Part 7 (2/2)

As a catty weighs 1-3/4 lb, this was no slight supply for an ar These concerted movements of the army south of the Tian Shan placed the country as far west as Karashar in the possession of the invader Their next advance, which they could not expect to be as unopposed as their late one, would bring thear No sooner had Karashar and Korla fallen into their possession than an edict was issued inviting the Mahomedan population to return to their homes, and many of them accepted the invitation In this quarter the arraced by any excesses, and moderation towards the unarmed population extenuated their severity towards ar so the people east of Kucha at Tsedayar and other places, and co them to withdraw to Kucha and to destroy their crops He at once resolved to frustrate the plan, and set out in person at the head of 1,500 light infantry and 1,000 cavalry to protect the inhabitants By forced h the better part of the night, he reached Tsedayar on the 17th of October, when he learnt that Bayen Hu had driven off the whole of the population, and was already at Bugur, on the road to Kucha At the next village to Tsedayar, a fortified post known as Yangy Shahr, he found that Bayen Hu was still ahead of hies on his line of march Kin Shun left a portion of his infantry behind to put out the conflagration, and resolutely pressed on with the reur This small town had also been set on fire, but here the rapidity of the Chinese general's advance was rewarded with the news that the enee number of the inhabitants, was only a short distance ahead The rear-guard, coari, emboldened by the sallant fashi+on Their charge was broken, however, by the steadiness of the Chinese infantry, armed with excellent rifles, and the cavalry perforari left 100 slain on the field of battle and twelve prisoners From these latter it was discovered that the main body of 2,000 soldiers was some distance on the road to Kucha, with the fae It was too late to advance further that day, but on the next the forward e multitude--”sohted by the advanced guard, but on exalasses it was discovered that scarcely more than a thousand carried arht to the front, and Kin Shun issued instructions that all those found with arms in their hands should be slain, but the others spared

The ararian are asse carried off to Kucha These were sent to the rear by order of Kin Shun, and distributed in such of the villages as were ht took place a few e called Arpa Tai The action appears to have been well contested, but the superior tactics and weapons of Kin Shun's small army prevailed; and the Mussulreat disorder Kin Shun followed up his success with arian troops fled incontinently to Kucha, abandoning the people and the country to the invader The unfortunate inhabitants implored with piteous entreaties the enuine satisfaction we record the fact that Kin Shun informed them of their safety, and bade them have no further alarm

By this tiely reinforced from the rear, for we have now coainst Kucha When the Chinese appeared before its walls they found that a battle was proceeding there between the Kashgarian soldiers and the townspeople, who refused to accompany them in a further retreat ard On the appearance of the Chinese ararian force evacuated the city, and joined battle with it on the western side of Kucha The Chinese at once attacked thee of the cavalry, nu some four or five thousand men, was only repulsed with so with remarkable effect upon the Maho upon the ground The infantry were at last ordered to advance, under cover of a heavy artillery fire, and the cavalry e at a most opportune moment The whole ar eneral, Ma-yeo-pu the Chinese called hih stated to be a noted nize his identity under the Chinese appellation This was certainly the uinary and the best-contested action of the whole war The numbers on each side were probably about 10,000 men, and it on as much by superior tactics and skill as by brute force and courage All the movements of the Chinese were characterized by rereatest ability on the part of the general and his lieutenants, as well as obedience, valour, and patience on the part of his soldiers The rapid advance frour, the capture of Kucha, the forbearance of the conqueror towards the inhabitants, all combine to make this portion of the war enerals, to Kin Shun in particular The reason given in the Official Report for the Kashgarian authorities atte to carry off the population was that the rebels wished in the first place to deprive the invading force of all assistance, thusfurther pursuit a work of difficulty, and in the second place, to ingratiate thear, Kuli Beg, by delivering this large mass of Turki-Mussulmans into his hands Bayen Hu was, therefore, certainly not Hakim Khan It is tolerably clear that heBacha's

A depot was forarrison; but the principal ad the position of the Turki-Mussulman population

