Part 10 (1/2)

As you would expect, the internal structure of the Navy variant will be strengthened in order to handle the loads a.s.sociated with catapult launches and arrested landings. There will be a carrier-suitable tailhook, though this may not have to be as strong as on previous naval aircraft, because the JSF will be powered by the same Pratt & Whitney F119-PW-100 turbofan planned for use on the USAF F-22A Raptor. This engine has a ”2-Dimensional” nozzle (it will rotate in the vertical plane), which will allow it to have much lower landing approach speeds than current carrier aircraft, and may allow the next generation of carriers (CVX) to do away with catapults altogether.

The Navy's need for survivability means that the JSF design will have a level of stealth technology comparable with the F-22 or B-2 stealth designs, which are the current gold standard in that area. All ordnance will be internally carried, and plans are for it to carry two 2,000-lb/909.1-kg-cla.s.s weapons in addition to an internal gun and AAMs Boeing and Lockheed Martin are scheduled to conduct a fly-off of their competing JSF designs in the year 2000, with a contract award the following year. The Boeing model is known as the X-32, while the Lockheed Martin design has been designated X-35. The winning entry should become operational sometime around 2010, at which time it will begin to replace the remaining F/A-18C/D aircraft in service. This is a make-or-break program for all the armed services of the United States. If it works, then the U.S. and our allies will have the pre-eminent strike fighter of the 21st century at their command.

The Future: Common Support Aircraft While fighters and strike aircraft are important, the various support aircraft like the S-3 Viking and E-2 Hawkeye play equally vital roles in a CVW. And like fighters, they will someday have to be replaced. While this is not going to happen soon, planning for what will be known as the Common Support Aircraft (CSA) is already underway. This aircraft will take over the AEW, COD, ESM/SIGINT, and perhaps even tanker roles currently handled by no less than three different airframes. As always, funding is a problem. Right now, there is very little money available for the development of a new medium-lift airframe that could be made carrier-capable. In current-year dollars, it would probably cost something like $3 billion just to design and develop the airframe. And the price of the various mission equipment packages for each role is anybody's guess.

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An artist's concept of an AGM-84 SLAM-ER cruise missile. The SLAM-ER is headed into production, and will be the long-range strike weapon for naval aviation into the 21st century.

BOEING MISSILE SYSTEMS.

One likely way around this dilemma might involve adapting for the Navy the new V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor transport currently entering production for the USMC and USAF. A V-22-based CSA could eliminate much of the airframe development costs and allow the design of state-of-the-art mission-equipment packages. It might even replace the SH-60Rs and CH-60's when they begin to wear out.

The Future: Bombs and Missiles With the introduction of GPS-guided air-to-ground ordnance and improved versions of a number of older PGM systems, the era of Navy aircraft dropping and firing unguided ordnance is dead.62 In Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, for example, something like 70% of the weapons expended in that short but effective air campaign were PGMs. This percentage is likely to rise in future conflicts. What follows is a quick look at the programs that are important to naval aviators. In Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, for example, something like 70% of the weapons expended in that short but effective air campaign were PGMs. This percentage is likely to rise in future conflicts. What follows is a quick look at the programs that are important to naval aviators.

