Part 3 (1/2)

Here it is argued that G.o.d, as an infinitely wise, benevolent, and powerful being, must have _known_ and _preferred_, and _decreed_, that just such beings should exist and events occur, as would, on the whole, be most for his own glory, and the _greatest good_ of the universe, _and such only_; and that, consequently, he has eternally, and unchangeably foreordained everything that does actually come to pa.s.s in time. Now it is plain that all the events which have come to pa.s.s in time must answer this description--must be for the best, for his highest glory--or the argument falls to the ground.

The Rev. Jas. McChain, one of the editors of the _Calvinistic Magazine_, in a discourse published in that periodical, December, 1847, thus undertakes to prove that G.o.d ”has foreordained whatsoever comes to pa.s.s:” ”Jehovah is infinitely _wise_; does he not, therefore, know what it is BEST should take place? He is infinitely _benevolent_; will he not choose, then, that _shall take place_ which he knows is FOR THE BEST? He is infinitely _powerful_; can he not, therefore, cause _to take place_ what he _chooses shall take place_? The Most High is infinitely wise, and _knows_ what it is BEST should come to pa.s.s--benevolent, and _chooses_ to bring to pa.s.s WHAT IS BEST--powerful, and _does_ bring to pa.s.s what he chooses as BEST.” ”Surely his infinite wisdom and goodness will choose and determine whatsoever it is best should take place, and his almighty power will perfectly carry out his plan.”

It is not my intention, at this time, to point out the fallacy of these arguments. I quote them to show that the consequence which I have deduced from the doctrine that G.o.d has decreed whatsoever comes to pa.s.s--that sin is not an evil, but a good, and worthy of being preferred to holiness in every instance in which it occurs-- is actually recognized as a truth, and used as a premise in proof of the Calvinistic doctrine of the decrees.

8. And how can we avoid adopting as a legitimate conclusion, the licentious infidel maxim, that ”WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT”?

9. It is obvious, at the first glance, that this doctrine destroys all reasonable ground for repentance. Of what shall we repent? Of sinning? Let it first be proved that, according to this doctrine, any one has sinned, or can sin. But, if sin be possible, yet in every instance of sinning we have done the will of G.o.d. He freely and unchangeably predestinated the act from all eternity. His providence brought it to pa.s.s. Before we feel ourselves authorized to repent we should be sure that G.o.d has repented of his purposes and acts. And, even then, there would be no good reason for repentance upon the part of his creatures.

For, if we, for the sake of the argument, allow that they are able to act otherwise than as they do, notwithstanding the Divine decrees, they are morally bound to submit cordially to those decrees, leaving to G.o.d the responsibility of decreeing wisely.

Hence there is no room for repentance.

This is precisely the application made of this doctrine by an intelligent Calvinistic lady of New England, Mrs. Elizabeth Stuart Phelps, daughter of the late Prof. Stuart, of Andover, and auth.o.r.ess of certain very popular works. In the memorial of her, prefixed to _The Last Leaf of Sunny Side_, she is quoted as saying in her diary: ”I never _could_ understand or divine before, my claim upon the Deity's overruling care. Now I do get a glimpse of it--enough to make me feel like an infant in its mother's arms. Every event, of every day, of every hour, is unalterably fixed. Each day is but the turning over a new leaf of my history, already written by the finger of G.o.d--every letter of it. Should I wish to re-write--to alter--one? Oh, no! no!! no!!!”

Here, you perceive, is no ground for repentance. It is repudiated.

She would not alter an event of her life, a letter of her history.

She carries this acquiescence in the Divine decrees so far as to say in another place: ”I have no hope but in my Saviour and if He has not saved me, then this too, I know, is just, and G.o.d's decrees I would not change.”

10. Nor can prayer be more reasonable than repentance. For what shall we pray? That G.o.d would reverse his eternal decrees? This would be to reflect upon his attributes. Are his decrees wrong?

Besides, the doctrine in question affirms them to be unchangeable.

Shall we pray that G.o.d may accomplish them? This can add nothing to the certainty of their accomplishment; for they cannot be defeated. So we are distinctly a.s.sured by the advocates of this theory. The only apology that can be offered for prayer, on the part of those who believe this doctrine, is that it is decreed they shall pray. But a prayer offered in strict logical accordance with this theory would be a manifest absurdity.

11. Another legitimate consequence of this doctrine is that man is not in a state of probation. There is a flat contradiction between the idea that man is in a state of probation and the affirmation that the whole series of volitions, states, actions, and events of his life is fixed, unchangeably, by the Divine decree, before he comes into existence. I have long regarded this as an inevitable deduction from the Calvinistic doctrine of decrees, but it was not until lately that I found it actually advanced as a doctrine by a Calvinistic writer. On page 77 of _Fisher's Catechism_, the following occurs:--

”_Q_. Is there any danger in a.s.serting that man is not now in a state of probation, as Adam was?--_Ans_. No.”

”_Q_. What, then, is the dangerous consequence of a.s.serting that fallen man is still in a state of probation?--_Ans_. This dangerous consequence would follow, that mankind are hereby supposed to be still under a covenant of works that can justify the doer!”

I do not mean to be understood that this dogma is held by all Calvinists, but, whether held or not, it is a legitimate inference.

