Part 7 (1/2)

Perhaps he was influenced by this consideration when he proposed that the payment of the doinally held, and those who had acquired by purchase, the certificates of indebtedness The public creditors would in that case have been more widely distributed in different sections of the country and aht, at any rate, does not seeerness hich the bank stock was sought for, denounced it as stock-jobbing and ganantly reflected that in these overnors of the country, and particularly of his own people No doubt there was a good deal of speculation; and, as at all such times, there were a feho made fortunes, while many, who had at first much money and no stock, next much stock and no money, had at last neither stock nor nation was quite wasted, and his fears quite unfounded Neither the stock-jobbers, the Bank, nor the bondholders ever usurped the government, whatever may have been Hamilton's hopes or schemes, if he had any other than to serve his country The money-power of the North built cities and shi+ps, factories and towns, and stretched out its hands to the great lakes and over the broad prairies, to add to its doive to labor and industry their due reward It was the South that devoted itself to the business of politics, and, united by stronger bonds than can ever be forged of gold alone, soon entered into possession of the government, which it retained and used for its own interests, without regard to the interests or the rights of the North, for nearly three quarters of a century Mr Madison had no prescience of any such future in the history of the country, nor, indeed, then had anybody else He e public debt and the owners of a great national bank, through which the monetary affairs of the country could be controlled, were aiovern over republican institutions The inconsistency of which Hamilton accused Madison was therefore not necessarily a criht even be a virtue, and Madison be applauded for his courage in avowing a change of opinion, if he saw in the practical application of Haers that had not occurred to hi at them only as abstract theories But the Federalists believed that Madison, governed by these purely selfish motives, sacrificed his convictions of as best for the country that he ht secure for hi side It is quite likely that thethe second session of Congress was due in so towards hi Federalists He see more than the proverbial zeal of the new convert If it was not always shown in debate, it lurked in his letters Anything that ca that favored the secretary's measures, was sure to be opposed by hi, and soht There was a manifest disposition on the part of the Federalists in the House to defer to the secretary in a way to provoke opposition froreat ability There was soress should submit to the secretary the question of ways and means to carry on the Indian war at the West, after St Clair's disastrous defeat, and when, a few days later, it was suggested that he should be called upon to report a plan for the reduction of the public debt Meht that they were quite capable of discharging the duties belonging to their branch of the government without instructions from a head of department whom many of theress For the same reason they refused with prompt decision to permit the secretary to appear upon the floor of the House to explain soton letter Hamilton said that he had ”openly declared” a ”determination to treat him [Madison] as a political enemy” He probably took care that Madison should hear of it, for he was not a ant and overbearing in ht, which he rather preferred to quietude, and had little disposition to spare an ene qualities likely to temper the asperities of political warfare, and they may have provoked even Madison, mild-mannered and almost timid as he was, to unusual heat

All this, of course, is aside froiven his allegiance, was right or wrong On that point there may be an honest difference of opinion It is apart also froe sides in politics, notwithstanding the suspicion that always follows him who runs from one side to the other, when in neither has there been any change in principles or overned by the most sincere convictions; and if he obeys them and abandons old friends for new ones, or consents to be friendless, it is the strongest proof the statesain for him all the more respect But whether that respect overned by other and lower e of political principles either in the party he had left or the party he had joined; but each was striving with all its ht to adapt the old doctrines to the altered condition of affairs under the new Union The change holly in Mr Madison That which had been white to him was now black; that which had been black was now as the driven snow Why was this? Had he co? Or had he suddenly learned, not that he rong, but that he had ht and narrow path for the broad road which would lead to the goal he was seeking? These are not pleasant questions He had served his country well; one does not like to doubt whether it ith a selfish rather than a noble purpose But of any public ed, the question alill be, What ard to Madison is to drop out of sight the turning-point of his career; not to consider it is to leave unheeded essential light upon one side of his character For his own fortunes the choice he ain the whole world” is always the wisest and best thing to do He gained his world, and ise and virtuous in his generation according to the vote of a large ood it is not so easy to say; probably it does, however; for the popular estiave the run, weighs with even scales; and the verdict on Madison's character usually comes with that pitiful recommendation to reat services in the Constitutional Convention and after it, when its as presented to the people for their approval, has never been withheld; upon his official integrity and his high sense of honor in all his personal relations, except when obligation to party may have overshadowed it, there rests no cloud; and his intellectual power is never questioned One having these recognized qualities, and who for five and twenty years was generally high in office, h estimation, especially in a new country where fa else, is cheap Nevertheless, impartial historians, who venture to believe that nature adinia, declare their conviction that Mr Madison either wanted the strength and courage to resist the influence of those about hih to overcoht stand in his way

