Part 4 (2/2)

How does social cooperation change things so that the same ent.i.tlement principles that apply to the noncooperative cases become inapplicable or inappropriate to cooperative ones? It might be said that one cannot disentangle the contributions of distinct one cannot disentangle the contributions of distinct individuals who cooperate; everything is everyone's joint product. On this joint product, or on any portion of it, each person plausibly will make claims of equal strength; all have an equally good claim, or at any rate no person has a distinctly better claim than any other. Somehow (this line of thought continues), it must be decided how this total product of joint social cooperation (to which individual ent.i.tlements do not apply differentially) is to be divided up: this is the problem of distributive justice. individuals who cooperate; everything is everyone's joint product. On this joint product, or on any portion of it, each person plausibly will make claims of equal strength; all have an equally good claim, or at any rate no person has a distinctly better claim than any other. Somehow (this line of thought continues), it must be decided how this total product of joint social cooperation (to which individual ent.i.tlements do not apply differentially) is to be divided up: this is the problem of distributive justice.

Don't individual ent.i.tlements apply to parts of the cooperatively produced product? First, suppose that social cooperation is based upon division of labor, specialization, comparative advantage, and exchange; each person works singly to transform some input he receives, contracting with others who further transform or transport his product until it reaches its ultimate consumer. People cooperate in making things but they work separately; each person is a miniature firm.18 The products of each person are easily identifiable, and exchanges are made in open markets with prices set compet.i.tively, given informational constraints, and so forth. In such a system of social cooperation, what is the task of a theory of justice? It might be said that whatever holdings result will depend upon the exchange ratios or prices at which exchanges are made, and therefore that the task of a theory of justice is to set criteria for ”fair prices.” This is hardly the place to trace the serpentine windings of theories of a just price. It is difficult to see why these issues should even arise here. People are choosing to make exchanges with other people and to transfer ent.i.tlements, with no restrictions on their freedom to trade with any other party at any mutually acceptable ratio. The products of each person are easily identifiable, and exchanges are made in open markets with prices set compet.i.tively, given informational constraints, and so forth. In such a system of social cooperation, what is the task of a theory of justice? It might be said that whatever holdings result will depend upon the exchange ratios or prices at which exchanges are made, and therefore that the task of a theory of justice is to set criteria for ”fair prices.” This is hardly the place to trace the serpentine windings of theories of a just price. It is difficult to see why these issues should even arise here. People are choosing to make exchanges with other people and to transfer ent.i.tlements, with no restrictions on their freedom to trade with any other party at any mutually acceptable ratio.19 Why does such sequential social cooperation, linked together by people's voluntary exchanges, raise any special problems about how things are to be distributed? Why isn't the appropriate (a not inappropriate) set of holdings just the one which Why does such sequential social cooperation, linked together by people's voluntary exchanges, raise any special problems about how things are to be distributed? Why isn't the appropriate (a not inappropriate) set of holdings just the one which actually occurs actually occurs via this process of mutually-agreed-to exchanges whereby people choose to give to others what they are ent.i.tled to give or hold? via this process of mutually-agreed-to exchanges whereby people choose to give to others what they are ent.i.tled to give or hold?

