Part 7 (1/2)

In June, 1779, the maritime situation of Great Britain had become much more serious by Spain's declaring war. At the same moment that d'Estaing with twenty-five s.h.i.+ps of the line had confronted Byron's twenty-one, the Channel fleet of forty sail had seen gathering against it a host of sixty-six. Of this great number thirty-six were Spanish.

The open declaration of Spain had been preceded by a secret alliance with France, signed on the 12th of April. Fearing that the British government would take betimes the reasonable and proper step of blockading the Brest fleet of thirty with the Channel forty, thus a.s.suming a central position with reference to its enemies and antic.i.p.ating the policy of Lord St. Vincent, the French Ministry hurried its s.h.i.+ps to sea on the 4th of June; Admiral d'Orvilliers, Keppel's opponent, still in command. His orders were to cruise near the island of Cizarga, off the north-west coast of Spain, where the Spaniards were to join him. On the 11th of June he was at the rendezvous, but not till the 23d of July did the bulk of the Spanish force appear. During this time, the French, insufficiently equipped from the first, owing to the haste of their departure, were consuming provisions and water, not to speak of wasting pleasant summer weather.

Their s.h.i.+ps also were ravaged by an epidemic fever. Upon the junction, d'Orvilliers found that the Spaniards had not been furnished with the French system of signals, although by the treaty the French admiral was to be in chief command. The rectification of this oversight caused further delay, but on the 11th of August the combined fleet sighted Ushant, and on the 14th was off the Lizard. On the 16th it appeared before Plymouth, and there on the 17th captured the British 64-gun s.h.i.+p _Ardent_.

Thirty-five s.h.i.+ps of the Channel fleet had gone to sea on the 16th of June, and now were cruising outside, under the command of Admiral Sir Charles Hardy. His station was from ten to twenty leagues south-west of Scilly; consequently he had not been seen by the enemy, who from Ushant had stood up the Channel. The allies, now nearly double the numbers of the British, were between them and their ports,--a serious situation doubtless, but by no means desperate; not so dangerous for sailing s.h.i.+ps as it probably will be for steamers to have an enemy between them and their coal.

The alarm in England was very great, especially in the south. On the 9th of July a royal proclamation had commanded all horses and cattle to be driven from the coasts, in case of invasion. Booms had been placed across the entrance to Plymouth Harbor, and orders were sent from the Admiralty to sink vessels across the harbour's mouth. Many who had the means withdrew into the interior, which increased the panic. Great merchant fleets were then on the sea, homeward bound.

If d'Orvilliers were gone to cruise in the approaches to the Channel, instead of to the Spanish coast, these might be taken; and for some time his whereabouts were unknown. As it was, the Jamaica convoy, over two hundred sail, got in a few days before the allies appeared, and the Leeward Islands fleet had similar good fortune. Eight homeward bound East Indiamen were less lucky, but, being warned of their danger, took refuge in the Shannon, and there remained till the trouble blew over. On the other hand, the stock market stood firm.

Nevertheless, it was justly felt that such a state of things as a vastly superior hostile fleet in the Channel should not have been. Sir John Jervis, afterward Earl St. Vincent, who commanded a s.h.i.+p in the fleet, wrote to his sister: ”What a humiliating state is our country reduced to!” but he added that he laughed at the idea of invasion.

The French had placed a force of fifty thousand men at Le Havre and St. Malo, and collected four hundred vessels for their transport.

Their plans were not certainly known, but enough had transpired to cause reasonable anxiety; and the crisis, on its face, was very serious. Not their own preparations, but the inefficiency of their enemies, in counsel and in preparation, saved the British Islands from invasion. What the results of this would have been is another question,--a question of land warfare. The original scheme of the French Ministry was to seize the Isle of Wight, securing Spithead as an anchorage for the fleet, and to prosecute their enterprise from this near and reasonably secure base. Referring to this first project, d'Orvilliers wrote: ”We will seek the enemy at St. Helen's,[70] and then, if I find that roadstead unoccupied, or make myself master of it, I will send word to Marshal De Vaux, at Le Havre, and inform him of the measures I will take to insure his pa.s.sage, which [measures]

will depend upon the position of the English main fleet [dependront des forces superieures des Anglais]. That is to say, I myself will lead the combined fleet on that side [against their main body], to contain the enemy, and I will send, on the other side [to convoy], a light squadron, with a sufficient number of s.h.i.+ps of the line and frigates; or I will propose to M. de Cordova to take this latter station, in order that the pa.s.sage of the army may be free and sure.

I a.s.sume that then, either by the engagement I shall have fought with the enemy, _or by their retreat into their ports_, I shall be certain of their situation and of the success of the operation.”[71] It will be observed that d'Orvilliers, accounted then and now one of the best officers of his day in the French navy, takes here into full account the British ”fleet in being.” The main body of the allies, fifty s.h.i.+ps, was to hold this in check, while a smaller force--Cordova had command of a special ”squadron of observation,” of sixteen s.h.i.+ps of the line--was to convoy the crossing.