FOOTNOTE:

[Footnote 14: ”I reverence the Constitution,” said Fisher Ames in debate, ”and I readily admit that the frequent appeal to that as a standard proceeds froreeable reflection But I feel very different emotions when I find it almost daily resorted to in questions of little importance

When by strained and fanciful constructions it is made an instru in our nity”]

CHAPTER XIII

FRENCH POLITICS

If any proof anting of how coave it in the memorable attack upon the secretary of the treasury in the spring of 1793, within four days of the close of the second session of the Second Congress It was hoped by that proceeding to overwhelrace, and that the President would feel hied to expel him from the cabinet When the resolutions with this aim were offered, a member said that delicacy, decency, and every rule of justice had been violated; ”a ress;” he ht have remained a member to this day, and, save for the attempts in our tis, not have changed his opinion

In the course of the preceding year Hanatures, had met his opponents in the newspapers But it was a veil, not a visor, behind which he fought; for everybody knew froht and left It was a boast always of Jefferson that he never condescended to newspaper controversy; but it was pretty well understood that he himself did not enter upon that rather unsatisfactory hting by proxy Haonist, and he aimed his blows over the heads of his petty assailants to where he knew they would hit houe in the cabinet Ah not a newspaper article, was an official letter to the President, in which Hamilton defended his principles and histo escape the toils of public life and to spend the rest of his days in tranquillity, had consulted Madison and his two secretaries, Jefferson and Ha a reelection He soon changed his mind, influenced, perhaps, as much by the dissensions, so evident in the expostulations of his friends, as by the expostulations themselves He deprecated this open feud between his secretaries as a public ht, if he could not reconcile them, to silence it That the Federalists were , he kneas not true, without the enant declarations of Ha e which they deemed so absurd that it was difficult to believe that anybody could er from that quarter, he could not fail to see that the reverence and love in which he was held constituted a bond of unity, so long as he reistrate; and he may have felt that, should he retire, there was no other coether a Union, the possible dissolution of which was, both at the North and at the South, considered with calmness, sometimes with complacency, and, when party passion was at a red heat, even as a thing to be prayed for At any rate, the President consented to take the advice of the counselors wholy aggravated the quarrel a them which caused hiuments he set forth both in conversation and by letter to influence Washi+ngton's decision, dwelt upon the unhappy condition of public affairs It was a stor to Monticello, though he thought it was Washi+ngton's duty to remain at the helm and keep an eye to ard

This unhappy condition of affairs, he said, had all come from the course pursued by the secretary of the treasury, and was the natural consequence of the acts of Congress in relation to the public debt, the Bank, excise, currency, and other important measures passed in accordance with the secretary's policy Whether this policy was meant to destroy the Union, subvert the republic, and establish a monarchy upon its ruins, at any rate such must be the inevitable result of those ed this view of the subject with such pertinacity that Washi+ngton, either because he was impressed by so much earnestness, or because he was curious to kno the assertions could best be answered, sent them to Hamilton, with other objections of a similar character froiven, but it is not likely that Ha where such strictures upon his administration of affairs cah,” he said in his answer, ”always to hear with calmness calumnies which necessarily include me as a principal object in the measures censured, of the falsehood of which I have the e that I cannot be entirely patient under charges which irity of my public ree, and expressions of indignation sometimes escape me in spite of every effort to suppress them” There were only two men in the country whom he could have had in ton's career there is nowhere a stronger proof of his strong will, self-reliance, and passionless impartiality than that he could stand between two such furnaces as Hamilton on one side and Jefferson and Madison on the other, both glowing at the intensest white heat, while he re the softest, balentlest airs of a day in June But all this personal controversy in the public prints, and in the official intercourse of the cabinet, left on both sides an intense exasperation, which could not fail to have a controlling influence in the conduct of political parties Whether Jefferson was conscious or not--and whatever his feeling was, Madison shared it with hinally defeated, the atteress followed, if it was not the consequence of, the mortification of defeat

In February, 1793, Mr Giles, a representative fro upon the President for certain infor to the finances They were a bold attack upon the secretary of the treasury, and, should it prove that they could not be satisfactorily answered, would convict hiovernard of law, of usurpation of power, and even of eround for believing such charges to be well-founded would be quite sufficient to bring the secretary to trial by impeachment There was probably little doubt at the ht seem the hand of Esau, the voice was the voice of Jacob Behind Giles was Madison; and behind Madison, of course, was Jefferson Mr John C

