Part 48 (1/2)
Further than this it refused to go; and Mr. Asquith in his speech of October 2, 1914, at Cardiff thus explained the reason:
They [the Germans] wanted us to go further. They asked us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of Germany being engaged in war, and this, mark you, at a time when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and defensive resources, and especially upon the sea. They asked us (to put it quite plainly) for a free hand, so far as we were concerned, when they selected the opportunity to overbear, to dominate, the European World. To such a demand, but one answer was possible, and that was the answer we gave[537].
[Footnote 537: See _Times_ of October 3, 1914, and July 20, 1915 (with quotations from the _North German Gazette_). Bethmann-Hollweg declared to the Reichstag, on August 19, 1915, that Asquith's statement was false; but in a letter published on August 26, and an official statement of September 1, 1915, Sir E. Grey convincingly refuted him.]
Thus, efforts for a good understanding with Germany broke down owing to the exacting demands of German diplomacy for our neutrality in all circ.u.mstances (including, of course, a German invasion of Belgium).
Thereupon she proceeded with a new Navy Act (the fifth in fourteen years) for a large increase in construction[538].
[Footnote 538: Castle and Hurd, _German Naval Power_, pp. 142-152.]
Perhaps Germany would have been more conciliatory if she had foreseen the events of the following autumn. As has already appeared, Italy's attack upon the Turks (coinciding with difficulties which their rigour raised up) furnished the opportunity--for which the Balkan States had been longing--to shake off the Turkish yoke. On March 13, 1912, Servia and Bulgaria framed a secret treaty of alliance against Turkey, which contained conditions as to joint action against Austria or Roumania, if they attacked, and a general understanding as to the part.i.tion of Macedonia. Greece came into the agreement later[539]. No time was fixed for action against Turkey; but in view of her obstinacy and intolerance action was inevitable. She precipitated matters by ma.s.sacring Christians in and on the borders of Macedonia. Thereupon the three States and Montenegro demanded the enforcement of the reforms and toleration guaranteed by the Treaty of Berlin (see p. 242). The Turks having as usual temporised (though they were still at war with Italy[540]), the four States demanded complete autonomy and the reconstruction of frontiers according to racial needs. Both sides rejected the joint offers of Austria and Russia for friendly intervention; whereupon Turkey declared war upon Bulgaria and Servia (October 17). On the morrow Greece declared war upon her. Montenegro had already opened hostilities. In view of these facts, the later a.s.sertions of the German Powers, that the Balkan League was a Russian plot for overthrowing Turkey and weakening Teutonic influence, is palpably false. Turkey had treated her Christian subjects (including the once faithful Albanians) worse than ever. Their union against Turkey had long been foretold. It was helped on by Ottoman misrule, and finally cemented by ma.s.sacre. Further, Russia and Austria acted together in seeking to avert an attack on Turkey; and the Powers collectively warned the Balkan States that no changes of boundary would be tolerated. Those States refused to accept the European fiat; for the present misrule was intolerable, and the inability of the Turks to cope with either the Italians or the Albanian rebels opened a vista of hope. The German accusations levelled at Russia were obviously part of the general scheme adopted at Berlin and Vienna for exasperating public opinion against the Slav cause.
[Footnote 539: The claim that the Greek statesman, Venizelos, founded the league seems incorrect. So, too, is the rumour that Russia, through her minister, Hartvig, at Belgrade, framed it (but see N. Jorga, _Hist.
des etats balcaniques_, p. 436). Miliukoff, in a ”Report to the Carnegie Foundation,” denies this. The plan occurred to many men so soon as Turkish Reform proved a sham. Venizelos is said to have mooted it to Mr.
James Bourchier in May 1911. (R. Rankin, _Inner History of the Balkan War_, p. 13.)]
[Footnote 540: Italy made peace on October 15, gaining possession of Tripoli and agreeing to evacuate the Aegean Isles, but on various pretexts kept her troops there. A little later she renewed the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria for five years. This may have resulted from the Balkan crisis then beginning, and from the visits of the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonoff, to Paris and London, whereupon it was officially stated that Russia adhered both to her treaty with France and her Entente with England. He added that the grouping of the great States was necessary in the interests of the Balance of Power.]
The Balkan States, though waging war with no combined aim, speedily overthrew the Turks in the most dramatic and decisive conflict of our age. The Greeks entered Salonica on November 8 (a Bulgarian force a few days later); on November 18 the Servians occupied Monastir, and the Albanian seaport, Durazzo, at the end of the month. The Bulgar army meanwhile drove the Turks southwards in headlong rout until in the third week of November the fortified Tchataldja Lines opposed an invincible obstacle. There, on December 3, all the belligerents, except Greece, concluded an armistice, and negotiations for peace were begun at London on December 16. Up to January 22, 1913, Turkey seemed inclined towards peace; but on the morrow a revolution took place at Constantinople, the Ministry of Kiamil Pacha being ousted by the warlike faction of Enver Bey. He, one of the contrivers of the revolution of July 1908, had since been attached to the Turkish Emba.s.sy at Berlin; and his successful coup was a triumph of German influence. The Peace Conference at London broke up on February 1. In March the Greeks and Bulgars captured Janina and Adrianople respectively, while Scutari fell to the Montenegrins (April 22). The Powers (Russia included) demanded the evacuation of this town by Montenegro; for they had decided to const.i.tute Albania (the most turbulent part of the Peninsula) an independent State, including Scutari.