A board of ad means of subsistence for the destitute, and for the distribution of seed-corn for the benefit of the whole community It had also to supervise the construction of roads, and the establishment of ferry boats, and of post-houses, in order to facilitate the movements of trade and travel, and to expedite the transistrates and prefects were appointed to all the cities, and special precautions were taken against the outbreak of epidemic or of famine All these wise provisions were carried out promptly, and in the islation and administration of alien states were the daily avocations of Chinaion from Turfan to Kucha the Chinese have departed from the statesmanlike and beneficent schemes which marked their re-installation as rulers; and whatever harshness or cruelty they arian soldiers was more than atoned for by the mildness of their treatment of the people

On the 19th, or more probably the 22nd of October, Kin Shun resu no serious opposition His first halt was at a village called Hoser, where he halted for one night, which he e the report to Pekin, which described the successes and movements of the previous three weeks At the next town, known as Bai, Kin Shun halted to await the arrival of the rear-guard, under General Chang Yao This force caainst Aksu was resumed Up to this point the chief interest centred in the army south of the Tian Shan, and in the achievements of Kin Shun Our principal, in fact our only, authority for this portion of the can is the _Pekin Gazette_

We have now to describe the movements of the Northern Ar, and which was operating in the north of the state, in coeneral had under him, at the most moderate computation, an arure; but a St Petersburg paper, on the authority of a Russian merchant, who had been to Manas, coth It was concentrated in the neighbourhood of Manas, and along the northern skirts of the Tian Shan; and also on the frontier of the Russian doned to a part of enforced inactivity, since it was impossible to enter Kuldja, and thus proceed by their old routes through the passes of Bedal or Muzart But it was not so; the travels of Colonel Prjevalsky in the commencement of 1877 had not been unobserved by the Chinese, and it was assu could go, there also could go a Chinese army By those little-known passes, which are made by the Tekes and Great Yuldus rivers, the Chinese araria; and it is probable that the two arhbourhood of Bai It was by this stroke of strategy on the part of Tso Tsung Tang that the Chinese found the arht of resistance died away fro Tang appeared before the walls of Aksu, the bulwark of Kashgar on the east, and its commandant, panic stricken, abandoned his post at the first onset He was subsequently taken prisoner by an officer of Kuli Beg, and executed The Chinese then advanced on Ush Turfan, which also surrendered without a blow As we said, the Chinese have not published any detailed description of this portion of the war, and we are consequently unable to say what their version is of those reported atrocities at Aksu and Ush Turfan, of which the Russian papers have e nuees fled to Russian territory, perhaps 10,000 in all, and these brought with theerated alar the assertion as true, that the arhtered without exception; but that the unarmed population and the women and children shared the same fate we distinctly refuse to credit

There is every precedent in favour of the assumption that a more moderate policy was pursued, and there is no valid reason why the Chinese should have dealt with Aksu and Ush Turfan differently to Kucha or Turfan The case of Manas has been greatly insisted upon by the agitators on this ”atrocity” question; but there is the highest authority for asserting that only armed men were massacred there This the Chinese have always done; it is a national custom, and they certainly did not depart froar

But there is no solid ground for convicting them of any more heinous crime, even in the instances of Manas and Aksu, which are put so prominently forward

Early in Deceainst the capital, and on the 17th of that , according to one account, fought a battle outside the town, in which he was defeated; according to another report, he had withdrawn to Yarkand, whence he fled to Russian territory, when he heard of the fall of Kashgar It is ar, for he certainly reached Tashkent, in co, ounded in that battle With the fall of Kashgar the Chinese reconquest of Eastern Turkestan was coy Hissar and Yarkand, speedily shared the same fate Khoten and Sirikul also sent in forar virtually closed the can No further resistance was encountered, and the new rulers had only to begin the task of reorganization When Kashgar fell the greater portion of the ar that they could expect no mercy at the hands of the Chinese, fled to Russian territory, and then spread reports of fresh Chinese ination

