Part 10 (2/2)

Over a period of two decades, Gorshkov grew his fleet with a focus on the large air-to-surface (ASMs) and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) that I discussed in the fifth chapter. Supporting this construction effort was a program of tactical development, exemplified by Gorshkov's concept of ”the Battle of the First Salvo.” His plan was to win a naval war by crippling enemy CVBGs by means of an early series of missile strikes, some of them pre-emptive. By the late 1970's, the Soviet fleet of ASM-armed bombers, and SSM-armed surface s.h.i.+ps and submarines, was thought by some to be ready to take on the USN for global maritime dominance.

None of these Soviet developments went unnoticed, and systems like the F-14A Tomcat, AIM-54 Phoenix AAM, and E-2C Hawkeye were the first responses. Then, with the arrival on the scene of President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of the Navy John Lehman in 1981, the men of America's CVBGs finally got the new s.h.i.+ps and equipment that had been needed since the 1960's. After years of being undermanned, underpaid, and short on spares and ordnance, the U.S. Navy was ready to win its share of the Cold War's final victory. To meet the increasingly sophisticated Soviet threat, the Navy bought new Aegis SAM s.h.i.+ps, and improved aircraft and weapons. However, the basic structure of the CVBG remained unchanged in the 1980's, and would stay that way until the end of the Cold War and the coming of Desert Storm in the early 1990's. What did change was the strategy by which carrier operations were to be conducted. In Secretary Lehman's vision (called ”The Maritime Strategy”), in the event of war with the Soviets, ma.s.sed groups of three or more CVBGs would advance into the Norwegian Sea or North Pacific to strike military bases on the Soviet mainland. In the event, the collapse of the Soviet Empire put an end to ”The Maritime Strategy.”

The post-Cold War American military drawdown scaled John Lehman's vision of a ”600 s.h.i.+p Navy” back to just over half that number. In addition, the structure of battle groups and air wings was radically altered. Older cla.s.ses of s.h.i.+ps were rapidly retired, along with the entire fleet of A-6 attack bombers and KA-6 tanker aircraft. The Cold War-era CVW of approximately ninety aircraft shrank to just over seventy. Because the Soviet threat of ASMs launched from bombers and SSMs fired by submarines and surface s.h.i.+ps was no longer significant, the need for fleet air defense was greatly reduced and the CVW could become an almost purely offensive force. The ”outer air battle” was therefore handed off from the squadrons of F-14's, F/A-18's, and E-2's to the Aegis radars and SM-2 Standard SAMs of the battle group's cruisers and destroyers.

Today, the Tomcats and Hornets have been a.s.signed to carry a variety of air-to-ground ordnance, including precision guided munitions (PGMs) for delivery onto targets ash.o.r.e. In the current era of ”littoral warfare” (as defined in ”From the Sea” and ”Forward from the Sea”), this is to be the primary function of sea-based naval aviation units. Along with delivering air strikes, the battle groups of the 1990's have been given other powerful offensive capabilities. Now CVBGs have each been teamed with a three-or-four-s.h.i.+p amphibious ready group (ARG) embarking a battalion-sized ”Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operations Capable” (MEU (SOC)).64 This means that as the first century of naval aviation comes to a close, the CVBG/CVW team stands as an almost purely offensive targeting and striking force for supporting units and objectives ash.o.r.e in the littoral zones. This means that as the first century of naval aviation comes to a close, the CVBG/CVW team stands as an almost purely offensive targeting and striking force for supporting units and objectives ash.o.r.e in the littoral zones.

Force Structure: How Many Carriers?

Though the power, flexibility, and mobility of CVBGs make them a critical a.s.set for national leaders, and this is unlikely to change in the 21st century, those same leaders must justify the costs of building, training, operating, and maintaining such forces. The costs of CVBGs are immense. The price tag for the U.S. version probably runs close to $20 billion to build and equip, and another $1 billion a year to operate and maintain-a lot of money! With those mind-numbing numbers in mind, let me put a question to you: How many carriers do we need? The answer is complex.

