Part 14 (1/2)
If the rational creature were compelled to perform a sinful act, as act, resistance would be impossible. And if it were true that the malice of an act practically cannot be separated from its physical ent.i.ty, then in the Thomistic hypothesis G.o.d would be the author not only of the _ent.i.tas_ but likewise of the _malitia peccati_. The devil tempts us only by moral means, _i.e._ by suggestion; are we to a.s.sume that G.o.d tempts us physically by inducing sin as an act and simultaneously withholding the _praemotio ad bonum_, thus making sin an inevitable fatality? This consideration may be supplemented by another. So-called ”sins of malice”
are comparatively rare. Most sins are committed for the sake of some pleasure or imaginary advantage. It is for this reason that moral theology in forbidding sin forbids its physical ent.i.ty. How gladly would not those who are addicted to impurity, for instance, separate the malice from the ent.i.ty of their sinful acts, in order to be enabled to indulge their pa.s.sion without offending G.o.d!
) Against the logic of this argument some Thomist theologians defend themselves by a simile. The soul of a lame man, they say, enables him indeed to move his disabled limb; however, the cause of limping is not the soul but a crooked s.h.i.+nbone. Father Pesch wittily disposes of such reasoning as follows: ”The will of Adam before the fall was not a crooked s.h.i.+nbone, but it was absolutely straight, and became crooked through physical premotion.”(742)
Another and more plausible contention of the Thomist school is that Molinism, too, is compelled to ascribe sin somehow to G.o.d. ”It is impossible for a man to sin unless G.o.d lends His cooperation. Do not, therefore, the Molinists also make G.o.d the author of sin?” Those who argue in this wise overlook the fact that there is a very large distinction between the _concursus simultaneus_ of the Molinists and the _praemotio physica_ of the Thomists. The _praemotio physica_ predetermines the sinful act without regard to the circ.u.mstance whether or not the will is able to offer resistance. The _concursus simultaneus_, on the other hand, begins as a mere _concursus oblatus_, which is in itself indifferent and awaits as it were the free consent of the will before it cooperates with the sinner as _concursus collatus_ in the performance of the sinful act.(743) For this reason the distinction between _actus_ and _malitia_ has a well-defined place in the Molinistic system, whereas it is meaningless in that of the Thomists.(744)
2. AUGUSTINIANISM.-This system, so called because its defenders pretend to base it on the authority of St. Augustine, has some points of similarity with Thomism but differs from the latter in more than one respect, especially in this that the Augustinians,(745) though they speak with great deference of the _gratia per se efficax_, hold that the will is not physically but only morally predetermined in its free acts. Hence Augustinianism may fitly be described as the system of the _praedeterminatio moralis_. Its most eminent defender is Lawrence Berti, O. S. A. (1696-1766), who in a voluminous work _De Theologicis Disciplinis_(746) so vigorously championed the Augustinian theory that Archbishop Jean d'Yse de Saleon, of Vienne,(747) and other contemporary theologians combated his teaching as a revival of Jansenism. Pope Benedict XIV inst.i.tuted an official investigation, which resulted in a decree permitting Augustinianism to be freely held and taught.
a) Whereas Thomism begins with the concept of _causa prima_ and _motor primus_, Augustinianism is based on the notion of _delectatio coelestis_ or _caritas_. Berti holds three principles in common with Jansenius: (1) Actual grace consists essentially in the infusion of celestial delectation. (2) This heavenly delectation (_i.e._ grace) causally precedes free-will in such wise that its relative intensity in every instance const.i.tutes the law and standard of the will's disposition to do good.
