Part 28 (1/2)

Some writers do not distinguish between emotions and feelings. Thus, Darwin, in his _Descent of Man_, calls pleasure and pain ”emotions.”

Marshall (_op. cit._, chapter ii) makes emotions, and even intuitions, ”instinct-feelings.” Dewey, in his _Ethics_ (p. 251), appears to treat emotions as synonymous with feelings. Gardiner, in his interesting and careful study, _Affective Psychology in Ancient Writers after Aristotle_ (_Psychological Review_. May, 1919), treats of ”what are popularly called the feelings, including emotions.”

On the other hand, in ethical writings the word, ”feelings,” very often means no more than pleasure and pain. Thus, _Seth_ (_A Study of Ethical Principles_, p. 63), makes feelings synonymous with pleasure and pain. Muirhead (_Elements of Ethics_, p. 46), says, ”by feeling is meant simply pleasure and pain”; and to have ”interest” in, he defines as to have pleasure in (p. 46).

This narrowing of the meaning of the word on the part of ethical writers is, perhaps, natural. The hedonistic moralists made pleasure and pain the only ultimate reasonable stimulants to action. Many moralists opposed them (see, later, Chapters XXIV and XXV). So pleasure and pain became ”the feelings,” _par excellence_. Both Dewey and Alexander sometimes speak as if, by the word ”feeling,” we meant no more than pleasure and pain. So does Kant.

The modern psychologist sometimes distinguishes pleasure and pain from ”agreeableness” and ”disagreeableness.” Marshall, a high authority on pleasure and pain, refuses to draw the distinction (_op. cit._, Part III. chapter vi). But he also refuses to call pleasure and pain sensations, regarding them as ”qualifications of our sensations,” like intensity, duration, and the like.

Are pleasures, as pleasures, alike? and are pains, as pains, alike?

Jeremy Bentham refused to distinguish between kinds of pleasures. On the other hand, John Stuart Mill did so (see Chapter XXV in this volume); and S. Alexander, in his work ent.i.tled _Moral Order and Progress_, maintains that pleasures differ in kind, and cannot be compared merely in their intensity (see page 202).

The whole matter is complicated enough, and there is occupation for the most disputatious. But I do not think that these disputes very directly affect the argument of my chapter.

Sec 50. That there is a relation between feeling and action, but that the two are by no means nicely adjusted to each other, has been recognized in many quarters.

Darwin, discussing the mental and moral qualities of man, points out that the satisfaction of some fundamental instincts gives little pleasure, although uneasiness is suffered if they are not satisfied. Seth (_op.

cit._, p. 64) says that feelings ”guide” action; and he claims that the energy of a moving idea lies in the feeling which it arouses (p. 70).

On the quant.i.ty of emotion, and its relation to action, see Stephen, The Science of Ethics, ii, iii, 25.

Sec 51. It appears to be repugnant to Green to admit that feeling-- pleasure--can be the direct object of action; and he denies roundly that a sum of pleasures can be made an object of desire and will at all (_Prolegomena to Ethics_, Sec 221; see Sec 113 of this book). Moreover, he maintains, and in this Dewey follows him, that the making of pleasure an object is evidence of the existence of unhealthy desires. I cannot but think this, taken generally, an exaggeration. Of course, what is called ”a man of pleasure” is a pretty poor sort of a thing.

Sec 52. In this section I do not touch at all upon the immemorial dispute concerning what has been called ”the 'freedom' of the will.”

Indeed, I leave it out of this book altogether. The moralist must, I think, a.s.sume that man has natural impulses and is a rational creature.

Those who are interested in the problem above mentioned, may turn to my _Introduction to Philosophy_, chapter xi, Sec 46, where the matter is discussed, and references (in the corresponding note) are given.

Chapter XVI.--The matter of this chapter appears, clear enough, but it may be well to give a few references touching the two conceptions of the functions of Reason.

Men of quite varying views have inclined to the doctrine which appeals to me. I think it is to be gotten out of Hegel. Green, who is much influenced by him, takes, as the rational end of conduct, a ”satisfaction on the whole,” which implies a harmonization and unification of the desires (see, in this book, Chapter XXVI, Sec 122). Spencer, in his _Study of Sociology_, defines the rational as the consistent.

Stephen, in his _Science of Ethics_, chapter ii, Sec 3, says: ”Reason, in short, whatever its nature, is the faculty which enables us to act with a view to the distant and the future.” He claims that rationality tends to bring about a certain unity or harmony. Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_, (pp. 572-581), says that reason harmonizes the impulses.

The champions of the opposite view are the intuitionists proper--such men as Kant, Reid, Price, even Sidgwick. To judge of their doctrine--they were great men, be it remembered, and worthy of all respect--I suggest that the reader wait until he has read the chapter on _Intuitionism_ in this volume, Chapter XXIII.

5. CHAPTERS XVII TO XIX.--What is said in Chapter XVII seems too obviously true to need comment. Indeed, it may be questioned whether the chapter is not full of plat.i.tudes. But even plat.i.tudes are overlooked by some; and there is some merit in arranging them systematically. Besides, they may serve as a spring-board.

As to Chapter XVIII, I suggest reading chapter vii, of Westermarck's book on _The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_. It is ent.i.tled _Customs and Laws as Expressions of Moral Ideas_.

For Chapter XIX, one may read Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_, Part I, chapter vi, where he shows how the mere ”group morality” gradually gives place to a wider morality in which the concept of humanity plays a part. In the same work, Part II, chapters i and ii, the author treats of religious or sub-religious ideas as affecting conduct. Compare Westermarck, _op. cit._, chapter xl. See, also, _The Ancient City_, by Fustel de Coulanges.