Part 6 (1/2)
Shortly before this, Byron had been constrained by one of the commercial exigencies which constantly embarra.s.sed the military action of British admirals. A large convoy of trading s.h.i.+ps, bound to England, was collecting at St. Kitts, and he thought necessary to accompany it part of the homeward way, until well clear of the French West India cruisers. For this purpose he left Santa Lucia early in June. As soon as the coast was clear, d'Estaing, informed of Byron's object, sent a small combined expedition against St. Vincent, which was surrendered on the 18th of the month. On the 30th the French admiral himself quitted Fort Royal with his whole fleet,--twenty-five s.h.i.+ps of the line and several frigates,--directing his course for the British Island of Grenada, before which he anch.o.r.ed on the 2d of July.
With commendable prompt.i.tude, he landed his troops that evening, and on the 4th the island capitulated. Except as represented by one small armed sloop, which was taken, the British Navy had no part in this transaction. Thirty richly laden merchant s.h.i.+ps were captured in the port.
At daybreak of July 6th, Byron appeared with twenty-one sail of the line, one frigate, and a convoy of twenty-eight vessels, carrying troops and equipments. He had returned to Santa Lucia on the 1st, and there had heard of the loss of St. Vincent, with a rumor that the French had gone against Grenada. He consequently had put to sea on the 3d, with the force mentioned.
[Ill.u.s.tration]
The British approach was reported to d'Estaing during the night of July 5th. Most of his fleet was then lying at anchor off Georgetown, at the south-west of the island; some vessels, which had been under way on look-out duty, had fallen to leeward.[57] At 4 A.M. the French began to lift their anchors, with orders to form line of battle on the starboard tack, in order of speed; that is, as rapidly as possible without regard to usual stations. When daylight had fully made, the British fleet (A) was seen standing down from the northward, close insh.o.r.e, on the port tack, with the wind free at north-east by east.
It was not in order, as is evident from the fact that the s.h.i.+ps nearest the enemy, and therefore first to close, ought to have been in the rear on the then tack. For this condition there is no evident excuse; for a fleet having a convoy necessarily proceeds so slowly that the war-s.h.i.+ps can keep reasonable order for mutual support.
Moreover, irregularities that are permissible in case of emergency, or when no enemy can be encountered suddenly, cease to be so when the imminent probability of a meeting exists. The worst results of the day are to be attributed to this fault. Being short of frigates, Byron had a.s.signed three s.h.i.+ps of the line (a), under Rear-Admiral Rowley, to the convoy, which of course was on the off hand from the enemy, and somewhat in the rear. It was understood, however, that these would be called into the line, if needed.
When the French (AA) were first perceived by Byron, their line was forming; the long thin column lengthening out gradually to the north-north-west, from the confused cl.u.s.ter[58] still to be seen at the anchorage. Hoping to profit by their disorder, he signalled ”a general chase in that quarter,[59] as well as for Rear-Admiral Rowley to leave the convoy; and as not more than fourteen or fifteen of the enemy's s.h.i.+ps appeared to be in line, the signal was made for the s.h.i.+ps to engage, _and form as they could get up_.”[60] It is clear from this not only that the s.h.i.+ps were not in order, but also that they were to form under fire. Three s.h.i.+ps, the _Sultan_, 74, the _Prince of Wales_, 74, and the _Boyne_, 70, in the order named,--the second carrying Barrington's flag,--were well ahead of the fleet (b).
The direction prescribed for the attack, that of the cl.u.s.tered s.h.i.+ps in the French rear, carried the British down on a south-south-west, or south by west, course; and as the enemy's van and centre were drawing out to the north-north-west, the two lines at that time resembled the legs of a ”V,” the point of which was the anchorage off Georgetown.
Barrington's three s.h.i.+ps therefore neared the French order gradually, and had to receive its fire for some time before they could reply, unless, by hauling to the wind, they diverged from the set course.
This, and their isolation, made their loss very heavy. When they reached the rear of the French, the latter's column was tolerably formed, and Barrington's s.h.i.+ps wore (w) in succession,--just as Harland's had done in Keppel's action,--to follow on the other tack.
In doing this, the _Sultan_ kept away under the stern of the enemy's rearmost s.h.i.+p, to rake her; to avoid which the latter bore up. The _Sultan_ thus lost time and ground, and Barrington took the lead, standing along the French line, from rear to van, and to windward.