(3) Simultaneously with this celestial delectation, concupiscence (_delectatio carnalis, concupiscentia_) is doing its work in fallen man, and the two powers constantly contend for the mastery. So long as celestial delectation (_i.e._ grace) is weaker than, or equipollent with, concupiscence, the will inevitably fails to perform the salutary act to which it is invited by the former. It is only when the _delectatio coelestis_ overcomes concupiscence (_delectatio coelestis victrix_) that free-will can perform the act inspired by grace. There is a fourth principle, and one, too, of fundamental importance, which brings out the essential difference between Augustinianism and Jansenism, _viz._: the _delectatio coelestis_ never overpowers the will but leaves it free to choose between good and evil.(748)
b) The relation between merely sufficient and efficacious grace in the Augustinian system, therefore, may be described as follows: Merely sufficient grace imparts to the will the _posse_ but not the _velle_, or at best only such a weak _velle_ that it requires the _delectatio victrix_ (_gratia efficax_) to become effective. Efficacious grace (_delectatio coelestis victrix_), on the other hand, impels the will actually to perform the good deed. Hence there is between the two an essential and specific difference, and the efficacy of that grace which leads to the performance of salutary acts does not lie with free-will but depends on the _delectatio coelestis_, which must consequently be conceived as _gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se_.(749)
c) Nevertheless, the necessity of the _gratia efficax ab __ intrinseco_, according to the Augustinian theory, is not due to the subordination of the _causa secunda_ to the _causa prima_, as the Thomists contend, but to a const.i.tutional weakness of human nature, consisting in this that its evil impulses can be overcome solely by the _delectatio coelestis victrix_ (_gratia efficax, adiutorium quo_. The case was different before the Fall, when the _gratia versatilis_ (_gratia sufficiens, adiutorium sine quo non_) sufficed for the performance of salutary acts.(750)
d) However, the Augustinians insist against the Jansenists, that the delectatio _coelestis_ (_i.e._ efficacious grace) does not intrinsically compel the will, but acts merely as a _praemotio moralis_, and that while the will obeys the inspiration of grace infallibly (_infallibiliter_) it does not do so necessarily (_non necessario_). With equal certainty, though not necessarily, the will, when equipped solely with sufficient grace, succ.u.mbs to concupiscence. The ultimate reason for the freedom of the will is to be found in the _indifferentia iudicii_.(751) By way of exemplification the Augustinians cite the case of a well-bred man who, though physically free and able to do so, would never turn summersaults on a public thoroughfare or gouge out his own eyes.
CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF AUGUSTINIANISM.-On account of its uncritical methods Augustinianism has found but few defenders and deserves notice only in so far as it claims to base its teaching on St. Augustine.
Like the Bible, the writings of that holy Doctor have been quoted in support of many contradictory systems.(752) If the use of Augustinian terms guaranteed the possession of Augustinian ideas, Jansenius would have a strong claim to be considered a faithful disciple of St. Augustine. Yet how widely does not the ”Augustinus Iprensis,” as he has been called, differ from the ”Augustinus Hipponensis”! Augustinianism, too, utterly misconceives the terms which it employs. s.p.a.ce permits us to call attention to one or two points only.
a) In the first place Augustinianism labors under an absolutely false conception of sufficient grace.
How can that grace be sufficient for justification which is first described in glowing colors as _parva et invalida_ and then in the same breath is declared to be insufficient except when reinforced by a _gratia magna_ in the shape of _delectatio victrix_? What kind of ”grace” can that be which in its very nature is so const.i.tuted that the will, under the prevailing influence of concupiscence, infallibly does the opposite of that to which it is supernaturally impelled? It is quite true that the distinction between _gratia parva_ and _gratia magna_(753) is found in St.
Augustine. However, he understands by _gratia parva_ not sufficient grace, but the grace of prayer (_gratia remote sufficiens_), and by _gratia magna_, not efficacious grace as such, but grace sufficient to perform a good act (_gratia proxime sufficiens_).(754)
b) Augustinianism is unable to reconcile its theory of a _praemotio moralis_ with the dogma of free-will.
Under the Augustinian system the influence of efficacious grace can be conceived in but two ways. Either it is so strong that the will is physically unable to withhold its consent; or it is only strong enough that the consent of the will can be inferred with purely moral certainty.
