Part 15 (1/2)
They know theirthose who have been kind to them, and they bear malice for years to those by whom they have been insulted or ill-treated Who does not recollect the dog Argos in the Odyssey, who, after so nize Ulysses?(321)
4 Brutes are able to couish A parrot will take up a nut, and throw it down again, without atteht; this he could discover only by coood nuts with that of the bad: and he has found that it has no kernel; this he could discover only by what philosophers would dignify with the grand title of syllogisht nut, therefore this nut is hollow”
5 Brutes have a will of their own I appeal to any one who has ever ridden a restive horse
6 Brutes show signs of shas, who has watched a retriever with sparkling eyes placing a partridge at hisaith his tail between his legs frons adins e use philosophical language, e claiuishi+ng good and evil; and, as we gain nothing by these scholastic terether
7 Brutes show signs of love and hatred There are well-authenticated stories of dogs following theirfood from any one Nor is there any doubt that brutes atch their opportunity till they revenge themselves on those whom they dislike
If, with all these facts before us, we deny that brutes have sensation, perception,forward powerful arguns which we observe in brutes so differently froine they have explained everything, if they ascribe to brutes _instinct_ instead of _intellect_ But, if we take these tords in their usual acceptations, they surely do not exclude each other(322) There are instincts in man as well as in brutes A child takes his mother's breast by instinct; the spider weaves its net by instinct; the bee builds her cell by instinct No one would ascribe to the child a knowledge of physiology because it e; nor shall we claie of eometry, because _we_ could not do what they do without a study of these sciences But what if we tear a spider's web, and see the spider exa up his work in despair, or endeavoring to mend it as well ascontrolled by observation, by coment
Instinct, whether mechanical or moral, is more prominent in brutes than in man; but it exists in both, as much as intellect is shared by both
Where, then, is the difference between brute and man?(324) What is it that ns, no rudiments, in the whole brute world? I ansithout hesitation: the one great barrier between the brute and e_ Man speaks, and no brute has ever uttered a word Language is our Rubicon, and no brute will dare to cross it This is our matter of fact answer to those who speak of development, who think they discover the rudiments at least of all human faculties in apes, and ould fain keep open the possibility that man is only a more favored beast, the triuuage is sole of the skull It ad, and no process of natural selection will ever distill significant words out of the notes of birds or the cries of beasts
Language, however, is only the outward sign We e our opponent to produce anything approaching to it from the whole brute world But if this were all, if the art of e our i by which we could assert our superiority over the brute creation, we orilla so close on our heels
It cannot be denied that brutes, though they do not use articulate sounds for that purpose, have neverthelesswith each other When a whale is struck, the whole shoal, though widely dispersed, are instantly ger beetle finds the carcass of a mole, he hastens to communicate the discovery to his fellows, and soon returns with his _four_ confederates(325) It is evident, too, that dogs, though they do not speak, possess the power of understanding much that is said to them, their names and the calls of their master; and other animals, such as the parrot, can pronounce every articulate sound Hence, although for the purpose of philosophical warfare, articulate language would still fornable position, yet it is but natural that for our own satisfaction we should try to find out in what the strength of our position really consists; or, in other words, that we should try to discover that inward power of which language is the outward sign and manifestation
For this purpose it will be best to examine the opinions of those who approached our proble for outward and palpable signs of difference between brute and man, inquired into the inward mental faculties, and tried to determine the point where man transcends the barriers of the brute intellect That point, if truly detere: and, if so, that coincidence ought to explain the problem which occupies us at present
I shall read an extract fro
After having explained how universal ideas areobserved the sale perceptions under the general conception of whiteness, Locke continues:(326) ”If it e their ideas that way to any degree: this, I think, Iis not at all in theeneral ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by nothe having general ideas as the distinguishi+ng feature betweento language as the one palpable distinction between the two, it would seen and realization of that inward faculty which is called the faculty of abstraction, but which is better known to us by the homely name of Reason