For starters, there are very few nations in the world with the means to even own flattops. The Royal Navy is committed to maintaining two carriers, as is France. Spain and Italy also plan to build additional flattops to give them each two CVBGs. Russia, Brazil, Thailand, and India will struggle to maintain the single carrier groups they currently possess-largely for reasons of national prestige. And then, standing alone, the United States is currently committed to keeping a dozen carriers in commission-as many flattops as the rest of the world combined. In the 1980's, John Lehman's ”600 s.h.i.+p Fleet” included fifteen fifteen CVBGs, a total driven by the strategy of simultaneous strikes around the Soviet Union's vast periphery. Launching strikes from the Norwegian Sea, the Mediterranean, and the North Pacific required between six and eight groups ready to get under way at any time. Today, with no monolithic threat on the horizon, the need for a dozen carriers in commission seems less obvious. So is twelve CVBGs overkill? No, not really. CVBGs, a total driven by the strategy of simultaneous strikes around the Soviet Union's vast periphery. Launching strikes from the Norwegian Sea, the Mediterranean, and the North Pacific required between six and eight groups ready to get under way at any time. Today, with no monolithic threat on the horizon, the need for a dozen carriers in commission seems less obvious. So is twelve CVBGs overkill? No, not really.

The number of carriers our nation requires is ultimately determined by its commitments in the post-Cold War world. In a world without superpower confrontation, our ”enemies” become ”rogue states,” like North Korea and Iraq, while international terrorists, criminal cartels, and chaotic regional, ethnic, or tribal conflicts now are the key threats to day-to-day peace. In today's world order, America's major overseas commitments and interests lie mainly outside outside the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, our victory in the Cold War has burdened the U.S. with responsibility for peacekeeping and stability in areas that, frankly, most Americans would prefer to ignore. Consider the following list of global flashpoints: the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, our victory in the Cold War has burdened the U.S. with responsibility for peacekeeping and stability in areas that, frankly, most Americans would prefer to ignore. Consider the following list of global flashpoints: * North Korea-On Korea-On the verge of starvation and collapse, North Korea continues to threaten the South Koreans and other nations in the region. It has recently deployed the Tapo-Dong ballistic missile, and may have one or two nuclear warheads. the verge of starvation and collapse, North Korea continues to threaten the South Koreans and other nations in the region. It has recently deployed the Tapo-Dong ballistic missile, and may have one or two nuclear warheads.* People's Republic of China (PRC)/Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan)- People's Republic of China (PRC)/Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan)- Following their confrontation over democratic elections and ballistic-missile tests/exercises in 1996 (in which two American CVBGs intervened), these two estranged countries continue to face off in a slow simmer. Following their confrontation over democratic elections and ballistic-missile tests/exercises in 1996 (in which two American CVBGs intervened), these two estranged countries continue to face off in a slow simmer.* India/Pakistan India/Pakistan-As both countries celebrate their golden anniversaries, they confront each other over disputed borders and ethnic and religious differences. An accelerating nuclear arms race raises threats of regional nuclear war, and the proximity of China only exacerbates the problem.* Persian Gulf-UN-sponsored Persian Gulf-UN-sponsored sanctions and ”no-fly” operations against Iraq continue, while Iran increases the size and capability of its military forces, causing concern among other countries in the region. Iran and Iraq once again are disputing border areas in the northern end of the Persian Gulf, and firing into each other's territory. sanctions and ”no-fly” operations against Iraq continue, while Iran increases the size and capability of its military forces, causing concern among other countries in the region. Iran and Iraq once again are disputing border areas in the northern end of the Persian Gulf, and firing into each other's territory.* Balkans-The Balkans-The crisis in the Balkans has continued, despite attempts to implement the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. Bosnia continues to be a hot spot, requiring continuous monitoring by NATO forces, while old ethnic hostilities are erupting in Kosovo and other areas. crisis in the Balkans has continued, despite attempts to implement the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. Bosnia continues to be a hot spot, requiring continuous monitoring by NATO forces, while old ethnic hostilities are erupting in Kosovo and other areas.* Algeria Algeria-A chronic Islamic insurrection faces a repressive military regime, as fanatic groups commit brutal ma.s.sacres in villages near the country's large cities, killing hundreds of innocent civilians.* Central Africa Central Africa-Hutu and Tutsi factions wage genocidal war, spilling across national borders and defying international relief efforts.* West Africa-Dest.i.tute West Africa-Dest.i.tute nations continue to be wracked by coups and civil wars that have been endemic since the end of colonial rule in the 1960's, requiring frequent evacuations of foreign civilians. nations continue to be wracked by coups and civil wars that have been endemic since the end of colonial rule in the 1960's, requiring frequent evacuations of foreign civilians.