In the former alternative we have a prevenient necessity which determines the will _ad unum_ and consequently destroys its freedom. In the latter, there can be no infallible foreknowledge of the future free acts of rational creatures on the part of G.o.d, because the Augustinians reject the _scientia media_ of the Molinists and expressly admit that the same grace which proves effective in one man remains ineffective in another because of the condition of his heart.(755)
c) Finally, the three fundamental principles of the Augustinian system are false and have no warrant in the writings of St. Augustine.
It is not true that pleasure (_delectatio_) is the font and well-spring of all supernaturally good deeds. Such deeds may also be inspired by hatred, fear, sorrow, etc.(756) With many men the fear of G.o.d or a sense of duty is as strong an incentive to do good as the sweet consciousness of treading the right path. St. Augustine did not regard ”celestial delectation” as the essential mark of efficacious grace, nor concupiscence as the characteristic note of sin.(757)
The second and third principles of the Augustinian system are likewise false. If delectation is only one motive among many, its varying intensity cannot be the standard of our conduct; and still less can it be said that the will is morally compelled in each instance to obey the relatively stronger as against the weaker delectation; for any necessitation that does not depend on the free will excludes the _libertas a coactione_, but not that _libertas a necessitate_ which const.i.tutes the notion of liberty.
There can be no freedom of the will unless the will is able to resist delectation at all times. Consequently, the fourth principle of the Augustinians, by which they pretend to uphold free-will, is also false.(758)
READINGS:-The literature on the different systems of grace is enormous. We can mention only a few of the leading works.
On the Thomist side: *Banez, O. P., _Comment. in S. Theol. S.
Thom._, Salamanca 1584 sqq.-*Alvarez, O. P., _De Auxiliis Gratiae et Humani Arbitrii Viribus_, Rome 1610.-IDEM, _Responsionum Libri Quatuor_, Louvain 1622.-Ledesma, O. P., _De Divinae Gratiae Auxiliis_, Salamanca 1611.-*Gonet, O. P., _Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae_, 16 vols., Bordeaux 1659-69.-Contenson, O. P., _Theologia Mentis et Cordis_, Lyons 1673.-De Lemos, O. P., _Panoplia Divinae Gratiae_, 4 vols., Liege 1676.-Goudin, O. P., _De Scientia et Voluntate Dei_, new ed., Louvain 1874.-*Gotti, O.
P., _Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica iuxta Mentem __ Divi Thomae_, Venice 1750.-Gazzaniga, O. P., _Theologia Dogmatica in Systema Redacta_, 2 vols., Vienne 1776.-*Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 5 (ed. Lequette, t. III, pp. 123 sqq.).-IDEM, _Le Thomisme Triomphant_, Paris 1725.-*Fr. G. Feldner, O. P., _Die Lehre des hl. Thomas uber die Willensfreiheit_, Prague 1890.-IDEM, in Commer's _Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und spekulative Theologie_, 1894 sqq.-*Dummermuth, O. P., _S. Thomas et Doctrina Praemotionis Physicae_, Paris 1886.-I. A. Manser, _Possibilitas Praemotionis Physicae Thomisticae_, Fribourg (Switzerland) 1895.-Joh. Ude, _Doctrina Capreoli de Influxu Dei in Actus Voluntatis Humanae_, Graz 1905.-Del Prado, _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, 3 vols., Fribourg (Switzerland) 1907.-P. Garrigou-Lagrange, _S. Thomas et le Neomolinisme_, Paris 1917.
On the Augustinian side: Card. Norisius, _Vindiciae Augustinianae,_ Padua 1677.-*Berti, _De Theologicis Disciplinis_, 8 vols., Rome 1739 sqq.-Bellelli, _Mens Augustini de Modo Reparationis Humanae Naturae_, 2 vols., Rome 1773.-L. de Thoma.s.sin, _Memoires sur la Grace, etc._, Louvain 1668.