Hamilton, in his ”History of the Republic,” asserts that the resolutions were still--when he wrote, twenty-five years ago--in the archives of the State Depart; and he further declares that Giles assured Rufus King that Madison was their author

Ha was imputed to him, was conclusive There had been technical violations of acts of Congress in one instance, but it was only to carry out the acts theress had, three years before, passed two acts authorizing the negotiation of two loans, one for twelve n debt, and another for two million dollars to be used at home It had been convenient, and had conduced to the success of the negotiation, to offer in Holland to contract a loan for fourteen ners probably the confusing, state that aress It was only in this borrowing of the ard of the letter of the law The loans and their purposes were kept entirely distinct in the accounts of the departement of these loans were so clearly and frankly explained that nothing but the captiousness of party could refuse to be satisfied On one point--the charge of an alleged deficit--the opposition was absolutely silenced The secretary indignantly explained that the su from any officer in the Treasury Depart was in credits for custoe on Europe sold but not yet paid for

Though there was enough of decency, or of prudence which took the place of decency, to drop the insinuation that the secretary had stolen what had never been in his possession, it was not so with the rest of the accusations Only four days before Congress was to adjourn, Giles offered another set of resolutions These assumed that the defiance of law and unwarranted assuested by the inquiries, were now proved to be true by the explanations that had been given The indictment, therefore, was made to include the verdict and the sentence; the criuilty, and conde, without the privilege of trial, or a recognition of the right to be heard The argument of the resolutions was, that certain acts were a violation of law; that the secretary had committed all those acts; and therefore it was the will of the House that the facts be reported to the President The presumption obviously was, that the President would iraced and faithless public servant But the prosecution was an utter failure The largest vote received for any of the resolutions was only fifteen; that on the others was from seven to twelve, in a quorum of from fifty to sixty members

In the course of the debate Mr Madison had said that ”his colleague [Giles] had rendered a service highly valuable to the legislature, and no less important and acceptable to the public” The House showed by its votes how very far it was fro with him But Fisher Ames wrote about that time: ”Madison is beco at any ordinary point of extreated this attack upon Ha Giles as his tool to get them before the House, Ames's reflection was not uncharitable

It would not be just, however, to leave the impression that the hostility shown in this affair was purely personal Both Jefferson and Madison had a hearty hatred for Haratified could they have made it the plain duty of the President to put him out of the Treasury Department a dishonored and ruined man But this particular outbreak of their enmity was intensified by their sincere and earnest enthusiasrief at any time because he was Haainst him just now because in recent newspaper and other controversies he had altogether got the better of them; but in this particular instance they wanted to punish hie of the indebtedness of the United States to France This was the essential delinquency at which the Giles resolutions were pointed The difficulty was, not that the secretary of the treasury was not careful enough of the publicquite certain, when paying off a public debt, that he was paying it to the right persons, and that no risk should be incurred of its being demanded a second time He felt there was no such certainty about pay was dethroned; but it was not wise, the secretary thought, to be hasty in recognizing revolutionary governency to-ain the third day It was more prudent to await a reasonable period for the evidence of perh to remember the late war of the rebellion kno iard to the recognition of the rebel confederacy by England and France

But to all this Jefferson did not in the least agree; neither did Madison They were in full, even passionate, syuillotine Money, they kneas needed, and it was a criainst liberty to delay payovernment With Haht to be, but whether they were, France With Jefferson and Madison they were France, because they ought to be

Hesitation to acknowledge that the Revolution was the nation, they thought, could only colican party,” the ”enemies of France and of Liberty,” ould lead the Aovernment of Great Britain,”--to use the terms in which Madison spoke, a little later, of the Federalists Which of these htful and prudent statesmen, and which were _doctrinaires_, nobody now, probably, questions The larger proportion of the people, however, were then carried away by the enthusiasm for the French revolutionists It was so, no doubt, at first without overnment should be called upon to take some decisive stand in relation to European politics, that the country should divide into two hostile ca should become more hostile to each other than ever It is not necessary to assuave the about the matter For the most part they followed, as the way is with parties, the political leaders to who that not to do so would be treacherous to the gratitude America owed to France, and to the cause of liberty and de monarchs from their thrones--at least one monarch from his, and more, it was hoped, would follow But when the revolution ran into the terrible excesses of a later stage, if any Federalists had wavered in their allegiance to their chiefs they soon returned, persuaded that the wild and bloody anarchy of Paris was not the road that led to the establishovern; real causes caland, and the United States had its part to play in this strife of giants Its real interest was to keep out of trouble; and, if all were agreed on that point, it does not see so ”It behooves the governton to Hamilton, ”to use every means in its power to prevent the citizens thereof fro to maintain a strict neutrality” It is difficult to conceive of aneither one side nor the other; of injuring neither one side nor the other; of o, an attitude of absolute impartiality towards both,--it is difficult to conceive of such awith the word ”neutrality” as applied to his position But Jefferson, nevertheless, quarreled with it; not frankly and directly as a thing he did not want, but captiously and hypercritically objecting to the word to cover his dislike to the thing itself ”A declaration of neutrality,” he said, ”was a declaration that there should be no war, to which the Executive was not competent”