Current U.S. national military strategy calls for a force structure sufficient to deal with two ”major regional contingencies” (small wars or big crises) plus one ”complex humanitarian emergency” (natural disaster, epidemic, famine, refugee migration, etc.). You might think that a dozen CVBGs would be enough to handle all that. Unfortunately, the unforgiving demands of complex machinery and the natural limits of human endurance set boundaries that make a dozen carrier groups just barely sufficient to maintain two or three carriers on distant deployment at any one time. Let me explain.

When you build a wars.h.i.+p like an aircraft carrier, it is not available for deployment overseas all the time. Wars.h.i.+ps require regular maintenance and upgrades. Thus, in the forty-five-year planned life of an aircraft carrier, it will spend as much as a fifth of its time in docks and yards being repaired and maintained. For example, for every year the s.h.i.+p is in service, two or three months are spent on minor upgrades and maintenance to keep the s.h.i.+p going between ”deep” overhauls (when the wars.h.i.+p is brought into dry dock for major work). These major overhauls are done every five years or so, take from eight to twelve months to complete, and include everything from repainting the hull to upgrading the living quarters and combat systems. Additionally, nuclear-powered carriers are periodically out of service for a three-year refueling, an intricate surgery (with meticulous attention to radiation safety) that requires cutting great holes through decks and bulkheads and then welding everything back together. All this means that a wars.h.i.+p is only available to sail about three years out of every five.

The crew, also, requires its own ”overhaul,” for the mult.i.tude of combat skills embodied in the battle group's ten thousand sailors, marines, and aviators are ”perishable.” If skills are not taught, practiced, and tested regularly, the combat potential of a s.h.i.+p or air group rapidly deteriorates, even when deployed into a forward area. So a battle group must be a.s.sembled and ”worked up” for almost six months before each six-month deployment.

Finally, and no less important, today's sailors and marines demand and deserve a personal life. People are not robots; they need rest, family relations.h.i.+ps, and opportunities to advance personally and professionally. Wars.h.i.+p crews need some portion of their service careers at or near their home ports. This human factor is the first casualty when politicians deny pay increases and hards.h.i.+p bonuses, or extend emergency deployments to extreme lengths. Because relatively few of today's national leaders have the personal experience of long military deployments, the sea services have especially suffered. To remedy this problem, Admiral Johnson has inst.i.tuted a six-month ”portal to portal” deployment policy. That is, the Navy has promised that sailors will spend 50% of their time in home port.

Navy planners struggle constantly to build schedules that maximize the number of carrier groups available for deployment, while providing the best quality of life for embarked sailors and marines. Given a carrier force level of a dozen units, it works out something like this: * Deep Overhaul/Nuclear Refueling Deep Overhaul/Nuclear Refueling-Two or three units at a time. Currently, there are three s.h.i.+pyards (Bremerton, Was.h.i.+ngton; Norfolk, Virginia; and Newport News s.h.i.+pbuilding) capable of doing this intensive job, which essentially ”zeros the mileage” on a s.h.i.+p.* Yearly/Periodic Maintenance Yearly/Periodic Maintenance-Two or three additional carriers are usually conducting yearly/periodic maintenance, which is mainly done dockside at the s.h.i.+p's home port.* Deployment/Workup Deployment/Workup Cycle-The remaining six or seven carriers are on an eighteen-month cycle, broken into the following phases: Cycle-The remaining six or seven carriers are on an eighteen-month cycle, broken into the following phases:-Leave/Unit Training Period-The first six months of the cycle are devoted to resting crews coming off deployment, with leave and training time. Some individual s.h.i.+p or unit training is also conducted then.-Workup Period-The second six months of the cycle are designed to refresh unit combat skills, conduct combine training, and validate the unit's ability to conduct joint operations prior to deployment.* Deployment Deployment-Designed to be six months long, this is the period where the combined battle group is packaged and forward-deployed for actual operations.

a.s.suming that this cycle is not interrupted by a major regional contingency, two or three CVBGs can be forward-deployed at any given time. There is always one from the East Coast, which can be a.s.signed to the 2nd (Atlantic), 5th (Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean), or 6th (Mediterranean) Fleets. The West Coast usually has one or two groups available, which work with the 3rd (Eastern Pacific), 5th (Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean), or 7th (Western Pacific) Fleets.65 Yes, it takes a great deal of effort and investment to keep just two or three carrier groups forward-deployed at one time. Yet the lack of forward U.S. bases in areas critical to American national interests makes these mobile air bases critical to the national leaders.h.i.+p. If America wants to have a voice in a crisis somewhere on the other side of the world, then we need either a friendly allied host nation66 or a carrier battle group offsh.o.r.e. And CVBGs have one major advantage: They do not need anyone's permission to sail anywhere in recognized international waters. or a carrier battle group offsh.o.r.e. And CVBGs have one major advantage: They do not need anyone's permission to sail anywhere in recognized international waters.