Let us now drop our a.s.sumption that people work independently, cooperating only in sequence via voluntary exchanges, and instead consider people who work together jointly to produce something. Is it now impossible to disentangle people's respective contributions? The question here is not whether marginal productivity theory is an appropriate theory of fair or just shares, but whether there is some coherent notion of identifiable marginal product. It seems unlikely that Rawls' theory rests on the strong claim that there is no such reasonably serviceable notion. Anyway, once again we have a situation of a large number of bilateral exchanges: owners of resources reaching separate agreements with entrepreneurs about the use of their resources, entrepreneurs reaching agreements with individual workers, or groups of workers first reaching some joint agreement and then presenting a package to an entrepreneur, and so forth. People transfer their holdings or labor in free markets, with the exchange ratios (prices) determined in the usual manner. If marginal productivity theory is reasonably adequate, people will be receiving, in these voluntary transfers of holdings, roughly their marginal products.ax But if the notion of marginal product were so ineffective that factors' marginal products in actual situations of joint production could not be identified by hirers or purchasers of the factors, then the resulting distribution to factors would not be patterned in accordance with marginal product. Someone who viewed marginal productivity theory, where it was applicable, as a patterned theory of justice, as a patterned theory of justice, might think that such situations of joint production and indeterminate marginal product provided an opportunity for some theory of justice to enter to determine appropriate exchange ratios. But an ent.i.tlement theorist would find acceptable whatever distribution resulted from the party's voluntary exchanges. might think that such situations of joint production and indeterminate marginal product provided an opportunity for some theory of justice to enter to determine appropriate exchange ratios. But an ent.i.tlement theorist would find acceptable whatever distribution resulted from the party's voluntary exchanges. ay ay The questions about the workability of marginal productivity theory are intricate ones. The questions about the workability of marginal productivity theory are intricate ones.20 Let us merely note here the strong personal incentive for owners of resources to converge to the marginal product, and the strong market pressures tending to produce this result. Employers of factors of productions are not all dolts who don't know what they're doing, transferring holdings they value to others on an irrational and arbitrary basis. Indeed, Rawls' position on inequalities requires that separate contributions to joint products be isolable, to some extent at least. For Rawls goes out of his way to argue that inequalities are justified if they serve to raise the position of the worst-off group in the society, if without the inequalities the worst-off group would be even more worse off. These serviceable inequalities stem, at least in part, from the necessity to provide incentives to certain people to perform various activities or fill various roles that not everyone can do equally well. (Rawls is Let us merely note here the strong personal incentive for owners of resources to converge to the marginal product, and the strong market pressures tending to produce this result. Employers of factors of productions are not all dolts who don't know what they're doing, transferring holdings they value to others on an irrational and arbitrary basis. Indeed, Rawls' position on inequalities requires that separate contributions to joint products be isolable, to some extent at least. For Rawls goes out of his way to argue that inequalities are justified if they serve to raise the position of the worst-off group in the society, if without the inequalities the worst-off group would be even more worse off. These serviceable inequalities stem, at least in part, from the necessity to provide incentives to certain people to perform various activities or fill various roles that not everyone can do equally well. (Rawls is not not imagining that inequalities are needed to fill positions that everyone can do equally well, or that the most drudgery-filled positions that require the least skill will command the highest income.) But imagining that inequalities are needed to fill positions that everyone can do equally well, or that the most drudgery-filled positions that require the least skill will command the highest income.) But to whom to whom are the incentives to be paid? To which performers of what activities? When it is necessary to provide incentives to some to perform their productive activities, there is no talk of a joint social product from which no individual's contribution can be disentangled. If the product was all that are the incentives to be paid? To which performers of what activities? When it is necessary to provide incentives to some to perform their productive activities, there is no talk of a joint social product from which no individual's contribution can be disentangled. If the product was all that inextricably joint, it couldn't be known that the extra incentives were going to the crucial persons; and it couldn't be known that the additional product produced by these now motivated people is greater than the expenditure to them in incentives. So it couldn't be known whether the provision of incentives was efficient or not, whether it involved a net gain or a net loss. But Rawls' discussion of justifiable inequalities presupposes that these things can be known. And so the claim we have imagined about the indivisible, nonpart.i.tionable nature of the joint product is seen to dissolve, leaving the reasons for the view that social cooperation creates special problems of distributive justice otherwise not present, unclear if not mysterious.

TERMS OF COOPERATION AND THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE.

Another entry into the issue of the connection of social cooperation with distributive shares brings us to grips with Rawls' actual discussion. Rawls imagines rational, mutually disinterested individuals meeting in a certain situation, or abstracted from their other features not provided for in this situation. In this hypothetical situation of choice, which Rawls calls ”the original position,” they choose the first principles of a conception of justice that is to regulate all subsequent criticism and reform of their inst.i.tutions. While making this choice, no one knows his place in society, his cla.s.s position or social status, or his natural a.s.sets and abilities, his strength, intelligence, and so forth.