There can be no doubt that the Chinese triuh, and that it will be ain the heart to rebel against their authority The strength of China has been thoroughly dee is coer there may be to the permanence of China's triumph lies rather from Russia than from the conquered peoples of Tian Shan Nan Lu; nor is there er that the Chinese laurels will beco and his lieutenants, Kin Shun, who has since fallen into disgrace,--perhaps he had excited the envy of his superior--and Chang Yao, accomplished a task which would reflect credit on any ariven a lustre to the present Chinese adood stead, and they have acquired a personal renown that will not easily depart The Chinese reconquest of Eastern Turkestan is beyond doubt thethe last fifty years, and it is quite the most brilliant achievement of a Chinese ar subdued the country o It also proves, in a manner that is more than unpalatable to us, that the Chinese possess an adaptive faculty that must be held to be a very important fact in every-day politics in Central Asia They conquered Kashgar with European weapons, and by careful study of Western science and skill Their soldiers marched in obedience to instructors trained on the Prussian principle; and their generals s of Moltke and Manteuffel Even in such lasses we find this Chinese ar was more absurd than the picture drawn by so of soldiers fantastically garbed in the guise of dragons and other hideous appearances All that belonged to an old-world theory The army of Eastern Turkestan was as widely different from all previous Chinese armies in Central Asia as it well could be; and in all essentials closely resembled that of an European power Its rehness hich China had in this instance adapted herself to Western notions

With the flight of Beg Kuli Beg to Tashkent closed the career of the house of the Athalik Ghazi in Kashgar Whatever turn events may take in this portion of Central Asia, whatever scheing anew the Chinese do that the ousted Khokandian officials will rally By his flight in the hour of danger, by the hesitation which marked all his movements, and by the murder of his brother in cold blood, this prince, of whom much at one time was expected, has irretrievably ruined both his career and his reputation

If on any future occasion Russia should seek to play the part played of old by Khans of Khokand in the internal history of Kashgar, it will not be Kuli Beg whom they will put forward as their puppet His old rival, Hakim Khan, stands a much better chance than he, more especially if it be true that he is the representative of the Khojas, being the son of Buzurg Khan, as many have asserted But the fact re a personal dynasty in Eastern Turkestan are now dispelled beyond all prospect of realization

CHAPTER XIV

THE CHINESE FACTOR IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION

The overthrow of the Tungani, and the reconquest of Kashgaria, have not coenerals and soldiers in Central Asia Great and remarkable as those triumphs were, the Chinese are not satisfied with them, because there yet remains more work to be done They have restored to the E as the Russians hold Kuldja, Tian Shan Pe Lu is only half won back

Moreover, so long as a great military power is domiciled in Kuldja, China's hold on the country west of Aksu must be only on sufferance As of old, the Chinese so often reconquered Kashgar, when it had shaken off the Chinese rule, froood pleasure play the sa in Ili would neutralize all the advantages that China had secured by her recent h there is a foundation of well grounded apprehension at the strategical advantages of Russia, at the root of China's demand for the surrender of Kuldja, that is not the only cause, or even the principal one, for the Chineseit Of all their Central Asian possessions, Ili was the ionundertook those arduous cans which have so far ended in triu other purposes, the purpose of giving that Viceroy a prestige and influence that would enable hi Ili was their metropolis in Central Asia, and its fall an-Khoja rising of 1862-63 and all its predecessors The fall of Ili meant the fall of Chinese power, and Chinese power cannot be held to be co as Ili remains in alien hands On this point the Chinese are very keen

Russia, on the other hand, hesitates to hand over Ili for various reasons In the first place, it is not certain that China has _permanently_ reconquered Eastern Turkestan, nor is it clear that the Imperial exchequer will be able to bear a continual strain upon it for Central Asian expenditure Moreover there is the unknown quantity of the rivalry of Li Hung Chang and Tso Tsung Tang, and whatever influence the lattercaste on account of his Mantchoo blood, the former holds the purse in his hands, and can at any th in Central Asia The Russians also, whatever rash proiven at Pekin--and they certainly did promise to retrocede Kuldja to China, whenever the Chinese should be strong enough to return to Central Asia--formally (_teste_ General Kolpakovsky's proclamation) annexed Kuldja ”in perpetuity” In the eyes of the people of Central Asia, that proclaue promise that was uttered in the ears of the authorities at Pekin Now Russia knows this as well as we do; and she is aware that no strict adherence to her word of honour will induce the people of Western, as well as of Eastern, Turkestan to believe that she retrocedes Kuldja for any other cause than fear of the Chinese The Khokandians, the Bokhariots, as well as the Kirghiz, the Calue that Russia restores Kuldja not through any desire to fulfil her engagements, but siing in a ith China, and her compliance with the demand would then be construed as an admission of her disinclination to encounter China in the field In fact, even if Russia had promptly restored Kuldja, she would not have secured the credit she ood faith, and she would have had no guarantee that the Chinese would have rested content with the cession of Ili proper and not gone on to claiance, the restoration of the Naryn district, which China at a period of weakness had herself ceded to Russia o Then, besides these objections to the surrender of Kuldja on political grounds, there are commercial and fiscal reasons why Russia should be loth to restore this province Not only has it becohly prosperous and thickly populated under Russian rule, but it has also been raised into one of the most fiscally remunerative portions of the Russian possessions in Central Asia, and then there is its admirable frontier in the Tian Shan, which places the future trade with the western parts of China h the Seuchak route, and, above all, it effectually dispels all sense of real danger from attack

