Part 13 (1/2)

Besides these there is a fifth theory, which tries to reconcile the two extremes and may therefore be called eclectic.

That the human will is free, yet subject to the influence of grace, is an article of faith unhesitatingly accepted by all Catholic theologians. It is in trying to explain how grace and free-will cooperate, that the above-mentioned schools differ.

In approaching this extremely difficult and obscure problem we consider it our duty to warn the student against preconceived opinions and to remind him that the different systems which we are about to examine are all tolerated by the Church. To-day, when so many more important things are at stake and the faith is viciously a.s.sailed from without, the ancient controversy between Thomism and Molinism had better be left in abeyance.

Article 1. Thomism And Augustinianism

Thomism and Augustinianism both hinge on the concept of _gratia efficax ab intrinseco s. per se_, whereas Molinism and Congruism will not admit even the existence of such a grace.

1. THE THOMISTIC THEORY OF GRACE.-The true founder of the Thomistic system is not St. Thomas Aquinas, who is also claimed by the Molinists, but the learned Dominican theologian Banez (1528-1604). His teaching may be summarized as follows:

a) G.o.d is the First Cause (_causa prima_) and Prime Mover (_motor primus_) of all things, and all created or secondary causes (_causae secundae_) derive their being and faculties, nay, their very acts from Him. If any creature could act independently of G.o.d, G.o.d would cease to be _causa prima_ and _motor primus_.(706)

The influence of the First Cause is universal, that is to say, it produces all creatural acts without exception,-necessary and free, good and bad,-because no secondary cause has power to act unless it is set in motion by the _motor primus_.

In influencing His creatures, however, G.o.d adapts himself to the peculiar nature of each. The necessary causes He determines to act necessarily, the free causes, freely. All receive from Him their substance and their mode of action.(707) The rational creature, therefore, though subject to His determining influence, acts with perfect freedom, just as if it were not moved.

b) In spite of free-will, however, the influence which G.o.d exerts on His rational creatures is irresistible because it proceeds from an absolute and omnipotent Being whose decrees brook no opposition. What G.o.d wills infallibly happens.(708)

Nevertheless, G.o.d is not the author of sin. He moves the sinner to perform an act; but He does not move Him to perform a sinful act. The malice of sin derives solely from the free will of man.(709)

c) Since the divine influence causally precedes all creatural acts, G.o.d's concurrence with creatural causes (_concursus generalis_) must be conceived as prevenient, not simultaneous. The Divine Omnipotence not only makes the action possible, but likewise effects it by moving the will from potentiality to actuality.(710) Consequently, the causal influence which the Creator exerts upon His creatures is not a mere _motio_, but a _praemotio_,-and not merely moral, but physical (_praemotio physica_).(711) It is by physical premotion that G.o.d's prevenient influence effects the free actions of His creatures, without regard to their a.s.sent.(712) Free-will is predetermined by G.o.d before it determines itself.(713)

d) If we a.n.a.lyse G.o.d's physical predeterminations in so far as they are created ent.i.ties, we find that they are nothing else than the effect and execution of His eternal decrees, embodied in the _praedeterminatio physica_. It is the temporal execution of the latter that is called _praemotio physica_. Hence we are justified in speaking, not only of a temporal _praemotio_, but of an eternal _praedeterminatio_, in fact the terms are often used synonymously.(714)

Viewed in its relation to rational creatures, this eternal predetermination is nothing but a temporal premotion of the free will to determine itself. Since G.o.d has from all eternity made absolute and conditional decrees, which possess the power of physical predetermination without regard to the free consent of His creatures, physical predetermination const.i.tutes an infallible medium by which He can foreknow their future free actions, and hence there is no need of a _scientia media_. If G.o.d knows His own will, He must also know the free determinations included therein. To deny this would be to destroy the very foundation of His foreknowledge.(715)

This is merely the philosophical basis of the Thomistic system. Its champions carry the argument into the theological domain by reasoning as follows: What is true in the natural must be equally true in the supernatural sphere, as we know from reason and Revelation.(716)

e) To physical predetermination or premotion in the order of nature, there corresponds in the supernatural sphere the _gratia efficax_, which predetermines man to perform salutary acts in such wise that he acts freely but at the same time with metaphysical necessity (_necessitate consequentiae_, not _consequentis_). It would be a contradiction to say that efficacious grace given for the purpose of eliciting consent may co-exist with non-consent, _i.e._, may fail to elicit consent.(717) The will freely a.s.sents to the divine impulse because it is effectively moved thereto by grace. Consequently, efficacious grace does not derive its efficacy from the consent of the will; it is efficacious of itself and intrinsically (_gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se_).(718)

It follows that efficacious grace must be conceived as a _praedeterminatio ad unum_.(719)

f) If efficacious grace is intrinsically and of its very nature inseparably bound up with the consent of the will, it must differ essentially from merely sufficient grace (_gratia mere sufficiens_), which confers only the power to act (_posse operari_), not the act itself (_actu operari_). Efficacious grace, by its very definition, includes the free consent of the will, while merely sufficient grace lacks that consent, because with it, it would cease to be merely sufficient and would become efficacious.(720)

Here the question naturally arises: How, in this hypothesis, can sufficient grace be called truly sufficient? The Thomists answer this question in different ways. Gazzaniga says that sufficient grace confers the power to perform a good deed, but that something more is required for the deed itself.(721) De Lemos ascribes the inefficacy of merely sufficient grace to a defect of the will.(722) If the will did not resist, G.o.d would promptly add efficacious grace.(723)

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE THOMISTIC THEORY.-The Thomistic system undoubtedly has its merits. It is logical in its deductions, exalts divine grace as the prime factor in the business of salvation, and magnificently works out the concept of G.o.d as _causa prima_ and _motor primus_ both in the natural and the supernatural order.

But Thomism also has its weak points.

A. The Thomistic conception of efficacious grace is open to two serious theological difficulties.

(1) To draw an intrinsic and substantial distinction between efficacious and merely sufficient grace destroys the true notion of sufficient grace.

(2) The Thomistic theory of efficacious grace is incompatible with the dogma of free-will.

Though in theory the Thomists defend the sufficiency of grace and the freedom of the will as valiantly as their opponents, they fail in their attempts at squaring these dogmas with the fundamental principles of their system.