Part 2 (2/2)

IN the preceding discourse, I called attention to the fact that the opponents of Calvinism are frequently charged with misunderstanding through ignorance, or grossly misrepresenting it. I read pa.s.sages from several, charging us with calumny, defamation, slander, and even blasphemy.

In view of these charges, often made and reiterated, and widely spread, with high official sanction, and likely to be repeated whenever Calvinism is boldly investigated, I deemed it necessary to show, by numerous quotations, that I do not misrepresent it when I impute to it the doctrine that G.o.d has willed, proposed, and decreed whatsoever comes to pa.s.s, and that, in some way or other, he brings to pa.s.s whatever occurs. For this purpose, I referred to the acknowledged publications of the Presbyterian, Congregational, Baptist, and Reformed Dutch Churches. I noted, particularly, that this doctrine is held by the New School Presbyterians, because it is supposed by many that they have abandoned it, and that their rejection of it const.i.tutes one of the points of difference between them and the Old School.

I also quoted largely to show that earnest efforts are in progress to exalt Calvinism, and disparage Arminianism and Arminians.

We now propose to test this dogma of Calvinism by reason and Scripture. We shall not, at present, enter upon the examination of the proof-texts, though we hold the Holy Scriptures to be the ultimate authority on all theological questions, but shall compare it with acknowledged Scripture principles. And, yet, it may be very reasonably expected that some attention will be paid to the pa.s.sage which, according to custom, has been selected as presenting the subject of discourse. It is the very first proof -text adduced by the _Westminster Confession of Faith_, but it fails to meet the demand made upon it. It does not contain the doctrine sought to be proved. It does, indeed, a.s.sert the predestination of believers to certain blessings, a point not in dispute, and also that they are predestinated to these blessings according to G.o.d's purpose; but all this is very far from teaching that _G.o.d has foreordained whatsoever comes to pa.s.s_.

The proof is supposed by some to be contained in the remaining portion of the pa.s.sage--”who worketh all things,” &c. But we must take the entire expression of the apostle in order to get his meaning, ”who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.” By this he means to say, merely, that, in whatever G.o.d does towards men or angels, he is uncontrolled. He carries out his own free purposes. He does not conform to the counsels of others. He does not yield to the clamors of discontented subjects, or make concessions to contemporary and independent powers. The words are thus paraphrased by McKnight, a Calvinistic commentator: ”According to the gracious purpose of him, who effectually accomplisheth all his benevolent intentions, by the most proper means, according to the wise determination of his own will.” We may, with as much propriety, argue from the apostolic injunction, ”Do all things without murmurings and disputings”

(Phil. ii. 14), that Christians are required by the law of G.o.d to _do all things_ absolutely, as, from the clause under consideration, that G.o.d has decreed and executes whatsoever comes to pa.s.s. But, if our brethren insist upon so understanding the apostle, we shall hold them to their interpretation. We shall not allow them to contradict it whenever the exigencies of the argument may render it convenient.

1. In the first place, this theory of predestination is inconsistent with the doctrine of man's free moral agency. The force of this objection is readily perceived. It is _impossible_ that we should be free agents, when all the _external circ.u.mstances_ that affect us, and all our _mental_ and _bodily acts_, are predetermined and brought about by G.o.d. Man is thus reduced to, a mere pa.s.sive instrument. He is nothing more than a complicate and curious machine--a man-machine, an automaton--whose every movement is conceived, determined, directed, controlled by a supervisor. It avails nothing to apply to him terms which signify freedom. We may say that he has _the power to will_; that he _actually wills_; but the difficulty is not relieved. The being who endowed him with this faculty has foreordained and brings to pa.s.s, by a well-directed agency, every movement of that faculty. We may say that he _wills according to his inclinations_, and is therefore free; but G.o.d has decreed and brings to pa.s.s all his inclinations. We may say that he acts according to his will, and not against his will; still nothing is gained, since all his purposes, and the movements by which he executes them, are equally preordained and brought to pa.s.s by G.o.d. We may say that he is _conscious_ of _acting freely_, but this is a mere delusion, if the doctrine we are considering be true. By the very logic which reconciles it with free agency in man, I will undertake to prove that every steamboat and every railroad-engine is a free agent. Calvinistic free agency must be something a.n.a.logous to Bishop Hughes's freedom of conscience, indestructible and inviolable, in its very nature and essence; so that a man may be denied the privilege of reading the Bible, or of propagating or entertaining any opinions contrary to the Church of Rome--he may be thrown into prison, and put to torture, for refusing to subscribe to its dogmas, or to wors.h.i.+p according to forms which he holds to be idolatrous--and yet he enjoys freedom of conscience. So, according to the teachings of modern Calvinism, man is a free agent, notwithstanding all the _circ.u.mstances_ which _surround_ him, with all his _sensations, emotions, desires, purposes, volitions_ and _acts_ were _decreed from eternity_, and brought to pa.s.s by a power which he can _neither control_ nor _resist_. This free agency must then be something absolutely inviolable in its nature and essence, something which G.o.d himself cannot destroy or impinge except by terminating the existence of the being in whom it inheres. As Bishop Hughes's freedom of conscience is very different from what is generally understood to be freedom of conscience, so the free agency which may be made to harmonize with this doctrine, is different from what is usually understood to be free agency. It is not the power to act otherwise than as we do act, or to choose or will otherwise than as we do choose or will.