The current scheme of carrier group rotations a.s.sumes a generous (by past standards) allotment of home-port time for s.h.i.+ps and sailors, given the operations tempos (OpTempos) of today. In an emergency, though, the groups working up can be rapidly ”surged” forward to reinforce groups already in the crisis zone. This is exactly what happened in 1990 and 1991 during Desert s.h.i.+eld and Desert Storm. By the time war broke out in early 1991, six CVBGs were in place for strikes against Iraq. Two other American CVBGs had operated in support of Operation Desert s.h.i.+eld and rotated home, while a British carrier group covered the Eastern Mediterranean to fill NATO commitments. In other words, even if forward-deployed carriers are tasked in a crisis, there is enough ”flex” in the rotational schedule to allow units at home in the U.S. to ”backfill” other American commitments.

USS George Was.h.i.+ngton George Was.h.i.+ngton (CVN-73) (CVN-73) Let's take a look at one of these groups ”up close and personal.” Specifically, the CVBG based around the USS George Was.h.i.+ngton George Was.h.i.+ngton (CVN-73), one of the East Coast carrier groups a.s.signed to 2nd Fleet at Norfolk. (CVN-73), one of the East Coast carrier groups a.s.signed to 2nd Fleet at Norfolk. ”GW,” ”GW,” as her crew calls her, is an improved as her crew calls her, is an improved Nimitz-cla.s.s Nimitz-cla.s.s (CVN-68) nuclear aircraft carrier. One of the second group of three built during John Lehman's glory years of the 1980's, she was laid down at Newport News s.h.i.+pbuilding on August 26th, 1986; launched from the dry dock on July 21st, 1990; and commissioned on July 4th, 1992. Manned by over six thousand sailors and Marines, the GW has conducted three Mediterranean and Persian Gulf deployments since commissioning, a very heavy OpTempo. During her maiden voyage she was ceremonial flags.h.i.+p for the 50th Anniversary Celebration of the D-Day Landings in Normandy, and has conducted ”no-fly” operations like Southern Watch (Iraq) and Deny Flight (Bosnia). (CVN-68) nuclear aircraft carrier. One of the second group of three built during John Lehman's glory years of the 1980's, she was laid down at Newport News s.h.i.+pbuilding on August 26th, 1986; launched from the dry dock on July 21st, 1990; and commissioned on July 4th, 1992. Manned by over six thousand sailors and Marines, the GW has conducted three Mediterranean and Persian Gulf deployments since commissioning, a very heavy OpTempo. During her maiden voyage she was ceremonial flags.h.i.+p for the 50th Anniversary Celebration of the D-Day Landings in Normandy, and has conducted ”no-fly” operations like Southern Watch (Iraq) and Deny Flight (Bosnia).

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USS George Was.h.i.+ngton George Was.h.i.+ngton (CVN-73). (CVN-73).

OFFICIAL U.S. NAVY PHOTO.

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The official emblem of the aircraft carrier USS George Was.h.i.+ngton George Was.h.i.+ngton (CVN-73). (CVN-73).

JACK RYAN ENTERPRISES, LTD., BY LAURA DENINNO.

