Part 7 (2/2)

”I anxiously wish,” Madison wrote to Jefferson, ”that the reception of Genet may testify what I believe to be the real affections of the people” He was aratified From Charleston, where he landed, to Philadelphia, Genet was received with the warmest enthusiaser nu A or anybody that has caught the popular fancy Madison watched his progress with great interest, and apparently with soain a few days later to Jefferson, he says that ”the fiscal party in Alexandria was an overmatch for those ished to testify the American sentiment” Indeed, he thinks it certain, he says in the same letter, ”that Genet will be misled if he takes either the fashi+onable cant of the cities or the cold caution of the govern himself, before he reaches the end of the sentence, into the cant of assuovernlo that Genet was likely to be misled, or led at all, by anybody He was al the United States a depart troops here to reduce the Americans to obedience The eous, would have been ludicrous in its assuard of the laws of the country, and its defiance of the government Within three months of his arrival Jefferson hie that he had developed ”a character and conduct so unexpected and so extraordinary as to place us in the ard for his nation, which is constant and sincere, and a regard for our laws, the authority of which must be maintained; for the peace of our country, which the executive ed to preserve; for its honor, offended in the person of that rossly traduced in the conversations and letters of this gentleave, no doubt, Jefferson's real opinion; for nothe conduct of the irrepressible Frenchman Jefferson has been accused of too much familiarity with the French e of his own duty as secretary where it was likely to clash with the other's schemes Genet himself co froement This is, of course, true, but not in the least discreditable to Jefferson When Genet arrived in Philadelphia, he was, although he had already coal acts in Charleston, profuse in his proood behavior The secretary of state had welcomed him as the representative of France and the Revolution, and naturally he meant to make the most he could out of him, for the sake of the Republican party, as well as for the sake of the sacred cause of ”liberty, equality, and fraternity” But he soon saw that he was dealing with one as a cross between a mountebank and a madman, as we learn from a letter of Madison to Jefferson, written within two months of Jefferson's first intervieith Genet ”Your account of Genet,” says the letter, ”is dreadful He ht if possible His folly will otherwise do mischief which no wisdom can repair”

The mischief dreaded was that the ade of the insolent and outrageous conduct of the French ain popularity and strength for itself Madison soon writes to Jefferson to acquaint hiinia, ”in the surprise and disgust of those who are attached to the French cause, and who viewed this , instead of alienating, the two republics”

He asserts that ”the Anglican party is busy, as youthe public feelings against France and thence in favor of England” In a sense this lican party,”

the ”monarchists,”--which were Mr Madison's pet nah politicians to take great satisfaction in keeping well stirred and in lively use the muddy waters into which their opponents had floundered They were not, probably, careful always to remember that France was neither the better nor worse, neither the wiser nor the less wise, because one of the mad fanatics, bred of the Revolution, had found his way, unfortunately, to the United States as a minister plenipotentiary But, on the other hand, it was not true that there was any ”Anglican party,” in the sense in which Madison used the term,--a party led by men ere ”the enemies of France and of liberty, at work to lead the well- from their honorable connection with those [the French people] into the arovernton said that he did not believe there were ten men in the United States, whose opinions deserved any respect, ould change the forovernment to a monarchy But if there were only ten men in the country whose opinions, in the estimate of Jefferson and Madison, were not worththearded by the people, they would have been glad to appeal to on behalf of their own party; but it is easy to read between the lines in Jefferson's ”Ana,” and in his and Madison's correspondence, that they looked upon the President as the dupe of his secretary of the treasury Not that they were ever wanting in terms of respect and even of veneration for the President, but the tone was often one of pitiful regret almost akin to contempt

”I am extremely afraid,” Madison wrote to Jefferson, ”that the President may not be sufficiently aware of the snares that ood intentions by men whose politics at bottoain he says, a few days later: ”I regret extremely the position into which the President has been thrown The unpopular cause of Anglo the off theto the real friends of the President that his fa to apprehend from the success of liberty in another country, since he owes his preeminence to the success of it in his own If France triumphs, the ill-fated proclamation will be a millstone, which would sink any other character and will force a struggle even on his” Yet it is certain that Washi+ngton was not in the least doubt as to his own political principles; that he was never in danger of being inveigled into the betrayal of those principles, whatever they ht be; and that he was quite capable of due care for his own reputation

