Part 49 (1/2)

These proposals prove that by the evening of July 29 Germany regarded war as imminent[553]. But why? Even in the East matters did not as yet threaten such a conflict. Russia had declared that Servia was not to be made a va.s.sal of the Hapsburgs; and, to give effect to that declaration, she had mobilised the southern and eastern portions of her forces as a retort to a similar partial mobilisation by Austria. But neither Russia nor, perhaps, Austria wished for, or expected, a European war[554].

Austria seems to have expected a _limited_ war, _i.e._ only with the Serbs. She denied that the Russians had any right to intervene so long as she did not annex Serb land. Her aim was to reduce the Serbs to va.s.salage, and she expected Germany successfully to prevent Russia's intervention, as in 1909[555]. The German proposals of July 29 are the first clear sign of a general conflict; for they presumed the probability of a war with France in which Belgium, and perhaps England, might be involved while Holland would be left alone. In the course of his remarks the Chancellor said that ”he had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany”--a reference to the German offers of 1912 described in this chapter. As at that time the Chancellor sought to tie our hands in view of any action by Germany, so, too, at present his object clearly was to preclude the possibility of our stirring on behalf of Belgium. Both Goschen and Grey must have seen the snare. The former referred the proposals to Grey, who of course decisively refused them.

[Footnote 553: M. Jules Cambon telegraphed from Berlin to his Government on July 30 that late on July 29 Germany had ordered mobilisation, but countermanded it in view of the reserve of Sir Edward Goschen as to England's att.i.tude, and owing to the Tsar's telegram of July 29 to the Kaiser. Berlin papers which had announced the mobilisation were seized.

All measures preliminary to mobilisation had been taken (French Yellow Book, No. 107; German White Book, No. 21).]

[Footnote 554: Russian Orange Book, Nos. 25, 40, 43, 58.]

[Footnote 555: Austrian ”Rotbuch,” Nos. 28, 31, 44; Brit. White Paper, Nos. 91-97, 161. _J'accuse_ (III. A) goes too far in accusing Austria of consciously provoking a European War; for, as I have shown, she wished on August 1 to continue negotiations with Russia. The retort that she did so only when she knew that Germany was about to throw down the gauntlet, seems to me far-fetched. Besides, Austria was not ready; Germany was.]

This was the first of Grey's actions which betokened tension with Germany. Up to the 28th his efforts for peace had seemed not unlikely to be crowned with success. On July 20, that is three days before Austria precipitated the crisis, he begged the Berlin Government to seek to moderate her demands on Servia. The day after the Austrian Note he urged a Conference between France and England on one side and Germany and Italy on the other so as to counsel moderation to their respective Allies, Russia and Austria. It was Germany and Austria who negatived this by their acts of the 28th. Still Grey worked for peace, with the approval of Russia, and, on July 30 to August 1, of Austria. But on July 31 and August 1 occurred events which frustrated these efforts. On July 31 the Berlin Government, hearing of the complete mobilisation by Russia (a retort to the similar proceeding of Austria a few hours earlier), sent a stiff demand to Petrograd for demobilisation within twelve hours; also to Paris for a reply within eighteen hours whether it would remain neutral in case of a Russo-German War.

Here we must pause to notice that to ask Russia to demobilise, without requiring the same measure from Austria, was manifestly unjust. Russia could not have a.s.sented without occupying an inferior position to Austria. If Germany had desired peace, she would have suggested the same action for each of the disputants. Further, while blaming the Russians for mobilising, she herself had taken all the preliminary steps, including what is called _Kriegsgefahr_, which made her army far better prepared for war than mobilisation itself did for the Russian Empire in view of its comparatively undeveloped railway system. Again, if the Kaiser wished to avoid war, why did he not agree to await the arrival (on August 1) of the special envoy, Tatisheff, whom, on the night of July 30, the Tsar had despatched to Berlin[556]? There is not a single sign that the Berlin Government really feared ”the Eastern Colossus,”

though statements as to ”the eastern peril” were very serviceable in frightening German Socialists into line.

[Footnote 556: German White Book, No. 23_a_; _J'accuse_, Section III. B, pp. 153, 164 (German edit.), shows that the German White Book suppressed the Tsar's second telegram of July 29 to the Kaiser, inviting him to refer the Austro-Serb dispute to the Hague Tribunal. (See, too, J.W.

Headlam, _History of Twelve Days,_ p. 183.)]

The German ultimatum failed to cow Russia; and as she returned no answer, the Kaiser declared war on August 1. He added by telegram that he had sought, _in accord with England,_ to mediate between Russia and Austria, but the Russian mobilisation led to his present action. In reply to the German demand at Paris the French Premier, M. Viviani, declared on August 1 at 1 P.M. that France would do that ”which her interests dictated”--an evasive reply designed to gain time and to see what course Russia would take. The Kaiser having declared war on Russia, France had no alternative but to come to the a.s.sistance of her Ally. But the Kaiser's declaration of war against France did not reach Paris until August 3 at 6.45 P.M.[557] His aim was to leave France and Belgium in doubt as to his intentions, and meanwhile to ma.s.s overwhelming forces on their borders, especially that of Belgium.

[Footnote 557: German White Book, Nos. 26, 27; French Yellow Book, No.

147.]

Meanwhile, on August 1, German officials detained and confiscated the cargoes of a few British s.h.i.+ps. On August 2 German troops violated the neutrality of Luxemburg. On the same day Sir Edward Grey a.s.sured the French amba.s.sador, M. Paul Cambon, that if the German fleet attacked that of France or her coasts, the British fleet would afford protection.

This a.s.surance depended, however, on the sanction of Parliament. It is practically certain that Parliament would have sanctioned this proceeding; and, if so, war would have come about owing to the naval understanding with France[558], that is, if Germany chose to disregard it. But another incident brought matters to a clearer issue. On August 3, German troops entered Belgium, though on the previous day the German amba.s.sador had a.s.sured the Government of King Albert that no such step would be taken. The pretext now was that the French were about to invade Belgium, as to which there was then, and has not been since, any proof whatever.

[Footnote 558: British White Paper, No. 105 and _Enclosures_, also No.

116.]

Here we must go back in order to understand the action of the British, French, and German Governments. They and all the Powers had signed the treaty of 1839 guaranteeing the independence of Belgium; and nothing had occurred since to end their engagement. The German proposals of July 29, 1914, having alarmed Sir Edward Grey, he required both from Paris and Berlin a.s.surances that neither Power would invade Belgium. That of France on August 1 was clear and satisfactory. On July 31 the German Secretary of State, von Jagow, declined to give a reply, because ”any reply they [the Emperor and Chancellor] might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing.” As on August 2 the official a.s.surances of the German amba.s.sador at Brussels were satisfactory, the British Foreign Office seems to have felt no great alarm on this topic. But at 7 P.M. of that evening the same amba.s.sador presented a note from his Government demanding the right to march its troops into Belgium in order to prevent a similar measure by the French. On the morrow Belgium protested against this act, and denied the rumour as to French action. King Albert also telegraphed to King George asking for the help of the United Kingdom.