These projects all fell to pieces before a strong east wind, and a change of mind in the French government. On the 16th of August, before Plymouth, d'Orvilliers was notified that not the Isle of Wight, but the coast of Cornwall, near Falmouth, was to be the scene of landing.

The effect of this was to deprive the huge fleet of any anchorage,--a resource necessary even to steamers, and far more to sailing vessels aiming to remain in a position. As a point to begin sh.o.r.e operations, too, as well as to sustain them, such a remote corner of the country to be invaded was absurd. D'Orvilliers duly represented all this, but could not stay where he was long enough to get a reply. An easterly gale came on, which blew hard for several days and drove the allies out of the Channel. On the 25th of August word was received that the British fleet was near Scilly. A council of war was then held, which decided that, in view of the terrible increase of disease in the s.h.i.+pping, and of the shortness of provisions, it was expedient not to reenter the Channel, but to seek the enemy, and bring him to battle.

This was done. On the 29th Hardy was sighted, being then on his return up Channel. With the disparity of force he could not but decline action, and the allies were unable to compel it. On the 3d of September he reached Spithead. D'Orvilliers soon afterwards received orders to return to Brest, and on the 14th the combined fleet anch.o.r.ed there.

The criticism to be pa.s.sed on the conduct of this summer campaign by the British Ministry is twofold. In the first place, it was not ready according to the reasonable standard of the day, which recognised in the probable coperation of the two Bourbon kingdoms, France and Spain, the measure of the minimum naval force permissible to Great Britain. Secondly, the entrance of Spain into the war had been foreseen months before. For the inferior force, therefore, it was essential to prevent a junction,--to take an interior position. The Channel fleet ought to have been off Brest before the French sailed.

After they were gone, there was still fair ground for the contention of the Opposition, that they should have been followed, and attacked, off the coast of Spain. During the six weeks they waited there, they were inferior to Hardy's force. Allowance here must be made, however, for the inability of a representative government to disregard popular outcry, and to uncover the main approach to its own ports. This, indeed, does but magnify the error made in not watching Brest betimes; for in such case a fleet before Brest covered also the Channel.

With regard to the objects of the war in which they had become partners, the views of France and Spain accorded in but one point,--the desirability of injuring Great Britain. Each had its own special aim for its own advantage. This necessarily introduced divergence of effort; but, France having first embarked alone in the contest and then sought the aid of Spain, the particular objects of her ally naturally obtained from the beginning a certain precedence.

Until near the close of the war, it may be said that the chief ambitions of France were in the West Indies; those of Spain, in Europe,--to regain Minorca and Gibraltar.

In this way Gibraltar became a leading factor in the contest, and affected, directly or indirectly, the major operations throughout the world, by the amount of force absorbed in attacking and preserving it. After the futile effort in the Channel, in 1779, Spain recalled her vessels from Brest. ”The project of a descent upon England was abandoned provisionally. To blockade Gibraltar, to have in America and Asia force sufficient to hold the British in check, and to take the offensive in the West Indies,--such,” wrote the French government to its amba.s.sador in Madrid, ”was the plan of campaign adopted for 1780.”

Immediately upon the declaration of war, intercourse between Gibraltar and the Spanish mainland was stopped. Soon afterwards a blockade by sea was inst.i.tuted; fifteen cruisers being stationed at the entrance of the Bay, where they seized and sent into Spanish ports all vessels, neutral or British, bound to the Rock. This blockade was effectively supported from Cadiz, but a Spanish force of some s.h.i.+ps of the line and many small vessels also maintained it more directly from Algeciras, on the Spanish side of the Bay of Gibraltar. The British Mediterranean squadron, then consisting only of one 60-gun s.h.i.+p, three frigates, and a sloop, was wholly unable to afford relief. At the close of the year 1779, flour in Gibraltar was fourteen guineas the barrel, and other provisions in proportion. It became therefore imminently necessary to throw in supplies of all kinds, as well as to reinforce the garrison. To this service Rodney was a.s.signed; and with it he began the brilliant career, the chief scene of which was to be in the West Indies.

Rodney was appointed to command the Leeward Islands Station on the 1st of October, 1779. He was to be accompanied there immediately by only four or five s.h.i.+ps of the line; but advantage was taken of his sailing, to place under the charge of an officer of his approved reputation a great force, composed of his small division and a large fraction of the Channel fleet, to convey supplies and reinforcements to Gibraltar and Minorca. On the 29th of December the whole body, after many delays in getting down Channel, put to sea from Plymouth: twenty-two s.h.i.+ps of the line, fourteen frigates and smaller vessels, besides a huge collection of stores.h.i.+ps, victuallers, ordnance vessels, troop-s.h.i.+ps, and merchantmen,--the last named being the ”trade” for the West Indies and Portugal.

