Part 26 (1/2)

I can, without the slightest hesitation, positively a.s.sert that public opinion, in the whole British Empire, and, not only in the United States, but in the whole of the two American continents, is, as a matter of principle, as much hostile to compulsory military service as it was before the present war, and would exult at its complete abolition as one of the happiest results of the gigantic contest still going on.

It is to be deplored, but still it is a fact, that great questions of public interest too often cannot be settled solely in conformity with the principles they imply.

If Great Britain, if the United States, if Canada, could consider the question of conscription exclusively from their own stand-point, they would most surely decide at once, and with great enthusiasm, to abolish the obligatory military service they have adopted only as a last resort under the stress of imperious necessity.

Moreover, I have no hesitation to express my own opinion that whatever will be the military system of continental Europe after the war, the British Empire and the United States will certainly not be cursed with permanent conscription. They are both so happily situated that, in peace times, they cannot be called upon to go very extensively into the costly preparedness which the European continental nations will have again to submit themselves to, if they are not wise enough to put an end forever to the barbarous militarism they have too long endured for fear of Teutonic domination.

Under the worst European situation, England, with a territorial army of a million of men ready to be called to the Colours, or actually flying them, backed by her mighty fleet maintained to its highest state of efficiency, could always face any continental enemy. And such an army of a ready million of well trained officers and men, voluntary service would easily produce.

If future conditions would require it, Canada herself could do her share to prepare for any emergency by reverting to voluntary enlistment, but in improving the service so as to produce more immediate efficiency.

Very apparently, the United States will come out of the present conflict with flying Colours and will dispense with compulsory service under any circ.u.mstances in the peace days to follow.

What then will the continental powers do? Blessed they will be, if they make up their mind to do away, once for all, with a system which has crushed the peoples so unmercifully.

To speak in all frankness, I believe it would be almost vain, however much desirable it is, to indulge in fond hopes of the complete abolition of militarism on the European continent. The canker is too deep in the flesh and blood of nations to be extirpated as if by magic. Such a reversal of conditions grown to extravagant proportions, during more than a century, will not likely be accomplished at the first stroke. Let us all hope that, at least, a good start will be made by a large limitation of armaments which may, with time, lead to the final achievement for which the whole world would be forever grateful to the Almighty. I have positively stated that extravagant militarism should be discontinued on sea as well as on land. Such has been the policy of England for many years past. I have proved it by the diplomatic correspondence between Great Britain and Germany, and the solemn declarations of all the leading British statesmen for the last quarter of a century. How persistingly England has implored Germany to agree with her in stopping that ruinous race in the building of war vessels, we have seen.

So, the a.s.sent, nay more, the determination of England to adhere to her old and n.o.ble policy, is a foregone conclusion.

The closing sentence of the last quoted paragraph of Cardinal Gasparri's letter expresses the opinion that ”_the right to make peace or war should be given to the people by way of referendum, or at least to Parliament_.”

The system preconized by the Eminent Cardinal has been in existence in England for a number of years; ever since the day when complete ministerial responsibility was adopted as the fundamental principle of the British const.i.tution. That system was carried to the letter by Great Britain with regard to her intervention in the present war.

The right to declare war and to make peace is one of the most important prerogatives of the British Crown. This prerogative of the Crown, like all the others, is held in trust by the Sovereign for the benefit of the people and exercised by Him ONLY UPON THE ADVICE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF HIS MINISTERS.

In conformity with this great British const.i.tutional principle, what happened in London, in August, 1914? The then Prime Minister, Mr.

Asquith, in his own name and in those of his colleagues, advised His Majesty King George V. to declare war against Germany because she had invaded Belgian territory in violation of the treaties by which these two countries were, in honour bound, to protect Belgium's neutrality.

They were const.i.tutionally responsible to the Imperial Parliament and to the people of the United Kingdom for their advice to their Sovereign.

In his admirable statement to the British House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said:--

”_I have a.s.sured the House--and the Prime Minister has a.s.sured the House more than once--that if any crisis such as this arose, we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British att.i.tude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that, because we had entered into that engagement, there was an obligation of honour upon the country._”

The British House of Commons, had they considered it to be their duty, had the right to disapprove the foreign policy of the Cabinet and to censure the ministers for the advice they had given, or had decided to give, to the Sovereign. On the other hand, the House of Commons had the right to approve the stand taken by the Government. They did so unanimously, and were most admirably supported by the people.

I must say that I consider it would be very difficult, if not absolutely impracticable, to have questions of war or peace dealt with by way of ”_Referendum_.” Crises suddenly created lead almost instantly to declarations of war. But this outcome could hardly be so rapidly produced that Parliament could not be called to deal with the emergency.

How could France have been able to oppose the crus.h.i.+ng German invasion, in 1914, if her Government and her representative Houses had been obliged to wait for the result of a ”_Referendum_” whether she would fight or kneel down?

But the whole world--outside the Central Empires and their Allies--witnessed with unbounded delight the spontaneous and unanimous decision of the heroic French nation to fight to the last. She threw herself with the most admirable courage against the invading waves of Teutonic barbarism, and succeeded by the great and glorious Marne victory in forcing them to ebb, thus giving England and the other Allies the time necessary to organize and train their armies which, by their united efforts will save Civilization from destruction and the world from the threatened German domination.

CHAPTER x.x.xV.

THE INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE WAR.

The hostilities, once opened as the direct consequence of Germany's obduracy, many of the most influential leaders of public opinion in the United States foresaw that the conflict taking such a wide range, the great American Republic was most likely to be, sooner or later, involved in the European struggle. They were of two cla.s.ses. Those out of office, holding for the time no official position, were, of course, not bound to the same careful discretion in judging the daily developments of the military operations, and their far reaching consequences, as those who were at the helm of State.