In Albania, as elsewhere, the feuds of rival races had drenched the Balkan lands with blood; Greek and Bulgar forces had fought near Salonica, and there seemed slight chance of a peaceful settlement in Central Macedonia. That chance disappeared when the Powers in the resumed Peace Conference at London persisted in ruling the Serbs and Montenegrins out of Albania, a decision obviously dictated by the longings of Austria and Italy to gain that land at a convenient opportunity. This blow to Servia's aspirations aroused pa.s.sionate resentment both there and in Russia. Finally the Serbs gave way, and claimed a far larger part of Macedonia than had been mapped out in their agreement with Bulgaria prior to the war. Hence arose strifes between their forces, in which the Greeks also sided against the Bulgars.
Meanwhile, the London Conference of the Powers and the Balkan States framed terms of peace, which were largely due to the influence of Sir Edward Grey[541].
[Footnote 541: See _Times_ of May 30, 1913; Rankin, _op. cit._ p. 517.]
They may be disregarded here; for they were soon disregarded by all the Balkan States. Seeking to steal a march upon their rivals, the Bulgar forces (it is said on the instigation of their King and his unofficial advisers) made a sudden and treacherous attack. Now, the dour, pus.h.i.+ng Bulgars are the most unpopular race in the Peninsula. Therefore not only Serbs and Greeks, but also Roumanians and Turks turned savagely upon them[542]. Overwhelmed on all sides, Bulgaria sued for peace; and again the Great Powers had to revise terms that they had declared to be final.
Ultimately, on August 10, 1913, the Peace of Bukharest was signed. It imposed the present boundaries of the Balkan States, and left them furious but helpless to resist a policy known to have been dictated largely from Vienna and Berlin. In May 1914 a warm friend of the Balkan peoples thus described its effects: ”No permanent solution of the Balkan Question has been arrived at. The ethnographical questions have been ignored. A portion of each race has been handed over to be ruled by another which it detests. Servia has acquired a population which is mostly Bulgar and Albanian, though of the latter she has ma.s.sacred and expelled many thousands. Bulgars have been captured by Greeks, Greeks by Bulgars, Albanians by Greeks, and not one of these races has as yet shown signs of being capable to rule another justly. The seeds have been sown of hatreds that will grow and bear fruit[543].” Especially lamentable were the recovery of the Adrianople district by the Turks and the unprovoked seizure of the purely Bulgar district south of Silistria by Roumania. On the other hand, Kaiser William thus congratulated her king, Charles (a Hohenzollern), on the peace, a ”splendid result, for which not only your own people but all the belligerent States and the whole of Europe have to thank your wise and truly statesmanlike policy.
At the same time your mentioning that I have been able to contribute to what has been achieved is a great satisfaction to me. I rejoice at our mutual co-operation in the cause of peace.”
[Footnote 542: Roumania's sudden intervention annoyed Austria, who had hoped for a longer and more exhausting war in the Balkans.]
[Footnote 543: Edith Durham, _The Struggle for Scutari_, p. 315.]
This telegram, following the trend of Austro-German policy, sought to win back Roumania to the Central Powers, from which she had of late sheered off. In other respects the Peace of Bukharest was a notable triumph for Austria and Germany. Not only had they rendered impossible a speedy revival of the Balkan League which had barred their expansion towards the Levant, but they bolstered up the Ottoman Power when its extrusion from Europe seemed imminent. They also exhausted Servia, reduced Bulgaria to ruin, and imposed on Albania a German prince, William of Wied, an officer in the Prussian army, who was destined to view his princ.i.p.ality from the quarter-deck of his yacht. Such was the Treaty of Bukharest. Besides dealing a severe blow to the Slav cause, it perpetuated the recent infamous spoliations and challenged every one concerned to further conflicts. Within a year the whole of the Continent was in flames.
CHAPTER XXIII
THE CRISIS OF 1914
”We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether this country would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history and thus become partic.i.p.ators in the sin.”--GLADSTONE:
Speech of August 1870.
The Prussian and German Army Bills of 1860 and onwards have tended to make military preparedness a weighty factor in the recent development of nations; and the issue of events has too often been determined, not by the justice of a cause, but rather by the armed strength at the back of it. We must therefore glance at the military and naval preparations which enabled the Central Powers to win their perilous triumph over Russia and the Slavs of the Balkans. In April 1912 the German Chancellor introduced to the Reichstag Army and Navy Bills (pa.s.sed on May 21) providing for great increases in the navy, also forces amounting to two new army corps, and that, too, though Germany's financial position was admitted to be ”very serious,” and the proposed measures merely precautionary. Nevertheless, only Socialists, Poles, and Alsatians voted against them. But the events of the first Balkan War were cited as menacing Germany with a conflict in which she ”might have to protect, against several enemies, frontiers which are extended and by nature to a large extent open.” A new Army Bill was therefore introduced in March 1913 (pa.s.sed in June), which increased the total of the forces by 145,000, and raised their peace strength in 1914 to more than 870,000 men. The Chancellor referred gratefully to ”the extraordinary ability and spirit of conciliation” of Sir Edward Grey during the Conference at London, and admitted that a collision between Germans and Slavs was not inevitable; but Germany must take precautions, this, too, at a time when Russia and Austria agreed to place their forces again on a peace footing. Germany, far from relaxing her efforts after the sharp rebuff to the Slavonic cause in the summer of 1913, continued her military policy. It caused grave apprehension, especially as the new drastic taxes (estimated to produce 50,000,000) were loudly declared a burden that could not long be borne. As to the naval proposals, the Chancellor commended Mr. Churchill's suggestion (on March 26) of a ”naval holiday,”
but said there were many difficulties in the way.
The British Naval Budget of 1912 had provided for a six years' programme of 25 _Dreadnoughts_ against Germany's 14; and for every extra German s.h.i.+p two British would be added. In March 1913 this was continued, with the offer of a ”holiday” for 1914 if Germany would soon accept. No acceptance came. The peace strength of the British Regular Army was reckoned early in 1914 at 156,000 men, with about 250,000 effective Territorials.