Volume I Part 3 (1/2)
”The Senator [Mr. Douglas] might have remembered, if he had chosen to recollect so unimportant a thing, that I once had to explain to him, ten years ago, the fact that I repudiated the doctrine of that letter at the time it was published, and that the Democracy of Mississippi had well-nigh crucified me for the construction which I placed upon it. There were men mean enough to suspect that the construction I gave to the Nicholson letter was prompted by the confidence and affection I felt for General Taylor. At a subsequent period, however, Mr. Ca.s.s thoroughly reviewed it. He uttered (for him) very harsh language against all who had doubted the true construction of his letter, and he construed it just as I had done during the canva.s.s of 1848. It remains only to add that I supported Mr. Ca.s.s, not because of the doctrine of the Nicholson letter, but in despite of it; because I believed a Democratic President, with a Democratic Cabinet and Democratic counselors in the two Houses of Congress, and he as honest a man as I believed Mr. Ca.s.s to be, would be a safer reliance than his opponent, who personally possessed my confidence as much as any man living, but who was of, and must draw his advisers from, a party the tenets of which I believed to be opposed to the interests of the country, as they were to all my political convictions.
”I little thought at that time that my advocacy of Mr. Ca.s.s upon such grounds as these, or his support by the State of which I am a citizen, would at any future day be quoted as an endors.e.m.e.nt of the opinions contained in the Nicholson letter, as those opinions were afterward defined. But it is not only upon this letter, but equally upon the resolutions of the Convention as constructive of that letter, that the Senator rested his argument. [I will here say to the Senator that, if at any time I do him the least injustice, speaking as I do from such notes as I could take while he progressed, I will thank him to correct me.]
”But this letter entered into the canva.s.s; there was a doubt about its construction: there were men who a.s.serted that they [pg 38] had positive authority for saying that it meant that the people of a Territory could only exclude slavery when the Territory should form a Const.i.tution and be admitted as a State. This doubt continued to hang over the construction, and it was that doubt alone which secured Mr. Ca.s.s the vote of Mississippi. If the true construction had been certainly known, he would have had no chance to get it.”
Whatever meaning the generally discreet and conservative statesman, Mr. Ca.s.s, may have intended to convey, it is not at all probable that he foresaw the extent to which the suggestions would be carried and the consequences that would result from it.
In the organization of a government for California in 1850, the theory was more distinctly advanced, but it was not until after the pa.s.sage of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, in 1854, that it was fully developed under the plastic and constructive genius of the Hon. Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois. The leading part which that distinguished Senator had borne in the authors.h.i.+p and advocacy of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, which affirmed the right of the people of the Territories ”to form and regulate their domestic inst.i.tutions in their own way, subject only to the Const.i.tution of the United States,” had aroused against him a violent storm of denunciation in the State which he represented and other Northern States. He met it very manfully in some respects, defended his action resolutely, but in so doing was led to make such concessions of principle and to attach such an interpretation to the bill as would have rendered it practically nugatory-a thing to keep the promise of peace to the ear and break it to the hope.
The Const.i.tution expressly confers upon Congress the power to admit new States into the Union, and also to ”dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.” Under these grants of power, the uniform practice of the Government had been for Congress to lay off and divide the common territory by convenient boundaries for the formation of future States; to provide executive, legislative, and judicial departments of government for such Territories during their temporary and provisional [pg 39] period of pupilage; to delegate to these governments such authority as might be expedient-subject always to the supervision and controlling government of the Congress. Finally, at the proper time, and on the attainment by the Territory of sufficient strength and population for self-government, to receive it into the Union on a footing of entire equality with the original States-sovereign and self-governing. All this is no more inconsistent with the true principles of ”popular sovereignty,” properly understood, than the temporary subjection of a minor to parental control is inconsistent with the doctrines of the Declaration of Independence, or the exceptional discipline of a man-of-war or a military post with the principles of republican freedom.