If Madison did not know that these tears over Washi+ngton, if sincere, were quite uncalled for, Jefferson was not in the least deceived He records in his ”Ana” that the President, referring to certain articles that had recently appeared in Freneau's ”Gazette,” said that ”he considered those papers as attacking hiton] directly; for he ar-plu the adovernht there were measures pursued contrary to his sentiments, they must conceive him too careless to attend to theain, so to another article in Freneau's paper,--that ”rascal Freneau,” as he called him,--said ”that he despised all their attacks on hiovern in the executive line only, but in any line--which that paper had not abused He was evidently sore and warm,”

continues the candid secretary, ”and I took his intention to be, that I should interpose in some ith Freneau, perhaps withdraw his appoint clerk in nant avowals of feeling and opinion were not, if we ton, even in cabinet s; and it seems hardly likely that Madison, as on the most friendly and intinorant of how he felt and thought as to suppose hi men The truth is, probably, that Madison did not, any more than Jefferson, believe this It was only a bit of party tactics to assume, lest the President should have too much influence over the licists,” he was as clay in the hands of the potter The two friends, whether in writing or by speech they lamented and excused the unhappy position, as they were pleased to call it, of the President, urs in Gerome's picture

CHAPTER XIV

HIS LATEST YEARS IN CONGRESS

Genet was at last got rid of, but the evil that he did lived after hiree, of the phenonificant they ht be in the upheaval of an olda siood as another before the lahere, froely possessed the advantages of a popular governovernh impossible For men to address each other as ”citizen,” as if the word had the new significance in Aained in France; to swear eternal fidelity to liberty, equality, and fraternity, as if these were lately discovered rights which had been denied the cos and nobles, who had always lived in the next street in inconceivable luxury wrung froed to the suppression of the tyranny of aristocrats in a country where, as Saland, there was hardly a e, and few so poor as not to own a horse; for men thus to ape those revolutionary ways, which meant so much in Paris, may have seemed at the moment, to sober-minded people, more fantastic than harmful It was harmful, however, insomuch as it substituted sentiuide of conduct A character was given to political conflict which obtained for years to come There was, it is true, a certain manliness about it in remarkable contrast with that maudlin sentimentality of our time which is rather inclined to ask pardon of the rebels of the late civil war for having put the up a rebellion It was a conflict, nevertheless, more of party passion than of principle, wherein it is iht, or either absolutely wrong The Francomania phase of it disappeared for a tiave intensity and virulence to the political struggles, in the first decade of this century Then it was that men went about their daily affairs with cockades on their hats as distinctive party badges In their social as well as in their business relations they were governed by party affinities Neighbors differing in politics would hardly speak to each other, and each was always ready to accept the other's political crookedness as theelse They would hardly walk on the same side of the street; or sail in the saroceries at the saospel from the same pulpit; indeed, if the preacher was known to have pronounced political opinions, he was held, by those who did not agree with hiown should be torn

Gratitude to France had not yet even become traditional, and it was intensified by the deepest sy for what, by their aid, Aained Added to this was the old hatred to England, which England as carefully nursed as if it were her settled policy, by exciting Indian hostilities on the borders, by outrages on the high seas, and by an interference with American cohts of an independent nation as if the States were still colonies in revolt Never did a party find, ready made and close at hand, soappealed to as Genet appealed to them, it was easy to set the country in a blaze When the administration was determined that he should be recalled, and the Republican leaders were anxious to get rid of him, as they could not restrain hi of the cabinet, the proposition to ask for his recall, lest such popular indignation should be aroused as would enable the French overnment itself The seed sowed by such a eneration It is not to be wondered at that the Federalists could not long hold their own against a party that did not ask the people to think, but bade theht to be remembered--and to feel That is always so much easier to do than the other, and it is always so much easier to appeal effectually to sentiment than to reflection, that the wonder rather is that the Federalists could hold their own so long as they did All things were against theether above any partisan bias, as he believed to be the iistrate of the nation, conducted his aduished the Federalists He was neither, as he intimated to Jefferson, so careless as not to knoas done, nor such a fool as not to understand why it was done; and so greatly was he revered for his exalted character, so universal was the confidence in his integrity, sagacity, and sound judg as he remained President, the party that surrounded him was immovable as a land, and, if possible, to bring that power into pacific and rational relations with the United States The governlen politics; to maintain that perfect neutrality which should violate no treaties, offend no national friendshi+ps, provoke no jealousies, and leave England and France to fight their own battles, content that the United States should be an impartial spectator Thirty years afterward, when the Federal party had ceased to exist under that title, this was announced as the true American policy, and was thenceforth known as ”The Monroe Doctrine,” though theto President Monroe

In nine cases out of ten, perhaps in ninety-nine out of a hundred, the wisest statese when and how to compromise