The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circ.u.mstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.21

What would persons in the original position agree to?

Persons in the initial situation would choose two ... principles: the first requires equality in the a.s.signment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic inequalities, for example, inequalities of wealth and authority are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society. These principles rule out justifying inst.i.tutions on the grounds that the hards.h.i.+ps of some are offset by a greater good in the aggregate. It may be expedient but it is not just that some should have less in order that others may prosper. But there is no injustice in the greater benefits earned by a few provided that the situation of persons not so fortunate is thereby improved. The intuitive idea is that since everyone's well-being depends upon a scheme of cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory life, the division of advantages should be such as to draw forth the willing cooperation of everyone taking part in it, including those less well situated. Yet this can be expected only if reasonable terms are proposed. The two principles mentioned seem to be a fair agreement on the basis of which those better endowed, or more fortunate in their social position, neither of which we can be said to deserve, could expect the willing cooperation of others when some workable scheme is a necessary condition of the welfare of all.22

This second principle, which Rawls specifies as the difference principle, holds that the inst.i.tutional structure is to be so designed that the worst-off group under it is at least as well off as the worst-off group (not necessarily the same group) would be under any alternative inst.i.tutional structure. If persons in the original position follow the minimax policy in making the significant choice of principles of justice, Rawls argues, they will choose the difference principle. Our concern here is not whether persons in the position Rawls describes actually would minimax and actually would choose the particular principles Rawls specifies. Still, we should question why individuals in the original position would choose a principle that focuses upon groups, rather than individuals. Won't application of the minimax principle lead each person in the original position to favor maximizing the position of the worst-off individual? individual? To be sure, this principle would reduce questions of evaluating social inst.i.tutions to the issue of how the unhappiest depressive fares. Yet avoiding this by moving the focus to groups (or representative individuals) seems To be sure, this principle would reduce questions of evaluating social inst.i.tutions to the issue of how the unhappiest depressive fares. Yet avoiding this by moving the focus to groups (or representative individuals) seems ad hoc, ad hoc, and is inadequately motivated for those in the individual position. and is inadequately motivated for those in the individual position.23 Nor is it clear which groups are appropriately considered; why exclude the group of depressives or alcoholics or the representative paraplegic? Nor is it clear which groups are appropriately considered; why exclude the group of depressives or alcoholics or the representative paraplegic?