AGM-84E SLAM Expanded Response Missile As mentioned earlier, the engineers at Boeing Missile Systems have been working on an improved version of the AGM-84E SLAM missile, which they call SLAM Expanded Response (SLAM-ER). SLAM-ER is designed to add a new generation of technology to the solid foundation laid by Harpoon and SLAM. This new missile will give the Navy a standoff strike weapon with unprecedented lethal power and accuracy. Improvements to the basic SLAM include a pair of ”pop-out” wings (similar to those on the TLAM), which will give it more range (out to 150 nm/278 km) and better maneuverability. A new warhead utilizes the same kind of reactive t.i.tanium casing used on the Block III TLAM, while its nose has been modified with a new seeker window to give the seeker a better field-of-view. The guidance system of SLAM-ER incorporates a new software technology developed by Boeing and the labs at Naval Weapons Center at China Lake, California. Known as Automatic Target Acquisition (ATA, also known as Direct Attack Munition Affordable Seeker-DAMASK), it allows the SLAM-ER seeker to automatically pick out a target from the background clutter. The seeker then ”locks” it up and flies the missile to a precise hit (within three meters/ten feet of the planned aimpoint). The SLAM-ER is already in low-rate production and has pa.s.sed all of its tests with flying colors. In fact, this program has become so successful that the Navy has deleted its funding for the planned Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (Ja.s.sAM), since SLAM-ER completely meets the requirements for that. Current plans have SLAM-ER entering the fleet in 1999.

A testing version of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guided bomb. JDAM utilizes GPS technology to guide it within just a few yards/meters of the aimpoint.

BOEING MISSILE SYSTEMS.

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GBU-29/30/31/32 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) Guided Bomb Family One key limitation of the current generation of LGBs and Imaging Infrared (IIR)-guided PGMs is that they do not perform well in poor weather. Water vapor and cloud cover are the enemies of these weapons and targeting systems, and have proven to be significant roadblocks to their employment. What airpower planners need is a family of true, all-weather PGMs. Creating this is the goal of the joint USAF/USN/USMC Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) program, which will go into service in 1999.

Now being developed by Boeing Missile Systems (formerly McDonnell Douglas Missile Systems), JDAM is designed to be a ”strap-on” guidance kit, compatible with a variety of different bomb warheads. JDAM will be equipped with a GPS guidance system and control fins, which can fit around a conventional Mk. 83 (1,000-lb/454 kg), Mk. 84 (2,000-lb/909-kg), or BLU-109 (2,000 lb/909 kg) bomb. Since the JDAM will take its guidance from the constellation of GPS satellites in orbit around the earth, all you'll need to designate a target will be the sixteen-digit numeric code that represents the target's geographic location on the earth's surface.

As currently planned, there will be four separate versions of the Phase I JDAM family. They include: [image]

An F/A-18C Hornet armed with four AGM-154A Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOWs) during a test flight. JSOW is one of a family of precision-strike weapons guided by the NAVISTAR GPS satellite navigation system.

RAYTHEON STRIKE SYSTEMS.

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The majority of the JDAM acquisition will be composed of kits for the GBU-31 and -32 versions. These are sized to fit around both Mk. 83/84 general-purpose bombs, as well as BLU-109/110 penetration warheads. So far, the program is proceeding well in tests, and has proved to be quite accurate. The specified thirteen-meter/forty-three foot-accuracy (six meters/ twenty feet when the new Block IIR GPS satellites are put into service) is regularly being beaten in drop tests, and JDAM should come into service on schedule. At a price of only about $15,000 over the price of the bomb, JDAM is going to be quite a bargain. It needs to be, since current plans have the American military alone buying over 87,000 JDAM kits over the next decade or so. One intriguing question about JDAM is whether or not it will be fitted with an ATA-type seeker to enable it to hit really precise targets. While an ATA seeker would only add another $15,000 to the cost of each kit, the accuracy would narrow to less than three meters/ten feet-as good as the Paveway III LGBs in service today. I would expect that you would see an ATA-based seeker deployed on JDAM by 2003.

AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) Well on its way into active service, the AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) is intended to be a munitions ”truck” able to carry a variety of weapons and payloads.63 Designed to glide to a target with guidance from an onboard GPS/INS system, it can deliver its payload with the same accuracy as a JDAM bomb. The initial AGM-154A version is armed with BLU-97 Combined Effect Munitions (CEMs), while the -B model will carry BLU- 108 Sensor Fused Weapons (SFWs) for attacking armor and vehicles. There are also plans for a -C model for the Navy, which will have a 500-lb/226.8-kg Mk. 82/BLU-111 unitary warhead as well as a man-in-the-loop data-link system similar to that on SLAM. An ATA-type seeker may also be fitted. This weapon is now officially operational with the fleet, with six -A models forward-deployed on the USS Designed to glide to a target with guidance from an onboard GPS/INS system, it can deliver its payload with the same accuracy as a JDAM bomb. The initial AGM-154A version is armed with BLU-97 Combined Effect Munitions (CEMs), while the -B model will carry BLU- 108 Sensor Fused Weapons (SFWs) for attacking armor and vehicles. There are also plans for a -C model for the Navy, which will have a 500-lb/226.8-kg Mk. 82/BLU-111 unitary warhead as well as a man-in-the-loop data-link system similar to that on SLAM. An ATA-type seeker may also be fitted. This weapon is now officially operational with the fleet, with six -A models forward-deployed on the USS Nimitz Nimitz (CVN-68) prior to the 1997 Iraq crisis, where they almost got their combat introduction. (CVN-68) prior to the 1997 Iraq crisis, where they almost got their combat introduction.

AIM-9X Sidewinder Air-to-Air Missile For almost a decade, the fighter pilots of the United States have been flying with a short-range AAM that has been thoroughly outcla.s.sed by competing products from Russia, Israel, and France. Despite its past successes, the third-generation AIM-9L/M Sidewinder AAM has been pa.s.sed by and is now thoroughly outcla.s.sed. Help is on the way however, in the form of a new fourth-generation Sidewinder, the AIM-9X. Built by Raytheon-Hughes Missile Systems, it will become operational in 1999. The changes in the AIM- 9X start at the seeker head, which will be a ”staring” IIR array, able to detect targets at ranges beyond those of the human eye. A new guidance and control section at the rear of the missile will make it the most maneuverable AAM in the world. Reduced drag will also extend its range and ”no-escape” zone for enemy target aircraft. Finally, the entire AIM-9X system will be controlled by a new helmet-mounted sighting system, which will first see service in the Super Hornet (but it will also be fitted on the Tomcat and earlier-model Hornets). This new missile will be so maneuverable that an AIM-9X can be fired at enemy aircraft that are alongside alongside the launching aircraft! the launching aircraft!

The Real Real Future: Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles Future: Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles Even as the JSF designs are being finalized and the eventual winner selected, it is important to remember that Lockheed Martin and Boeing can't engineer out the nature of the humans that will fly it. Right now, combat aircraft require their air crews to endure dynamic forces that are nothing less than physical torture. At times these stresses can turn deadly. The rapid onset of G-forces in sharp turns literally drains the blood from pilots' heads, causing a sudden ”G-Induced Loss-of-Consciousness,” or G-LOC. This means that there is a limit to the performance engineers can put into new aircraft-the physical limitations of the human pilots.

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A flight of Lockheed Martin Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) concept aircraft. Such remote-controlled aircraft will likely serve in the mid-21st century.

LOCKHEED MARTIN.

With this in mind, it is likely that the generation of combat aircraft after after JSF will be unmanned. Today, in roles like photo-reconnaissance and wide-area surveillance, a great deal is already being done with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Back in the 1970's there were even trials with armed drones, though the threat to pilot billets put short work to that idea. Even so, they make a lot of sense-if not today, then tomorrow. What will be known as Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles, or UCAVs for short, will probably start out as modified existing designs (such as leftover F-16's or F/A-18's) whose c.o.c.kpits will be filled with sensors and data links back to the operators on the ground. In fact, a modified F/A-18C would make an excellent first-generation UCAV, since it already can conduct automatic carrier landings. JSF will be unmanned. Today, in roles like photo-reconnaissance and wide-area surveillance, a great deal is already being done with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Back in the 1970's there were even trials with armed drones, though the threat to pilot billets put short work to that idea. Even so, they make a lot of sense-if not today, then tomorrow. What will be known as Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles, or UCAVs for short, will probably start out as modified existing designs (such as leftover F-16's or F/A-18's) whose c.o.c.kpits will be filled with sensors and data links back to the operators on the ground. In fact, a modified F/A-18C would make an excellent first-generation UCAV, since it already can conduct automatic carrier landings.