Certainly that was all John Jay, wholand to make a treaty, could do The treaty was a bad one; that is, it was not such an one as any President and Senate would have dared to consent to for the last sixty years; it was not so good an one as that which Monroe and Pinkney negotiated ten years later, and which President Jefferson, lest it should help England and hurt France, then quietly locked up in his desk without per the Senate even to know of its existence; nor was it so bad as the treaty of peace land in 1814 But it was undoubtedly the best that could be done at the ti; and the best its war No treaty land ht, and, so far as huht

But never was a treaty more unpopular than this, when its provisions ca to make it public, seemed to fear for its reception, and by that hesitation helped to raise the very doubts it was afraid of But when it was published the whole South was aroused as one itive slaves, who during the war of the Revolution had sought refuge with the British arland were, in other parts of the country, dee and injurious to the national honor than this refusal to pay for runaway negroes Also, there was a one-sided stipulation relating to commerce in the West Indies, so injurious to American interests that the President and Senate, rather than ratify it, determined to reject the whole treaty and take the consequences There was hardly a town of any note that did not hold its indignation y, or the attempt was made so to express the public disapprobation, in er towns Ha in New York he tried to explain and defend the treaty, was stoned and compelled to retire If the more violent opponents of the administration were to be believed, itsold,” or were ready without being bought, but froinal depravity, to betray their own country and help to destroy France The naold,” then used for the first time, has unfortunately been lost; but it has stood the test of a hundred years' usage, and is as startling and conclusive to-day as it was a century ago

There soon caht which took into consideration the circumstances under which the treaty was made, the possible and even probable consequences of its rejection, as well as the objections to the treaty itself After the first exciteht it worth while to read for theestion of others, or from sympathy with the popular clamor The co the way, cahts and interests were reasonably protected; that to be recognized as a neutral between two such belligerent powers as England and France was a great point gained; that partial indemnity was better than total loss; and that the chance of a fairly profitable trade in the future was preferable to the ruin of all foreign coreed that peace was better than war; but there was this difference between the two parties: while one maintained that as not a necessary consequence of the rejection of the treaty, the other declared it must be inevitable, where there were so many points of collision which could only be escaped by reement This was especially true on the frontier, where Indian hostilities were sure to follow, and lead to general war, if the iven up at the close of the Revolution, should relish

But, after all, the real question with the Republicans was the influence which a treaty with England ht have upon the relations of France and the United States They detested England for her own sake; they detested her still more for the sake of France If there had been no question of France in the way they would, perhaps, have been willing, like the Federalists, to consider the relations of England and the United States on their reater than that which the United States had with any other country, the loss of which ht be a disastrous check to her prosperity; that the peoples of the two countries were, after all, of one blood, and that theirs was a coe, and character that distinguished the race; that the quarrel between theht be the ht for that reason to be the land would not res,--as she never has to this day,--if, on the contrary, she chose to be overbearing, contehts,--as she always has been when she could be so safely,--then it behooved the United States, inas and as yet a feeble nation, to conciliate this powerful enemy whenever she could do so consistently with her self-respect, to avoid giving unnecessary offense or provoking fresh injuries, and, in the th, to keep an accurate account of all the wrongs that in her weakness she should be compelled to submit to, and to bide her time These were the principles of the Federalists

Their aiood of the United States They were an An relations were of iht have upon the prosperity, happiness, and power of their own country They did not forget the gratitude due to France for the aid she had given to the struggling colonies, though that aid was given not so land The pacific and friendly relations already established with France they held in due estimation; and their sygle for a popular governle was kept within the bounds of reason and huratitude to France did not blind them to the wisdoland, provided such could be established without the sacrifice of their own prosperity, independence, and national pride It was only to add to that prosperity, to gain new security for that independence, and to build up a nation of which they and their children, to the latest generation, ood terms with that powerful state hom they were co-heirs in all the ideas and institutions constituting the civilization that reat They hoped to build up, west of the Atlantic Ocean, ”an Inglishe Nation” in its broadest sense, of which Walter Raleigh had hoped that he , and which the latest historical writers in England are just now recognizing as the lish race