As a ”working cla.s.s” carrier, GW lacks some of the glamor and polish that fleet ”s...o...b..ats” enjoy (the carrier John F. Kennedy, Kennedy, CV-67, once had this reputation). This is a wars.h.i.+p, not some floating palace to impress visiting dignitaries. You'll notice on GW's bridge, for example, the row of ”E” (Efficiency) awards painted there. These are fleet awards, which are given within each cla.s.s of s.h.i.+ps (aircraft carriers, guided-missile cruisers, etc.) to display the s.h.i.+p's visible accomplishments. Each award reflects a particular specialty, ranging from engineering and weapons to food service and tactical ability. In fact, just before leaving on her 1997 cruise, the GW crew got the word that they had been selected to wear the Battle ”E” (marking them as the top wars.h.i.+p for the entire Atlantic Fleet) for 1997, their third such award in just five years. From the bridge to the pump rooms, the men and women who serve aboard the GW know they are expected to be the best in the fleet. They make a pretty good case that they have achieved that goal. CV-67, once had this reputation). This is a wars.h.i.+p, not some floating palace to impress visiting dignitaries. You'll notice on GW's bridge, for example, the row of ”E” (Efficiency) awards painted there. These are fleet awards, which are given within each cla.s.s of s.h.i.+ps (aircraft carriers, guided-missile cruisers, etc.) to display the s.h.i.+p's visible accomplishments. Each award reflects a particular specialty, ranging from engineering and weapons to food service and tactical ability. In fact, just before leaving on her 1997 cruise, the GW crew got the word that they had been selected to wear the Battle ”E” (marking them as the top wars.h.i.+p for the entire Atlantic Fleet) for 1997, their third such award in just five years. From the bridge to the pump rooms, the men and women who serve aboard the GW know they are expected to be the best in the fleet. They make a pretty good case that they have achieved that goal.

What follows is a ”snapshot” of the GW GW team in the late summer and fall of 1997, and should help you appreciate the kind of people who make a carrier battle group work. But be aware that Navy crews, like all military units, are in a state of constant transition. The sailors and aviators that appear here will certainly have changed a.s.signments by the time you read this book. One other quick point. Because of the mixed Navy/Marine Corps personnel base aboard the battle group, it is easy to confuse the ranks of officers. To help straighten these out, refer to the following table for clarification: team in the late summer and fall of 1997, and should help you appreciate the kind of people who make a carrier battle group work. But be aware that Navy crews, like all military units, are in a state of constant transition. The sailors and aviators that appear here will certainly have changed a.s.signments by the time you read this book. One other quick point. Because of the mixed Navy/Marine Corps personnel base aboard the battle group, it is easy to confuse the ranks of officers. To help straighten these out, refer to the following table for clarification: MILITARY OFFICER RANK TABLE 67 67.

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Heading the GW command team when we were aboard was Captain Lindell G. ”Yank” Rutheford, USN. A graduate of the University of Missouri, ”Yank” has spent much of his career as an F-14 Tomcat pilot (he also flew A-4 Skyhawks and F-4 Phantom IIs). He commanded a squadron, VF-142 (the ”Ghostriders”), aboard USS Eisenhower Eisenhower (CVN-69) in 1988 and 1989. Following a staff tour abroad the (CVN-69) in 1988 and 1989. Following a staff tour abroad the Theodore Roosevelt Theodore Roosevelt (nicknamed ”TR,” CVN-71) during Desert s.h.i.+eld and Desert Storm, he decided to take the carrier command track (described in the third chapter). (nicknamed ”TR,” CVN-71) during Desert s.h.i.+eld and Desert Storm, he decided to take the carrier command track (described in the third chapter).

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Captain Lindell ”Yank” Rutheford, the Commanding Office (CO) of the carrier USS George Was.h.i.+ngton George Was.h.i.+ngton (CVN-73). (CVN-73).

JOHN D. GRESHAM.

Two years later, following nuclear power training and command school, he became the Executive Officer (XO) of TR TR for two deployments to the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. Captain Rutheford then spent eighteen months as Commanding Officer (CO) of the replenishment s.h.i.+p USS for two deployments to the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. Captain Rutheford then spent eighteen months as Commanding Officer (CO) of the replenishment s.h.i.+p USS Seattle Seattle (AOE-3), which qualified him for deep-draft command. While driving (AOE-3), which qualified him for deep-draft command. While driving Seattle, Seattle, he acquired a reputation around the fleet for superb s.h.i.+p-handling and organizational skills-very useful talents during the next step in his career. Following his relief as CO of the he acquired a reputation around the fleet for superb s.h.i.+p-handling and organizational skills-very useful talents during the next step in his career. Following his relief as CO of the Seattle Seattle in November of 1996, he joined the in November of 1996, he joined the GW GW as commanding officer. Along with his partner, the commander of the embarked Carrier Air Wing One (CVW-1), Captain John Stufflebeem (whom we will meet later), he provides the commander of the as commanding officer. Along with his partner, the commander of the embarked Carrier Air Wing One (CVW-1), Captain John Stufflebeem (whom we will meet later), he provides the commander of the GW GW battle group with a powerful core of striking capability. battle group with a powerful core of striking capability.