Meanwhile, the forming of the enemy had revealed to Byron for the first time, and to his dismay, that he had been deceived in thinking the French force inferior to his own. ”However, the general chase was continued, and the signal made for close engagement.”[61] The remainder of the s.h.i.+ps stood down on the port tack, as the first three had done, and wore in the wake of the latter, whom they followed; but before reaching the point of wearing, three s.h.i.+ps, ”the _Grafton_, 74, the _Cornwall_, 74, and the _Lion_, 64 (c), _happening to be to leeward_,[62] sustained the fire of the enemy's whole line, as it pa.s.sed on the starboard tack.” It seems clear that, having had the wind, during the night and now, and being in search of an enemy, it should not have ”happened” that any s.h.i.+ps should have been so far to leeward as to be unsupported. Captain Thomas White, R.N., writing as an advocate of Byron, says,[63] ”while the van was wearing ... the sternmost s.h.i.+ps were coming up under Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker....
Among these s.h.i.+ps, the _Cornwall_ and _Lion_, from being nearer the enemy than those about them (for the rear division had not then _formed into line_), drew upon themselves almost the whole of the enemy's fire.” No words can show more clearly the disastrous, precipitate disorder in which this attack was conducted. The _Grafton_, White says, was similarly situated. In consequence, these three were so crippled, besides a heavy loss in men, that they dropped far to leeward and astern (c', c”), when on the other tack.
When the British s.h.i.+ps in general had got round, and were in line ahead on the starboard tack,--the same as the French,--ranging from rear to van of the enemy (Positions B, B, B), Byron signalled for the eight leading s.h.i.+ps to close together, for mutual support, and to engage close. This, which should have been done--not with finikin precision, but with military adequacy--before engaging, was less easy now, in the din of battle and with crippled s.h.i.+ps. A quick-eyed subordinate, however, did something to remedy the error of his chief.
Rear-Admiral Rowley was still considerably astern, having to make up the distance between the convoy and the fleet. As he followed the latter, he saw Barrington's three s.h.i.+ps unduly separated and doubtless visibly much mauled. Instead, therefore, of blindly following his leader, he cut straight across (aa) to the head of the column to support the van,--an act almost absolutely identical with that which won Nelson renown at Cape St. Vincent. In this he was followed by the _Monmouth_, 64, the brilliancy of whose bearing was so conspicuous to the two fleets that it is said the French officers after the battle toasted ”the little black s.h.i.+p.” She and the _Suffolk_, 74, Rowley's flags.h.i.+p, also suffered severely in this gallant feat.
It was imperative with Byron now to keep his van well up with the enemy, lest he should uncover the convoy, broad on the weather bow of the two fleets. ”They seemed much inclined to cut off the convoy, and had it much in their power by means of their large frigates, independent of s.h.i.+ps of the line.”[64] On the other hand, the _Cornwall, Grafton_, and _Lion_, though they got their heads round, could not keep up with the fleet (c', c”), and were dropping also to leeward--towards the enemy. At noon, or soon after, d'Estaing bore up with the body of his force to join some of his vessels that had fallen to leeward. Byron very properly--under his conditions of inferiority--kept his wind; and the separation of the two fleets, thus produced, caused firing to cease at 1 P.M.
The enemies were now ranged on parallel lines, some distance apart; still on the starboard tack, heading north-north west. Between the two, but far astern, the _Cornwall, Grafton, Lion_, and a fourth British s.h.i.+p, the _Fame_, were toiling along, greatly crippled. At 3 P.M., the French, now in good order, tacked together (t, t, t), which caused them to head towards these disabled vessels. Byron at once imitated the movement, and the eyes of all in the two fleets anxiously watched the result. Captain Cornwallis of the _Lion_, measuring the situation accurately, saw that, if he continued ahead, he would be in the midst of the French by the time he got abreast of them. Having only his foremast standing, he put his helm up, and stood broad off before the wind (c”), across the enemy's bows, for Jamaica. He was not pursued. The other three, unable to tack and afraid to wear, which would put them also in the enemy's power, stood on, pa.s.sed to windward of the latter, receiving several broadsides, and so escaped to the northward. The _Monmouth_ was equally maltreated; in fact, she had not been able to tack to the southward with the fleet. Continuing north (a'), she became now much separated. D'Estaing afterwards reestablished his order of battle on the port tack, forming upon the then leewardmost s.h.i.+p, on the line BC.
