Part 44 (1/2)

pp. 554-55: Meeting with Joint Chiefs: Naftali and Zelikow, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. II, 578-98. vol. II, 578-98.

p. 555: ”Can you imagine”: O'Donnell and Powers, 318.

p. 555: After JFK left the room: Naftali and Zelikow, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. II, 597-98. vol. II, 597-98.

p. 555: JFK told Bundy: FRUS: Missile Crisis, FRUS: Missile Crisis, 117. 117.

p. 555: Told RFK and Sorensen: Sorensen, 780.

p. 556: Afternoon meeting: FRUS: Missile Crisis, FRUS: Missile Crisis, 116-22. 116-22.

p. 556: RFK urged JFK: Brugioni, 303-4.

p. 556: Oct. 20 meeting: FRUS: Missile Crisis, FRUS: Missile Crisis, 126-36. Also see JFK conversation with Omsby-Gore, Zelikow and May, 126-36. Also see JFK conversation with Omsby-Gore, Zelikow and May, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. III, 5. vol. III, 5.

p. 556: ”that we would accept nothing: Ibid., 148.

p. 556: JFK asked the Times: Times: JFK to Orvil Dryfoos, Oct. 25, 1962, Box 29, POF; Zelikow and May, JFK to Orvil Dryfoos, Oct. 25, 1962, Box 29, POF; Zelikow and May, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. III, 4. vol. III, 4.

p. 557: JFK told Taylor: Naftali and Zelikow, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. II, 614. vol. II, 614.

p. 557: For calls to the former presidents: FRUS: Missile Crisis, FRUS: Missile Crisis, 153. 153.

p. 557: For the National Security Council meeting: Ibid., 152-56, and Zelikow and May, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. III, 42-57. vol. III, 42-57.

p. 557: Meeting with congressional leaders: Zelikow and May, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. III, 60-90. vol. III, 60-90.

p. 557: Joked with Humphrey: Richard Reeves, 393.

pp. 557-58: JFK comment to Donald: Donald, 13.

p. 558: DDE to JFK: Zelikow and May, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. III, 12. vol. III, 12.

p. 558: ”the most difficult meeting”: Robert Kennedy, 53, 55.

p. 558: JFK to NSK, Oct. 22, 1962: FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, 165-66. 165-66.

pp. 558-59: JFK speech: PPP: JFK, 1962, PPP: JFK, 1962, 806-9. 806-9.

p. 559: ”We have won”: Quoted in Richard Reeves, 397. NSAM No. 196, in FRUS: Missile Crisis, FRUS: Missile Crisis, 157. 157.

p. 559: Ex Comm meeting, 10 A.M. A.M., Oct. 23: Zelikow and May, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. III, 102-140. vol. III, 102-140.

p. 560: NSK to JFK, Oct. 23, 1962: FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, 166-67. 166-67.

p. 560: JFK and Clay: Zelikow and May, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. III, 146-47. vol. III, 146-47.

p. 560: Enforce the blockade: Ibid., 148-49.

p. 560: Evening Ex Comm meeting: Ibid., 150-73.

p. 560: JFK to NSK, Oct. 23, 1962: FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, 168. Soviet s.h.i.+pment of warheads by plane also worried JFK. Because Moscow would need landing rights in West Africa for this s.h.i.+pment, JFK won agreement from the presidents of Guinea and Senegal not to allow it. See Philip Kaiser, 197-99. 168. Soviet s.h.i.+pment of warheads by plane also worried JFK. Because Moscow would need landing rights in West Africa for this s.h.i.+pment, JFK won agreement from the presidents of Guinea and Senegal not to allow it. See Philip Kaiser, 197-99.

p. 560: JFK and RFK: Zelikow and May, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. III, 177. vol. III, 177.

pp. 560-61: RFK initiative and meeting with Dobrynin: Fursenko and Naftali, 251-53; FRUS: Missile Crisis, FRUS: Missile Crisis, 175-77; Zelikow and May, 175-77; Zelikow and May, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. III, 178-82. vol. III, 178-82.

p. 561: Ex Comm meeting, Oct. 24, 10 A.M. A.M.: Zelikow and May, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. III, 183-205. vol. III, 183-205.

p. 561: The MRBMs and Soviet knowledge of SAC's nuclear alert: Fursenko and Naftali, 256, 258.

p. 561: ”This was the moment”: Quoted in Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, 514. 514.

pp. 561-62: State Dept. report, report to McCone, and JFK worried: Zelikow and May, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. III, 188, 191-92, 196-98. vol. III, 188, 191-92, 196-98.

p. 562: ”We're eyeball”: Rusk, 237.

pp. 562-63: McNamara and Anderson: Roswell L. Gilpatric OH; Shapley, 176-77; Brugioni, 415-17.

p. 563: Afternoon meetings, Oct. 24, 1962: Zelikow and May, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. III, 206-26. vol. III, 206-26.

p. 563: JFK told Macmillan, Ibid., 226-28.

p. 563: NSK to JFK, Oct. 24, 1962: FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, 169-70. 169-70.

pp. 563-64: Knox-Khrushchev meeting: William E. Knox OH.

p. 564: JFK to NSK, Oct. 25, 1962: FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, 171. ”He could not go to war”: Fursenko and Naftali, 259-62. 171. ”He could not go to war”: Fursenko and Naftali, 259-62.

p. 564: NSK's proposal: Fursenko and Naftali, 259.

p. 564: JFK's temporizing: Zelikow and May, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. III, 232-69. vol. III, 232-69.

p. 564: ”a sense of euphoria”: Ibid., 253.

p. 564: U Thant, JFK, and Macmillan: Ibid., 261-62, 280. Also, FRUS: Missile Crisis, FRUS: Missile Crisis, 183, 191-97, 199, 203-4, 210-12. 183, 191-97, 199, 203-4, 210-12.

pp. 564-65: AES and Zorin: New York Times, New York Times, Oct. 26, 1962. Oct. 26, 1962.

p. 565: ”I never knew”: O'Donnell and Powers, 334.

p. 565: Lebanese s.h.i.+p boarding: Zelikow and May, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. III, 284. vol. III, 284.

p. 565: For quotes from the Oct. 26 meetings: Ibid., 287-88, 293, 295, 302, 309-10, 312, 328, 345.

pp. 565-66: NSK's letter: Llewellyn Thompson OH. FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, 172-77. 172-77.

p. 566: Scali-Fomin meeting: Fursenko and Naftali, 263-65. Fursenko and Naftali believe that Fomin took this initiative on his own. But it so closely reflected two of NSK's proposals as to make it doubtful that Fomin acted without instructions. Indeed, would any KGB operative have taken the initiative on so large a matter?