Part 28 (2/2)

6. CHAPTERS XX TO XXII.--What is said in Chapter XX may be well reinforced by turning to Hobhouse (_op. cit._), Part I, chapter iii, where he traces the gradual evolution of rational morality in the field of justice. See, also, Westermarck, (_op. cit._) chapters ix and x, i. e., ”The Will as the Subject of Moral Judgment and the Influence of External Events,” and ”Agents under Intellectual Disability.” In the last chapter referred to, animals, drunkards, idiots, the insane, etc., come on the stage. The chapter is full of curious information.

In Chapter XXI (Sec 86), I have spoken of the hesitating utterances of moralists touching any duties we may owe to the brutes. I suggest that before anyone dogmatize in detail on this subject he read with some care such a comprehensive work as Miss Washburn's _The Animal Mind_. The book is admirable. Chapters x and xliv of Westermarck's work are instructive and entertaining on this subject. Hegel disposes of the animals rather summarily. See his _Philosophy of Right_, Sec 47.

Sidgwick, _The Methods of Ethics_, Book III, chapter iv, 2, is well worth consulting. See in my own volume, Chapter x.x.x, Sec 141.

For Chapter XXII, I give no references. I appeal only to the common sense of my reader.

7. Chapters XXIII to XXIX.--For the chapters on the Schools of the Moralists, XXIII to XXIX, I shall give briefer notes than I should have given, were the chapters not already so well provided with foot-notes.

So far as the first four of these chapters are concerned, I shall a.s.sume that enough has been said, drawing attention only to two points which concern Chapter XXIII.

It is very interesting to note that one of our best critics of intuitionism, Hemy Sidgwick, was himself an intuitionist. His _Methods of Ethics_ deserves very close attention. Again Intuitions are often spoken of as if they had been shot out of a pistol, and had neither father nor mother. To understand them better it is only necessary to read chapter viii of Dr. H. R. Marshall's little book, _Mind and Conduct_, which shows how difficult it is to mark intuitions off sharply, and to treat them as if they had nothing in common with reason.

Those interested in the ethics of evolution, treated in Chapter XXVII, should not miss reading the fourth chapter of Darwin's _Descent of Man_. Huxley's essay, _Evolution and Ethics_, might be read. The ”Prolegomena” to the essay is, however, much more valuable than the essay itself. Spencer's general theory of conduct is best gathered from his _Data of Ethics_, which was reprinted as Part I of his _Principles of Ethics_. The volume by C. M. Williams, ent.i.tled, _A Review of Evolutionary Ethics_, gives a convenient account of a dozen or more writers who have treated of ethics from the evolutionary standpoint. It is well not to overlook what Sidgwick has to say of evolution and ethics; see _The Methods of Ethics_, Book I, chapter ii, Sec 2.

As for Chapter XXVIII, on ”Pessimism,” it is enough, I think, to refer the reader to Book IV, in Schopenhauer's work on _The World as Will and Idea_. The Book is ent.i.tled _The a.s.sertion and Denial of the Will to Live, where Self-consciousness has been Attained_. See also his supplementary chapters, xlvi, on ”The Vanity and Suffering of Life,” and xlviii, ”On the Doctrine of the Denial of the Will to Live.” For the doctrine of von Hartmann, see chapters xiii to xv, in the part of his work ent.i.tled, _The Metaphysic of the Unconscious_.

For the chapter on Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, I shall give but a few references, though the literature on these writers is enormous. The English reader will find T. K. Abbott's translation of Kant's ethical writings a very convenient volume (third edition, London, 1883). The translation of Hegel's _Philosophy of Right_, by S. W. Dyde (1896), I have found good, where I have compared it with the original. The word ”Right” in the t.i.tle is unavoidably ambiguous, for the German word means both ”right” and ”law.” Hegel is dealing, in a sense, with both. I have indicated, in a foot-note, that Nietzsche ought to be read in the original. He is a marvellous artist.

Perhaps I should add that Nietzsche will be read with most pleasure by those who do not attempt to find in his works a system of ethics. I recommend to the reader, especially, his three volumes: _The Genealogy of Morals_; _Beyond Good and Evil_; and _Thus Spake Zarathustra_; (New York, 1911).