If the difference principle is not satisfied by some inst.i.tutional structure J, then under J J some group some group G G is worse off than it would be under another inst.i.tutional structure is worse off than it would be under another inst.i.tutional structure I I that satisfies the principle. If another group F is better off under that satisfies the principle. If another group F is better off under J J than it would be under the than it would be under the I I favored by the difference principle, is this sufficient to say that under favored by the difference principle, is this sufficient to say that under J J ”some ... have less in order that others may prosper”? (Here one would have in mind that ”some ... have less in order that others may prosper”? (Here one would have in mind that G G has less in order that has less in order that F F prosper. Could one also make the same statement about prosper. Could one also make the same statement about I? I? Does Does F F have less under have less under I I in order that in order that G G may prosper?) Suppose that in a society the following situation prevailed: may prosper?) Suppose that in a society the following situation prevailed: 1. Group G G has amount has amount A A and group and group F F has amount has amount B, B, with with B B greater than greater than A. A. Also things could be arranged differently so that Also things could be arranged differently so that G G would have more than A, and would have more than A, and F F would have less than B. (The different arrangement might involve a mechanism to transfer some holdings from F to G.) would have less than B. (The different arrangement might involve a mechanism to transfer some holdings from F to G.)Is this sufficient to say2. . G is badly off because F because F is well off; is well off; G G is badly off is badly off in order that F in order that F be well off; be well off; F's F's being well off makes being well off makes G G badly off; G is badly badly off; G is badly off on account of F's off on account of F's being well off; G is not better off being well off; G is not better off because of how because of how well off F is. well off F is.If so, does the truth of statement 2 depend on G's being in a worse position than F? There is yet another possible inst.i.tutional structure K that transfers holdings from the worse-off group G to F, F, making G even more worse off. Does the possibility making G even more worse off. Does the possibility of K of K make it true to say that, under make it true to say that, under J J, F F is not (even) better off because of how well off is not (even) better off because of how well off G G is? is?We do not normally hold that the truth of a subjunctive (as in 1) is alone sufficient for the truth of some indicative causal statement (as in 2). It would improve my life in various ways if you were to choose to become my devoted slave, supposing I could get over the initial discomfort. Is the cause of my present state your not becoming my slave? Because your enslaving yourself to a poorer person would improve his lot and worsen yours, are we to say that the poor person is badly off because you are as well off as you are; has he less in order that you may prosper? From3. . If P P were to do act A then Q would not be in situation S. were to do act A then Q would not be in situation S.we will conclude4. P's not doing A is responsible for Q's being in situation S; P's not doing A causes Q to be in S.only if we also also believe that believe that5. P ought to do act A, or P has a duty to do act A, or P has an obligation to do act A, and so forth.24 Thus the inference from 3 to 4, in this case, Thus the inference from 3 to 4, in this case, presupposes presupposes 5. One cannot argue from 3 to 4 as one step in order to get to 5. The statement that in a particular situation some have less in order that others may prosper is often based upon the very evaluation of a situation or an inst.i.tutional framework that it is introduced to support. Since this evaluation does not follow merely from the subjunctive (for example, 1 or 3) an independent argument must be produced for it. 5. One cannot argue from 3 to 4 as one step in order to get to 5. The statement that in a particular situation some have less in order that others may prosper is often based upon the very evaluation of a situation or an inst.i.tutional framework that it is introduced to support. Since this evaluation does not follow merely from the subjunctive (for example, 1 or 3) an independent argument must be produced for it. az azRawls holds, as we have seen, thatsince everyone's well-being depends upon a scheme of cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory life, the division of advantages should be such as to draw forth the willing coooperation of everyone taking part in it, including those less well situated. Yet this can be expected only if reasonable terms are proposed. The two principles mentioned seem to be a fair agreement on the basis of which those better endowed or more fortunate in their social position ... could expect the willing cooperation of others when some workable scheme is a necessary condition of the welfare of all.25 No doubt, the difference principle presents terms on the basis of which those less well endowed would be willing to cooperate. (What better better terms could they propose for themselves?) But is this a fair agreement on the basis of which those terms could they propose for themselves?) But is this a fair agreement on the basis of which those worse worse endowed could expect the endowed could expect the willing willing cooperation of others? With regard to the existence of gains from social cooperation, the situation is symmetrical. The better endowed gain by cooperating with the worse endowed, cooperation of others? With regard to the existence of gains from social cooperation, the situation is symmetrical. The better endowed gain by cooperating with the worse endowed, and and the worse endowed gain by cooperating with the better endowed. Yet the difference principle is not neutral between the better and the worse endowed. Whence the asymmetry? the worse endowed gain by cooperating with the better endowed. Yet the difference principle is not neutral between the better and the worse endowed. Whence the asymmetry?

Perhaps the symmetry is upset if one asks how much how much each gains from the social cooperation. This question might be understood in two ways. How much do people benefit from social cooperation, as compared to their individual holdings in a each gains from the social cooperation. This question might be understood in two ways. How much do people benefit from social cooperation, as compared to their individual holdings in a non noncooperative scheme? That is, how much is T Tt-St, for each individual i? Or, alternatively, how much does each individual gain from general social cooperation, as compared, not with no no cooperation, but with more limited cooperation? The latter is the more appropriate question with regard to general social cooperation. For failing general agreement on the principles to govern how the benefits of general social cooperation are to be held, not everyone will remain in a noncooperative situation if there is some other beneficial cooperative arrangement involving some, but not all, people, whose partic.i.p.ants can agree. These people will partic.i.p.ate in this more narrow cooperative arrangement. To focus upon the benefits of the better and the worse endowed cooperating together, we must try to imagine less extensive schemes of part.i.tioned social cooperation in which the better endowed cooperate only among themselves and the worse endowed cooperate only among themselves, with no cross-cooperation. The members of both groups gain from the internal cooperation within their respective groups and have larger shares than they would if there were no social cooperation at all. An individual benefits from the wider system of extensive cooperation between the better and the worse endowed to the extent of his incremental gain from this wider cooperation; namely, the amount by which his share under a scheme of general cooperation is greater than it would be under one of limited intragroup (but not cross-group) cooperation. General cooperation will be of more benefit to the better or to the worse endowed if (to pick a simple criterion) the mean incremental gain from general cooperation (when compared with limited intragroup cooperation) is greater in one group than it is in the other. cooperation, but with more limited cooperation? The latter is the more appropriate question with regard to general social cooperation. For failing general agreement on the principles to govern how the benefits of general social cooperation are to be held, not everyone will remain in a noncooperative situation if there is some other beneficial cooperative arrangement involving some, but not all, people, whose partic.i.p.ants can agree. These people will partic.i.p.ate in this more narrow cooperative arrangement. To focus upon the benefits of the better and the worse endowed cooperating together, we must try to imagine less extensive schemes of part.i.tioned social cooperation in which the better endowed cooperate only among themselves and the worse endowed cooperate only among themselves, with no cross-cooperation. The members of both groups gain from the internal cooperation within their respective groups and have larger shares than they would if there were no social cooperation at all. An individual benefits from the wider system of extensive cooperation between the better and the worse endowed to the extent of his incremental gain from this wider cooperation; namely, the amount by which his share under a scheme of general cooperation is greater than it would be under one of limited intragroup (but not cross-group) cooperation. General cooperation will be of more benefit to the better or to the worse endowed if (to pick a simple criterion) the mean incremental gain from general cooperation (when compared with limited intragroup cooperation) is greater in one group than it is in the other.

One might speculate about whether there is an inequality between the groups' mean incremental gains and, if so, which way it goes. If the better-endowed group includes those who manage to accomplish something of great economic advantage to others, such as new inventions, new ideas about production or ways of doing things, skill at economic tasks, and so on,ba it is difficult to avoid concluding that the it is difficult to avoid concluding that the less less well endowed gain more than the better endowed do from the scheme of general cooperation. What follows from this conclusion? I do not mean to imply that the better endowed should get even more than they get under the ent.i.tlement system of general social cooperation. well endowed gain more than the better endowed do from the scheme of general cooperation. What follows from this conclusion? I do not mean to imply that the better endowed should get even more than they get under the ent.i.tlement system of general social cooperation.bb What does follow from the conclusion is a deep suspicion of imposing, in the name of fairness, constraints upon voluntary social cooperation (and the set of holdings that arises from it) so that those already benefiting most from this general cooperation benefit even more! What does follow from the conclusion is a deep suspicion of imposing, in the name of fairness, constraints upon voluntary social cooperation (and the set of holdings that arises from it) so that those already benefiting most from this general cooperation benefit even more!

Rawls would have us imagine the worse-endowed persons say something like the following: ”Look, better endowed: you gain by cooperating with us. If you want our cooperation you'll have to accept reasonable terms. We suggest these terms: We'll cooperate with you only if we get as much as possible. as much as possible. That is, the terms of our cooperation should give us that maximal share such that, if it was tried to give us more, we'd end up with less.” How generous these proposed terms are might be seen by imagining that the better endowed make the almost symmetrical opposite proposal: ”Look, worse endowed: you gain by cooperating with That is, the terms of our cooperation should give us that maximal share such that, if it was tried to give us more, we'd end up with less.” How generous these proposed terms are might be seen by imagining that the better endowed make the almost symmetrical opposite proposal: ”Look, worse endowed: you gain by cooperating with us. us. If you want our cooperation you'll have to accept reasonable terms. We propose these terms: We'll cooperate with you so long as If you want our cooperation you'll have to accept reasonable terms. We propose these terms: We'll cooperate with you so long as we we get as much as possible. That is, the terms of our cooperation should give us the maximal share such that, if it was tried to give us more, we'd end up with less.” If these terms seem outrageous, as they are, why don't the terms proposed by those worse endowed seem the same? Why shouldn't the better endowed treat this latter proposal as beneath consideration, supposing someone to have the nerve explicitly to state it? get as much as possible. That is, the terms of our cooperation should give us the maximal share such that, if it was tried to give us more, we'd end up with less.” If these terms seem outrageous, as they are, why don't the terms proposed by those worse endowed seem the same? Why shouldn't the better endowed treat this latter proposal as beneath consideration, supposing someone to have the nerve explicitly to state it?