The Chinese would find that to force the Tian Shan range into Kuldja would be a task almost impossible for them, and they would be compelled to enter the province fro, they would leave the whole of their flank and line of co effect both at Manas and in Kashgar, and with a scientific foe such as Russia, no sane China Kuldja except in theforce It may be as well to sketch here the history of Russia's rule in Kuldja fro with the consideration of the questions aroused by the difficulty between Russia and China

When an independent government had been founded in Kuldja in 1866, a ruler of the nahlan was placed upon the throne He appears to have been a Tungan, and he certainly was a truculent and self-confident potentate He refused to abide by the stipulations of the Treaties of Kuldja and Pekin, and in petty reat, set himself in direct opposition to Russia For five years he pursued his career undisturbed by exterior influences, and during that period he tolerated the inroads of his subjects into Russian territory, urged the Kirghiz tribes beyond his frontier to revolt, and forbade Russian merchants to enter his dominions On a small scale, he aped theBut he was only a roaned under his tyranny, and the 75,000 slaves within his doe by any deliverer whatsoever The state of Kuldja, as adhlan, was pre-eminently one that would fall to pieces at the first rude shock from outside For five years, or thereabouts, the Russian authorities at Vernoe, Naryn, and in Semiretchinsk put up with his veiled hostility; but when it beca into divers frag would, probably, come in for the lion's share, the Russians, whose patience had becoh exhausted, resolved not to be forestalled in Kuldja, either by the Athalik Ghazi, or the Tungani Confederation A kind of _ultiiven a last chance of retaining power, if he consented to ratify the terms of the past treaties with China He does not appear to have distinctly refused to do so, when he was required to enter into this agreement with Russia But he prevaricated and delayed, until at last the patience of the Muscovite authorities was quite exhausted They resolved to destroy the govern their frontier down to the Tian Shan

In May, 1871, Major Balitsky crossed the river Borodshudsir, which formed the boundary between the two countries, and, at the head of a small detachhlan His force, however, was small, and, after a brief reconnaissance, he retired within Russian territory Six weeks afterwards the main body under General Kolpakovsky crossed the frontier into Kuldja andarmy consisted of only 1,785 hlan offered a brave resistance, but the Russian cannon and rifles carried everything before them; and on the 4th of July the ruler presented himself at the Russian outposts When taken before General Kolpakovsky, he said, ”I trusted to the righteousness of my cause, and to the help of God Conquered, I subhty If any crin, but spare his innocent subjects” The next day the Russian general entered the capital after a caht or nine days Protection was promised to all ould lay down their arhlan was pensioned, and Orel was appointed as his place of residence Kuldja or ”Dzungaria,” as it is called in the proclamation, was annexed ”in perpetuity,” and becaovernorshi+p of Priilinsk There can be no doubt but that the Russian occupation of Kuldja was an unqualified benefit to the inhabitants of that region The declaration of the abolition of slavery alone released seventy-five thousand hus from a life of hardshi+p and hopelessness The return of trade, which had beconant, ensured the prosperity and advance the seven years Russia has ruled in Kuldja, the people have steadily progressed inthe same period remarkably increased, and the valleys of the Ili teem with a population at once contented and prosperous The rule of Russia in Kuldja is the brightest spot in her Central Asian ad the retrocession of Kuldja labour under the one disadvantage that they coreater by the bad naan country, by the atrocities they are said to have committed Those ill take the trouble to scan the matter carefully, and to consult the _Pekin Gazette_, as much as they do the _Tashkent_, will find that these atrocities are for the most part the creation of panic, and of malicious observers, and in the few cases where Chinese vindictiveness overcame military discipline, as at Manas and Aksu, we have clear evidence that women and children were spared The _Tashkent Gazette_ has laboured strenuously, and not in vain, to disseminate the report of Chinese atrocities; and one London paper has so far assisted the object of the Russian press in raising a feeling of indignation against China, on account of these reported massacres in Eastern Turkestan, that it has placed translations of these charges before the English reader, and, on the authority of the _Tashkent Gazette_, has indicted and surossest acts of inhuest, that in common fairness to the Chinese this journal should place before its readers the tenified reports that have appeared in the _Pekin Gazette_ of those events upon which the _Tashkent Gazette_ has conantly