On the 7th of January, 1780, a hundred leagues west of Cape Finisterre, the West India s.h.i.+ps parted for their destination, under convoy of a s.h.i.+p of the line and three frigates. At daylight on the 8th, twenty-two sail were seen to the north-east, the squadron apparently having pa.s.sed them in the night. Chase was at once given, and the whole were taken in a few hours. Seven were s.h.i.+ps of war, one 64 and six frigates; the remainder merchant vessels, laden with naval stores and provisions for the Spanish fleet at Cadiz. The provision s.h.i.+ps, twelve in number, were diverted at once to the relief of Gibraltar, under charge of the Spanish sixty-four, which had been one of their convoy before capture, and was now manned by a British crew.

Continuing on, intelligence was received from time to time by pa.s.sing vessels that a Spanish squadron was cruising off Cape St. Vincent.

Thus forewarned, orders were given to all captains to be prepared for battle as the Cape was neared. On the 16th it was pa.s.sed, and at 1 P.M. sails in the south-east were signalled. These were a Spanish squadron of eleven s.h.i.+ps of the line, and two 26-gun frigates. Rodney at once bore down for them under a press of canvas, making signal for the line abreast.[72] Seeing, however, that the enemy was trying to form line of battle ahead on the starboard tack, which with a westerly wind was with heads to the southward, towards Cadiz, a hundred miles to the south-east, he changed the orders to a ”General Chase,” the s.h.i.+ps to engage as they came up; ”to leeward,” so as to get between the enemy and his port, and ”in rotation,” by which probably was meant that the leading British vessel should attack the sternmost of the Spaniards, and that her followers should pa.s.s her to leeward, successively engaging from the enemy's rear towards the van.

At 4 P.M. the signal for battle was made, and a few minutes later the four headmost of the pursuers got into action. At 4.40 one of the Spanish s.h.i.+ps, the _Santo Domingo_, 80, blew up with all on board, and at 6 another struck. By this hour, it being January, darkness had set in. A night action therefore followed, which lasted until 2 A.M., when the headmost of the enemy surrendered, and all firing ceased. Of the eleven hostile s.h.i.+ps of the line, only four escaped. Besides the one blown up, six were taken. These were the _Fenix_, 80, flag of the Spanish Admiral, Don Juan de Langara, the _Monarca_, 70, the _Princesa_, 70, the _Diligente_, 70, the _San Julian_, 70, and the _San Eugenio_, 70. The two latter drove ash.o.r.e and were lost.[73] The remaining four were brought into Gibraltar, and were ultimately added to the Navy. All retained their old names, save the _Fenix_, which was renamed _Gibraltar_. ”The weather during the night,” by Rodney's report, ”was at times very tempestuous, with a great sea. It continued very bad weather the next day, when the _Royal George_, 100, _Prince George_, 90, _Sandwich_, 90 (Rodney's flags.h.i.+p), and several other s.h.i.+ps were in great danger, and under the necessity of making sail to avoid the shoals of San Lucar, nor did they get into deep water till the next morning.”

It was in this danger from a lee sh.o.r.e, which was deliberately though promptly incurred, that the distinction of this action of Rodney's consists. The enemy's squadron, being only eleven s.h.i.+ps of the line, was but half the force of the British, and it was taken by surprise; which, to be sure, is no excuse for a body of war-s.h.i.+ps in war-time.

Caught unawares, the Spaniards took to flight too late. It was Rodney's merit, and no slight one under the conditions of weather and navigation, that they were not permitted to retrieve their mistake.

His action left nothing to be desired in resolution or readiness. It is true that Rodney discussed the matter with his flag-captain, Walter Young, and that rumor attributed the merit of the decision to the latter; but this sort of detraction is of too common occurrence to affect opinion. Sir Gilbert Blane, Physician to the Fleet, gives the following account: ”When it was close upon sunset, it became a question whether the chase should be continued. After some discussion between the Admiral and Captain, at which I was present, the Admiral being confined with the gout, it was decided to persist in the same course, with the signal to engage to leeward.” Rodney at that time was nearly sixty-two, and a constant martyr to gout in both feet and hands.

The two successes by the way imparted a slightly triumphal character to the welcome of the Admiral by the garrison, then sorely in need of some good news. The arrival of much-needed supplies from home was itself a matter of rejoicing; but it was more inspiriting still to see following in the train of the friendly fleet five hostile s.h.i.+ps of the line, one of them bearing the flag of a Commander-in-Chief, and to hear that, besides these, three more had been sunk or destroyed.

The exultation in England was even greater, and especially at the Admiralty, which was labouring under the just indignation of the people for the unpreparedness of the Navy. ”You have taken more line-of-battle s.h.i.+ps,” wrote the First Lord to Rodney, ”than had been captured in any one action in either of the two last preceding wars.”