to give ”offense”, especially in view of parliament's refusal to hear the remonstrance.

Only 39 of the 119 elected burgesses were sitting on May 29, 1765 when Patrick Henry introduced and George Johnston seconded seven resolutions for consideration by the house. The first five stated:

Resolved, That the first Adventurers and Settlers of this his Majesty's Colony and Dominion brought with them and transmitted to their Posterity and all other his Majesty's Subjects since inhabiting in this his Majesty's said Colony, all the Privileges, Franchises and Immunities that have at any time been held, enjoyed, and possessed by the people of Great Britain.

Resolved, That by two royal Charters granted by King James first the Colonists aforesaid are declared int.i.tuled to all the Privileges, Liberties, and Immunities of Denizens and natural-born Subjects, to all Intents and Purposes as if they had been abiding and born within the Realm of England.

Resolved, That the Taxation of the People by themselves or by Persons chosen by themselves to represent them, who can only know what Taxes the People are able to bear, and the easiest Mode of raising them, and are equally affected by such Taxes Themselves, is the distinguis.h.i.+ng Characteristic of British Freedom and without which the ancient Const.i.tution cannot subsist.

Resolved, That his Majesty's liege People of this most ancient Colony have uninterruptedly enjoyed the Right of being thus governed by their own a.s.sembly in the article of the Taxes and internal Police, and that the same hath never been forfeited or any other way given up but hath been constantly recognized by the Kings and People of Great Britain.

Resolved, Therefore that the General a.s.sembly of this Colony have the only and sole exclusive Right and Power to lay Taxes and Impositions upon the Inhabitants of this Colony and that every Attempt to vest such Power in any Person or Persons whatsoever, other than the General a.s.sembly aforesaid, has a manifest Tendency to destroy British as well as American Freedom.