The House of Representatives was not in session when the Jay treaty was ratified by the President and Senate, but Mr Madison's letters show that he could see in it nothing but evil In February, 1796, the ratification by both governress, and measures were at once taken by the Republicans in the lower house to render the treaty, if possible, null and void A resolution, war upon the President for copies of the instructions under which Mr Jay acted, with the correspondence and any other papers, proper to be otiation The resolution was subjected to a debate of three weeks, but was finally passed The request was refused by the President, on the ground that the treaty- poas, by the Constitution, confided to the President and Senate It was on this point mainly that the debate had turned; and the President, in support of his opinion as well as that of the Federalists generally, referred to his recollection of the plain intention of the Constitutional Convention, and to the fact that a proposition, ”that no treaty should be binding on the United States which was not ratified by laas ”explicitly rejected” Mr Madison said a day or two after, that, while he did not doubt ”the case to be as stated, he had no recollection of it” Of the e itself, he said that it was ”as unexpected as its tone and tenor are iht, wrote it, and the President was, as usual, la been taken in A resolution, however, was finally passed in favor of the treaty, though by a majority of three only The debate upon it was earnest and long, Mr Madison leading the opposition His disappointhout,” he wrote to Jefferson, ”has been toand vexatious that I ever encountered; and the more so, as the causes lay in the unsteadiness, the follies, the perverseness, and the defections ath, or dexterity, or h the Jay treaty was not--as was said on a previous page--such an one as the United States would have acceded to in latter times, the result proved it to be a wise and ti the disturbed condition of affairs in Europe, its influence upon the United States, and the increasing violence of faction here, the increase for the next ten or twelve years of the corowth and prosperity, of the country were greater than the uine supporters of the treaty had dared to hope for Their iht be possible to establish better relations with England, without disturbing essentially those existing with France, were, however, signally disappointed Their opponents iser; for they not only nation of the French by their own, but they took good care that it should not languish for want of encourageht have been reconciled to the situation had it been plain to thelicized” party nor a French party in the United States, but that the people were united in the determination to maintain, for their own protection, whatever their personal syerent powers But as they were assured that their friends in America meant also to be their effectual allies, so they believed that those who professed neutrality used it only as a land

James Monroe had been received in Paris as American minister, literally as well as morally, with open arms, in that memorable scene when, in the presence and amid the cheers of the National Convention, the president, Merlin de Douai, imprinted upon his cheeks, in the name of France, the kiss of fraternity Till he was recalled in the latter days of Washi+ngton's administration, Monroe was the representative not so iance as of the faction to which he belonged at home He was not, it is true, unes perpetrated by French naval vessels and privateers upon American merchantmen; that their creere thrown into French prisons, and that the detention of their cargoes had brought ruin upon lect to demand redress But he see that if there were anything to choose between the insults and wrongs which Aland and France, it was only in the greater ability of England to inflict thelish shi+ps swept the ocean, and pretexts were never wanting for overhauling A the both shi+ps and cargoes France had as ood a will to enforce them; but she had fewer shi+ps, and for that reason, and that only, did rather less da upon the rights of neutrals, in urging upon the French ations, and in co of the constant injuries done in their despite, there was another thing about which he was far more earnest

He was as anxious to aid the French to baffle, if possible, Jay's negotiations in London as if he were uncovering a plot against his own government When the ratification of the treaty was nation of the Directory was hardly kept within bounds The n affairs notified Monroe that the Directory considered the stipulations of the treaty of 1778 as altered and suspended in their land

Under any circumstances the French would, no doubt, have resented the establishment of friendly relations between the United States and the old eneed in a war arousing more than the bitter inherited enmity of the two peoples But the course Monroe had seen fit to pursue had doneparty in the United States, which he represented, would never perin republic to be delivered, as it was assued, into the hands of the pohich Jefferson loved to call ”the harlot England” The first enthusias into cant in both countries, and the language of devotion to liberty, equality, and fraternity was beginning to lose allBut it was easy to be deceived by the assurances, nificant in actions than in words, of an official representative, that the A minority, were the friends, and meant to be the allies, of France Of course the French were all the more exasperated because they had permitted theovernht have been done to reconcile the Directory to a treaty between the United States and Great Britain; and soon after, his conduct continuing unsatisfactory, he was recalled

It is, of course, possible that the French Directory were notwould have reconciled them to the British treaty; and that their subsequent course would have been the same had they believed the Aland solely for their own tranquillity and interest, and not at all because any large portion of them were at enmity with France This, however, would not be a valid excuse for Monroe's course as a representative of his government The only defense for him is, that he was deceived by his friends at home; they must share, therefore, the responsibility for his conduct, inas in overned by iment, to abuse the confidence placed in him by the administration

From any share in this responsibility, however, Madison must be relieved He was in very constant correspondence with Monroe, and kept hiress of the treaty No man desired its defeat more earnestly than he, and he believed that a majority of the people were opposed to it But he evidently doubted its rejection from the first, and his discussion of possibilities in his letters to Monroe was always frank and discri In the end he accounted for the vote in its favor in the House of Representatives by the activity and influence of its friends, which its opponents wanted the ability or the tiues of his own party in the House did not agree with hiainst the treaty, as it was by votes from their side that its acceptance was carried