Part 8 (1/2)

We have assuhout this volume, and we shall assuland and Russia, in Asia at all events, veneered over as it is by a lacquer of politeness and civilization We have only to consider the relations between England and China, and between Russia and China To take the latter first, they have always been united by ties of friendshi+p and reciprocity in cohts Their intercourse has been on the whole singularly hare three wars to obtain a standing for ourco like the same extreme measures, has been able to secure all she, or her merchants, wanted in Middle and Western China She has made the Amoor a Russian river; she dominates the Yellow and japanese seas fro the Khalkas, and in Kuldja, two portals to various weak points in the Chinese Empire Yet all the time she has been on terms of the closest amity with China She has several commercial treaties of the most favourable character, and she has always been on the footing of ”the most favoured nation” But she has been more than that; she has been the most favoured nation But the Chinese have not failed to observe that this good understanding with Russia has, so far as advantages arising froo, been a very one-sided affair For all Russia's protestations of friendshi+p and good-will, what advantages has China reaped froh-flown promises? Whereas, the patriotic Chinaman has but to look to the Amoor, and to the attenuated province of Manchuria, to see what Russian friendshi+p o farther still He has only to enquire into the relations Russia has ed to conclude with the Taranath Laa think of Russia's position in the vicinity of that important city; and he cannot fail to form a very clear and decided opinion as to what Russia's friendshi+p signifies The Chinese have, in the full extent of their northern frontier, a great question in discussion with Russia So long as China eak, and consequently unable to resent the patronage of her friend, so long was Russia able to play ”race and perfect success But the , and in a position to resent the condescension of her whilome ally, the Chinese took a different tone, and already we hear of the Chinese assuion But whereas China's apprehension--for it is apprehension that is at the root of her hostility to Russia, at Russia's designs in Manchuria and anation is clear and easily defined at Russia retaining possession of Kuldja after she has de the northern frontier, which has slumbered, but never died out, since the Russians seized the A the Crimean War, is reduced to a focus in Central Asia, where Russia appears inclined to throw herself in the path of, or at least to retard, their victorious career It is not so much the Kuldja question, which is of local i moment, as the rupture between Russia and China, that a crisis in the Issik Kul region will make complete That rupture has already taken place, and no concession on the part of Russia will restore her good name with the Chinese Shearm if she can; but she has forfeited all clai to accede to that which those people consider in every sense their right and due Had Russia at once said to China, ”We will abandon Kuldja, and only require you to guarantee the safety of the population,” there would have been not only the preservation of the good understanding between the countries, but there ht have been, for fresh purposes, a Russo-Chinese alliance in Central Asia That alliance er to this country, and for reasons that will best be described under the head of Anglo-Chinese relations

But the Russian authorities failed to grasp the situation in its full extent They treated the Kuldja question as a mere local affair, and they trifled with the Chinese as if the latter had no very strong interest in the nored the terrible earnestness of the Chinese character, and they treated the de in a spirit of levity that eneral

Their policy, regarded fro in mind the past tact and diplos with China, it must appear more shallow and foolish Of course this Kuldja question differs from all previous questions in the essential point of all, that here for the first ti, as always had been the case heretofore The Russian authorities siarded the matter from the point of viehat effect it would have upon the peoples of Central Asia They persuaded theive an impetus to every hostile elee generally throughout Asia As a leading Russian paper expressed it, ”the retrocession of Kuldja would be an act of political suicide, for not only would it raise the prestige of China to a higher point than ever before, but it would also under the Chinese a strong military position within our natural frontier For these reasons Kuldja cannot be restored” That paragraph suu to retain possession of Kuldja They add soainst the Chinese for ru to themselves and to their administrative capacity, between the present condition of Kuldja, and what it would beco what this would be, they entirely ignore the prosperous condition of Kuldja before the Tungan revolt, and they appear to assu there, when they entered it in 1871, was due to the Chinese, instead of being caused by the ingratitude and fickleness of its own people And they shut their eyes to the great benefits China conferred upon Central Asia during the century that she was paramount therein They would like us, and every other observer of the crisis, to do the sa of history is clear, and points to a diametrically opposite conclusion We do not dispute the beneficence of Russia's government of Kuldja We freely ad the Chinese, and asserting that they are utter barbarians; nor is it a reason, in the eyes of China to entertain the overtures of Tso Tsung Tang, which were made, there is reason to believe, before the attack on Yakoob Beg, the Russians huffed the Chinese; and by procrastinating ever since, when questioned upon the subject, they have still further displeased them The Russians are aware of this, and feel convinced that, no ht be disposed to be, the Chinese will now no longer appreciate their ainsaid, what becomes of the Kuldja question, and of its peaceful solution that many claim to see? How can it be peacefully solved, if Russia will not accede to the tere? Surely not by a fresh commotion on the part of the Mussulman population, which so a petty success that has been obtained by the insignificant ruler of Khoten over a Chinese detachment