The usual process of transition from a territorial condition to that of a State was, in the first place, by an act of Congress authorizing the inhabitants to elect representatives for a convention to form a State Const.i.tution, which was then submitted to Congress for approval and ratification. On such ratification the supervisory control of Congress was withdrawn, and the new State authorized to a.s.sume its sovereignty, and the inhabitants of the Territory became citizens of a State. In the cases of Tennessee in 1796, and Arkansas and Michigan in 1836, the failure of the inhabitants to obtain an ”enabling act” of Congress, before organizing themselves, very nearly caused the rejection of their applications for admission as States, though they were eventually granted on the ground that the subsequent approval and consent of Congress could heal the prior irregularity. The entire control of Congress over the whole subject of territorial government had never been questioned in earlier times. Necessarily conjoined with the power of this protectorate, was of course the duty of exercising it for the safety of the persons and property of all citizens of the United States, permanently or temporarily resident in any part of the domain belonging to the States in common.
Logically carried out, the new theory of ”popular sovereignty” would apply to the first adventurous pioneers settling in the wilderness before the organization of any Territorial government by Congress, as well as afterward. If ”sovereignty” is inherent [pg 40] in a thousand or five thousand persons, there can be no valid ground for denying its existence in a dozen, as soon as they pa.s.s beyond the limits of the State governments. The advocates of this novel doctrine, however, if rightly understood, generally disavowed any claim to its application prior to the organization of a territorial government.
The Territorial Legislatures, to which Congress delegated a portion of its power and duty to ”make all needful rules and regulations respecting the Territory,” were the mere agents of Congress, exercising an authority subject to Congressional supervision and control-an authority conferred only for the sake of convenience, and liable at any time to be revoked and annulled. Yet it is proposed to recognize in these provisional, subordinate, and temporary legislative bodies, a power not possessed by Congress itself. This is to claim that the creature is endowed with an authority not possessed by the creator, or that the stream has risen to an elevation above that of its source.
Furthermore, in contending for a power in the Territorial Legislatures permanently to determine the fundamental, social, and political inst.i.tutions of the Territory, and thereby virtually to prescribe those of the future State, the advocates of ”popular sovereignty” were investing those dependent and subsidiary bodies with powers far above any exercised by the Legislatures of the fully organized and sovereign States. The authority of the State Legislatures is limited, both by the Federal Const.i.tution and by the respective State Const.i.tutions from which it is derived. This latter limitation did not and could not exist in the Territories.
Strange as it may seem, a theory founded on fallacies so flimsy and leading to conclusions so paradoxical was advanced by eminent and experienced politicians, and accepted by many persons, both in the North and in the South-not so much, perhaps, from intelligent conviction as under the delusive hope that it would afford a satisfactory settlement of the ”irrepressible conflict” which had been declared. The terms ”popular sovereignty” and ”non-intervention” were plausible, specious, and captivating to the public ear. Too many lost sight of the elementary truth that political sovereignty does not reside in unorganized [pg 41] or partially organized ma.s.ses of individuals, but in the people of regularly and permanently const.i.tuted States. As to the ”non-intervention” proposed, it meant merely the abnegation by Congress of its duty to protect the inhabitants of the Territories subject to its control.
The raid into Virginia under John Brown-already notorious as a fanatical partisan leader in the Kansas troubles-occurred in October, 1859, a few weeks before the meeting of the Thirty-sixth Congress. Insignificant in itself and in its immediate results, it afforded a startling revelation of the extent to which sectional hatred and political fanaticism had blinded the conscience of a cla.s.s of persons in certain States of the Union; forming a party steadily growing stronger in numbers, as well as in activity. Sympathy with its purposes or methods was earnestly disclaimed by the representatives of all parties in Congress; but it was charged, on the other hand, that it was only the natural outgrowth of doctrines and sentiments which for some years had been freely avowed on the floors of both Houses. A committee of the Senate made a long and laborious investigation of the facts, with no very important or satisfactory results. In their final report, June 15, 1860, accompanying the evidence obtained and submitted, this Committee said:
”It [the incursion] was simply the act of lawless ruffians, under the sanction of no public or political authority, distinguishable only from ordinary felonies by the ulterior ends in contemplation by them, and by the fact that the money to maintain the expedition, and the large armament they brought with them, had been contributed and furnished by the citizens of other States of the Union under circ.u.mstances that must continue to jeopard the safety and peace of the Southern States, and against which Congress has no power to legislate.
”If the several States [adds the Committee], whether from motives of policy or a desire to preserve the peace of the Union, if not from fraternal feeling, do not hold it inc.u.mbent on them, after the experience of the country, to guard in future by appropriate legislation against occurrences similar to the one here inquired into, the Committee can find no guarantee elsewhere for the security of peace between the States of the Union.”
