Part 15 (2/2)

This, no doubt, was as good as the lishman and a French waiter But I doubt whether it deserves the na We speak of a cow, not of a _moo_ Of a laes, such as Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit If this principle of Onomatopoieia is applicable anywhere, it would be in the formation of the names of anioose and cackling, hen and clucking, duck and quacking, sparrow and chirping, dove and cooing, hog and grunting, cat and rowling

There are of course some names, such as _cuckoo_, which are clearly formed by an imitation of sound But words of this kind are, like artificial flowers, without a root They are sterile, and are unfit to express anything beyond the one object which they imitate If you remember the variety of derivatives that could be formed from the root _spac_, to see, you will at once perceive the difference between the fabrication of such a word as _cuckoo_, and the true natural growth of words

Let us colish is clearly a mere imitation of the cry of that bird, eventeres the imitative element has received the support of a derivative suffix; we have _kokila_ in Sanskrit, and _kokkyx_ in Greek, _cuculus_ in Latin(330) _Cuckoo_ is, in fact, a eac_, the Ger purely onoes of Gri but the sound of a particular bird, it could never be applied for expressing any general quality in which other aniive rise are words expressive of a metaphorical likeness with the bird The same applies to _cock_, the Sanskrit _kukku?a_ Here, too, Grimm's Law does not apply, for both words were intended to conveysound of the bird; and, as this intention continued to be felt, phonetic change was less likely to set in The Sanskrit _kukku?a_ is not derived from any root, it simply repeats the cry of the bird, and the only derivatives to which it gives rise are inally strutting about like a cock; _coquetterie_; _cocart_, conceited; _cocarde_, a cockade; _coquelicot_, originally a cock's comb, then the wild red poppy, likewise so called from its similarity with a cock's coht seem at first, as if this also was ine they perceive a kind of similarity between the word _raven_ and the cry of that bird This seelo-Saxon _hrafn_, the Gerh-German _hraban_ The Sanskrit _karava_ also, the Latin _corvus_, and the Greek _korone_, all are supposed to show some similarity with the unmelodious sound of _Maitre Corbeau_ But as soon as we analyze the e find that it is of a different structure from _cuckoo_ or _cock_ It is derived froeneral predicative power The root _ru_ or _kru_ is not a mere imitation of the cry of the raven; it embraces ht have been applied to the nightingale as well as to the raven In Sanskrit this root exists as _ru_, a verb which is applied to the s and theof cows From it are derived numerous words in Sanskrit In Latin we find _raucus_, hoarse; _rumor_, a whisper; in German _runen_, to speak low, and _runa_, inal _ravimentum_ or _cravimentum_ This root _ru_ has several secondary for_ in _rugire_, to howl; the Greek _kru_ or _klu_, in _klaio_, _klausomai_; the Sanskrit _krus_, to shout; the Gothic _hrukjan_, to crow, and _hropjan_, to cry; the Ger is closely allied to this root It is _sru_ in Sanskrit, _klyo_ in Greek, _cluo_ in Latin; and before it took the recognizedWhen a noise was to be heard in a far distance, the , for his ears were sounding and ringing; and the same verb, if once used as a transitive, expressed exactly e mean by I hear a noise

You will have perceived thus that the process which led to the formation of the word _karava_ in Sanskrit is quite distinct from that which produced _cuckoo_ _Karava_(331) ht have been applied to nized na but the cuckoo, and while a word like _raven_ has ever so many relations from a _rumor_ down to _a row_, cuckoo stands by itself like a stick in a living hedge

It is curious to observe how apt we are to deceive ourselves e once adopt this systeine that he hears in the word ”thunder” an i noise which the old Ger at nine-pins? Yet _thunder_ is clearly the same word as the Latin _tonitru_ The root is _tan_, to stretch From this root _tan_, we have in Greek _tonos_, our tone, _tone_ being produced by the stretching and vibrating of cords In Sanskrit the sound thunder is expressed by the same root _tan_, but in the derivatives _tanyu_, _tanyatu_, and _tanayitnu_, thundering, we perceive no trace of the ruined we perceived in the Latin _tonitru_ and the English _thunder_ The very same root _tan_, to stretch, yields solish _tender_, the French _tendre_, the Latin _tener_, are derived frolish _thin_, _tener_ er surface, then _thin_, then _delicate_ The relationshi+p betwixt _tender_, _thin_, and _thunder_ would be hard to establish if the original conception of thunder had really been its ruine that he hears soar came fro but sweet sounding This _sarkhara_ is the saar_; it was called in Latin _saccharuar juice