Surely not by such trivial circu dependency, will China be either expelled froo her claims on Kuldja The success of the Khoten chief is but a n, and for that district and its people it reat e The Kuldja question will not be solved by such lish readers can feel assured; and the hostility of Russia and China towards each other will become more pronounced every day Already petty disturbances are reported to have taken place along the border Russianwhom the assailed assert there were Chinese soldiers; and no satisfaction could be obtained fro Tang upon the subject, and his reply has not been very amicable

Russian caravans, which were alelcoress of the war at Manas, Karakaru, and Urureeted with the sa an intention to close their frontier to Russians Few caravans, the _Tashkent Gazette_ informs us, now care to leave Kuldja for the territory occupied by the Chinese army; and slowly, but none the less surely, is the old alliance between Russia and China departing to join the things that were, but are not

But, although so much is clear, it is almost impossible to predicate the future course of the Kuldja question It is not probable that Tso Tsung Tang will openly attack the Russians, yet his hand may be forced by the home authorities, and he may be left no alternative between that and the abandonment of his enterprise It ue at Pekin, and a skilful envoyChang as to induce the latter to paralyze the a supplies and reinforcements from the army of Central Asia So unpatriotic a course would, we believe, be hateful to Li Hung Chang, and it, certainly, would be attended with great danger, sure to recoil upon his guilty head, if for a personal rivalry he debased himself so far as to become the tool of his country's foe But yet it is in vain to deny that there is danger to the preservation of China's most cherished interests in the rivalry of some of her chief statesmen The Kuldja question, which scarcely adht be solved in the palace at Pekin e scale in Jungaria and Turkestan; and there is a possibility that RussiaTang, and to stultify the recent Chinese successes It is very doubtful whether they would succeed, for Chinese opinion runs high upon the topic, and the Mantchoo caste is united in its support of itsEven if they did, it would only be shelving the Kuldja question, for so long as the Chinese reard the presence of Russia in Kuldja as a slight to themselves, as well as a menace to their line of coainst their succeeding Li Hung Chang's position is not so secure that he can dare to put himself in face of those who champion a national cause, as is the re-absorption of Chinese Turkestan The return of Tso Tsung Tang with his veterans would be the least danger that the adoption of an unpatriotic policy would entail If this hoer, then, does not arise, the Kuldja question will be settled between Tso and the Russian authorities in Khokand and Kuldja

The result of that discussion cannot be doubtful The advocates on either side are soldiers, each equally confident in their own abilities and power, and each flushed by a long tide of success They will come to the discussion of the question with heated blood and excited nerves; reason will not be the presiding Goddess at the council board There will be accusations and recriminations bandied from one side to the other If such be the case, the Kuldja question will not be long in discussion, and before the close of the present year perhaps, but , there will be war between Russia and China along the Tian Shan range Even if Tso is content to pere, there will be no solution of the difficulty, so long as Russia remains where she is; and consequently the difference will be as great between Russia and China as if there were open hostilities between the countries And this, after all, is the main point, for the destruction of all friendly sentiment between Russia and China ame in Central Asia,” and that element, as an adverse one to Russia, is a beneficial circumstance for this country The difference over the Kuldja questiondiscordant points between the countries, and irretrievably wrecks whatever prospect there once was of Russia and China pursuing an identical policy towards Baroghil and Cashland and China, in order that we nificance of China's reappearance in Central Asia, and also what is to be the probable outcoradual approximation of the three Great Powers, and the slow extinction of the once innumerable petty states of Asia