As we said, the Chinese are fully resolved to regain Ili They may not be able to induce Russia easily to surrender it, yet they will not despair In all probability they will fail altogether to re-acquire it by diplomatic means, yet they will not omit to employ all the artifices that are sanctioned by modern diplo over to Russia a strip of territory in Manchuria, which would give to the Russian harbour of Vladivostock a land communication with the forts on the Amoor But this ruoes to show that China's successes beyond Gobi, instead of iven her confidence sufficient to arouse her into a state of opposition to further encroachments on the part of Russia in that direction It is now said that Russia demands pecuniary inde Kuldja to its present highly prosperous condition; and at a first glance nothing could seem fairer, nor do we think that the Chinese would have raised objections to the payment of a moderate sum But the sum demanded by the Russians is far from moderate

The exact amount has not been mentioned, but the Chinese declare that it exceeds the total cost of the can in the north-west, and that certainly was not less than twoThis is, of course, too exorbitant, and is only put forward as a reason for declining to abide by her forive her diplomatists a _locus standi_ in their discussions with the Chinese representatives A Chinese E, and to endeavour to effect an understanding with Russia upon the Kuldja question; but it does not appear to have started, and the real settle and General Kaufmann The latest report is that the former has demanded afresh the restoration of Kuldja; the Russian reply is awaited with eagerness and some anxiety In the nificance at the hands of a chief of Khoten, and their power does not see up reinforceo They have also an extensive recruiting ground aht be of great strategical iive rise to a Russo-Chinese war, the Chinese are sufficiently numerous and sufficiently prepared to task the capacity of an army of 20,000 Russians; and it is quite certain there are not 5,000 in Kuldja at present But the Kuldja question, despite the prominence it has attained, is only one, if the , of those questions that are raised and suggested by the appearance of the Chinese in Central Asia More especially is this the case if, as can scarcely be doubted, the Russians refuse to restore Kuldja; yet the Chinese, knowing the strength of their adversary, shall hesitate to attack where they cannot but recognize that the penalties of failurereotten But the Chinese will not forget, nor will they condone the offence But whatever reat the delay, the Kuldja question will continue to remain a most i as it is unsettled, operate in a manner adverse to the interests of Russia The Chinese need only uchak, Karakaru, Manas, Aksu, Ush Turfan and Kashgar, and slowly bring up reinforcements from Kansuh and froerously insecure In fact, in this aame; whereas Russia can only hope to profit by precipitation on the part of Tso Tsung Tang If the Chinese refuse to hold any intercourse with the faithless Russians, and simply content themselves with the declaration that they cannot re-enter into political or commercial relations with them until Kuldja is retroceded, Russia can never rest tranquil either in Kuldja, Naryn, or Khokand Above all, so long as she is occupied in Western Asia as she is at present, she could never dare to cross the path of China, and enter upon a hich would rage froar Therefore the settleht be supposed; nor does it find Russia so strong or China so weak as ht have been expected But after all, as we have just said, the Kuldja question is not the only one suggested by the appearance of the Chinese in Eastern Turkestan There is the far wider one raised by the appearance of the Chinese as a factor in the great Central Asian question The three great Asiatic Powers have now converged upon a point; what is to be the result?

The only way to be in a position to venture upon a surnificance the lessons of the past

What have been the land, Russia, and China?