Part 7 (2/2)
Pa.s.sing north of the Isthmus of Panama, there come up for consideration another group of Latin-American States of which the racial history resembles closely that of South America. The little cl.u.s.ter of Central American States can hardly be taken seriously. Their ultimate fate will probably be that of Cuba--nominal independence under the close surveillance of the United States. But, farther north, Mexico claims more serious attention. Some time before Peru had received the blessings of civilisation from Pizarro, Mexico had reluctantly yielded her independence to Cortez, a Spanish leader whose task was much more severe than that of Pizarro. Whilst the mild Peruvians gave up without a struggle, the fierce Mexicans contested the issue with stubbornness and with a courage which was enterprising enough to allow them to seize the firearms of dead Spanish soldiers and use them against the invaders.
The original Aztec civilisation was warlike and Spartan. Extreme severity marked the penal codes. Intemperance, the consuming canker of Indian races, was severely penalised. There were several cla.s.ses of slaves, the most unhappy being prisoners of war, who were often used as sacrificial victims to the G.o.ds. Sacrificed human beings were eaten at banquets attended by both s.e.xes. The Aztecs were constantly at war with their neighbours, and needed no better pretext for a campaign than the need to capture sacrifices for their G.o.ds.
Grijalba was the first Spaniard to set foot on Mexico. He held a conference with an Aztec chief, and interchanged toys and trinkets for a rich treasure of jewels and gold. Cortez, the conqueror of Mexico, was sent to Mexico by Velasquez, conqueror of Cuba. He landed in Mexico with the avowed object of Christianising the natives, and considered himself a Soldier of the Cross. Like a good Crusader, he was ready to argue with the sword when words failed to convince. For some while he engaged in amicable relations with the Mexicans, exchanging worthless trifles for Mexican gold. But eventually various small wars led up to a three months' siege of the Aztec capital, which fell after a display of grand courage on the part of the Mexicans. Their civilisation, when at a point of high development, was then blotted out for ever.
It was in 1521 that the Spaniards first landed in Mexico. Their rule extended over three centuries. In 1813 Mexico first declared her independence, and in 1821 achieved the separation from Spain. The war of liberation had been fierce and sanguinary. It was succeeded by civil wars which threatened to tear to pieces the new nation. In 1822 an Empire was attempted. It ended with the a.s.sa.s.sination of the Emperor, Augustin de Yturbidi. A series of military dictators.h.i.+ps followed, until in 1857 a Republican const.i.tution was promulgated. Because this const.i.tution was strongly anti-clerical, it led to another series of wars.
Meanwhile greedy eyes were fixed upon the rich territories thus ravaged by civil strife. The United States to the north coveted the coastal provinces of California. Napoleon III. of France conceived the idea of reviving French influence on the American continent, and in 1864 helped to set up the second Empire of Mexico with the unhappy Maximilian at its head. Maximilian left Europe in the spring of 1864. After three years of civil war he was shot by the revolutionary commander. His rule had not commended itself to the Mexicans and was viewed with suspicion by the United States, which saw in it an attempt to revive European continental influences.
Then anarchy reigned for many years, until in 1876 the strong hands of Diaz, one of the great men of the century, took control. He did for the Mexican revolutionaries what Napoleon had done for the French Terrorists. But it was different material that he had to work upon. The Mexicans, their Aztec blood not much improved by an admixture of European, gave reluctant obedience to Diaz, and he was never able to lead them towards either a peaceful and stable democracy or a really progressive despotism. For more than a quarter of a century, however, he held power, nominally as the elected head of a Republic, really as the despotic centre of a tiny oligarchy. The country he ruled over, however, was not the old Spanish Mexico. There had been a steady process of absorption of territory by her powerful northern neighbour. Over 1,000,000 square miles, included in the rich Californian and Texas districts, had pa.s.sed over by right of conquest or forced sale to the United States. The present area of Mexico is 767,000 square miles. So more than half of this portion of Spanish America has pa.s.sed over to the Stars and Stripes.
The fall of Diaz in 1911 seemed to presage the acquirement by the United States of the rest of Mexico. There had been for some months rumours of an alliance between Mexico and j.a.pan, which would have had an obviously unfriendly purpose towards the United States. The rumours were steadily denied. But many believed that they had some foundation, and that the mobilisation of United States troops on the Mexican frontier was not solely due to the desire to keep the frontier line secure from invasions by the Mexican revolutionaries. Whatever the real position, the tension relaxed when the abdication of Diaz allayed for a while the revolutionary disorders in Mexico. Now (1912) disorder again riots through Mexico, and again the authorities of the United States are anxiously considering whether intervention is not necessary.[5]
I am strongly of the opinion that by the time the Panama Ca.n.a.l has been opened for world s.h.i.+pping, the United States will have found some form of supervision over all Latin North America necessary: and that her diplomacy is now shaping also for the inclusion of Latin South America in an American Imperial system by adding to the present measure of diplomatic suzerainty which the Monroe doctrine represents a preferential tariff system. Before discussing that point, the actual strength of Latin America should be summarised. To-day the chief nations of Latin America--all of Spanish-Indian or of Portuguese-Indian origin--are:--
The Republic of Argentina, area 3,954,911 square miles; population, 6,489,000 (increasing largely by immigration from all parts of Europe); revenue, about 20,000,000 a year.