What, then, have been the land and China in the past? There is no necessity to enter into the question of the footing we are on along the sea-coast, for that is really beside the question; nor need we recapitulate the hich we have at various tie in Eastern China The result of those wars, those treaties, and that constant inter-colishmen have secured a foothold in lish trade is supre the land frontier are quite the opposite of those obtained on the sea-board, and they are influenced by entirely different considerations During the last century, and for a considerable portion of the present, ere not, strictly speaking, neighbours of the Chinese; for between the two empires there intervened a belt of seiance to China Some of these were Nepaul, Sikhim, Bhutan and Birma, with its dependency of assam It was in the days of Lord Cornwallis that we first realized the significance of the fact that Chinese prestige had penetrated south of the Himalaya The Ghoorka rulers of Nepaul had, on several occasions, rown so bold, that on one expedition they advanced as far as Lhasa, which they plundered At thatthe retirement from public life, which a few years afterwards, like the Asiatic Charles the Fifth that he was, he adopted; but, on the news of this insult to his authority, his warlike spirit fired up, and he vowed that the marauders of Khate arth of 70,000 enerals advanced by the Kirong Pass upon the Nepaulese capital A desperate battle was fought along this elevated road, resulting in victory to the Chinese Several other encounters took place with the same result, and the Ghoorkas were compelled to sue for terms The Chinese showed no disposition to stay their advance, until Lord Cornwallis ed its suzerainty to China, and agreed to send tribute every five years to Pekin Forthe last thirty years it has been either discontinued, or has grown irregular But for us theto the rerace We had stood between them and their prey

But this was not the full extent of the mistake we had actually committed We had annoyed the Chinese; but we had absolutely offended the people and the ruling Las had sent two le, the other under Captain Turner--to the Teshu Laround very happily in Tibet He had also conferred an obligation upon hi leniently with the intractable Bhutanese or Bhuteas; and he had followed up that sense of obligation by the despatch of two successful is_ of British protection over Nepaul, it is true that we had no diploood footing with the people generally, having a native representative at Lhasa naatze, the chief city of the southern portion of Tibet The Tibetans, the instant the Ghoorkas raided their country, notified the saood offices to prevent the Ghoorkas invading their country The Chinese, their lawful protectors, were so far away that e could be inflicted upon the arlish, whom they had always found so just, for assistance in their extremity Their appeal was evidently ranted Therefore it ith double regret they saw the English reainst Lhasa, and ravaging the fertile districts watered by the Sanpu But their regret and surprise at our govern conation when they learnt that ere actually interfering on behalf of the n chastisement, and we of course prevented the establisharrison at Khatmandoo, which we could whenever we chose have easily expelled; but we offended the Tibetans and the Chinese, and induced theainst ourselves After that war (1792) the Hiainst us, and the Chinese block-houses have effectually barred the way to Tibet and Northern Asia ever since

Mr Tholish travellers, penetrated into Tibet in 1812, and resided there solish traveller overcame Bhutea and Ghoorka indifference and Chinese hostility Tibet rehts to enter it, no Englishreat, and the prize to be secured far froue or trivial The assumed reason is the covert hostility of the Chinese

