Volume I Part 4 (1/2)

It needed but little knowledge of the status of parties in the several States to foresee a probable defeat if the conservatives were to continue divided into three parts, and the aggressives [pg 53] were to be held in solid column. But angry pa.s.sions, which are always bad counselors, had been aroused, and hopes were still cherished, which proved to be illusory. The result was the election, by a minority, of a President whose avowed principles were necessarily fatal to the harmony of the Union.

Of 303 electoral votes, Mr. Lincoln received 180, but of the popular suffrage of 4,676,853 votes, which the electors represented, he obtained only 1,866,352-something over a third of the votes. This discrepancy was owing to the system of voting by ”general ticket”-that is, casting the State votes as a unit, whether unanimous or nearly equally divided. Thus, in New York, the total popular vote was 675,156, of which 362,646 were cast for the so-called Republican (or Lincoln) electors, and 312,510 against them. Now York was ent.i.tled to 35 electoral votes. Divided on the basis of the popular vote, 19 of these would have been cast for Mr. Lincoln, and 16 against him. But under the ”general ticket” system the entire 35 votes were cast for the Republican candidates, thus giving them not only the full strength of the majority in their favor, but that of the great minority against them superadded. So of other Northern States, in which the small majorities on one side operated with the weight of entire unanimity, while the virtual unanimity in the Southern States, on the other side, counted nothing more than a mere majority would have done.

The manifestations which followed this result, in the Southern States, did not proceed, as has been unjustly charged, from chagrin at their defeat in the election, or from any personal hostility to the President-elect, but from the fact that they recognized in him the representative of a party professing principles destructive to ”their peace, their prosperity, and their domestic tranquillity.” The long-suppressed fire burst into frequent flame, but it was still controlled by that love of the Union which the South had ill.u.s.trated in every battle-field, from Boston to New Orleans. Still it was hoped, against hope, that some adjustment might be made to avert the calamities of a practical application of the theory of an ”irrepressible conflict.” Few, if any, then doubted the right of a State to withdraw its grants delegated to the Federal Government, or, in other words, to secede from the [pg 54] Union; but in the South this was generally regarded as the remedy of last resort, to be applied only when ruin or dishonor was the alternative. No rash or revolutionary action was taken by the Southern States, but the measures adopted were considerate, and executed advisedly and deliberately. The Presidential election occurred (as far as the popular vote, which determined the result, was concerned) in November, 1860. Most of the State Legislatures convened soon afterward in regular session. In some cases special sessions were convoked for the purpose of calling State Conventions-the recognized representatives of the sovereign will of the people-to be elected expressly for the purpose of taking such action as should be considered needful and proper under the existing circ.u.mstances.

These conventions, as it was always held and understood, possessed all the power of the people a.s.sembled in ma.s.s; and therefore it was conceded that they, and they only, could take action for the withdrawal of a State from the Union. The consent of the respective States to the formation of the Union had been given through such conventions, and it was only by the same authority that it could properly be revoked. The time required for this deliberate and formal process precludes the idea of hasty or pa.s.sionate action, and none who admit the primary power of the people to govern themselves can consistently deny its validity and binding obligation upon every citizen of the several States. Not only was there ample time for calm consideration among the people of the South, but for due reflection by the General Government and the people of the Northern States.

President Buchanan was in the last year of his administration. His freedom from sectional asperity, his long life in the public service, and his peace-loving and conciliatory character, were all guarantees against his precipitating a conflict between the Federal Government and any of the States; but the feeble power that he possessed in the closing months of his term to mold the policy of the future was painfully evident. Like all who had intelligently and impartially studied the history of the formation of the Const.i.tution, he held that the Federal Government had no rightful power to coerce a State. Like the sages [pg 55] and patriots who had preceded him in the high office that he filled, he believed that ”our Union rests upon public opinion, and can never by cemented by the blood of its citizens shed in civil war. If it can not live in the affections of the people, it must one day perish. Congress may possess many means of preserving it by conciliation, but the sword was not placed in their hand to preserve it by force.”-(Message of December 3, 1860.)