The aircraft would fly and operate conventionally, with the exception that when high-G maneuvers are needed, the 9-G limit in the flight-control software could be disabled and the UCAV flown to the actual structural limits of the design. Since we already have in service AAMs that make thirty-G turns, we could easily produce combat aircraft with performances that would make manned aircraft obsolete overnight. UCAVs would doubtless also be much cheaper than current designs, since so much of the money in a manned aircraft design goes into making it safe for the pilot and crew to operate. Keep an eye on this emerging technology. It will be exciting!

Carrier Battle Group: Putting It All Together Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs) are the single most useful military force available in time of crisis or conflict. No other military unit, be it an airborne brigade or a wing of strategic bombers, gives the leaders.h.i.+p of a nation the options and power that such a force commands. This is because the real real value of CVBGs goes far beyond the simple existence of the unit and its availability for combat; CVBGs also provide value of CVBGs goes far beyond the simple existence of the unit and its availability for combat; CVBGs also provide presence. presence. America's forward-deployed battle groups in the Middle East and the Western Pacific are the most visible symbol of the nation's global commitments. Because of these battle groups, our nation has a say in the affairs of nations and people who threaten America's forward-deployed battle groups in the Middle East and the Western Pacific are the most visible symbol of the nation's global commitments. Because of these battle groups, our nation has a say in the affairs of nations and people who threaten our our vital national interests. The commander of such a battle group bears an awesome responsibility. vital national interests. The commander of such a battle group bears an awesome responsibility.

Rear Admiral Jay Yakley was one of those commanders. He's gone from flying fighters in Vietnam to commanding his own aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG), based around the USS Abraham Lincoln Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72). Back in the early days of August 1990, he was the one of the point men facing down the forces of Saddam Hussein following the invasion of Kuwait. As commander of Carrier Air Wing Fourteen (CVW-14) aboard the USS Indepen (CVN-72). Back in the early days of August 1990, he was the one of the point men facing down the forces of Saddam Hussein following the invasion of Kuwait. As commander of Carrier Air Wing Fourteen (CVW-14) aboard the USS Independence (CV-61), he was in charge of the first organized combat air unit to reach the region following the invasion. In this capacity, together with roughly ten thousand other Americans of the (CV-61), he was in charge of the first organized combat air unit to reach the region following the invasion. In this capacity, together with roughly ten thousand other Americans of the Independence Independence CVBG, he had the job of holding the line until other reinforcements could arrive. CVBG, he had the job of holding the line until other reinforcements could arrive.

He did not have long to wait. Within days, Allied units began to pour in and form the core of the coalition that eventually liberated Kuwait and defeated Saddam's forces. But for those first few days, Jay Yakley and his roughly ninety airplanes were the only credible aerial force that might have struck at Saddam's armored columns, had they chosen to continue their advance into the oil fields and ports of northern Saudi Arabia. Only Hussein himself knows whether or not the Independence Independence group was the deterrent that kept Saddam from invading Saudi Arabia. group was the deterrent that kept Saddam from invading Saudi Arabia.

However, the ability to quickly move the Independence Independence and her battle group from their forward-deployed position near Diego Garcia made it possible to demonstrate American resolve to the Iraqi dictator. and her battle group from their forward-deployed position near Diego Garcia made it possible to demonstrate American resolve to the Iraqi dictator. That That is the real point of aircraft carriers: is the real point of aircraft carriers: to be seen. to be seen. Once seen, they can cause an aggressor to show common sense and back off. But if the aggressor fails to show common sense, then the CVBG can act to make them back off with force. Once seen, they can cause an aggressor to show common sense and back off. But if the aggressor fails to show common sense, then the CVBG can act to make them back off with force.

It is not just the obvious power of the carriers-or more particularly, of the aircraft that fly off them-that is the source of the options a CVBG provides national leaders.h.i.+p. In fact, to look at a CVBG without seeing beyond the carrier is to look at an iceberg without seeing what lies submerged. The real real power of a CVBG is far more than what the flattop with its air wing can bring to bear. Each CVBG is a carefully balanced mix of s.h.i.+ps, aircraft, personnel, and weapons, designed to provide the national command authorities with an optimum mix of firepower and capabilities. That the group can be forward-deployed means that it has a presence wherever it goes, and that American leaders have options when events take a sudden or unpleasant turn on the other side of the planet. The downside is cost. CVBGs are among the most expensive military units to build, operate, train, and maintain; a country can only buy so many. Nevertheless, in the years since the end of the Cold War, CVBGs have demonstrated how very useful they can be on a number of occasions. Operations like Southern Watch (Iraqi no-fly patrols, 1991 to present), Uphold Democracy (Haiti, 1994), and Deliberate Force (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995) are only a few of these. power of a CVBG is far more than what the flattop with its air wing can bring to bear. Each CVBG is a carefully balanced mix of s.h.i.+ps, aircraft, personnel, and weapons, designed to provide the national command authorities with an optimum mix of firepower and capabilities. That the group can be forward-deployed means that it has a presence wherever it goes, and that American leaders have options when events take a sudden or unpleasant turn on the other side of the planet. The downside is cost. CVBGs are among the most expensive military units to build, operate, train, and maintain; a country can only buy so many. Nevertheless, in the years since the end of the Cold War, CVBGs have demonstrated how very useful they can be on a number of occasions. Operations like Southern Watch (Iraqi no-fly patrols, 1991 to present), Uphold Democracy (Haiti, 1994), and Deliberate Force (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995) are only a few of these.

Carrier Battle Group Development Common sense dictates protecting the most valuable wars.h.i.+ps in your a.r.s.enal when they head into potentially hostile waters. And that-simply-is the reason why aircraft carriers are placed in battle groups. Aircraft carriers are useless unless they are carrying carrying aircraft. But it takes more than just airplanes to insure the carrier's survival. More important, using the CVW's a.s.sets for carrier defense defeats the real strength of sea-based aviation. Unless carrier-based aircraft are flying attack missions or defending other fleet vessels (and aircraft are not in fact able to stay airborne long enough to fully accomplish that job), they are being wasted. In other words, sentinels with more staying power than aircraft must protect the carrier against threats-particularly submarines-that can leave it so much burned and twisted sc.r.a.p metal on the ocean floor. Any s.h.i.+p, no matter how well built, even a huge ninety-thousand-plus-ton aircraft. But it takes more than just airplanes to insure the carrier's survival. More important, using the CVW's a.s.sets for carrier defense defeats the real strength of sea-based aviation. Unless carrier-based aircraft are flying attack missions or defending other fleet vessels (and aircraft are not in fact able to stay airborne long enough to fully accomplish that job), they are being wasted. In other words, sentinels with more staying power than aircraft must protect the carrier against threats-particularly submarines-that can leave it so much burned and twisted sc.r.a.p metal on the ocean floor. Any s.h.i.+p, no matter how well built, even a huge ninety-thousand-plus-ton Nimitz-cla.s.s Nimitz-cla.s.s (CVN-68) carrier, can be sunk by (CVN-68) carrier, can be sunk by conventional conventional weapons. Without some sort of escort, a carrier is just a very large opportunity for some enemy officer. weapons. Without some sort of escort, a carrier is just a very large opportunity for some enemy officer.