2. This doctrine, being at variance with man's free agency, is, by necessary consequence, at variance with his _moral accountability_.

There would be as much reason in holding the _atmosphere_ accountable, or the _trees_, or the _gra.s.s_, or the _clods_, or the _stones_. All his _views_, _feelings_, and _volitions_, being thus predetermined, he can no more be accountable for them than for the _circ.u.mstances_ of his _birth_, or the _natural color_ of his _skin_. He cannot reasonably be made the subject of commendation or censure--of reward or punishment.

3. It also follows, from this doctrine, that there is not, and cannot be any such thing as sin. If man be not a free agent--if he be incapable of acting otherwise than as predetermined by Jehovah--he is incapable of either virtue or vice. It would be as reasonable to predicate virtue or vice of the flux and reflux of the tides, or the circulation of the blood, as of man or angel under such circ.u.mstances.

And, mark! if we, for the sake of the argument, should admit that man is capable of _virtue_, notwithstanding all his acts are foreordained and rendered infallibly certain by a power which he cannot successfully resist, he is still incapable of _vice_. He cannot sin, for this plain, all-sufficient reason--he cannot act otherwise than according to the will of G.o.d. ”Nothing comes to pa.s.s in time but what was decreed from eternity.” ”None of the decrees of G.o.d can be defeated or fail of execution.” So Calvinism explicitly affirms.

Further, while the inference that there is and can be no sin is fairly deducible from the supposition that man is not a free agent, it does not depend upon that supposition. Let it be admitted, for the purpose of the argument, that man is a free agent, and capable of sinning, notwithstanding all his actions were predetermined, and what is the state of the case? _Still he has not sinned_. He has done nothing but what G.o.d freely willed and ordained he should do. The perfect obedience of Christ consisted in his doing in all respects the will of the Father.

Either, then, it may be sinful to do the will of G.o.d, or there is--there can be no sin. I do not know of any way in which this consequence can be avoided. I do not believe that it can.

Let us take another view of this point. Let the advocates of this doctrine succeed in proving that man is a free agent, in the proper sense of the term, and capable of sinning, notwithstanding all his actions are decreed and brought to pa.s.s by G.o.d, and we have before us this remarkable result: _Every individual of the human race, while in a state of probation, without a knowledge of G.o.d's predetermination respecting him, and without any controlling influence brought to bear upon him, has, in every instance, willed and acted in accordance with the will of G.o.d_. The result is _universal voluntary holiness_. Here, then, is a dilemma. Either there is _no possibility of sin or of holiness_, or, if there be a possibility of sin or of holiness, there is, in fact, _no sin_ --there is, in fact, _universal holiness_.

4. If it be a.s.serted that sin exists, notwithstanding this perfect coincidence between the will of G.o.d and the conduct of his creatures, it will follow, most conclusively, that _G.o.d is the author of sin_. He has decreed and brings to pa.s.s all the sensations, perceptions, emotions, inclinations, volitions, and overt actions, of the whole human race. Various attempts have been made to avoid this result, but they are all futile. The _Confession of Faith_ says: ”G.o.d, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pa.s.s; yet so as thereby neither is G.o.d the author of sin.” We pay all respect to this as a disclaimer. Our Presbyterian brethren do not intend to charge G.o.d with being the author of sin. But we are compelled to regard these propositions as directly contradictory to each other. Is not a being the author of that which he originally designs and decrees, and subsequently brings into existence? and is it not maintained that he decreed from all eternity, and brings to pa.s.s whatever occurs? Either sin has not come to pa.s.s, or G.o.d is the author of it. It is useless to say that G.o.d has brought to pa.s.s the act, but not the sinfulness.

The sinfulness has come to pa.s.s. It is useless to say that sin is man's, and not G.o.d's act. Man does nothing but what G.o.d has decreed, and, in some infallible way leads him to do. ”G.o.d's power,” says Dr.