Ten years before, Mr. Calhoun addressing the Senate with all the earnestness of his nature and with that sincere desire to avert the danger of disunion which those who knew him best never doubted, had asked the emphatic question, ”How can the Union be saved?” He answered his question thus:

”There is but one way by which it can be [saved] with any certainty; and that is by a full and final settlement, on the principles of justice, of all the questions at issue between the sections. The South asks for justice-simple justice-and less she ought not to take. She has no compromise to offer but the Const.i.tution, and no concession or surrender to make....

”Can this be done? Yes, easily! Not by the weaker party; for it can of itself do nothing-not even protect itself-but by the stronger.... But will the North agree to do this? It is for her to answer this question. But, I will say, she can not refuse if she has half the love of the Union which she professes to have, nor without exposing herself to the charge that her love of power and aggrandizement is far greater than her love of the Union.”

During the ten years that intervened between the date of this speech and the message of Mr. Buchanan cited above, the progress of sectional discord and the tendency of the stronger section to unconst.i.tutional aggression had been fearfully rapid. With very rare exceptions, there were none in 1850 who claimed the right of the Federal Government to apply coercion to a State. In 1860 men had grown to be familiar with threats of driving the South into submission to any act that the Government, in the hands of a Northern majority, might see fit to perform. During the canva.s.s of that year, demonstrations had been made by quasi-military organizations in various parts of the North, [pg 56] which looked unmistakably to purposes widely different from those enunciated in the preamble to the Const.i.tution, and to the employment of means not authorized by the powers which the States had delegated to the Federal Government.

Well-informed men still remembered that, in the Convention which framed the Const.i.tution, a proposition was made to authorize the employment of force against a delinquent State, on which Mr. Madison remarked that ”the use of force against a State would look more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might have been bound.” The Convention expressly refused to confer the power proposed, and the clause was lost. While, therefore, in 1860, many violent men, appealing to pa.s.sion and the l.u.s.t of power, were inciting the mult.i.tude, and preparing Northern opinion to support a war waged against the Southern States in the event of their secession, there were others who took a different view of the case. Notable among such was the ”New York Tribune,” which had been the organ of the abolitionists, and which now declared that, ”if the cotton States wished to withdraw from the Union, they should be allowed to do so”; that ”any attempt to compel them to remain, by force, would be contrary to the principles of the Declaration of Independence and to the fundamental ideas upon which human liberty is based”; and that, ”if the Declaration of Independence justified the secession from the British Empire of three millions of subjects in 1776, it was not seen why it would not justify the secession of five millions of Southerners from the Union in 1861.” Again, it was said by the same journal that, ”sooner than compromise with the South and abandon the Chicago platform,” they would ”let the Union slide.” Taunting expressions were freely used-as, for example, ”If the Southern people wish to leave the Union, we will do our best to forward their views.”

All this, it must be admitted, was quite consistent with the oft-repeated declaration that the Const.i.tution was a ”covenant with h.e.l.l,” which stood as the caption of a leading abolitionist paper of Boston. That signs of coming danger so visible, evidences [pg 57] of hostility so unmistakable, disregard of const.i.tutional obligations so wanton, taunts and jeers so bitter and insulting, should serve to increase excitement in the South, was a consequence flowing as much from reason and patriotism as from sentiment. He must have been ignorant of human nature who did not expect such a tree to bear fruits of discord and division.

Footnote 17: (return) May 19, 1860.

Footnote 18: (return) Horace Greeley, ”The American Conflict,” vol. i, p. 322.

CHAPTER VIII.

Conference with the Governor of Mississippi.-The Author censured as ”too slow.”-Summons to Was.h.i.+ngton.-Interview with the President.-His Message.-Movements in Congress.-The Triumphant Majority.-The Crittenden Proposition.-Speech of the Author on Mr. Green's Resolution.-The Committee of Thirteen.-Failure to agree.-The ”Republicans” responsible for the Failure.-Proceedings in the House of Representatives.-Futility of Efforts for an Adjustment.-The Old Year closes in Clouds.

In November, 1860, after the result of the Presidential election was known, the Governor of Mississippi, having issued his proclamation convoking a special session of the Legislature to consider the propriety of calling a convention, invited the Senators and Representatives of the State in Congress, to meet him for consultation as to the character of the message he should send to the Legislature when a.s.sembled.