The original configuration that gave birth to CVBG development dates from the early experiments with carriers in the late 1920's. Because of their high speeds and medium-caliber gun armament, the large carriers that emerged from the 1922 Was.h.i.+ngton Naval Treaty tended to be a.s.signed to the scouting or cruiser forces of navies. They initially were used as ”eyes” for the lines of battles.h.i.+ps that were then the real measure of seapower. But before long, carrier admirals found ways to operate independently, showing that they could survive without the backing of a line of battles.h.i.+ps. By the outbreak of the Second World War, they were the battle forces.

In 1939, no nation had more than a half-dozen large-deck carriers, and most CVBGs had only a single flattop, with a handful of cruisers and destroyers as escorts. However, this practice began to change very rapidly with the outbreak of World War II. Early in the war, the British began to add fast battles.h.i.+ps and battle cruisers to carrier groups, providing protection against enemy surface units. Then the j.a.panese grouped their six big-deck carriers into a single unit called the Kido Butai Kido Butai (j.a.panese for ”Striking Force”). Its escort included a pair of fast battles.h.i.+ps, some cruisers, and over a dozen destroyers-enough to stand up against all but the largest surface fleet. With multiple flight decks and hundreds of fighters and strike aircraft, (j.a.panese for ”Striking Force”). Its escort included a pair of fast battles.h.i.+ps, some cruisers, and over a dozen destroyers-enough to stand up against all but the largest surface fleet. With multiple flight decks and hundreds of fighters and strike aircraft, Kido Butai Kido Butai could overwhelm any fleet or air force it encountered. Officially known as the ”First Air Fleet,” and commanded by Admiral Chichi Nagumo, it was could overwhelm any fleet or air force it encountered. Officially known as the ”First Air Fleet,” and commanded by Admiral Chichi Nagumo, it was Kido Kido Butai that struck Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941. For the next six months, Nagumo and Butai that struck Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941. For the next six months, Nagumo and Kido Butai Kido Butai ranged across half the globe, the most powerful force in Naval history. Only the ”miracle at Midway” stopped ranged across half the globe, the most powerful force in Naval history. Only the ”miracle at Midway” stopped Kido Kido Butai, and returned the initiative in CVBG evolution to the Americans. Butai, and returned the initiative in CVBG evolution to the Americans.

By early 1943, the power of American industry began to make itself felt as a stream of new Ess.e.x Ess.e.x (CV-9) and (CV-9) and Independence-cla.s.s Independence-cla.s.s (CVL-22) fast fleet carriers steamed across the Pacific. Before heading for action, they would stop at Pearl Harbor to conduct training and be integrated with fast, new battles.h.i.+ps, cruisers, destroyers, and other support s.h.i.+ps, and then formed into Task Groups. (Two or more Task Groups formed a Task Force.) Experience gained during raids on j.a.panese island outposts in 1943 showed that the optimum size for such groups was three or four carriers, a pair of fast battles.h.i.+ps, four cruisers, and twelve to sixteen destroyers. More carriers than that tended to make the groups unwieldy. Task Groups were commanded by a senior naval aviator, who a.s.signed strike missions, refueling a.s.signments, independent raids, and other jobs. (CVL-22) fast fleet carriers steamed across the Pacific. Before heading for action, they would stop at Pearl Harbor to conduct training and be integrated with fast, new battles.h.i.+ps, cruisers, destroyers, and other support s.h.i.+ps, and then formed into Task Groups. (Two or more Task Groups formed a Task Force.) Experience gained during raids on j.a.panese island outposts in 1943 showed that the optimum size for such groups was three or four carriers, a pair of fast battles.h.i.+ps, four cruisers, and twelve to sixteen destroyers. More carriers than that tended to make the groups unwieldy. Task Groups were commanded by a senior naval aviator, who a.s.signed strike missions, refueling a.s.signments, independent raids, and other jobs.

By early 1944, Task Force 34/58 had developed into the most powerful Naval force in history. This force, based around four Task Groups and commanded by Admiral Marc Mitscher, won key battles-in the Philippine Sea, off Formosa, at Leyte Gulf, in the South China Sea, and around Okinawa-that eventually led to Allied victory in the Pacific. Task Force 34/58 never lost a battle, and throughout its two-year life span lost only a single flattop, the light carrier Princeton Princeton (CVL-23). (CVL-23).