12. Let us now notice the bearing of this strange tenet upon some of the leading doctrines and facts of Christianity. Take the doctrine of the Fall--which is understood to be that G.o.d made man in his own image--holy; righteous, capable of standing in his integrity, yet liable to be seduced from it; and that man voluntarily transgressed, brought guilt and depravity upon himself, and involved his posterity in moral degradation and ruin. But, if the Calvinistic doctrine of decrees be true, there was obviously no fall in the case. There was a change in the condition of Adam, but that change was a part of G.o.d's eternal plan. Nothing occurred but what belonged to the divinely predetermined series of events. If Adam had acted otherwise than as he did, G.o.d's original purposes would have been frustrated. If there were any fall, it should be predicated of the Divine decrees rather than of the human subject thereof.

13. Again: The plan of redemption, it is supposed, was designed to rescue him from a deplorable, desperate condition, in which his perverseness had placed him; but, if the doctrine we are considering be true, the redemption, so called, is nothing but a part of a chain of predetermined events. He _was, and is, at no time_, in _any other condition_ than was _devised_ and _decreed_ by _Jehovah as most conducive to his own glory_ and _the highest good of the universe_. Thus, the redemption, about which so much is said, is resolved into a mere nullity.

14. Again: The glorious doctrine of Christ crucified thrills the bosom of the church with intense emotions of fear, and penitence, and hope, and grat.i.tude, and joy. Paul attached so much importance to it as to say: ”For I determined to know nothing among men save Christ and him crucified.” But, view it in the light of the doctrine that G.o.d has decreed whatsoever comes to pa.s.s, and what does it amount to? The sufferings and death of Christ derive their importance from the fact of their being propitiatory--an atonement. But for what shall they atone? For acts which were determined upon, as a part of G.o.d's plan, for his glory, and the good of the universe, millions of ages before the human actors were born; for acts which no more need to be atoned for than the actions of Jesus Christ himself. To say that those acts were wrong is to reflect upon the decrees of G.o.d, since ”nothing has come to pa.s.s but what was decreed by him;” since, according to Mr. Barnes, we are ”to interpret the decrees of G.o.d by facts, and the actual result, by whatever means brought about, expresses the design of G.o.d.” If men need atonement, they need it for doing the will of G.o.d, and for nothing else. Need I add that, in view of the Calvinistic doctrine of decrees, the doctrine of atonement by the sufferings and death of Christ is absolute nonsense?

15. Again: I affirm of this doctrine that it renders utterly baseless the _doctrine of pardon_, or the remission of sins. It renders the offer of pardon a mockery. For what is pardon offered? For _doing the will of G.o.d_--for doing just _what he decreed_ we should do; for _carrying into effect_ his _eternal counsels_. How can any man need pardon if this doctrine be true?

Should it be said, in reply, that although the decrees of G.o.d have been invariably fulfilled, yet his _precepts_ have been violated, I rejoin that the violation of these precepts was, according to the Calvinistic hypothesis, specifically _decreed_.

Unless decreed, it could not have come to pa.s.s. Hence, the violation was inevitable, from the very nature of the case. G.o.d offers pardon to his creatures, who have invariably, from the commencement of their being, fulfilled his decrees. He offers pardon to them for violating commands which it was impossible for them to keep, inasmuch as he had eternally decreed that they should not keep them, and his decrees are infinitely wise and holy, and cannot be, frustrated.

Further, if G.o.d's decrees are righteous (and we are told explicitly by the creed we are reviewing that they had their origin in his ”wise and holy counsel”), it follows that his precepts must be unrighteous, whenever they are a.s.sumed to be in opposition to his decrees; and surely no one can need pardon for pursuing a righteous course in opposition to an unrighteous one.

If it be said that his precepts and his decrees are all equally righteous, it follows that a course in direct opposition, in all respects, to a righteous law is, nevertheless, a righteous course, and thus the distinction between righteousness and unrighteousness is destroyed. View the subject in whatever light you may, and the offer of pardon in connection with the Calvinistic doctrine of decrees, becomes an impertinence and an absurdity.

16. And what is the effect of the Calvinistic theory of predestination upon the doctrine of _regeneration_? Regeneration is usually understood to be a change by which unholy dispositions --dispositions at variance with the character and will of G.o.d --are subst.i.tuted by those in accordance therewith. But, if Calvinism be true, regeneration is nothing more than a preordained change from doing the will of G.o.d perfectly in one way, to doing it perfectly in another way.

17. A consequence of this theory has been incidentally brought to view in ill.u.s.trating a preceding argument, which deserves a distinct statement. It is that G.o.d has two hostile wills, in relation to the same thing--his decrees, and his published commands and prohibitions. He has enjoined certain modes of action, by the most solemn legislation, and yet decreed, from all eternity, that mult.i.tudes of those whom he has subjected to those obligations, shall constantly act at variance therewith; so that mult.i.tudes of human beings are doing his will perfectly, and yet violating his will at the same time.

18. This theory makes all civil government manifestly unreasonable.

Civil government proceeds upon the supposition that man is a free agent, capable of choosing and acting otherwise than as he does; but this theory, as we have seen, is incompatible with free agency.

And should we admit, for the sake of the argument, that it is not incompatible with free agency, it is still irreconcilable with civil government. Civil legislation prohibits various modes of acting. It a.s.sumes that the forbidden actions are wrong-- injurious to society--whereas, this theory represents that all the actions that have been performed, or will be performed, were freely willed, purposed, decreed, foreordained, and brought to pa.s.s by G.o.d himself--that there are no events, and can be none, but what are in precise harmony with his eternal purposes--so that, unless we suppose that G.o.d has from all eternity freely decreed what is wrong and injurious, thereby subjecting human legislators to the necessity of opposing his will in order to prevent outrage and injury, civil legislation admits of no justification or apology.