While holding, in common with my political a.s.sociates, that the right of a State to secede was unquestionable, I differed from most of them as to the probability of our being permitted peaceably to exercise the right. The knowledge acquired by the administration of the War Department for four years, and by the chairmans.h.i.+p of the Military Committee of the Senate at two different periods, still longer in combined duration, had shown me the entire lack of preparation for war in the South. The foundries and armories were in the Northern States, and there were stored all the new and improved weapons of war. In the a.r.s.enals of the Southern States were to be found only arms of the old and rejected models. The South had no manufactories of powder, and no navy to protect our harbors, no merchant-s.h.i.+ps [pg 58] for foreign commerce. It was evident to me, therefore, that, if we should be involved in war, the odds against us would be far greater than what was due merely to our inferiority in population. Believing that secession would be the precursor of war between the States, I was consequently slower and more reluctant than others, who entertained a different opinion, to resort to that remedy.

While engaged in the consultation with the Governor just referred to, a telegraphic message was handed to me from two members of Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet, urging me to proceed ”immediately” to Was.h.i.+ngton. This dispatch was laid before the Governor and the members of Congress from the State who were in conference with him, and it was decided that I should comply with the summons. I was afterward informed that my a.s.sociates considered me ”too slow,” and they were probably correct in the belief that I was behind the general opinion of the people of the State as to the propriety of prompt secession.19

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On arrival at Was.h.i.+ngton, I found, as had been antic.i.p.ated, that my presence there was desired on account of the influence which it was supposed I might exercise with the President (Mr. Buchanan) in relation to his forthcoming message to Congress. On paying my respects to the President, he told me that he had finished the rough draft of his message, but that it was still open to revision and amendment, and that he would like to read it to me. He did so, and very kindly accepted all the modifications which I suggested. The message was, however, afterward somewhat changed, and, with great deference to the wisdom and statesmans.h.i.+p of its author, I must say that, in my judgment, the last alterations were unfortunate-so much so that, when it was read in the Senate, I was reluctantly constrained to criticise it. Compared, however, with doc.u.ments of the same cla.s.s which have since been addressed to the Congress of the United States, the reader of Presidential messages must regret that it was not accepted by Mr. Buchanan's successors as a model, and that his views of the Const.i.tution had not been adopted as a guide in the subsequent action of the Federal Government.

The popular movement in the South was tending steadily [pg 60] and rapidly toward the secession of those known as ”planting States”; yet, when Congress a.s.sembled on December 3, 1860 the representatives of the people of all those States took their seats in the House, and they were all represented in the Senate, except South Carolina, whose Senators had tendered their resignation to the Governor immediately on the announcement of the result of the Presidential election. Hopes were still cherished that the Northern leaders would appreciate the impending peril, would cease to treat the warnings, so often given, as idle threats, would refrain from the bravado, so often and so unwisely indulged, of ability ”to whip the South” in thirty, sixty, or ninety days, and would address themselves to the more manly purpose of devising means to allay the indignation, and quiet the apprehensions, whether well, founded or not, of their Southern brethren. But the debates of that session manifest, on the contrary, the arrogance of a triumphant party, and the determination to reap to the uttermost the full harvest of a party victory.

Mr. Crittenden, of Kentucky, the oldest and one of the most honored members of the Senate,20 introduced into that body a joint resolution proposing certain amendments to the Const.i.tution-among them the restoration and incorporation into the Const.i.tution of the geographical line of the Missouri Compromise, with other provisions, which it was hoped might be accepted as the basis for an adjustment of the difficulties rapidly hurrying the Union to disruption. But the earnest appeals of that venerable statesman were unheeded by Senators of the so-called Republican party. Action upon his proposition was postponed from time to time, on one pretext or another, until the last day of the session-when seven States had already withdrawn from the Union and established a confederation of their own-and it was then defeated by a majority of one vote.21

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Meantime, among other propositions made in the Senate were two introduced early in the session, which it may be proper specially to mention. One of these was a resolution offered by Mr. Powell, of Kentucky, which, after some modification by amendment, when finally acted upon, had taken the following form:

”Resolved, That so much of the President's message as relates to the present agitated and distracted condition of the country, and the grievances between the slaveholding and the non-slave holding States, be referred to a special committee of thirteen members, and that said committee be instructed to inquire into the present condition of the country, and report by bill or otherwise.”

The other was a resolution offered by Mr. Green, of Missouri, to the following effect: