Part 14 (1/2)

As has been already said, Hu about the existence or the nature of the soul; but he carries the war into the enemy's camp, and accuses those who affirm the i substance, of atheism and Spinozism, which are assuenious Observation appears to acquaint us with two different systeree, that the necessary substratum of each of these is a substance, in which the phenomena adhere, or of which they are attributes or modes

”I observe first the universe of objects or of body; the sun, moon, and stars; the earth, seas, plants, animals, men, shi+ps, houses, and other productions either of art or of nature Here Spinoza appears, and tells me that these are only modifications and that the subject in which they inhere is simple, uncompounded, and indivisible After this I consider the other systeht, or my impressions and ideas Then I observe another sun, moon, and stars; an earth and seas, covered and inhabited by plants and animals, towns, houses,I can discover or conceive in the first systeians present themselves, and tell me that these also are modifications, and modifications of one simple, uncompounded, and indivisible substance Immediately upon which I am deafened with the noise of a hundred voices, that treat the first hypothesis with detestation and scorn, and the second with applause and veneration I turn my attention to these hypotheses to see what reat a partiality; and find that they have the saible, and that, as far as we can understand them, they are so much alike, that 'tis impossible to discover any absurdity in one, which is not common to both of them”--(I p 309)

For the ood, I inal Plain people ible, without plunging any further a, while the conclusions carry no conviction

FOOTNOTES:

[35] ”Our internal intuition shows no pero is only the consciousness of ” ”There is nothe constitution of the soul, so far as regards the possibility of its separate existence”--_Kritik von den Paralogismen der reinen Vernunft_

[36] _Essays on Soion_, (Essay I Revelation of a Future State), by Richard Whately, DD, Archbishop of Dublin Fifth Edition, revised, 1846

[37] _The Future States: their Evidences and Nature; considered on Principles Physical, Moral, and Scriptural, with the Design of showing the Value of the Gospel Revelation_ by the Right Rev Reginald Courtenay, DD, Lord Bishop of Kingston (Jaht life and ih the Gospel,' and that in the most literal sense, which implies that the revelation of the doctrine is _peculiar_ to His Gospel, see of the Scriptures of the New Testament”--Whately, _lc_ p 27

[39] Compare, _Of the Immateriality of the Soul_, Section V of Part IV, Book I, of the _Treatise_, in which Hume concludes (I p 319) that, whether it be uments for the immortality of the soul are equally inconclusive; and in both cases the y of nature are equally strong and convincing”

[40] ”The question again respecting the materiality of the soul is one which I am at a loss to understand clearly, till it shall have been clearly deter of it, any more than of mind, except its attributes”--Whately, _lc_ p 66

[41] ”None of those who contend for the natural immortality of the soulhave been able to extricate theuments apply, with exactly the same force, to prove an ih in such a conclusion as this they are never willing to acquiesce”--Whately, _lc_ p 67

[42] ”Nor are we therefore authorised to infer _a priori_, independent of Revelation, a future state of retribution, fro in the present life, since that future state does not account fully for these irregularities It may explain, indeed, how present evil ood could not be attained without the evil; it may reconcile with our notions of the divine justice the present prosperity of the wicked, but it does not account for the existence of the wicked”--Whately, _lc_ pp 69, 70

[43] ”So reason also shows, that for man to expect to earn for hiht, an iroundless pretension”--Whately, _lc_ p 101 On the other hand, however, the Archbishop sees no unreasonableness in afor himself an immortality of intense unhappiness by the practice of vice So that life is, naturally, a venture in which you ht somewhat hard upon mankind if they are pushed into a speculation of this sort, willy-nilly

[44] _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ Ed Hartenstein, p 547

CHAPTER X

VOLITION: LIBERTY AND NECESSITY

In the opening paragraphs of the third part of the second book of the _Treatise_, Huives a description of the will

”Of all the immediate effects of pain and pleasure there is none , it be not co of its nature and properties is necessary to the explanation of them, we shall here make it the subject of our inquiry I desire itbut _the internal iive rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of ourones of pride and humility, love and hatred, 'tis impossible to define, and needless to describe any further”--(II p 150)

This description of volition rounds More especially does it see which arises e act, or appear to act, as causes: for onewhich we have forgotten

Every volition is a complex idea composed of two elements: the one is the idea of an action; the other is a desire for the occurrence of that action If I will to strike, I have an idea of a certain movement, and a desire that that movement should take place; if I will to think of any subject, or, in other words, to attend to that subject, I have an idea of the subject and a strong desire that it should remain present to my consciousness And so far as I can discover, this combination of an idea of an object with an e that can be directly observed in an act of volition So that Hume's definition may be amended thus: Volition is the impression which arises when the idea of a bodily or mental action is accompanied by the desire that the action should be accomplished It differs froard ourselves as possible causes of the action desired

Two questions arise, in connexion with the observation of the phenomenon of volition, as they arise out of the contemplation of all other natural phenomena Firstly, has it a cause; and, if so, what is its cause?

Secondly, is it followed by any effect, and if so, what effect does it produce?

Hume points out, that the nature of the phenoin of the conception that they are connected by the relation of cause and effect For that relation is nothing but an order of succession, which, so far as our experience goes, is invariable; and it is obvious that the nature of pheno to do with their order Whatever it is that leads us to seek for a cause for every event, in the case of the phenoency, to seek it in that of theof the law of causation, in the physical world, is, that it generalises universal experience of the order of that world; and, if experience shows a si states of consciousness, the law of causation will properly express that order

That such an order exists, however, is acknowledged by every sane man:

”Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation, arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where siether, and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity which we ascribe to matter Beyond the constant _conjunction_ of similar objects and the consequent _inference_ from one to the other, we have no notion of any necessity of connexion