Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 101 (1/2)
Therefore intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue.
_I answer that,_ A thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders something from being better simply, e.g. ”learning than riches,” and yet not better relatively, i.e. ”for one who is in want” [*Aristotle, _Topic._ iii.]. Now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in its proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes its species from its object, as explained above (Q. 54, A. 2; Q. 60, A. 1).
Hence, speaking simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the more excellent object. Now it is evident that the object of the reason is more excellent than the object of the appet.i.te: since the reason apprehends things in the universal, while the appet.i.te tends to things themselves, whose being is restricted to the particular.
Consequently, speaking simply, the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral virtues, which perfect the appet.i.te.
But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue, which perfects the appet.i.te, whose function it is to move the other powers to act, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1), is more excellent. And since virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for it is the perfection of a power, it follows again that the nature of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue, though the intellectual virtues are more excellent habits, simply speaking.
Reply Obj. 1: The moral virtues are more lasting than the intellectual virtues, because they are practised in matters pertaining to the life of the community. Yet it is evident that the objects of the sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more lasting than the objects of moral virtue, which are certain particular matters of action. That the moral virtues are more necessary for human life, proves that they are more excellent, not simply, but relatively. Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues, from the very fact that they are not referred to something else, as a useful thing is referred to an end, are more excellent. The reason for this is that in them we have a kind of beginning of that happiness which consists in the knowledge of truth, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 6).
Reply Obj. 2: The reason why man is said to be good simply, in respect of moral virtue, but not in respect of intellectual virtue, is because the appet.i.te moves the other powers to their acts, as stated above (Q. 56, A. 3). Wherefore this argument, too, proves merely that moral virtue is better relatively.
Reply Obj. 3: Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the choice of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the end of each moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue; which mean is appointed according to the right ruling of prudence, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6; vi, 13.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 4]
Whether Justice Is the Chief of the Moral Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral virtues. For it is better to give of one's own than to pay what is due. Now the former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice.
Therefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than justice.
Obj. 2: Further, the chief quality of a thing is, seemingly, that in which it is most perfect. Now, according to Jam. 1:4, ”Patience hath a perfect work.” Therefore it would seem that patience is greater than justice.
Obj. 3: Further, ”Magnanimity has a great influence on every virtue,”
as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3. Therefore it magnifies even justice.
Therefore it is greater than justice.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that ”justice is the most excellent of the virtues.”
_I answer that,_ A virtue considered in its species may be greater or less, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater simply, whereby a greater rational good s.h.i.+nes forth, as stated above (A. 1). In this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by considering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is the will, and the will is the rational appet.i.te, as stated above (Q.
8, A. 1; Q. 26, A. 1): its object or matter, because it is about operations, whereby man is set in order not only in himself, but also in regard to another. Hence ”justice is the most excellent of virtues” (Ethic. v, 1). Among the other moral virtues, which are about the pa.s.sions, the more excellent the matter in which the appet.i.tive movement is subjected to reason, so much the more does the rational good s.h.i.+ne forth in each. Now in things touching man, the chief of all is life, on which all other things depend. Consequently fort.i.tude which subjects the appet.i.tive movement to reason in matters of life and death, holds the first place among those moral virtues that are about the pa.s.sions, but is subordinate to justice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. 1) that ”those virtues must needs be greatest which receive the most praise: since virtue is a power of doing good.
Hence the brave man and the just man are honored more than others; because the former,” i.e. fort.i.tude, ”is useful in war, and the latter,” i.e. justice, ”both in war and in peace.” After fort.i.tude comes temperance, which subjects the appet.i.te to reason in matters directly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one species, viz. in matters of food and of s.e.x. And so these three virtues, together with prudence, are called princ.i.p.al virtues, in excellence also.
A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping or adorning a princ.i.p.al virtue: even as substance is more excellent simply than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is more excellent than substance in so far as it perfects substance in some accidental mode of being.
Reply Obj. 1: The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of justice, for ”a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his own” (Polit. ii, 3). Hence there could be no liberality apart from justice, which discerns between ”meum” and ”tuum”: whereas justice can be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than liberality, as being more universal, and as being its foundation: while liberality is greater relatively since it is an ornament and an addition to justice.
Reply Obj. 2: Patience is said to have ”a perfect work,” by enduring evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness; but also inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it is more perfect and excellent through plucking up the root in this matter. It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues simply. Because fort.i.tude not only endures trouble without being disturbed, but also fights against it if necessary. Hence whoever is brave is patient; but the converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fort.i.tude.
Reply Obj. 3: There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3. Hence it is compared to them as their ornament, so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but not simply.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 5]
Whether Wisdom Is the Greatest of the Intellectual Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one commanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in _Ethic._ i, 2 that political science, which belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 8), ”orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, and to which of these each individual should devote himself, and to what extent.” Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems that prudence is greater than wisdom.