In _squirrel_ again so and whirling of the little animal But we have only to trace the name back to Greek, and there we find that _skiouros_ is co shade, the other tail; the ani called shade-tail by the Greeks

Thus the word _cat_, the German _katze_, is supposed to be an i But if the spitting were expressed by the sibilant, that sibilant does not exist in the Latin _catus_, nor in _cat_, or _kitten_, nor in the Gerht see of the cat; but it is derived fro the aniht be given to sho easily we are deceived by the constant connection of certain sounds and certain e, and how readily we i in the sound to tell us theof the words ”The sound must seem an echo to the sense”

Most of these Onomatopoieias vanish as soon as we trace our own nalo-Saxon and Gothic, or conates in Greek, Latin, or Sanskrit The number of names which are really formed by an imitation of sound dwindle down to a very sist, and we are left in the end with the conviction that though _a_ language obbling, twittering, cracking, banging, slaues hich _we_ are acquainted point to a different origin(333)

And so we find ainst a theory which would place man even below the animal Why should man be supposed, they say, to have taken a lesson from birds and beasts?

Does he not utter cries, and sobs, and shouts hi as he is affected by fear, pain, or joy? These cries or interjections were represented as the natural and real beginnings of hu else was supposed to have been elaborated after their model This is what I call the Interjectional, or Pooh-pooh, Theory

Our answer to this theory is the sae interjections, and some of them may become traditional, and enter into the composition of words But these interjections are only the outskirts of real language Language begins where interjections end

There is as h,” and the interjection ha, ha! between ”I suffer,” and oh! as there is between the involuntary act and noise of sneezing, and the verb ”to sneeze” We sneeze, and cough, and screah in the same manner as animals, but if Epicurus tells us that we speak in the sas bark, moved by nature,(334) our own experience will tell us that this is not the case

An excellent answer to the interjectional theory has been given by Horne Tooke

”The dominion of speech,” he says,(335) ”is erected upon the downfall of interjections Without the artful contrivances of language,but interjections hich to co of a horse, the lowing of a cow, the barking of a dog, the purring of a cat, sneezing, coughing, groaning, shrieking, and every other involuntary convulsion with oral sound, have alood a title to be called parts of speech, as interjections have Voluntary interjections are only employed where the suddenness and vehemence of some affection or passion returns et the use of speech; or when, from some circumstance, the shortness of time will not permit them to exercise it”

As in the case of Onomatopoieia, it cannot be denied that with interjections, too, soe like that which we find in nu all the races of men One short interjection may bespeech In fact, interjections, together with gestures, the movements of the muscles of the mouth, and the eye, would be quite sufficient for all purposes which language ansith the ,whose dominions bordered on the Euxine He happened to be at Ro seen a pantoed hiht ehborhood hom he could hold no intercourse on account of the diversity of language A panto, and there is hardly anything which cannot be thus expressed We, having language at our co without words; but in the south of Europe that art is still preserved If it be true that one look ht save ourselves much of the trouble entailed by the use of discursive speech Yet we h!_ _tut!_ _pooh!_ are as little to be called words as the expressive gestures which usually acco soically from mere interjections, they are apt to fail froine that there is so expressive in the sounds of words Thus it is said ”that the idea of disgust takes its rise in the senses of smell and taste, in the first instance probably in s ourselves from a bad smell we are instinctively ih the co rise to a sound represented by the interjections faugh! foh! fie! From this interjection it is proposed to derive, not only such words as _foul_ and _filth_, but, by transferring it frolish _fiend_, the German _Feind_” If this were true, we should suppose that the expression of conte e with half-opened lips But _fiend_ is a participle from a root _fian_, to hate; in Gothic _fijan_; and as a Gothic aspirate always corresponds to a tenuis in Sanskrit, the same root in Sanskrit would at once lose its expressive power It exists in fact in Sanskrit as _piy_, to hate, to destroy; just as _friend_ is derived froht(336)

There is one more remark which I have to make about the Interjectional and the Onomatopoetic theories, namely this: If the constituent ele of the cries of nature, it would be difficult to understand why brutes should be without language There is not only the parrot, but the -bird and others, which can imitate most successfully both articulate and inarticulate sounds; and there is hardly an ani interjections, such as huff, hiss, baa, &c It is clear also that if what puts a perfect distinction betwixt e which arises from interjections and from the imitation of the cries of anin of that distinctive faculty ofat least (and this is the only point which interests us), would have been the signs of individual iradually have been adapted to the expression of general ideas

The theory which is suggested to us by an analysis of language carried out according to the principles of coy is the very opposite

We arrive in the end at roots, and every one of these expresses a general, not an individual, idea Every name, if we analyze it, contains a predicate by which the object to which the na philosophers, whether language originated in general appellations, or in proper nanitu the true nature of the root, or the _pri whom I may mention Locke, Condillac, Adaald Stewart, maintain that all terms, as at first employed, are expressive of individual objects I quote fronation,” he says, ”of particular names to denote particular objects, that is, the institution of nouns substantive, would probably be one of the first steps towards the forht to speak, but had been bred up rein to fore by which they would endeavor tocertain sounds whenever they meant to denote certain objects Those objects only which were most familiar to them, and which they had most frequent occasion to ned to the sheltered them from the weather, the particular tree whose fruit relieved their hunger, the particular fountain whose water allayed their thirst, would first be denominated by the words _cave_, _tree_, _fountain_, or by whatever other appellations they on, to ed experience of these savages had led theed them to make mention of, other caves, and other trees, and other fountains, they would naturally bestow upon each of those new objects the same name by which they had been accustomed to express the similar object they were first acquainted with The new objects had none of them any name of its own, but each of them exactly resembled another object which had such an appellation It was ies could behold the new objects without recollecting the old ones; and the name of the old ones, to which the new bore so close a resemblance When they had occasion, therefore, to mention or to point out to each other any of the new objects, they would naturally utter the name of the correspondent old one, of which the idea could not fail, at that instant, to present itself to their est and liveliest inally the proper names of individuals, became the co to speak calls every person who comes to the house its papa or its mamma; and thus bestows upon the whole species those naht to apply to two individuals I have known a cloho did not know the proper name of the river which ran by his own door It was _the river_, he said, and he never heard any other name for it His experience, it seeeneral word _river_ therefore was, it is evident, in his acceptance of it, a proper na an individual object If this person had been carried to another river, would he not readily have called it _a river_? Could we suppose any person living on the banks of the Thaeneral word _river_, but to be acquainted only with the particular word _Thaht to any other river, would he not readily call it a _Thames_? This, in reality, is no eneral word are very apt to do An Englishreat river which he n country, naturally says that it is another Thames It is this application of the nareat multitude of objects, whose resemblance naturally recalls the idea of that individual, and of the naiven occasion to the formation of those classes and assortenera_ and _species_”

This extract froive a clear idea of one view of the fore I shall now read another extract, representing the diametrically opposite view It is taken froeneral teres He likewise appeals to children

”Children,” he says, ”and those who know but little of the language which they attempt to speak, or little of the subject on which they would e_, _plant_, _ani proper names, of which they are destitute And it is certain that all proper or individual naain: ”Thus I would inally general terms, because it would happen very rarely that man would invent a name, expressly and without a reason, to denote this or that individual We s were naiven _par excellence_, or otherwise, to some individual; as the naest, or as the reat heads known”

It ht seem presumptuous to attempt to arbitrate between such men as Leibniz and Adam Smith, particularly when both speak so positively as they do on this subject But there are tays of judging of former philosophers One is to put aside their opinions as simply erroneous where they differ fro ancient philosophy Another way is to try to enter fully into the opinions of those from e differ, to make them, for a time at least, our own, till at last we discover the point of view from which each philosopher looked at the facts before hiarded theht error in the history of philosophy than is co so conducive to a right appreciation of truth as a right appreciation of the error by which it is surrounded

Now, in the case before us, Adaht, when he says that the first individual cave which is called cave gave the name to all other caves In the saave the name to all other towns; the first iave the naht differences between caves, towns, or palaces are readily passed by, and the first naeneral with every new individual to which it is applied So far Adaht, and the history of alht be cited in support of his view But Leibniz is equally right when, in looking beyond the first eence of such names as cave or town or palace, he asks how such names could have arisen Let us take the Latin names of cave A cave in Latin is called _antrum_, _cavea_, _spelunca_ Now _antrum_ means really the same as _internum_ _Antar_ in Sanskrit means _between_ and _within_(339) _Antruinally what is within or inside the earth or anything else It is clear, therefore, that such a naiven to any individual cave, unless the general idea of being within, or inwardness, had been present in the eneral idea once formed, and once expressed by the prono is clear and intelligible The place where the savage could live safe from rain and from the sudden attacks of wild beasts, a natural hollow in the rock, he would call his _within_, his _antru in the earth or cut in a tree, would be designated by the saeneral idea, however, would likewise supply other names, and thus we find that the _entrails_ were called _antra_ (neuter) in Sanskrit, _enteron_ in Greek, originally things within