It was true that the Executive was not competent to declare that there should be no war; it was not true that the use of the word ”neutrality”

could have any such application to the future as to prevent Congress, when it should asse war should it see fit to do so

But ency having arisen that ment to call an extra session, he, with the assent of the cabinet,--for Jefferson did not venture upon direct opposition,--issued a proclamation ”to exhort and warn the citizens of the United States carefully to avoid all acts and proceedings whatsoever” that ht interfere with ”the duty and interest of the United States” to ”adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and ierent powers” The objectionable as left out in deference to Mr Jefferson, who, really preferring that there should be no procla out of it by the o said, not the way of saying it, that the President insisted upon, as it was his duty to preserve the peace till the legislature should declare for war, and his inclination to preserve it altogether

It can hardly be doubted that Jefferson and his friends saw as plainly as the other party sa perilous to the interests of the United States a foreign ould probably be But, while professing a desire to avoid it, they were far ive aid, moral as well as les they syland, wholadly see crippled Not to be an eneland they held was to be an enehts of man” They could not or would not comprehend any wisdom in moderation, any prudence in delay It is curious to see how party animosity blinded even the best of them The objection to the word ”neutrality” was a ood citizens to maintain at their peril that state which, in all dictionaries, neutrality is defined to be Mr Jefferson, in instructing as secretary of state the American overnment, could find no better term than ”a fair neutrality” The fact was, the Republican leaders wished to avoid taking any positive stand, partly because delay ht be a help to France, and partly in obedience to the law of party politics, in opposition to the other side They were not at first quite sure of their ground, and wanted to gain time Mr Madison seems to have waited about six weeks before he could venture upon a positive opinion as to the proclae of party opinion, and party opinion helped him to make up his own ”Every 'Gazette' I see,”--he wrote in June, about eight weeks after the proclamation was published,--”every 'Gazette' I see (except that of the United States [Federalist]) exhibits a spirit of criticised on the Executive politics The proclamation was, in truth, a ly cautious even in writing to Jefferson Then he had observed that newspaper criticisms aroused attention, and he had heard expressions of surprise ”that the President should have declared the United States to be neutral in the unqualified terms used, ere so notoriously and unequivocally under eventual engagements to defend the American possessions of France I have heard it remarked, also, that the impartiality enjoined on the people was as little reconcilable with their ations as the unconditional neutrality proclaiovernment is with the express articles of the treaty” He adds: ”I have been mortified that on these points I could offer no _bona fide_ explanations that , however Mr Jefferson sent him within two or three weeks a series of papers by Hanature of ”Pacificus,” in defense of the proclaed him to reply This Madison undertook to do at once, and in five papers, under the signature of ”Helvidius,” he took up all the points in dispute

The question relating to treaty obligations was the uaranteed ”to his Most Christian Majesty the present possessions of the Crown of France in America” An attempt on the part of Great Britain to take any of the French West India Islands would involve the United States in the war How, then, Mr

Madison's friends ht well ask, as in the letter just quoted he said they did, could ”the President declare the United States to be neutral in the unqualified terms used, ere so notoriously and unequivocally under eventual engagements to defend the Around was that the treaty, by its ter in this case, inasland was offensive; and that, besides, the treaty was in suspension, as France herself was, in a sense, in suspension, having only a provisional governitimate successor to which was uncertain But an iht, in the decision to receive Genet as the Frenchin accordance with that cautious policy which he thought to be, in such a crisis, the most judicious, questioned whether a overnnized without reservations Such an aht be followed presently by another accredited by a neer in the revolutionary progress This would, at the least, be an aard dilenity by the government of the United States But this point also was yielded in deference to Jefferson, and much to his mortification the concession turned out to be before he was many weeks older