Part 31 (1/2)
Mr Ray Stannard Baker, in his book ”What Wilson Did in Paris,” says:
Of all the important decisions at the Peace Conference none worried the President sopeninsula--and none, finally, satisfied him less Not one of the problems he had to meet at Paris, serious as they all were, did he take more personally to heart than this He told me on one occasion that he had been unable to sleep on the previous night for thinking of it
Those last days before the Treaty was finished were a the hardest of the entire Conference As I have said before, the erous problems had inevitably been left to the last, and had all to be finally settled in those crowded days of late April
Consider, for a moment, the exact situation at Paris on April 29th, when the japanese-Chinese crises reached the explosive point
It was on that very day that the Ger morosely into Versailles, ready for a treaty that was not yet finished The Three--for Orlando had then withdrawn fro their sessions, the discussions were longer and more acrimonious They were tired out Only six days before, on April 23rd, the High Council had been hopelessly deadlocked on the Italian question The President had issued his boldthe disposition of Fiuation departed from Paris with the expectation that their withdraould either force the hands of the Conference, or break it up
While this crisis was at its height the Belgian delegation, which had long been restive over the non-settleian claims for reparations, became insistent They had no place in the Supreme Council and they orried lest the French and British--neither of whoh money out of Germany to pay for its losses--would take the lion's share and leave Belgium unrestored The little nations were alorried at Paris lest the big ones take everything and leave the! Very little appeared in the news at the tiian deium were not satisfied she also would withdraw fron the Treaty
It was at this critical moment that the Chinese-japanese question had to be settled It had to be settled because the disposition of Gerhts in China (unlike Italian claio into the German Treaty before it was presented to Brockdorff Rantzau and his delegates at Versailles; and because the japanese would not sign the Treaty unless it was settled The defection of japan, added to that of Italy and the possible withdrawal of Belgium, would have s that japan wanted at the Peace Conference were: first, a recognition in the Covenant of the League of Nations of the ”equality of the nations and the just treatnition of certain rights over the for)
After a struggle lasting all through the Conference, japan had finally lost out, in the ue of Nations Coreat contention She was refused the recognition of racial or even national equality which she deh a ue of Nations Conition was just and should find a place in the Covenant
Few people realize how sharply the japanese felt this hurt to their pride: and few people realize the reat cole
Having lost out in their first great contention the japanese ca of irritation but with added deterates were the least expressive of any at the Conference: they said the least: but they were the fir to the line of their interests and their agreeotten also, in all fairness, that the japanese delegates, not less than the British, French, and American, had their own domestic political problems, and opposition, and that there was a powerful demand in japan that, while all the other nations were securing some return for their losses and sacrifices in the war, japan should also get soer position than any other of the Allied and associated Powers except the United States She had been little hurt, and er; she did not need the League of Nations aselse, she occupied a strong legal status, for her claims were supported by treaties both with China and the Allies; and she was, moreover, in a position, if she were rendered desperate, to take by force what she considered to be her rights if the Allies refused to accord the of 1917, the British and French, in order to sharpen japanese support of the allied cause, reements to sustain the claihts in Shantung It thus happened, in the Council of Three, for Orlando had then gone home, that two of the powers, Great Britain and France, were bound by their pledged word to japan Indeed, the British argued that they felt the-friendly ally but for helping to keep the Pacific free of the ene transported to Europe and thus relieving a great burden for the British fleet It otten that China was also bound by the Treaty and Notes of 1915 and the Notes of 1918 with japan-- although China vigorously asserted that all of these agreements were entered into upon her part under coercion by japan In fact, one of the Chinese delegates at Paris had actually signed one of the agree the Conference to overthrow
It was not only this wire entanglement of treaties which Mr Wilson found in his advance, but itjapan's dees and a ”sphere of influence” in China, he was also opposing a principle which every other strong nation at the Conference believed in and acted upon, if not in China, then elsewhere in the world japan asserted that she was only asking for the rights already conceded to other nations japan was thus in a very strong position in insisting upon her claims, and China in a very weak position
In this crisis Mr Wilson was face to face with difficult alternatives If he stood stiffly for immediate justice to China, he would have to force Great Britain and France to break their pledged ith japan Even if he succeeded in doing this, he still would have had to face the probability, practically the certainty, that japan would withdraw froo houe, but it would go far toward eventually disrupting the Peace Conference, already shaken by the withdrawal of Italy and the dangerous defection of Belgiu of the Peace Conference and of the Alliance of the Great Poould have the in the Treaty and of holding off in the hope that the forces of industrial unrest then spreading all over Europe hly irritating effect upon all the bolshevist ele uncertainty, and the spread of anarchical conditions With japan out of the association of western nations there was also the possibility, voiced just at this tiin building up alliances of her own in the East--possibly with Germany and Russia Indeed, if the truth were told, this was probably thethe final decision It was the plain issue between the recrudescence, in a new and erous form, of the old system of military alliances and balances of power, and the new systeue of nations It was the ainst the American Wilsonian idea
No statesman probably ever had a more difficult problem presented to him than did Mr Wilson upon the s see was to be saved out of the wreckage of the world The first was a speedy peace, so that ht return to the work of production and reconstruction and the avenues of trade everywhere be opened
Peace and work! The second was of supreether to steady a world which was threatened with anarchy It was absolutely necessary to keep a going concern in the world! The third was to perpetuate this world organization in a league of nations: this the most important of all, for it had reference to the avalanche of new problems which were just ahead
If the Conference were broken up, or even if Italy res would be impossible On the other hand, if the Allies could be kept firht into being, there was a chance of going fororld reconstruction on the broadest lines, and of the full realization of the principles of justice laid down in the Armistice terms and accepted by all nations The Treaty, after all, is no final settlereat process of world reconstruction
It ith all these considerations in view that the Shantung settle in the President's house in the Place des etats-Unis--with the japanese in full agreement
This settlement was in two parts, the first set forth in the Treaty itself, and the second a special agreement of the three Great Poith japan I find that this fact is not clear to many people, who look for the entire settlement in the Treaty itself
Under sections 156, 157, and 158 of the Treaty all the rights at Kiauchow and in Shantung Province for to Germany are transferred without reservation to japan This conforives a proud nation what it considered its full rights
On the other hand, the japanese delegates at the Conference, on behalf of their govern peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the econoht to establish a settletao”
Under this agreement, by which japan hts in Shantung to China, she also agrees to re on the peninsula ”at the earliest possible tihts as an econoreat powers and the whole future relationshi+p between the two countries falls at once under the guarantee of the League of Nations, by the provisions of which the territorial integrity and political independence of China will be insured
If the President had risked everything in standing for the immediate and complete realization of the Chinese demands, and had broken up the Conference upon that issue, it would not have put japan either politically or economically out of China Neither our people nor the British would go to ith japan solely to keep her out of Shantung