[pg 42]
On February 2, 1860, the author submitted, in the Senate of the United States, a series of resolutions, afterward slightly modified to read as follows
”1. Resolved, That, in the adoption of the Federal Const.i.tution, the States, adopting the same, acted severally as free and independent sovereignties, delegating a portion of their powers to be exercised by the Federal Government for the increased security of each against dangers, domestic as well as foreign; and that any intermeddling by any one or more States, or by a combination of their citizens, with the domestic inst.i.tutions of the others, on any pretext whatever, political, moral, or religious, with the view to their disturbance or subversion, is in violation of the Const.i.tution, insulting to the States so interfered with, endangers their domestic peace and tranquillity-objects for which the Const.i.tution was formed-and, by necessary consequence, tends to weaken and destroy the Union itself.
”2. Resolved, That negro slavery, as it exists in fifteen States of this Union, composes an important portion of their domestic inst.i.tutions, inherited from our ancestors, and existing at the adoption of the Const.i.tution, by which it is recognized as const.i.tuting an important element in the apportionment of powers among the States, and that no change of opinion or feeling on the part of the non-slaveholding States of the Union in relation to this inst.i.tution can justify them or their citizens in open or covert attacks thereon, with a view to its overthrow; and that all such attacks are in manifest violation of the mutual and solemn pledge to protect and defend each other, given by the States respectively, on entering into the const.i.tutional compact which formed the Union, and are a manifest breach of faith and a violation of the most solemn obligations.
”3. Resolved, That the Union of these States rests on the equality of rights and privileges among its members, and that it is especially the duty of the Senate, which represents the States in their sovereign capacity, to resist all attempts to discriminate either in relation to persons or property in the Territories, which are the common possessions of the United States, so as to give advantages to the citizens of one State which are not equally a.s.sured to those of every other State.
”4. Resolved, That neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature, [pg 43] whether by direct legislation or legislation of an indirect and unfriendly character, possesses power to annul or impair the const.i.tutional right of any citizen of the United States to take his slave property into the common Territories, and there hold and enjoy the same while the territorial condition remains.
”5. Resolved, That if experience should at any time prove that the judiciary and executive authority do not possess means to insure adequate protection to const.i.tutional rights in a Territory, and if the Territorial government shall fail or refuse to provide the necessary remedies for that purpose, it will be the duty of Congress to supply such deficiency.14
”6. Resolved, That the inhabitants of a Territory of the United States, when they rightfully form a Const.i.tution to be admitted as a State into the Union, may then, for the first time, like the people of a State when forming a new Const.i.tution, decide for themselves whether slavery, as a domestic inst.i.tution, shall be maintained or prohibited within their jurisdiction; and they shall be received into the Union with or without slavery, as their Const.i.tution may prescribe at the time of their admission.
”7. Resolved, That the provision of the Const.i.tution for the rendition of fugitives from service or labor, 'without the adoption of which the Union could not have been formed,' and that the laws of 1793 and 1850, which were enacted to secure its execution, and the main features of which, being similar, bear the impress of nearly seventy years of sanction by the highest judicial authority, should be honestly and faithfully observed and maintained by all who enjoy the benefits of our compact of union; and that all acts of individuals or of State Legislatures to defeat the purpose or nullify the requirements of that provision, and the laws made in pursuance of it, are hostile in character, subversive of the Const.i.tution, and revolutionary in their effect.”15
After a protracted and earnest debate, these resolutions were adopted seriatim, on the 24th and 25th of May, by a decided majority of the Senate (varying from thirty-three to thirty-six [pg 44] yeas against from two to twenty-one nays), the Democrats, both Northern and Southern, sustaining them unitedly, with the exception of one adverse vote (that of Mr. Pugh, of Ohio) on the fourth and sixth resolutions. The Republicans all voted against them or refrained from voting at all, except that Mr. Teneyck, of New Jersey, voted for the fifth and seventh of the series. Mr. Douglas, the leader if not the author of ”popular sovereignty,” was absent on account of illness, and there were a few other absentees.
The conclusion of a speech, in reply to Mr. Douglas, a few days before the vote was taken on these resolutions, is introduced here as the best evidence of the position of the author at that period of excitement and agitation:
Conclusion of Reply to Mr. Douglas, May 17, 1860.