The Republic of Bolivia, area 605,400 square miles; population 2,049,000; revenue, about 1,300,000 a year.
The Republic of Brazil, area 3,218,991 square miles; population 21,461,000 (there is a great European immigration); revenue, about 18,000,000 a year.
The Republic of Chili, area 2474 square miles; population about 4,500,000; revenue about 1,400,000 a year.
The Republic of Ecuador, area 116,000 square miles; population about 1,400,000; revenue about 1,400,000.
The Republic of Uruguay, area 72,210 square miles; population 1,042,668; revenue about 5,000,000.
The Republic of Venezuela, area 393,870 square miles; revenue about 2,000,000.
The Republic of Paraguay, area 98,000 square miles; population about 650,000.
The Republic of Mexico, area 767,000 square miles; population about 14,000,000.
The total of populations is between 50,000,000 and 60,000,000.
These peoples have the possibility--but as yet only the possibility--of organising appreciable naval power, and are possessed now of a military power, not altogether contemptible, and equal to the task at most points of holding the land against a European or Asiatic invader, if that invader had to face the United States' naval power also. Presuming their peaceable acceptance of a plan to embrace them in the ambit of an American Imperial system--a system which would still leave them with their local liberties,--there is no doubt at all that they could add enormously to the strength of the United States. Presuming, on the other hand, a determined plan on their part to form among themselves a grand Federal League, and to aim at a Latin-American Empire, they might make some counterbalance to the power of the United States on the American continent and in the Pacific.
Neither contingency seems immediately likely. These Latin-American peoples have not yet shown any genius for self-government. They produce revolutionary heroes, but not statesmen. Among themselves they quarrel bitterly, and a Latin-American Confederation does not seem to be possible. On the other hand, Latin America is jealous of the United States: resents, whilst it accepts the benefits of, the Monroe doctrine, and would take as a danger signal any action hostile to the Mexican Republic which the Anglo-Celtic Republic should be forced to take. Any attempt on the part of the United States to ”force the pace” in regard to Latin America would saddle her with half a dozen annoying wars.
What seems to be the aim of United States diplomacy, and what seems to be an attainable aim, is that very gradually the countries of South America will be brought closer to the northern Republic, coaxed by a system of reciprocity in trade which would offer them advantageous terms. Commercial union would thus pave the way to a closer political union. Such a development would be a very serious detriment to British trade interests, and to the British position in the Pacific. British export trade with Latin America is very considerable, amounting to some 60,000,000 worth a year. The two greatest contributors to the total are Brazil (16,426,000 in 1910) and the Argentine Republic (19,097,000 in 1910). Their communications with Great Britain will be left unchanged with the opening of the Panama Ca.n.a.l: and that event consequently will not strengthen American influence there. The same remark applies to trade with Mexico (2,399,000 in 1910), with Columbia (1,196,000), with Uruguay (2,940,000). But trade with Peru (1,315,000) and Chili (5,479,000) will be affected by the ca.n.a.l bringing New York compet.i.tion nearer.
There would, however, be a very serious position created for British trading interests if a proposal were carried out of an American preferential tariff system embracing the United States and Latin America. The total of British trade with Latin America (about 60,000,000) is nearly one-third of the total of British foreign trade (183,986,000 in 1910), and is more than half the total British trade with British possessions. Moreover, it is almost exclusively in lines in which United States compet.i.tion is already keenly felt. A tariff preference of any extent to the United States would drive British goods, to a large degree, out of the Latin-American market.
The position of Latin America in its effect on the dominance of the Pacific may be summed up as this: racial instability will probably prevent the Latin-American nations from federating and forming a great Power; the veto of the United States will prevent them from falling into the sphere of influence of any European Power; their jealousy and distrust of the United States, whether it be without or with reason, will stand in the way of their speedy absorption in an American Imperial system. But that absorption seems ultimately inevitable (though its form will leave their local independence intact). Its first step has been taken with the Monroe declaration; its second step is now being prepared with proposals for trade reciprocity.
FOOTNOTES:
[5] A dispatch from Was.h.i.+ngton, February 7, 1912, stated:
President Taft and Secretary Knox held a long conference this morning on the state of affairs in Mexico, which, it is believed, are worse than is officially admitted. Reluctant as the President is to take any steps that might compel intervention or the military occupation of Mexico, he is forced to view both as ultimate possibilities, and to make preparations accordingly. Thus the Army on the border is being strengthened, although thus far no important military movements have taken place, but the plans are complete for mobilisation.
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