The Navy supports its carrier captains with handpicked subordinates who run the day-to-day activities of the boat and her three-thousand-plus-person crew (the air wing brings along more than 2,500 more). Of these, the most critical job on board is the Executive Officer, or XO. While we were aboard the GW, we were fortunate to observe a handover between two XOs, when Captain Michael R. Groothousen (the GW GW's XO since May 1996) left to take command of Seattle, Seattle, and the new XO, Commander Chuck Smith, arrived to take his place. Captain Groothousen, a longtime F/A-18 Hornet aviator, was on his way to a deep-draft command in preparation for commanding a carrier of his own, while Commander Smith is something else entirely, having served in S-3 Viking ASW/Sea Control squadrons. and the new XO, Commander Chuck Smith, arrived to take his place. Captain Groothousen, a longtime F/A-18 Hornet aviator, was on his way to a deep-draft command in preparation for commanding a carrier of his own, while Commander Smith is something else entirely, having served in S-3 Viking ASW/Sea Control squadrons.

A tall, lean professional (he resembles a young Peter O'Toole), Chuck Smith is the kind of aviator you'd want at the controls if your plane had to make a night landing in a storm with one engine out. Carrier captains usually come from fighter and attack aviation backgrounds. The ”right stuff” mystique and old-boy network of TopGun fighter jockeys make it tough for aviators from electronic warfare, ASW, AEW, and sea control specialties to claw their way to the top of the promotion ladder. However, the increasing importance and versatility of the S-3 in carrier operations, has enabled a few former Viking drivers to get choice commands: big-deck amphibious s.h.i.+ps (like the Tarawa Tarawa (LHA-1) and (LHA-1) and Wasp-cla.s.s Wasp-cla.s.s (LHD-1) helicopter carriers), and even some supercarriers. Chuck Smith will make a terrific carrier CO when he ”fleets up” in a few years. Commander Smith took over the XO job in late August 1997, while GW was steaming into the battle group's final training exercise prior to deploying to the Mediterranean. The change happened quickly and seamlessly. The only sign of it aboard the s.h.i.+p was the few minutes it took for every officer who could fit into flight-deck control to see Captain Groothousen off the s.h.i.+p, en route to his next a.s.signment. (LHD-1) helicopter carriers), and even some supercarriers. Chuck Smith will make a terrific carrier CO when he ”fleets up” in a few years. Commander Smith took over the XO job in late August 1997, while GW was steaming into the battle group's final training exercise prior to deploying to the Mediterranean. The change happened quickly and seamlessly. The only sign of it aboard the s.h.i.+p was the few minutes it took for every officer who could fit into flight-deck control to see Captain Groothousen off the s.h.i.+p, en route to his next a.s.signment.

Master Chief Petty Officer Kevin Lavin, the Command Master Chief of the USS George Was.h.i.+ngton George Was.h.i.+ngton (CVN-73). Here he is just minutes away from boarding the GW for the 1997/98 cruise to the Persian Gulf. (CVN-73). Here he is just minutes away from boarding the GW for the 1997/98 cruise to the Persian Gulf.

JOHN D. GRESHAM.

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Commander Chuck Smith, the Executive Officer (XO) of the carrier USS George Was.h.i.+ngton George Was.h.i.+ngton (CVN- 73). (CVN- 73).

JOHN D. GRESHAM.

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Of the three thousand crewmembers aboard the GW, GW, something like 95% are enlisted sailors. Their representative, advocate, and amba.s.sador to the Captain is GW's Command Master Chief (CMC) Petty Officer, the senior NCO on board. This is a job of great responsibility. If the food or laundry service in the enlisted s.p.a.ces is unsatisfactory, it is the CMC who makes sure the Captain knows about it. If a sailor's family member ash.o.r.e needs a.s.sistance, he is the one to coordinate solutions through the Red Cross or other appropriate authority. On something like 95% are enlisted sailors. Their representative, advocate, and amba.s.sador to the Captain is GW's Command Master Chief (CMC) Petty Officer, the senior NCO on board. This is a job of great responsibility. If the food or laundry service in the enlisted s.p.a.ces is unsatisfactory, it is the CMC who makes sure the Captain knows about it. If a sailor's family member ash.o.r.e needs a.s.sistance, he is the one to coordinate solutions through the Red Cross or other appropriate authority. On GW, GW, the job is ably filled by CMC Kevin Lavin. When you meet him he seems more like the vice-president of a start-up computer company than the traditional gruff, tattooed Navy chief (his background is in electronics maintenance). Chief Lavin is Commander Smith's senior enlisted advisor, and when he speaks both the CO and XO listen closely! the job is ably filled by CMC Kevin Lavin. When you meet him he seems more like the vice-president of a start-up computer company than the traditional gruff, tattooed Navy chief (his background is in electronics maintenance). Chief Lavin is Commander Smith's senior enlisted advisor, and when he speaks both the CO and XO listen closely!

