Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 101 (2/2)
Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to happiness: because virtue is ”the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best,” as stated in _Phys._ vii, text. 17. Now prudence is ”right reason about things to be done,” whereby man is brought to happiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man attains happiness. Therefore prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom.
Obj. 3: Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems to be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs, which are the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14): because Divine things are incomprehensible, according to Job 26:26: ”Behold G.o.d is great, exceeding our knowledge.”
Therefore science is a greater virtue than wisdom.
Obj. 4: Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from indemonstrable principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is a greater virtue than wisdom.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that wisdom is ”the head” among ”the intellectual virtues.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom surpa.s.ses the objects of all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom considers the Supreme Cause, which is G.o.d, as stated at the beginning of the _Metaphysics._ And since it is by the cause that we judge of an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects; hence it is that wisdom exercises judgment over all the other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect of them all.
Reply Obj. 1: Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater virtue than wisdom, ”unless,” as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 7, ”man were the greatest thing in the world.” Wherefore we must say, as stated in the same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not command wisdom, but vice versa: because ”the spiritual man judgeth all things; and he himself is judged by no man” (1 Cor. 2:15). For prudence has no business with supreme matters which are the object of wisdom: but its command covers things directed to wisdom, viz. how men are to obtain wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political science, is, in this way, the servant of wisdom; for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king.
Reply Obj. 2: Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz. the Supreme Intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness in the act of wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in respect of its princ.i.p.al object, which is G.o.d, it follows that the act of wisdom is a beginning or partic.i.p.ation of future happiness, so that wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness.
Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 1), ”one knowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a higher object, or because it is more certain.” Hence if the objects be equally good and sublime, that virtue will be greater which possesses more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about a higher and better object, is preferable to that which is more certain about an object of inferior degree. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 60) that ”it is a great thing to be able to know something about celestial beings, though it be based on weak and probable reasoning”; and again (De Part. Animal. i, 5) that ”it is better to know a little about sublime things, than much about mean things.” Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about G.o.d pertains, is beyond the reach of man, especially in this life, so as to be his possession: for this ”belongs to G.o.d alone” (Metaph. i, 2): and yet this little knowledge about G.o.d which we can have through wisdom is preferable to all other knowledge.
Reply Obj. 4: The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know what is a whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles are const.i.tuted, is the function of wisdom: since universal being is the proper effect of the Supreme Cause, which is G.o.d. And so wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding, not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do, but also by pa.s.sing its judgment on them, and by vindicating them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 6]
Whether Charity Is the Greatest of the Theological Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the theological virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while hope and charity are in the appet.i.tive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral virtue. Now intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident above (Q. 62, A. 3). Therefore faith is greater than hope and charity.
Obj. 2: Further, when two things are added together, the result is greater than either one. Now hope results from something added to charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward to the beloved. Therefore hope is greater than charity.
Obj. 3: Further, a cause is more n.o.ble than its effect. Now faith and hope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on Matt. 1:3 says that ”faith begets hope, and hope charity.” Therefore faith and hope are greater than charity.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): ”Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the three theological virtues look at G.o.d as their proper object, it cannot be said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its having a greater object, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is greater than the others. Because the others, in their very nature, imply a certain distance from the object: since faith is of what is not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed. But the love of charity is of that which is already possessed: since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again, the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved; hence it is written (1 John 4:16): ”He that abideth in charity, abideth in G.o.d, and G.o.d in him.”
Reply Obj. 1: Faith and hope are not related to charity in the same way as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First, because the theological virtues have an object surpa.s.sing the human soul: whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things beneath man.
Now in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than to know them. Because knowledge is perfected by the known being in the knower: whereas love is perfected by the lover being drawn to the beloved. Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than in man: since a thing is contained according to the mode of the container. But it is the other way about in things beneath man.
Secondly, because prudence moderates the appet.i.tive movements pertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appet.i.tive movement tending to G.o.d, which movement belongs to the theological virtues: it only shows the object. And this appet.i.tive movement towards its object surpa.s.ses human knowledge, according to Eph. 3:19: ”The charity of Christ which surpa.s.seth all knowledge.”
Reply Obj. 2: Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who desires good, loves himself rather than something else. On the other hand, charity implies love of friends.h.i.+p, to which we are led by hope, as stated above (Q. 62, A. 4).
Reply Obj. 3: An efficient cause is more n.o.ble than its effect: but not a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more n.o.ble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in this way that faith begets hope, and hope charity: in the sense, to wit, that one is a disposition to the other.
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QUESTION 67
OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE (In Six Articles)
We must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?
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