Rawls devotes much attention to explaining why those less well favored should not complain at receiving less. His explanation, simply put, is that because the inequality works for his advantage, someone less well favored shouldn't complain about it; he receives more more in the unequal system than he would in an equal one. (Though he might receive still more in another unequal system that placed someone else below him.) But Rawls discusses the question of whether those in the unequal system than he would in an equal one. (Though he might receive still more in another unequal system that placed someone else below him.) But Rawls discusses the question of whether those more more favored will or should find the terms satisfactory favored will or should find the terms satisfactory only only in the following pa.s.sage, where A and in the following pa.s.sage, where A and B B are any two representative men with A being the more favored: are any two representative men with A being the more favored: The difficulty is to show that A has no grounds for complaint. Perhaps he is required to have less than he might since his having more would result in some loss to B. B. Now what can be said to the more favored man? To begin with, it is clear that the well-being of each depends on a scheme of social cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory life. Secondly, we can ask for the willing cooperation of everyone only if the terms of the scheme are reasonable. The difference principle, then, seems to be a fair basis on which those better endowed, or more fortunate in their social circ.u.mstances, could expect others to collaborate with them when some workable arrangement is a necessary condition of the good of all. Now what can be said to the more favored man? To begin with, it is clear that the well-being of each depends on a scheme of social cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory life. Secondly, we can ask for the willing cooperation of everyone only if the terms of the scheme are reasonable. The difference principle, then, seems to be a fair basis on which those better endowed, or more fortunate in their social circ.u.mstances, could expect others to collaborate with them when some workable arrangement is a necessary condition of the good of all.26 What Rawls imagines being said to the more favored men does not show that these men have no grounds for complaint, nor does it at all diminish the weight of whatever complaints they have. That the well-being of all depends on social cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory life could also be said to the less well endowed by someone proposing any other principle, including that of maximizing the position of the best endowed. Similarly for the fact that we can ask for the willing cooperation of everyone only if the terms of the scheme are reasonable. The question is: What terms would be would be reasonable? What Rawls imagines being said thus far merely sets up his problem; it doesn't distinguish his proposed difference principle from the almost symmetrical counterproposal that we imagined the better endowed making, or from any other proposal. Thus, when Rawls continues, ”The difference principle, then, seems to be a fair basis on which those best endowed, or more fortunate in their social circ.u.mstances, could expect others to collaborate with them when some workable arrangment is a necessary condition of the good of all,” the presence of the ”then” in his sentence is puzzling. Since the sentences which precede it are neutral between his proposal and any other proposal, the conclusion that the difference principle presents a fair basis for cooperation reasonable? What Rawls imagines being said thus far merely sets up his problem; it doesn't distinguish his proposed difference principle from the almost symmetrical counterproposal that we imagined the better endowed making, or from any other proposal. Thus, when Rawls continues, ”The difference principle, then, seems to be a fair basis on which those best endowed, or more fortunate in their social circ.u.mstances, could expect others to collaborate with them when some workable arrangment is a necessary condition of the good of all,” the presence of the ”then” in his sentence is puzzling. Since the sentences which precede it are neutral between his proposal and any other proposal, the conclusion that the difference principle presents a fair basis for cooperation cannot cannot follow from what precedes it in this pa.s.sage. Rawls is merely repeating that it seems reasonable; hardly a convincing reply to anyone to whom it doesn't

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