Captain Rutherford and Commander Smith manage an organization that seems more like a small city or corporation than a s.h.i.+p. Its various departments are key to keeping the GW running smoothly for the six months or more that she may spend deployed, or ”on cruise” as her crew calls it. Each department performs specific tasks, which make possible the operation of her men, aircraft, and weapons. The alphabetical breakdown of these departments and their heads in the fall of 1997 is shown below: * Administration (ADMIN)- Administration (ADMIN)-Headed by Lieutenant Jerry Morrison, this is the primary record-keeping group for the s.h.i.+p, and includes personnel, maintenance, supply, financial, and other files.* Aircraft Maintenance Division Aircraft Maintenance Division (AIMD)-With almost six hundred personnel a.s.signed, AIMD provides the (AIMD)-With almost six hundred personnel a.s.signed, AIMD provides the GW' GW's embarked air wing with spare parts, maintenance facilities, and specialized support personnel. Commander Gordon Coward heads this division.* Air Department Air Department (AIR)-One of the busiest groups aboard the (AIR)-One of the busiest groups aboard the GW, GW, the Air Department controls the operations of the the Air Department controls the operations of the GW's GW's hangar and flight decks, as well as the airs.p.a.ce directly around the s.h.i.+p. The Air Department is led by an officer nicknamed the ”Air Boss,” and his deputy, the ”Mini Boss.” While we were aboard hangar and flight decks, as well as the airs.p.a.ce directly around the s.h.i.+p. The Air Department is led by an officer nicknamed the ”Air Boss,” and his deputy, the ”Mini Boss.” While we were aboard GW, GW, the Air Boss was Commander John Kindred, while the ”Mini” was Commander Carl June. Both are experienced pilots who have the skills and knowledge to control every type of carrier-capable aircraft under all weather and sea conditions. In late 1997, Commander Kindred was planning to move on to his next a.s.signment, while Commander June would stay aboard and ”fleet up” as the new the Air Boss was Commander John Kindred, while the ”Mini” was Commander Carl June. Both are experienced pilots who have the skills and knowledge to control every type of carrier-capable aircraft under all weather and sea conditions. In late 1997, Commander Kindred was planning to move on to his next a.s.signment, while Commander June would stay aboard and ”fleet up” as the new GW GW Air Boss. Then it will be his job to train a new ”Mini” before he moves on in a year or so. Air Boss. Then it will be his job to train a new ”Mini” before he moves on in a year or so.* Crew Recreation and Morale Department Crew Recreation and Morale Department (CRMD)-This department deals with the crew's spiritual and moral welfare, and is headed by (CRMD)-This department deals with the crew's spiritual and moral welfare, and is headed by GW GW's Command Chaplain, Captain Jim Nichols.* Deck Division Deck Division (DECK)-Even in a ”high-tech” age of networked computers and PGMs, there is still a need on every Naval vessel for sailors who can handle lines, small boats, anchors, and all the paraphernalia of traditional seamans.h.i.+p. The (DECK)-Even in a ”high-tech” age of networked computers and PGMs, there is still a need on every Naval vessel for sailors who can handle lines, small boats, anchors, and all the paraphernalia of traditional seamans.h.i.+p. The GW GW's ”Deck Division” handles everything from launching the s.h.i.+p's boats to manning the replenishment stations during underway refueling and replenishment (UNREP). Lieutenant Commander Johnnie Draughton, who will retire in late 1997, and will be replaced by Lieutenant Greg Worley, leads the sailors of the Deck Division.* Dental Department (DENTAL)-A Dental Department (DENTAL)-A community of over six thousand people is bound to have some cavities, broken t

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