8. CHAPTERS x.x.x TO x.x.xVI.--I shall not comment on Chapter x.x.x. It is sufficiently interpreted by what has been said earlier in this book. Nor do I think that Chapter x.x.xI needs to be discussed here. I need only say that many moralists have commented upon the negative aspect of the moral law. It will be remembered that the ”demon” of Socrates--a dreadful translation--was a negative sign. I do not think that those who have dwelt upon the negative aspect of morality have reflected sufficiently upon the moral organization of society. We are put to school unavoidably as soon as we are born.

I shall not dwell upon Chapters x.x.xII and x.x.xIII. Here I appeal merely to the good sense of the reader.

But Chapter x.x.xIV demands more attention. He who is ignorant of history, and has come into no close contact with the organization and functioning of any state other than his own, is as unfit to pa.s.s judgment upon states generally, as is the man who has never been away from his native village to pa.s.s judgment upon towns generally--towns inhabited by various peoples and situated in different quarters of the globe. His lot may, it is true, happen to be cast in a good village; but how he is to tell that it is good, I cannot conceive. He has no standard of comparison.

Fortunately, his ignorance is not as harmful as it might be. The Rational Social Will, which is penetrated through and through with traditions wiser than the whims of the individual, carries him along upon its broad bosom, and makes decisions for him.

The sociologist and the political philosopher should be consulted, as well as the historian, by one who would make a satisfactory list of books touching the subject of this chapter. But the moralist may be allowed to suggest a few t.i.tles, some of them very old ones. Plato's _Republic_ is fascinating, and Aristotle's _Politics_ is the shrewdest of books. But compare the state as conceived by these men with our notions of a modern democracy! More's _Utopia_ is a delight. To get back to earth and see what _history_ means to a state, and to its const.i.tution and laws, read Sir Henry Maine's _Ancient Law_. States are not made in a day, although, under abnormal conditions, governments may be upset, and new ones set up, within twenty-four hours. After such unhistorical proceedings, one can scarcely expect ”fast colors.” One or two was.h.i.+ngs will suffice to show what was there before.

He who has a weakness for the operatic can peruse Rousseau's _Social Contract_ and the _Declaration of the Rights of Man_ published in the great French Revolution. As an antidote, I suggest Bentham's essay on _Anarchical Fallacies_.

But reading will do little good--even historical reading--unless one also thinks. It is wonderful how much knowledge a man may escape, if he is born under the proper star. I once knew an undergraduate in an American university, who attended compulsory chapel for more than three years, and who still thought that the Old Testament was a history of the Ancient Romans.

There is quite too much to say about Chapters x.x.xV and x.x.xVI. The only thing to do is to say nothing. I shall touch upon just one point in each chapter. I venture to beg the teacher, when he treats of International Ethics, to read in cla.s.s, with his students, those pages in which Sir Thomas More describes the principles upon which the Utopians conducted their wars. Remember that Sir Thomas was not merely a statesman, but, by common consent, a learned, a great, and a good man. Mark the reaction of the undergraduate mind.

The one matter upon which I shall comment in Chapter x.x.xVI, is the question of belief as an object of approval or of censure. Westermarck states (_The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_, Volume I, chapter viii, p. 216), that neither the Catholic nor the Protestant Church regarded _belief, as such_, as an object of censure. Yet each was willing to punish heresy. The point is most interesting, and I hazard an explanation. The churches were organizations with a definite object.

They made use of reward and punishment. This was reasonable enough, abstractly considered. However, doctrine was the affair of the theologian. Now the theologian, like the philosopher, is a man who a.s.sumes that he is concerned with _proofs_, and with proofs only. If a thing is _proved_, how can a man _help_ believing it? Only if he _will_ not, which is sheer obstinacy or perversity. Let him, then, be punished on account of his defective character (see Westermarck, I, chapter xi, p. 283).

I think the apparent quibbling here can be gotten rid of by recognizing the truth emphasized in Sec Sec 167-168, namely, that logical proofs play but a subordinate part in the adoption or rejection of beliefs touching a vast number of matters both secular and religious. If we can influence men's emotions, we can influence their beliefs. Both State and Church have this power. It is a power that can be abused. But it is, on the whole, a good thing that men's beliefs can thus be influenced. There would be no stability in human society could they not. Every ignorant man--and many men are ignorant--would be at the mercy of every clever talker; and he would change his beliefs every day. As men act on beliefs, this means that he would zig-zag through life to the detriment of all orderly development. I beg the reader, learned or unlearned, to put aside prepossessions, and to look at things as they are in this field.

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