Let us now look back to the result of our former Lectures It was this
After we had explained everything in the growth of language that can be explained, there remained in the end, as the only inexplicable residuum, e called _roots_ These roots fores This discovery has sie immensely It has taken away all excuse for those rapturous descriptions of language which invariably preceded the arguin We shall hear no more of that wonderful instrument which can express all we see, and hear, and taste, and touch, and sives fors of our souls, and body to the loftiest dreae in accurate perspective the past, the present, and the future, and throw over everything the varying hues of certainty, of doubt, of contingency All this is perfectly true, but it is no longer wonderful, at least not in the Arabian Nights sense of that word ”The speculativethe first and last steps of the progress of language, feels the sa insensibly on the slope of a hill, comes to look from a precipice of an almost unfathomable depth to the summit of which he scarcely believes himself to have ascended without supernatural aid” To certain ain by the hand of history froible which they can adible which they can only understand But to a mature mind reality is more attractive than fiction, and simplicity s as co more truly wonderful in a root than in all the lyrics of the world
What, then, are these roots? In our es roots can only be discovered by scientific analysis, and, even as far back as Sanskrit, we may say that no root was ever used as a noun or as a verb But originally roots were thus used, and in Chinese we have fortunately preserved to us a representative of that priranite, underlies all other strata of huive, appears in Sanskrit _da-naift, as a substantive; in _do_, Sanskrit _dadaive, as a verb; but the root Da can never be used by itself In Chinese, on the contrary, the root TA, as such, is used in the sense of a noun, greatness; of a verb, to be great; of an adverb, greatly or much Roots therefore are not, as is commonly maintained, inally as real words What ant to find out is this, What inward erms of human speech?
Two theories have been started to solve this problem, which, for shortness' sake, I shall call the _Bo theory_ and the _Pooh-pooh theory_(327)
According to the first, roots are i to the second, they are involuntary interjections The first theory was very popular ahteenth century, and, as it is still held by uished scholars and philosophers, we must exa as yet s and cows, the thunder of the clouds, the roaring of the sea, the rustling of the forest, the murmurs of the brook, and the whisper of the breeze He tried to i cries useful as signs of the objects from which they proceeded, he followed up the idea and elaborated language This vieas most ably defended by Herder(328) ”Man,” he says, ”shows conscious reflection when his soul acts so freely that it may separate, in the ocean of sensations which rush into it through the senses, one single wave, arrest it, regard it, being conscious all the tile wave Man proves his conscious reflection when, out of the dreaather hie, fixing it with a bright and tranquil glance, and discovering for hie and no other Man proves his conscious reflection when he not only perceives vividly and distinctly all the features of an object, but is able to separate and recognize one orfeatures” For instance, ”Man sees a lamb He does not see it like the ravenous wolf He is not disturbed by any uncontrollable instinct He wants to know it, but he is neither draards it nor repelled from it by his senses The lamb stands before him, as represented by his senses, white, soft, woolly The conscious and reflecting soul ofwhich est iht or touch, remains in the soul The lamb returns-white, soft, woolly The soul sees, touches, reflects, looks for a nized it 'Ah, thou art the bleating ani, perceived as the distinguishi+ng mark of the lamb, becomes the name of the lamb It was the couage but a collection of such words?”
Our answer is, that though there are nae formed by mere imitation of sound, yet these constitute a very ss, not the tools, of language, and any attempt to reduce the most common and necessary words to imitative roots ends in co most strenuously defended this theory of Onoained a prize which the Berlin Acadee, renounced it openly towards the latter years of his life, and threw hiuages as miraculously revealed We cannot deny the possibility that _a_ language ht have been formed on the principle of ie has been discovered that was so for a dish placed before hi to knohether it was a duck, said, with an interrogative accent,
_Quack quack?_
He received the clear and straightforward answer,
_Bo!_