Part 14 (2/2)

”If it appear, therefore, what all mankind have ever alloithout any doubt or hesitation, that these two circumstances take place in the voluntary actions of men, and in the operations of reed in the doctrine of necessity, and that they have hitherto disputedeach other”--(IV p 97)

But is this constant conjunction observable in huive but one answer to this question:

”Aenerosity, public spirit: these passions, h society, have been, fro of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprizes which have ever been observed a mankind Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Rolish You cannot beto the forard to the latter Mankind are so much the same, in all ti new or strange in this particular

Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of hu men in all varieties of circu us with materials from which we ular springs of huues, factions, and revolutions are so many collections of experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science, in the same manner as the physician or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external objects, by the experi them Nor are the earth, air, water, and other elements examined by Aristotle and Hippocrates more like to those which at present lie under our observation, than the overn the world”--(IV pp 97-8)

Hume proceeds to point out that the value set upon experience in the conduct of affairs, whether of business or of politics, involves the acknowledgment that we base our expectation of what men will do, upon our observation of what they have done; and, that we are as firhts as we are of that of things

And, if it be urged that human actions not unfrequently appear unaccountable and capricious, his reply is prorant it possible to find soular connexion with any known motives, and are exceptions to all the overnular and extraordinary actions, we ard to those irregular events which appear in the course of nature, and the operations of external objects All causes are not conjoined to their usual effects with like uniformity An artificer, who handles only dead matter, may be disappointed in his aim, as well as the politician who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent agents

”The vulgar, who take things according to their first appearance, attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes as h they meet with no i that, almost in every part of nature, there is contained a vast variety of springs and principles, which are hid, by reason of their minuteness or remoteness, find that it is at least possible the contrariety of events ency in the cause, but from the secret operation of contrary causes This possibility is converted into certainty by further observation, when they remark that, upon an exact scrutiny, a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes, and proceeds froive no better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch, than to say that it does not coht But an artist easily perceives that the sa or pendulum has always the same influence on the wheels; but fails of its usual effect, perhaps by reason of a grain of dust, which puts a stop to the whole movement

From the observation of several parallel instances, philosophers form a maxim, that the connexion between all causes and effects is equally necessary, and that its see uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes”--(IV pp 101-2)

So with regard to human actions:--

”The internal principles andthese seeularities; in the same manner as the winds, rains, clouds, and other variations of the weather are supposed to be governed by steady principles; though not easily discoverable by huacity and inquiry”--(IV p

103)

Meteorology, as a science, was not in existence in Hume's time, or he would have left out the ”supposed to be” In practice, again, what difference does any one make between natural and moral evidence?

”A prisoner who has neither money nor interest, discovers the impossibility of his escape, as hen he considers the obstinacy of the gaoler, as the walls and bars hich he is surrounded; and, in all attempts for his freedom, chooses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of the other The same prisoner, when conducted to the scaffold, foresees his death as certainly frouards, as fro a certain train of ideas: The refusal of the soldiers to consent to his escape; the action of the executioner; the separation of the head and body; bleeding, convulsive motions, and death Here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions; but thefrom one link to another, nor is less certain of the future event, than if it were connected with the objects presented to the ether by e are pleased to call a _physical_ necessity The same experienced union has the same effect on the mind, whether the united objects be ure and s, but their nature and their operation on the understanding never change”--(IV pp

105-6)

But, if the necessary connexion of our acts with our ideas has always been acknowledged in practice, why the proclivity of mankind to deny it words?

”If we examine the operations of body, and the production of effects from their causes, we shall find that all our faculties can never carry us further in our knowledge of this relation, than barely to observe, that particular objects are _constantly conjoined_ together, and that the mind is carried, by a _customary transition_, from the appearance of the one to the belief of the other But though this conclusion concerning hunorance be the result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject,propensity to believe, that they penetrate further into the province of nature, and perceive so like a necessary connexion between cause and effect When, again, they turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds, and _feel_ no such connexion between the motive and the action; they are thence apt to suppose, that there is a difference between the effects which result froht and intelligence But, being once convinced, that we know nothing of causation of any kind, than merely the _constant conjunction_ of objects, and the consequent _inference_ of thethat these two circumstances are universally allowed to have place in voluntary actions; we may be more easily led to own the same necessity common to all causes”--(IV pp 107, 8)

The last asylum of the hard-pressed advocate of the doctrine of uncaused volition is usually, that, argue as you like, he has a profound and ineradicable consciousness of what he calls the freedoh only in a note, as if he thought the extinction of so transparent a sophisnity of his text

”The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for fro experience, which we have, or may have, of liberty or indifference in many of our actions The necessity of any action, whether of , a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent being who may consider the action; and it consists chiefly in the deterhts to infer the existence of that action fro objects; as liberty, when opposed to necessity, is nothing but the want of that determination, and a certain looseness or indifference which we feel, in passing or not passing, fro one Noe _ on human actions, we seldom feel such looseness or indifference, but are commonly able to infer them with considerable certainty froent; yet it frequently happens, that in _perfor like it: And as all rese objects are taken for each other, this has been employed as demonstrative and even intuitive proof of human liberty We feel that our actions are subject to our will on ine we feel, that the will itself is subject to nothing, because, when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel that it e of itself (or a _Velleity_ as it is called in the schools), even on that side on which it did not settle This ie or faint notion, we persuade ourselves, could at that ti itself; because, should that be denied, we find upon a second trial that at present it can We consider not that the fantastical desire of showing liberty is here the motive of our actions”--(IV p

110, _note_)

Moreover, theto the words, the supposed opposition between free will and necessity turns out to be a mere verbal dispute

”For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions?

We cannot surely mean, that actions have so little connexion with motive, inclinations, and circuree of uniformity from the other, and that one affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the other For these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact By liberty, then, we can onlyto the determinations of the will_; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains Here then is no subject of dispute”--(IV p 111)

Half the controversies about the freedoraph had been well pondered by those who oppose the doctrine of necessity For they rest upon the absurd presumption that the proposition, ”I can do as I like,” is contradictory to the doctrine of necessity The answer is; nobody doubts that, at any rate within certain lis and dislikings? Did you make your own constitution? Is it your contrivance that one thing is pleasant and another is painful? And even if it were, why did you prefer to make it after the one fashi+on rather than the other? The passionate assertion of the consciousness of their freedoe of the opponents of the doctrine of necessity, is mere futility, for nobody denies it What they really have to do, if they would upset the necessarian argument, is to prove that they are free to associate any emotion whatever with any idea whatever; to like pain as much as pleasure; vice as much as virtue; in short, to prove, that, whatever s, that of thought is given over to chance