Part 25 (1/2)

With regard to the supposed conflict of ”anglo-saxonism” and ”pan-germanism” I will merely say that it is only another sample of Mr.

Boura.s.sa's wily dreams.

As I have already said, this last pamphlet of the Nationalist leader is, for a large part of it, but the repet.i.tion of his diatribes so often _hurled_ at England. I will close this chapter by quoting from page 57, the following paragraph which summarizes, in a striking way, the charges Mr. Boura.s.sa is so fond to _hurl_ at the mother-country. It reads thus:--

”_What has allowed England to bring Portugal into va.s.salage? to dominate Spain and keep Gibraltar, Spanish land? to deprive Greece of the Ionians and Cyprus Islands? to steal Malta? to foment Revolution in the Kingdom of Naples and the Papal States? to run, during thirty years, the foreign policy of Italy and to throw her in Austria's execrated arms? to take possession of Suez and to make her own thing of it? to chase France from the Upper Nile, and subsequently from the whole of Egypt, to intervene in the Berlin treaty to deprive Russia of the profits of her victory, to galvanize dying Turkey, to delay for thirty years the revival of the Balkan States and to make of Germany the main spring of continental Europe? In a word, what has permitted England to rule the roost in Europe and to acc.u.mulate the frightful storm let loose in 1914? Who?

What? if it is not the ”naval domination” of England ever since the destruction of the French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar._”

It would be most difficult to condense more erroneous historical appreciations and political absurdities in so few lines.

Many will be quite surprised to learn, from Mr. Boura.s.sa's resounding trumpet, that England had been for many years gathering the storm which broke out in 1914. So far all fairminded men were convinced that this rascally work had been done by Germany, in spite of England's exhortations to reduce military armaments.

In all sincerity, I am unable to understand how Mr. Boura.s.sa can expect to successfully give the lie to such incontrovertible truths as the guilt of Germany in preparing the war she finally brought on more than four years ago, and as the unceasing determination of England to maintain peace.

CHAPTER x.x.xIII.

A CASE FOR TRUE STATESMANs.h.i.+P.

Whatever the TRUE and the FALSE friends of PEACE may hope and say, it is perfectly useless to close our eyes to the glaring fact that its restoration can only be the result of military effort combined with the highest practical statesmans.h.i.+p. After all what has happened, and the oft-repeated declaration of the Rulers of the belligerent nations, it would be a complete loss of a very valuable time to indulge any longer in the expression of views all acknowledge in principle, but which no one, however well disposed he may be, is actually able to traduce in practical form.

When writing my French book, in the fall of 1916, reviewing the situation as it had so far developed, I said:--

”All are most anxious for peace. However it is infinitely better to look at matters such as they are. It is evident that the military situation does not offer the least hope that the war can be immediately brought to an end. Successes have been achieved on both sides. But nothing decisive has yet happened.

The armies are facing one another in defiant att.i.tude. The belligerent nations, on both sides, have yet, and for a long time, great resources in man-power and money.”

”If Germany, which should first give up the fight in acknowledging her crime, is obdurate to final exhaustion, how can it be possibly expected that the Allies who were forced to fight, will submit to the humiliation and shame of soliciting from their cruel enemy a peace the conditions of which, they know, would be utterly unacceptable. Consequently they must with an indomitable courage and an invincible perseverance go on struggling to solve, for a long time, the redoubtable problem to which they are pledged, in honour bound, to give the only settlement which can rea.s.sure the world.”

I am still and absolutely of the same opinion. The present military situation has certainly much improved in favour of the Allies since 1916. However, looking at the question, first, from the standpoint of the developing military operations, there is no actual, and there will not be for many months yet--more or less--practical possibility of a satisfactory peace settlement.

Secondly, looking at the question from the standpoint of true statesmans.h.i.+p, it is very easy to draw the inexorable conclusion that, again, there is not actually the least chance of an immediate restoration of peace.

Statesmen, responsible, not only for the future of their respective countries, but, actually, for that of the whole world, are not to be supposed liable to be carried away by a hasty desire to put an end to the war and to their own arduous task in carrying it to the only possible solution:--A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE.

A broad and certain fact, staring every one, is that the Berlin Government will not accept the only settlement to which the Allies can possibly agree as long as her armies occupy French and Belgian territories. If Mr. Boura.s.sa and his ”pacifists” friends--or dupes--have really entertained a faint hope to the contrary, they were utterly mistaken.

Present military events, however proportionately enlarged by the increased resources, in man-power and money, of the belligerents, are not without many appropriate precedents. History is always repeating itself. Great Powers having risked their all in a drawn battle, do not give in as long as they can stand the strain, considering the importance of the interests they have at stake.

For the same reason above stated, but reversed, the Allies will not negotiate for peace before they have thrown the German armies out of French and Belgian soil, and repulsed them over Teutonic territory. I do not mean to say that peace must necessarily be proclaimed either from Berlin or from Paris. But it will only be signed as the inevitable result of a final triumphant march on the way either to Berlin or to Paris. There is no possible escape from the alternative. In such matters, there is no halfway station.

CHAPTER x.x.xIV.

AFTER-THE-WAR MILITARY PROBLEM.

Two of the most important propositions of His Holiness the Pope more especially deserve earnest consideration. They are indeed supported by the Allies who are purposely fighting for their adoption.