Byron's action off Grenada, viewed as an isolated event, was the most disastrous in results that the British Navy had fought since Beachy Head, in 1690. That the _Cornwall, Grafton_, and _Lion_ were not captured was due simply to the strained and inept caution of the French admiral. This Byron virtually admitted. ”To my great surprise no s.h.i.+p of the enemy was detached after the _Lion_. The _Grafton_ and _Cornwall_ might have been weathered by the French, if they had kept their wind,... but they persevered so strictly in declining every chance of close action that they contented themselves with firing upon these s.h.i.+ps when pa.s.sing barely within gunshot, and suffered them to rejoin the squadron, without one effort to cut them off.” Suffren,[65]
who led the French on the starboard tack, and whose s.h.i.+p, the _Fantasque_, 64, lost 22 killed and 43 wounded, wrote: ”Had our admiral's seamans.h.i.+p equalled his courage, we would not have allowed four dismasted s.h.i.+ps to escape.” That the _Monmouth_ and _Fame_ could also have been secured is extremely probable; and if Byron, in order to save them, had borne down to renew the action, the disaster might have become a catastrophe.
That nothing resulted to the French from their great advantage is therefore to be ascribed to the incapacity of their Commander-in-Chief. It is instructive to note also the causes of the grave calamity which befell the British, when twenty-one s.h.i.+ps met twenty-four,[66]--a sensible but not overwhelming superiority. These facts have been shown sufficiently. Byron's disaster was due to attacking with needless precipitation, and in needless disorder.
He had the weather-gage, it was early morning, and the northeast trade-wind, already a working breeze, must freshen as the day advanced. The French were tied to their new conquest, which they could not abandon without humiliation; not to speak of their troops ash.o.r.e.
Even had they wished to retreat, they could not have done so before a general chase, unless prepared to sacrifice their slower s.h.i.+ps.
If twenty-four s.h.i.+ps could reconcile themselves to running from twenty-one, it was scarcely possible but that the fastest of these would overtake the slowest of those. There was time for fighting, an opportunity for forcing action which could not be evaded, and time also for the British to form in reasonably good order.
It is important to consider this, because, while Keppel must be approved for attacking in partial disorder, Byron must be blamed for attacking in utter disorder. Keppel had to s.n.a.t.c.h opportunity from an unwilling foe. Having himself the lee-gage, he could not pick and choose, nor yet manoeuvre; yet he brought his fleet into action, giving mutual support throughout nearly, if not quite, the whole line.
What Byron did has been set forth; the sting is that his bungling tactics can find no extenuation in any urgency of the case.
The loss of the two fleets, as given by the authorities of either nation, were: British, 183 killed, 346 wounded; French, 190 killed, 759 wounded. Of the British total, 126 killed and 235 wounded, or two thirds, fell to the two groups of three s.h.i.+ps each, which by Byron's mismanagement were successively exposed to be cut up in detail by the concentrated fire of the enemy. The British loss in spars and sails--in motive-power--also exceeded greatly that of the French.
After the action d'Estaing returned quietly to Grenada. Byron went to St. Kitts to refit; but repairs were most difficult, owing to the dearth of stores in which the Admiralty had left the West Indies. With all the skill of the seamen of that day in making good damages, the s.h.i.+ps remained long unserviceable, causing great apprehension for the other islands. This state of things d'Estaing left unimproved, as he had his advantage in the battle. He did, indeed, parade his superior force before Byron's fleet as it lay at anchor; but, beyond the humiliation naturally felt by a Navy which prided itself on ruling the sea, no further injury was done.
In August Byron sailed for England. Barrington had already gone home, wounded. The station therefore was left in command of Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker,[67] and so remained until March, 1780, when the celebrated Rodney arrived as Commander-in-Chief on the Leeward Islands Station. The North American Station was given to Vice-Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, who had under him a half-dozen s.h.i.+ps of the line, with headquarters at New York. His command was ordinarily independent of Rodney's, but the latter had no hesitation in going to New York on emergency and taking charge there; in doing which he had the approval of the Admiralty.
The approach of winter in 1778 had determined the cessation of operations, both naval and military, in the northern part of the American continent, and had led to the transfer of five thousand troops to the West Indies, already noted. At the same time, an unjustifiable extension of British effort, having regard to the disposable means, was undertaken in the southern States of Georgia and South Carolina. On the 27th of November a small detachment of troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Campbell, sailed from Sandy Hook, convoyed by a division of frigates commanded by Captain Hyde Parker.[68] The expedition entered the Savannah River four weeks later, and soon afterwards occupied the city of the same name.