The end of World War II brought a number of changes to CVBGs. In fact, the ma.s.sive force reductions following the war almost spelled their end. Results of the early atomic tests at Bikini showed the need to disperse carrier groups. Thus single-carrier CVBGs again became the norm. On the other hand, new technologies began to make these individual carriers much more effective and powerful. Angled flight decks, steam catapults, jet engines, air-to-air missiles (AAMs), and atomic weapons marked just a few of the new systems that Naval aviators saw arrive in the decade of Elvis and Ike. As new technologies arrived, CVBGs began to change their mixes of aircraft and s.h.i.+ps. Piston-engined propeller aircraft were sent to the boneyard, and replaced by supersonic jets and high-performance turboprops. The battles.h.i.+ps and big-gun cruisers were also retired, as new guided-missile destroyers and cruisers took over the job of escorting a new generation of flattops. Even without the destructive power of the nuclear weapons they carried, each carrier now had more firepower than an entire World War II Task Group.

At the start of the Vietnam War in the mid-1960's, America had more carriers than the rest of the world combined, allowing the USN to easily station three or four CVBGs in the South China Sea. Each group normally had one attack carrier, as well as a guided-missile destroyer or cruiser to provide surface-to-air missile (SAM) coverage. Known as Task Force 77, the flattops were on station near Vietnam from the torpedo boat attacks of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in 1964 to the evacuation of Saigon a decade later. By then, the older World War II-era carriers were worn out and had to be retired. Yet, with the defense budget drained by the Vietnam War, one-for-one replacement of s.h.i.+ps and aircraft was impossible. Instead, the Navy built a new generation of amphibious s.h.i.+ps with flight decks for helicopters (the Tarawa-cla.s.s Tarawa-cla.s.s (LHA-1)), and combined the attack and ASW missions into the air wings (CVWs) on the fifteen newer carriers commissioned since the end of World War II. By adding a squadron each of S-3 Vikings and SH-3 Sea King helicopters to the existing attack carrier wings, the so-called ”CV Air Wing” was created in 1975. This remained the basic CVW structure for the rest of the Cold War. (LHA-1)), and combined the attack and ASW missions into the air wings (CVWs) on the fifteen newer carriers commissioned since the end of World War II. By adding a squadron each of S-3 Vikings and SH-3 Sea King helicopters to the existing attack carrier wings, the so-called ”CV Air Wing” was created in 1975. This remained the basic CVW structure for the rest of the Cold War.

While the Navy was reducing the number of carriers and beefing up their air groups, the new Nimitz-cla.s.s Nimitz-cla.s.s (CVN-68) nuclear supercarriers began to arrive. A new generation of aircraft also began to appear on the decks of American flattops. In 1974, the F-14 Tomcat arrived in the fleet, along with new models of the A-6 Intruder and A-7 Corsair attack bombers, and improved models of the E-2 Hawkeye and EA-6B Prowler electronic aircraft. (CVN-68) nuclear supercarriers began to arrive. A new generation of aircraft also began to appear on the decks of American flattops. In 1974, the F-14 Tomcat arrived in the fleet, along with new models of the A-6 Intruder and A-7 Corsair attack bombers, and improved models of the E-2 Hawkeye and EA-6B Prowler electronic aircraft.

By the late 1970's the driving force in CVBG development was no longer American plans or technology. That honor fell to Admiral of the Soviet Navy Sergei Gorshkov. In the generation following the high seas humiliation of his fleet during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Gorshkov had managed to create the largest navy in the world. Though much of the Soviet naval buildup was designed to support and protect its growing fleet of ballistic-missile submarines, a large share of its maritime budget was devoted to the destruction of American CVBGs.