If we turn farther to the east, to assam--which we have absorbed--to Birma, and even to Sianized in Yunnan the Panthay Sultan of Talifoo; we have always striven to treat the kings of Birma and Siam as independent princes, whereas they are only Chinese vassals; and we are believed to have carried on intrigues with the Shans and other tribes beyond the assamese frontier These steps may be prudent or they may not for other reasons; but they certainly are imprudent for the reason that they offend the Chinese As a policy intended to conciliate the Chinese, our frontier policy on the north and the east has been the worst possible, and a tissue of blunders fro to end; and the result is that for the last half-century we have lived on the very worst terms with the Chinese We should have conciliated them, but we aroused instead all their latent suspicion and dislike We should have becohbours who, if not decidedly hostile to each other, shun each other's presence And the real base of our sentiment towards the Chinese is to be seen in the fact that one of the first articles in the creed of Indian state policy is ”to keep China as far off as possible” That precept, which may have been very useful, has served its turn, and it is time that our Indo-Chinese policy should be set upon a new basis With China once more supre ulti the ruler of Mandalay as she esteeh tiether, to set our house in order with the Chinese Thethe Panthays, and in a general policy of indifference to Chinese opinion, have all tended to bring about the present deadlock in our relations with China Our acknowledgment of the Athalik Ghazi cannot have conduced to the creation of any very friendly senti the Chinese towards us, and, therefore, at the presenta the Chinese in Tibet and Yunnan towards us exists in Kashgaria also; and that feeling is a veiled hostility Therefore, while the Chinese are beginning to regard Russia with the hostile feelings that once were reserved for England, they have by no means altered their old senti whatever to induce thear, and on the whole English opinion may be said to have been more adverse to, than in favour of, their claiar and Yarkand land's alliance with, and friendshi+p for, Yakoob Beg; and, on the other hand, they certainly owe much to the assistance of Russian overnment Nor should we for an instant delude ourselves with the fallacy that the Chinese will look to us for aid against Russia, as Yakoob Beg did They have conquered Eastern Turkestan without us--in fact, despite of our moral opposition; and they will retain it if they can by their own right arms It will not enter their head for an instant to play the old gaainst Russia But, although they will play a perfectly independent game, it by no means follows that they will be hostile to this country, if by so holad at the result of the war in Central Asia, however nize which was the rightful cause But what is that fortunate stroke of diploht to pass? To each of these questions it would be rash to give any confident reply In dealing with the Chinese we are not only treating with a people e very ioverns of whose policy we neither know nor appreciate The action we h it should be on the experience of soht fail to accoht be croith success, itto decide is, how are we to take official cognizance of China's reconquest of Kashgaria, and how are we to bring ho and his lieutenants the knowledge that we have repented of our shortsighted policy towards Yakoob Beg, and are willing to atone for it in so far as we are able by an ae in affairs north of the Karakoraht to send an embassy to Tibet, on the condition that it should be acted upon within a given space We did not avail ourselves of that concession, and the Chinese, we are inforht has lapsed We may have been wise or we may have been foolish--into enforce the only real concession China ary Does this concession, which we never made use of, entitle us to send aupon this precedent, are we justified in supposing that the Chinese would hold out a hand of friendshi+p to an English envoy co from Leh to Yarkand? It is much to be feared that it would not At the present moment, too, the country must be in such a disturbed state, that the Chinese would have a ready excuse if any accident befel our envoy

Moreover, at the present moment an envoy would have no definite object before him A few years hence, when the Chinese rule shall be cohout Eastern Turkestan, it may be reasonable to expect a revival of trade in this direction; but at present it would be preratulation look well We have too recently befriended the Athalik Ghazi tobut a mockery The Chinese would be puffed up with vanity, and think that ere only worshi+pping their rising sun Whatever action we do take in Central Asia, to effect an understanding with the Chinese, we must be very careful that it has been well considered, and that it is as cautious as it must be clearly defined Any ood relations with China Therefore, we_Quieta non movere_ must be our motto, and we must only look forward to some auspicious occasion when it may be possible to enter into cordial relations with China

But, although our hands are tied in Central Asia, they are not fettered at Pekin, and we certainly should congratulate, if we have not done so already, the Chinese on their reht be pregnant with beneficent results, and our desire to be on good terht be met in a cordial manner by the Chinese The Chinese will not stoop to propitiate us in order to preserve their rule in Eastern Turkestan; but it is against coer to embroil the with the Russians The Kuldja question must throw China into our alliance, if we are not precipitate, and do not offer her any slight bywith this semi-independent chief of Khoten, who is said to have overthrown a Chinese detacharia, we es are all very well, but that political are infinitely more important It has been tersely said that we patronized Yakoob Beg in order to es we secured in a commercial sense were far es we derived fro with the Chinese we e of supplying the good people of Kashgar and Yarkand with tea and other necessaries What we aspire to is to be on terms of amity with China, as a power in Central Asia, which will possess everything it desires when Ili has been restored, and which randizees that land and China But at the present juncture there are others sihan question, which now clah this crisis without finding our hold on Cabul made more assured, is in many respects connected with the Kuldja

In each case the ambition of Russia is the aain, as possible In neither will she fight, if she can avoid the necessity, yet in each there is a point beyond which her honour and her interests alike refuse to permit her to remain concealed and neutral The solution of the two questions is being worked out sihan question will at least very seriously affect the later stages of the Kuldja If Russia has to fight to defend Shere Ali, then we ions will not remain inactive, and that General Kolpakovsky will either have to beat a retreat to Vernoe, or engage in a war out of which, on his own resources alone, it will be impossible for him to issue victorious If Russia interfere openly in defence of Shere Ali, Kuldja must be restored to the Chinese, otherwise Russia's flank would be exposed to a crushi+ng blohich the Chinese would not be slow to take advantage of Present events on the Ili and on the Cabul have, therefore, this much in common, that they both aim, directly or indirectly, at the fabric of Russian supreland, or even a partial occupation of it as is very probable, would seriously weaken Russian prestige in Western Turkestan A Chinese occupation of Kuldja would underhiz