Chalmers, ”gives birth to _every purpose_; it gives impulse to _every desire_, gives shape and color to _every conception_.” Says Fisher, in his _Catechism_: ”G.o.d not only efficaciously concurs in producing the action as to the matter of it, but likewise predetermines the creature to such or such an action, and not to another, shutting up all other ways of acting, and leaving only that open which he had determined to be done.” We might, with vastly more plausibility, deny that Paul was the author of his Epistles, because he employed an amanuensis, or, for the same reason, deny that Milton was the author of _Paradise Lost_. It is useless here to speculate upon the reasons which induced G.o.d to ordain and bring sin to pa.s.s. We are now concerned with the fact merely, and we hence conclude that he is the author of sin and the only being properly answerable for it.

5. If the advocates of this doctrine should still insist that it does not make G.o.d the author of sin; that man is a free agent, and properly responsible for his actions, notwithstanding they are foreordained; I press them with this plain consequence--G.o.d is, to say the least, a partic.i.p.ant in the sinning. And he is not merely a _coadjutor_, but the _princ.i.p.al_--the princ.i.p.al in _every instance of sinning_. He originates the first conception of the sinning act. He forms the plan. He arranges all the circ.u.mstances. He, by his providence, applies the influence by which the result is effectuated. Here, then, is a dilemma from which there is no escape. Either G.o.d is, _strictly and properly_, the _author of sin_, or he is a _partic.i.p.ant_ therein, and not merely accessory, but _the princ.i.p.al_, the _plotter_, the _prime mover_, the RINGLEADER thereof.

6. Another inevitable consequence of this doctrine is that, admitting the existence of sin, G.o.d _prefers sin to holiness_ in every instance in which sin takes place. This consequence is too plain to require much ill.u.s.tration. If G.o.d _freely_ ordained whatsoever comes to pa.s.s; if he was not under a fatal necessity of ordaining just as he did; if he had it in his power to ordain otherwise, he could have ordained holiness in the place of sin.

The fact that he was free and unnecessitated in his decrees, and could ordain the one or the other, according to his good pleasure, is proof substantial that he prefers sin to holiness in every instance in which sin occurs. Had he preferred holiness, he could have decreed it, and it would have come to pa.s.s. This consequence has been admitted, and is, by many Calvinists at this day, maintained as a doctrine. In fact, it has been a matter of dispute amongst Calvinists--Dr. Taylor, of Connecticut, taking one side, and Dr. Tyler, of Connecticut, taking the other. But what a shocking conception! (See _Christian Spectator_, vol. iv.

p. 465.)

7. Nor can we resist the further conclusion, from these premises, that sin is not a real evil, but, on the contrary, a good, and that in every instance in which it is preferred to holiness, it is worthy of such preference. This reasoning proceeds upon the a.s.sumption that G.o.d is a being of infinite goodness and wisdom, and, therefore, always prefers good to evil, being, of course, always able to distinguish the one from the other.

This inference also has been admitted by many of the advocates of Calvinistic predestination. They distinctly affirm that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, and, as such, so far.

as it exists, is preferable on the whole to holiness in its stead--that its existence is, on the whole, for the best. I give as authority for this affirmation, a publication of the Presbyterian Board, ent.i.tled _Old and New Theology_. On the first page we find this explicit statement: ”It has been a common sentiment among New England divines, since the time of Edwards, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, and as such, so far as it exists, is preferable, on the whole, to holiness in its stead.”

I do not charge Dr. Musgrave with holding this inference as a doctrine, and yet it is very clearly a.s.serted in an argument designed to prove the Calvinistic doctrine of foreordination.

”There must,” says he, ”have been a time when no creature existed, as G.o.d alone is from everlasting. Before creation, and from all eternity, all things that are possible, as well as all things that actually have or will come to pa.s.s in time, must have been perfectly known to G.o.d. He must, therefore, have known what beings and events would, on the whole, be most for his own glory, and the greatest good of the universe; and therefore, as an infinitely wise, benevolent, and Almighty Being, he could not but have chosen or determined, that such beings and events, and SUCH ONLY, should come to pa.s.s in time.” ”The conclusion is, therefore, to our minds, irresistible, that if G.o.d be infinitely wise, benevolent, and powerful, and perfectly foreknew what beings and events would, _on the whole_, BE BEST, he must have chosen and ordained that they should exist, or be permitted to occur; and that, consequently, everything that does actually come to pa.s.s in time, has been eternally and unchangeably foreordained.”

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