Ad these, is it not natural to suppose that in each case Russia will fight, or that, even if she does not fight in each case, she will fight in the one that she may deem of the most importance? But we need not pursue the subject farther The Chinese are face to face with Russia in the heart of Central Asia, just as a few shortand the power of the Tungani

Their ar enerals are the same who have led it to constant victory; its ns The Chinese are persuaded, and it is ihteousness of their cause The Russians can have no equal confidence either in their strength, or in theira bad cause, or a lost one, but, in coal position It remains to be seen whether by force of arms, or by diplomatic superiority, they can make up for the flaw in their tenure of Kuldja

Farther on, in the vista of the events yet to colo-Chinese alliance, that enerally But, before it will be possible for Englishmen to count upon the presence of the Chinese as a favourable ”factor in the Central Asian question,” our relations with China must be placed upon a firmer and a more friendly basis than any which has yet existed We have it in our power to do this, and the ever-widening breach between Russia and China siree

The day will come when Russia will discover that the Kuldja question was no trivial matter at all, and that to it can be traced nize in it one of the most useful circu rivalry with Russia At the very crisis of our border history, e are on the eve of dealing out well merited chastisement to an A compelled to discuss a question with China, when her attention is required elsewhere She will not yield what the Chinese demand, yet she dare not refuse; and the latter will simply bide their time until she is hampered elsewhere It is no rash prophecy to say that China will be reinstalled, either by peaceful means or by force, in Kuldja before the close of next year, probably long before An alliance between any two of the three great Asiatic Powers must then be conclusive in all Central Asian matters, and, before that alliance, the third will have the prudence to submit

It behoves us to learn our lesson, when that day coood time

APPENDIX

THE POSITION OF LOB-NOR

Lake Lob-Nor is placed in thethis volume in accordance with the explorations of Colonel Prjevalsky in 1876-77; the result of which was published in Dr Peter of the present year The accuracy of the gallant explorer in identifying Lob-Nor with his lake of Kara Koshun had not been challenged when this ood reasons for doubting its accuracy were published on the 14th of September, it was too late to make the necessary alteration

The quotation of Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen's strictures on Colonel Prjevalsky's lakes is taken from the _Athenaeum_ of the 14th of September, 1878:--

”It would appear that the Russian traveller Prejevalsky, in his last remarkable journey in the heart of Central Asia, did not explore Lob-Nor at all, as he claims to have done Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen, one of the first coraphers of the day, has exaht of Chinese literature, and proves, al, that the true Lob-Nor must lie somewhere north-east of the so-called Kara Kotchun Lake discovered by Prejevalsky, and that, in all probability, it is fed by an eastern arm of the Tarim river This, at all events, would account for the reone by the waters of that stream as they proceed southward, which could not but strike an attentive reader of the Russian explorer's narrative We have not space to reproduce all the arguments which Von Richthofen adduces, but the more important are these:--Prejevalsky's lake was fresh, whereas Lob-Nor has been called _The_ Salt Lake, _par excellence_, in all ages; Shaw, Forsyth, and other authorities, report that the naions, whereas Prejevalsky found no such name applied to his lake; the Chinese maps, of the accuracy of which Von Richthofen has had repeated proofs, represent Lob-Nor as lyingnearly in the position of those discovered by Prejevalsky, Khasoolian for jade, a famous product of Khotan of whichby these very lakes _en route_ Another iument is, as we have ed by the Tarim at its mouth Von Richthofen's theory presupposes that the Tarim River has altered its course, and that the main rush of water is now south-east instead of due east as foration, and it is possible that Prejevalsky, who reports about to return to Central Asia, may be enabled to elucidate it He will return to Zaissan, the Russian frontier post, and thence endeavour to make his way into Tibet by way of Barkul and Hareat, if not insuperable, obstruction, for we learn from private advices from India, that the ill-advised publication in the Chefoo Convention of the then proposed ent orders to the Tibetan officials at all the various routes and passes to allow no European traveller to enter into the country on any pretext whatever”

Having stated the view of Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen, which is endorsed by the high authority of the _Athenaeeum_, and which bears, ive the vital portion of Colonel Prjevalsky's own description The _Geographical Magazine_, for May, 1878 Contains _in extenso_ the report, and the sentences here quoted are from that translation